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Abstract
A substantial proportion of revenue in many developing countries comes from 
indirect taxes. It is also common for governments in developing countries to procure
agricultural outputs through public agencies at prices below world prices and to sell at
higher prices. In Pakistan over 80% of government revenue comes from (explicit)
indirect taxes. Also, since the 1960s the nature and extent of government control of 
prices, particularly in agriculture, has changed dramatically. The theory of public 
finance can help to guide policy makers on the appropriate price and tax policies. In 
Chapter 1 we show how this theory can structure an analysis of the reform of taxes
and prices.
The appropriate pricing policies depend sensitively on the policy instruments 
available to the government and on the nature of relationships between economic agents. 
A central topic of this thesis is the examination of how standard pricing policy analysis 
and prescriptions need to be adapted for developing countries where agriculture plays a 
dominant role and where government control over transactions is far from complete.
Since the nature of transactions plays a crucial role, in Chapter 2 we give a brief
discussion of the diversity of agricultural organization and practices in Pakistan, and
highlight some of the important topics in the economics of agriculture in developing
countries. We stress the importance of decision making in the presence of uncertainty
and the existence of market imperfections in understanding agriculture in LDCs.
A characteristic of agriculture in developing countries is that households are both 
consumers and producers of foodgrains and that the pattern of marketed surplus varies
across households. In Chapter 3 we show how cross-section data can be used to 
explain this variation in the marketed surplus for wheat The need to allow for sample 
selection, influential observations and heteroskedasticity in analyses which use similar 
models and data is highlighted. The behaviour of marketed surplus is a crucial input 
into price and tax analysis.
In Chapter 4 we use a ’double hurdle’ model to explain the variation in fertilizer 
levels applied to wheat in Pakistan. We show that attitudes to uncertainty and how 
these vary with wealth, along with varying productivity levels and credit constraints, can 
help to explain this variation.
The prevalence of distortions in developing countries is well documented. In
Chapter 1 we show how the use of shadow prices in reform analysis can incorporate
these distortions. Moreover, shadow prices have a number of further useful applications. 
Using input-output tables and data on revenue collections and price distortions we show, 
in Chapter 5, how one can calculate a set of shadow prices (accounting ratios) for 
Pakistan. These are then used to analyse how social profitability varies across industries
and to comment on trade and industrialization policies.
In Chapter 6 we present a model which is intended to allow normative analysis of 
the policy instruments which were available to the government in Pakistan in the mid 
1970s for raising revenue. Together with the theory presented in Chapter 1 this is then 
used to identify welfare-improving reforms of pricing policy and also to focus on the 
issues that need to be addressed when formulating pricing policy. We argue that there 
were large efficiency gains to be had from higher prices for major agricultural 
commodities. We also argue that in the absence of more direct income-transfer 
mechanisms subsidised rations and low procurement prices for foodgrains may be 
desirable when one is concerned with income distribution. Chapter 7 provides a
summary and some conclusions. Although our analysis uses data for the mid 1970s our
results also carry lessons for policies beyond this period and we use them to comment 
on policies followed in the 1980s and to set out recommendations for future policies.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
§1.1 Background
In this thesis we examine issues which influence the appropriate agricultural pricing 
and indirect taxation policies in developing countries. For this purpose we concentrate 
on the policies followed in Pakistan in the mid 1970s. Our choice of country and time 
period reflects the wide range of policy instruments employed during this period and 
also the availability of adequate data. However, we also use our analysis both to 
comment on policy since the mid 1970s and to make recommendations for future 
pricing policy. Because the basic economic principles underlying pricing policy and 
indirect taxation policy are essentially the same, we will often use the general term 
’pricing policy’ to refer to both.
Our focus on agricultural pricing policy suggests two questions: ’Why pricing 
policy?’ and ’Why agriculture?’. The answer in each case is that both are central to 
public policy in developing countries. A common characteristic of many developing 
countries is the extent of government intervention in the economy by way of 
manipulating prices, either directly through price controls or indirectly through indirect 
taxes. While there may be a number of reasons or objectives behind such intervention 
the need to raise revenue to finance various government expenditures is often central. 
Although economic theory suggests that the most efficient way to raise revenue is to do 
so directly via lump-sum taxes, the absence or political unacceptability of such 
instruments in developing countries necessitates a reliance on more indirect instruments 
such as the manipulation of prices. This is particularly so when it comes to the 
taxation of agriculture where the number of households and their geographical dispersion 
removes many of the more direct instruments from the menu of feasible instruments.
Pakistan is no different in this respect. Since the mid 1970s indirect taxes have 
accounted for around 80-85% of total tax revenue, which in turn accounted for around 
70% of total revenue. As in many other developing countries, trade taxes and excises
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raise most of the indirect tax revenue. In 1976/7 customs and excises accounted for
around 37% and 32%, respectively, of indirect tax revenue. However, while tax revenue 
has remained at around 13% of GDP during the 1970s and 1980s, current expenditures 
have increased from 16% in 1975 to 23% in 1985. Within indirect taxes there has 
been a shift towards customs and surcharges and away from excises. Both have
concentrated on a narrow base in terms of commodities covered, and on the taxation of 
intermediate commodities with the consequent cascading and efficiency problems.
Between 1976 and 1986 customs and surcharges increased (as a percentage of total 
indirect tax revenue) from 37% to 42% and 7% to 13%, respectively, while excises fell 
from 32% to 23%. The shift towards customs reflects the pressure to raise more
revenue to finance increasing current expenditures, the convenience of foreign trade as a 
source of revenue (especially in the short run) and the small base for excises in terms 
of the number of commodities covered.
While one can argue that there is an over-reliance on commodity taxation as a
source of revenue and that one needs to develop a more effective direct tax system, in
the short to medium term at least, it is likely that the extra revenue requirement must 
come from indirect taxation. However, we shall argue that there is much room for 
improvement in the existing combination of indirect taxes and subsidies in terms of both 
their efficiency and distributional impact. We also argue that our ultimate concern 
should be for the present and future well-being of individuals rather than sectors.
The main contribution of the thesis is in the area of applied economics, in 
particular in relation to agricultural pricing policy. We take a specific model for the 
analysis of policy in Pakistan and our results highlight issues which are central to the 
understanding of what constitutes appropriate pricing policy. We focus particularly on 
agricultural inputs and outputs and show how empirical analysis can be used to explain 
the patterns of agricultural outputs and input use across farms. We also show how 
these patterns are affected by various household characteristics (such as composition, 
farm size and prices), some of which can be influenced by government policy, and their
consequences for other variables of interest to government (e.g. revenues, expenditures,
foreign exchange, and the pattern of foreign trade). We also show how the existing
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pattern of outputs and inputs and their responsiveness to government policy instruments 
influence the equity and efficiency consequences of price reforms and thus determine 
appropriate pricing policy. Our analysis also brings out the strong relationship between 
investment, trade and pricing policies. In all these respects the level of detail and the 
scope of the thesis mean that the work presented should be seen as complementary to 
recent works in the area of agricultural pricing policy in general (see Newbery and 
Stem, 1987) and pricing policy in Pakistan in particular (see Ahmad and Stem, 1991).
In this chapter we describe our approach to the analysis of pricing policy. In §1.2 
we give a brief account of the main features of standard optimal commodity taxation 
models. These models provide some very useful insights into the desirable 
characteristics of a system of commodity taxes and help to highlight the efficiency and 
equity issues which underpin most of the results. However, the system of indirect taxes 
which exists in many developing countries often bears little resemblance to that 
suggested by these models and governments are understandably wary of making 
substantial changes, not least because of the uncertainty about revenues needed to 
finance politically sensitive expenditures. One therefore needs a theory for the reform
of prices and in §1.3 we describe a theory of price reform which helps to identify
welfare-improving changes when there already exist many other distortions in the system. 
Then in §1.4 we describe how such a theory can be applied in practice and identify the
data requirements for such an analysis. In §1.5 we highlight some of the special
features of the agricultural sector which need to be incorporated into standard theoretical 
models and any analysis of the impact of reforms on social welfare. Finally, in §1.6, 
we describe the layout of the thesis and indicate some of the policy implications of our 
analysis.
§1.2 The Theory of Optimum Pricing and Indirect Taxation
The issue of how to raise the revenue necessary to finance the various government 
expenditures is an important one for all developing countries. When formulating and 
appraising the policy instruments employed one needs to combine basic economic 
principles with an understanding of the political, legal and administrative environment of
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the country in question. One needs to recognise that without an effective legal system 
any form of taxation is open to manipulation or abuse and may be rendered totally 
ineffective. Likewise, when advocating policies one must be aware of both the political 
and administrative constraints facing governments which determine the eventual success 
or failure of policies pursued. Therefore, the appropriate policies from an economic 
"viewpoint need to be set against legal, political and administrative criteria and experience 
has shown that these often lead to contradictory choices or conclusions. Although we 
focus primarily on economic criteria, i.e. equity and efficiency considerations, we try to 
heed our own advice and use these other non economic criteria when making final 
recommendations. The advantage of the approach described below is that while it helps 
to identify the trade-off between equity and efficiency when choosing between competing 
’distortionary’ revenue-raising instruments it does so in a way which also helps to 
identify the types of policy instruments required and the consequent gainers and losers 
(i.e. the incidence of the taxes). One can then consider the legal and administrative 
requirements necessary for implementing such policies and consider their political 
acceptability.
The theory of public finance has long been concerned with the most efficient and 
equitable ways of raising a given revenue requirement. For our purposes the two 
fundamental theorems of public economics provide a useful starting point. These state 
that:
(a) If we assume that all markets exist and that there are no externalities then a 
competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
(b) If we further assume that production and preferences are convex and that revenue 
can be raised and distributed in a lump-sum manner, then any Pareto efficient 
allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium.
The term ’lump-sum’ refers to the fact that agents are unable to change the level of 
taxes paid or transfers received by changing their behaviour. These theorems suggest
that governments wishing to raise revenue, either to finance the provision of public 
services or to redistribute income to other households, should do so using lump-sum 
taxes and transfers. Under these circumstances (relative) consumer and producer prices
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are equal and reflect social opportunity costs in terms of a social welfare function
which depends on the welfare of households in the economy. Resource allocation 
decisions by economic agents, e.g. consumers and producers, based on market prices will 
be socially optimal in the sense of (a) and (b) above.
Much of the literature in public finance is concerned with optimal policy when
some of the above assumptions are relaxed. For example, many governments,
particularly in developing countries, are either unwilling or unable to raise some or all 
of their revenue requirement using lump-sum taxes. Also, the identification and use of 
certain household characteristics to enable the effective lump-sum transfer of income to 
deserving (e.g. poor) households is not always desirable from a political viewpoint or 
feasible from an administrative viewpoint. The process of identifying or constructing 
lump-sum tax instruments is more difficult when one considers the problem of incentives
where households understand that there is, say, a ’wealth’ or income basis for the level
of tax paid. Therefore, governments are generally forced to rely on ‘distortionary’ taxes
which drive a wedge between market prices and social costs and benefits. Distortionary
taxes can be divided into ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ taxes. Direct taxes usually take income 
and wealth as their base whereas indirect taxation refers to the taxation of commodities. 
Because of the political and administrative implications of many direct forms of taxation 
it is often left to the indirect tax system to raise the bulk of the funds required. This
leads us to ask what commodities should be taxed and how should these rates of taxes
vary over commodities, if  at all?
The theory of optimal indirect (i.e. commodity) taxation asks how commodity taxes 
should be set so as to raise a given revenue requirement [see, for example, Ramsey
(1927), Samuelson (1951 and 1988), Boiteux (1956) and Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)]. 
Generally speaking, from an efficiency point of view, taxes should be higher on goods 
with lower (compensated) price elasticities of demand. However, when we introduce 
income distribution considerations into the model the theory suggests that commodities 
which account for a higher proportion of the budgets of more deserving households
should have relatively lower taxes. Since, in practice, those commodities are often 
necessities with low demand elasticities there is often a trade-off or conflict between
15
efficiency and distributional considerations when setting commodity taxes.
The general results described here suggest that we should have a differentiated tax 
system with rates varying across commodities according to the pattern of own- and cross 
price demand elasticities and the pattern of their budget shares across income groups. 
However, if we introduce the possibility of lump-sum transfers to households related to 
demographic structure and if consumer preferences satisfy certain conditions, e.g. 
common and constant marginal propensities to spend across households and separability 
of labour from goods, then uniform commodity taxes are optimal in the presence of 
optimal lump-sum transfers of the type described (see, for example, Deaton and Stem, 
1986, and Stem, 1990, for a more detailed discussion). We can then view indirect 
taxes as purely revenue-raising instruments with income distribution considerations taken 
care of through lump-sum taxes financed by the indirect tax revenue. In general, the 
more comprehensive the system of lump-sum transfers available the stronger the 
argument for uniform commodity taxes.
So far we have been concemed only with ways of raising revenue where there are 
limitations on tax instmments. The implicit assumption (see, for example, Drèze and 
Stern, 1987) is that producer prices are proportionail to shadow prices, defined as social 
opportunity costs. If there are market imperfections then (relative) shadow prices may 
not equal (relative) producer prices. Fortunately, many of the principles discussed 
follow through by simply replacing producer prices; with shadow prices, and interpreting 
taxes as shadow taxes. Then taxes can be seen as having a dual purpose: the raising 
of revenue and the correction of market imperfections.
The standard models (see, for example. Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971) usually 
assume that either all production is in the public sector or, where some private 
production exists, that technology exhibits cons-tant returns and markets are perfectly 
competitive. Alternatively, in the presence of puire profits in the private sector, we can 
assume that profits can be optimally taxed so thiat the effects of any changes in profits 
on income distribution can be ignored. In sudh circumstances production efficiency is 
desirable in the public and private sectors takem together so that all producers (public 
and private) should face the same prices (and, tthus, marginal rates of transformation in
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production) and there should not be any taxation of intermediate goods.
In the model presented by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) to analyse optimal 
commodity taxation (which also assumes all goods can be taxed) the assumptions imply 
not only that production efficiency is desirable but also that the model can be 
formulated as if producer prices are constant, i.e. as if taxes are totally shifted forward 
onto the consumer. However, for developing countries where a large proportion of the 
population usually rely directly on agriculture as their main source of income the
assumptions above caimot be realistically applied. For example, it is widely accepted 
that taxation of profits from agricultural production is very difficult so that the 
assumption of 100% (or optimal) profits taxation would be hard to accept. Also, since 
most farm households consume from their own produce before marketing their surplus, it 
is not possible to tax all goods (total household consumption), i.e. we cannot confront 
producers and consumers with different prices. However, if  there are no agricultural 
profit taxes, one can include the agricultural sector along with the consumer sector. In 
this case production efficiency is desirable in the remaining ‘limited’ production sector, 
and the relevant derivatives in the tax rules relate to marketed surplus rather than
consumption. Notice that because the agricultural sector is now taken as part of the 
consumer sector we will in general require inputs to be taxed or subsidized at the
optimum - production efficiency is desirable only for the limited production sector
(assuming the Diamond-Mirrlees assumptions apply to the ’remainder’ of the model).
The above discussion suggests that where possible we should tax final consumption 
only. Intermediate taxation is desirable only if some output cannot be taxed (or for 
income distribution reasons where alternative redistribution measures are unavailable). 
Often output and input prices are distorted as a  means of encouraging or discouraging 
certain industries. Broadly speaking economic theory suggests that if we wish to 
encourage or discourage certain industries (say, for ’infant industry’ or ’learning by 
doing’ reasons) then we should try to do so directly, i.e. go directly to the source of 
the distortion. If there are externalities in production which are not reflected in output 
prices then taxes or subsidies should be used to» correct the relevant prices. Distorting 
input prices in an attempt to influence investment decisions is not desirable unless more
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direct instruments (e.g. direct subsidies or output taxes) are not available. The theory 
of the second best also emphasises that the presence of irremovable distortions or 
market imperfections elsewhere affects the types of policies we should implement. In 
such cases, where shadow and producer prices are not proportional, indirect taxes take 
on a corrective role as well as their revenue raising function.
An attractive feature of the optimum tax models discussed is that they give 
guidance on the design of the overall tax and transfer system and emphasise the 
trade-off between equity and efficiency which exists when one does not have access to 
non-distortionary or lump-sum instruments. However, more often than not, the tax and 
transfer systems in place in many developing countries bear little resemblance to those 
suggested by optimal tax models, even when we think in terms of a second-best 
optimum situation. A risk-averse government with politically sensitive expenditures to 
finance will be understandably wary of policies which require a major redesign of the 
existing system. However, it will probably be more receptive to ’welfare-improving’ 
policy recommendations which involve small or gradual movements away from the status 
quo even when these are presented within a framework which involves a longer-term 
redesign of the existing system. It is therefore helpful to have a theory of tax (or 
price) reform. We have focused here on indirect taxation policy. However, the 
principles highlighted above also apply directly to pricing policy since we can interpret 
the differences between output prices and (marginal) costs as a tax. Many important 
industries, e.g electricity, gas, transport and fertilizers, are often in the public sector or 
under strict government control. The pricing of these outputs are therefore also under 
the control of government and should be guided by the principles outlined. In the rest 
of the thesis we use the terms ’indirect tax policy’ and ’pricing policy’ interchangably.
§1.3 The Theory of Price Reform
The model presented here is taken from Drèze and Stem (1987). In this model 
we see the government as examining a group (Of policy variables. Some of these policy 
variables will be taken as fixed or predetermined and others as chosen optimally subject 
to the scarcity constraints that demands do mot exceed supplies. Let œ be a vector
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describing the former and k the vector describing the latter (bold type indicates vectors). 
Social welfare V(k,0)) and excess private sector demands E(ic,û)) are both functions of 
these policy variables. The optimal value for k  is derived from the solution to the 
following problem:
M^x V(K,(D) ( 1 . 3 . 1 )
s . t .  E ( k , q) = z
where z is a vector of public sector supplies (which may be zero). We are assuming 
that the above problem is feasible so that we shall usually require the dimension of K
to be greater than or equal to those of E and z (i.e. there are at least as many policy
variables to be chosen as there are constraints). If the two dimensions are exactly
equal then, if the function E is invertible, k  will be defined as a function of z and
there will essentially be no choice. Thus the case where policies are determined
entirely by constraints is included. Further constraints in addition to those arising
through E(k,(d)=z may be added to the analysis although they will add extra terms to
the Lagrangian of the problem. The Lagrangian for (1.3.1) is:
L(k,o)) = V(K,(o) - V [E(K,œ) - z] (1.3.2)
where v is the vector of shadow prices (prime superscripts denote row vectors). The 
shadow price of a good is here defined as the increase in social welfare when an extra 
unit of public supply is made available [or 3V*/9z where V* (m,z) is the maximum-value 
function for (1.3.1)]. Given that we have set up the problem as in (1.3.2) above, 
shadow prices will coincide with the Lagrangian multipliers for (1.3.2) when the k  are 
chosen optimally.
Taking a reform viewpoint we may regard some indirect taxes and government 
controlled prices as elements of ©, the vector of predetermined variables. We may then 
consider the reform issue as an evaluation of a shift in a variable previously seen as 
fixed from its pre-reform position. It can be shown (see Ahmad and Stem, 1990, 
ppl36-139) that the effect on welfare of a change in a predetermined variable, here a 
change in the indirect tax or government controlled price of the i ’th commodity, d^, is:
"V = { 3%; + d t i  ( 1 . 3 , 3 )
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where Ry is shadow government revenue (its derivative taken at constant shadow prices)
and is derived as follows. If y, p and q are vectors of private sector output, producer 
prices and consumer prices respectively then:
E = X - y
and we can write
-v’e  = v ’(y - x) = (V - p)’y + (q - v)’x + p y - q x 
— Ry
where (p y - qx) is government direct tax revenue, and (q - v) and (v - q) can be 
thought of as ’shadow consumption taxes’ and ’shadow producer taxes’ respectively. So, 
from (1.3.3) we see that the effect of the reform on welfare is the direct change in 
welfare plus the change in shadow revenue representing the general equilibrium 
adjustments to the reform. The change in shadow revenue will be composed of two 
elements: the change in actual revenue and an adjustment to take into account the 
divergence between shadow and market prices. We can then define the marginal cost 
in terms of social welfare of raising one extra unit of revenue by taxing good i as:
Xi = ^  ^  ( 1 . 3 . 4 )
Away from the optimum there will be as many marginal costs of funds raised as there 
are tax instruments. If we think of another commodity, j, where Xj > Aj, i.e. the 
marginal social cost of raising one unit of revenue by taxing i is greater than that from 
taxing j, then we can increase social welfare, at constant shadow revenue, by switching 
a unit of shadow revenue on the margin from good i to good j.
We link social welfare to household welfare using a Bergson-Samuelson welfare 
function such that:
W = W ( , .... Vh , .... ,VH )
where V^, the utility of household h. We think of it as a function of consumer prices 
and lump-sum income, i.e. via the indirect utility function. For the most part we 
assume lump-sum incomes are fixed. We assume there are H households and index
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them using Then the ‘direct effect’ on household welfare of a tax change is:
aw _ y aw avh
a t j ^ av^ a t j
= - Xh P” X?
where ph = (aw /av^)ah is the social marginal utility of income to household h, is 
its private marginal utility of income, is the consumption of commodity i by 
household h and and we think of as being amongst the other elements of co
and K so that a tj^q j. It is clear that av/ati=a^x}^ with or without rationing in the 
system. Here qj and pj are the consumer and producer prices of the i ’th commodity 
respectively. From (1.3.3) we have that the indirect effect is given by the effect on 
shadow revenue, Ry, so that
^  = x j + Z j ( q j  - v j )
The marginal social cost of raising an extra unit of shadow revenue by taxing good i is 
simply the direct effect on welfare of the change divided by the indirect effect:
Xi = ---------- '  P** ’‘ i*-------- 3 3 ^  ( 1 . 3 . 5 )
Xj + ï j C q j  - Vj)
where Xj = x}^  The set of Xs which emerge from a reform analysis provide a
menu of possible tax reforms. By comparing the marginal social cost of varying each 
tax rate (price) we can focus on welfare-improving reforms which keep shadow revenue 
constant. If Xj>Xj, i.e. the marginal social cost of raising an extra unit of shadow 
revenue by taxing good i exceeds that from taxing good j, then we can increase welfare 
by switching shadow revenue from i to j in such a maimer that shadow revenue is 
constant. Alternatively we can use the results to decide on the least damaging way of 
raising extra revenue.
The direct distributional consequences of a (marginal) reform are captured by the 
extent of consumption by household h of the commodity in question, multiplied by the 
social marginal utility of income to this household. This is summed across all
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households. Notice that the indirect effect depends on the response to the reform (say, 
a change in price) of the aggregate consumption of each commodity and also the
divergence between consumer and shadow prices for these commodities. In response to 
a change in % the demand for and prices of other commodities will change to restore 
equilibrium. The elasticities capture the demand changes while shadow prices depend on 
the way in which equilibrium is restored to the system so that the scarcity constraints 
are met. The shadow price of a commodity was defined, from (1.3.2), as the net effect
on social welfare of a change in its net supply. If, for example, an increase in supply
leads to a change in the foreign trade flow of a commodity then its shadow price is its
world price, or if it leads to a change in domestic production then it is the marginal
social cost of production. Likewise, the shadow price of another commodity j will
depend on how its market clears in response to a change in the net demand for j due
to a change in q .  If the price of j changes so as to restore equilibrium then this
must be reflected in the shadow price. If, for example, an increase in q  leads to a
fall in demand for i and a fall in demand for labour then equilibrium in the labour
market may be restored by a fall in the wage rate. The distributional consequences of 
this are captured through the shadow wage rate which is an element of the shadow 
price vector which is used to calculate Ry.
The results of a reform analysis can be translated into policy guidelines in a way 
which can be constructed so as to appeals to the intuition of policy makers. The data 
requirements are also less demanding than those required by optimal taxation models.
One needs information on present consumption patterns by household and also local 
aggregate elasticities. As with optimality analysis one can experiment with welfare
weights which reflect varying degrees of aversion to inequality.
§1.4 Empirical Applications
As mentioned above, one of the attractions of focusing on price reform (as 
opposed to optimal pricing) is the less stringent data requirements. To focus on these 
we rewrite (1.3.5) in a form more convenient for empirical application. Multiplying 
numerator and denominator by q  we get:
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where qjXj is the expenditure on good i (summed over all households), ^  is the shadow 
tax on good j, i.e. (qj - vj), as a proportion of its consumer price, and cjj is the 
uncompensated elasticity of demand for good j with respect to the price of good i. 
This formula is more useful because household expenditure surveys usually contain 
expenditures by each household on each commodity and demand responses often come 
in the form of elasticities. Also, we show in Chapter 5 that using an input-output table 
and revenue collections it is relatively straightforward to calculate accounting ratios 
defined as the shadow price divided by the consumer price for a commodity (see 
Ahmad, Coady and Stem, 1988). Since
tj = (Qj - Vj) / qj 
= 1 - (Vj/qj)
these can easily be applied in our analysis using (1.4.1).
By focusing on the reciprocal of Aj we can arrive at an informative decomposition 
involving a distributional characteristic of the commodity and a tax elasticity (see Stem, 
1988). From (1.4.1):
4 r  = ^ ^
where Dj = p^xf / Xj] and other variables are as earlier. The term Dj involves 
only household demands and welfare weights but not demand derivatives and it is often 
termed the distributional characteristic of a good - see, for example, Feldstein (1972). 
This characteristic often plays a dominant role in determining the ranking of "Xs over 
commodities, especially when one has a high aversion to inequality (reflected in 
declining strongly with real income).
Above we expressed the formulas for calculating the marginal social cost of raising 
extra revenue using the consumption vector, x. Implicit in this is the assumption that 
all consumption can be taxed so that consumers and producers face different prices. 
However, agricultural households are both producers and consumers for certain
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commodities thus imposing a restriction on the tax instruments available to the 
government. We have seen that in such a situation we can include the agricultural
sector along with the consumer sector and the efficiency and equity effects of price 
changes then depend on the price elasticity of net trade (or marketed surplus) and its 
pattern across households.
To show how marketed surplus enters the formulas we can consider the agricultural 
sector in isolation and remember thât it is now classified along with the consumer 
sector. The indirect utility for the farmer is given by:
V = V (q, m)
where m is lump-sum income or profits from production, n(q), and q are now the 
prices faced by the farmer (e.g. output and input prices, or the prices of purchased final 
goods). Differentiating with respect to a particular qj we have:
dv  ^ av  ^ av an 
3qj 3qj ain üqj
which, using Roy’s Identity (i.e. av/aqj=-axj, where a^av/am ) and Hotelling’s Lemma 
(i.e. an/aqj=yj), reduces to:
m  (y j - " j )
= m  ( 1 - 4 . 3 )
where xj is consumption and yj production, dW/dm is the marginal utility of income and 
s is the marketed surplus. So when measuring the direct effect on households of a 
change in price we focus on net trade. Non-producing households can be introduced by 
setting Sj=-Xj.
The indirect effect of a reform is captured by the change in government revenue at 
shadow prices, R (from here on we drop the subscript for convenience), where:
R = ^j(qj - Vj)sj
where s reflects the degree of government intervention in the economy. Then, the 
denominator of (1.4.1) is:
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Qi ^  =qiSi  + Xj Tj q j s j  c j i  ( 1 . 4 . 4 )
where sj = sj' is the net surplus of j summed over all households, Tj is one minus 
the accounting ratio for good j, is the value of total net trade in j and cjj is now 
the elasticity of total net trade in j with respect to the price of good i.
We can see that the direct and indirect effects of any reform depend on the 
pattern of marketed surplus across households and how the aggregate surplus responds to 
price changes. For some commodities the net trade of agricultural households can be 
negative, positive or zero (e.g. foodgrains, labour), positive or zero (e.g. cash crops), or 
negative or zero (e.g. purchased inputs).
§1.5 The Importance of Agriculture
It is instructive to consider why we focus particularly on the agricultural sector and 
not just see it as one production sector among many. A common feature in developing 
countries is that agriculture accounts for both a large proportion of total output (25-50%) 
and of total employment (50-75%) in the economy. Therefore, agricultural policies can 
affect the incomes of a substantial number of households and these effects in turn can 
have implications throughout the economy. For example, changes in agricultural incomes 
affect demand for both agricultural and industrial outputs; changes in agricultural 
foodgrain prices directly affect most urban and rural households while changes in cash 
crop prices affect industrial users; changes in foodgrain prices can have substantial
effects on rural marketed surplus, government procurement and foreign trade earnings; 
changes in rural incomes affect the level of migration to urban areas, urban
unemployment and wages; and the dominant contribution of agriculture to GDP means 
that changes in its growth rate have a large impact on the growth rate of the economy
as a whole. Also the political sensitivity of food security means that most governments
in developing countries pay particular attention to the total availability of food, and its 
distribution, pricing and quality.
In the 1950s a common view of the role of agriculture in development was as a 
declining sector which should provide food, labour and finance for a growing industrial
25
sector. Surplus labour could be drawn from the agricultural sector without adverse 
effects on food supply, and the consequent increasing per capita incomes of those 
remaining could be tapped to provide finance for modem industry. Although this 
’extractive’ approach towards agriculture was challenged in the 1960s (see, for example, 
Johnston and Mellor, 1961), with greater emphasis being placed on agriculture as a
source of increasing food supplies and essential foreign exchange earnings, and 
expansion of demand for industrial outputs, it still appears to have dominated 
development strategies followed in many developing countries (see, for example. 
Government of India, 1956). While it has been recognized that the importance of 
domestic food supply in growth strategies depends on the openess of the economy, it is 
the case that important stimuli to economic growth in developing countries have come
from increased productivity (through technical progress) in agriculture.
The view of agriculture as a resource reservoir has naturally been reflected in the 
taxation and pricing policies formulated by governments. Since agriculture accounts for 
such a high proportion of total incomes in developing countries it must be included in
the tax base if sufficient revenue is to be raised to finance growing government
expenditures. However, the presentation of the question as one of agricultural versus 
industrial taxation is not very fruitful and ignores the diversity in patterns of production, 
consumption and income within each sector. One should recognize that there exist 
projects in both sectors which show high social returns and that ’poor’ households are 
to be found in both rural and urban areas. In rural areas households possess a diverse 
range of characteristics as regards sources of income (e.g. labour or land), size and 
quality of landholdings, cropping patterns, production technologies, access to knowledge 
and credit, attitudes to risk, and influence over government policies. Urban areas are 
not only made up of those employed in the formal or modem industrial sector, but also 
include those employed in the informal sector and the unemployed. While both sectors 
have their share of wealth and poverty, the policy instruments available to the 
government to raise revenue or transfer resources between households may differ in each 
sector. For example, direct transfer mechanisms (such as rationing schemes) may be 
more prevalent in urban compared to rural areas. When deciding on appropriate tax
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and pricing policies the government must take account of this diversity of characteristics
within each sector and the different constraints on policy instruments since both of these
determine the efficiency and distributional implications of taxes.
Economic theory tells us that where possible revenue should be raised and 
distributed using ’lump-sum’ instruments or with as ’little distortion’ as possible. It is 
for this reason that land taxation is often seen as an attractive way of taxing rural 
households. In principle land provides a relatively easy base to measure since it has 
fixed location and owners have an incentive to register property rights. These factors 
should ensure that administration costs are low relative to potential revenue, at least 
compared with other taxes. Land taxation may be seen as attractive from both 
efficiency and equity viewpoints since it is in inelastic supply and is unequally
distributed. One could argue that land taxation based on land quality might deter 
investments to improve land quality and output and thus have adverse efficiency effects. 
But it may be possible to base valuations for land tax on such exogenous characteristics 
as rainfall, soil quality or access to a canal network. However, in spite of these
apparent economic advantages and although historically important (see Ahmad and Stem, 
1991, Chapter 8, for a discussion for India and Pakistan) land taxes presently raise very 
little revenue in most developing countries and attempts to impose them have been 
strenuously opposed, possibly reflecting the visibility of such taxes and the political 
influence wielded by those with large landholdings. It should also be noted though that 
complete reliance on land taxes to the exclusion of output taxes may not be desirable 
when output and incomes are uncertain and complete insurance markets do not exist 
(see Hoff, 1991).
The inability or unwillingness of governments in developing countries to use 
’lump-sum’ or more direct policy instruments to raise and redistribute revenue has meant 
that they have had to rely predominantly on more indirect methods by manipulating the 
prices facing consumers and producers. Economists have therefore focused on 
minimizing the excess burden and distributive impact associated with ’distorted’ prices. 
Unfortunately, the question has often been presented as a choice between agricultural 
and industrial taxation. Proponents of a greater reliance on agricultural taxation have
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pointed to the low price elasticity of aggregate supply in this sector. Some empirical
studies do support such claims (see, for example, Binswanger et al, 1985) when 
concerned with aggregate agricultural output. However, empirical studies also show that 
individual elasticities can be quite high (see Askari and Cununings, 1976, and Tinuner 
et al, 1983). One can also argue that although the direct effect of the taxation of 
agricultural output (more precisely, marketed surplus) is to decrease the income of 
relatively wealthy farmers the indirect effects on labour markets may imply a fall in the 
incomes of rural labourers whose standard of living may already be quite low. This in 
turn may decrease wages and prices in the modem industrial sector thus increasing the 
welfare of urban consumers who often enjoy a much higher standard of living than their 
rural counterparts. Obviously the conclusions we come to in relation to all of these 
arguments will ultimately depend on empirical analysis (as well as the theoretical
structuring of the problem).
Traditionally, governments in developing countries have relied an manipulating the 
prices of agricultural outputs and inputs in order to tax or subsidise farmers. These 
include (with examples for Pakistan):
(i) The imposition of export taxes, e.g. export duties on cotton and rice with the sole 
right to export often invested in publically controlled marketing boards.
(ii) The procurement of agricultural outputs at prices below world prices, e.g. wheat
procurement and the ban on inter-provincial trade.
(iii) The subsidization or taxation of imports, e.g. subsidies to imported wheat and sugar
distributed through ration shops, and import taxes on private imports of sugar.
(iv) Price support to farmers, e.g. sugarcane.
(v) Subsidized agricultural inputs, e.g. prices for electricity and water fixed below costs
of production or fertilizer prices fixed below world prices.
(vi) Taxes on final consumer goods consumed by rural households.
The central objective of this thesis is to analyse the impact of reforms of this system
of taxes on social welfare (in terms of equity and efficiency) and to identify possible 
welfare- improving reforms with particular emphasis on agricultural pricing policies.
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§1.6 The Layout of the Thesis
We have argued that both the manner in which governments can raise revenue 
effectively by manipulating prices and the implications of these policy instruments for 
efficiency and equity depend on the nature of the relationships between economic agents, 
the organization of markets, and the decision-making framework of households. 
Therefore, in Chapter 2 we describe the organization of agriculture in Pakistan using 
country-wide data on farm households for 1976/7 (the Indus Basin Survey) and we 
comment briefly on preliminary results from more recent surveys. We discuss the 
system of land tenure, the operation of factor markets and their implication for the 
economic behaviour of farm households, and use this analysis of the data to suggest 
possible reasons for the substantial variability in farm practices and yields across farms 
and individual crops. We argue that behaviour under uncertainty and the imperfect 
operation of many markets can help to explain this observed diversity in agricultural 
organization. It is therefore important that these aspects be incorporated into any 
analysis of the behaviour of agricultural households or the implications of various 
policies for farm household decisions.
In §1.4 we showed that when the government cannot tax total consumption, as is 
the case for foodgrains in Pakistan where a substantial ^proportion is consumed on-farm, 
then the agricultural sector can be viewed as part of the consumer sector and we should
focus on marketed surplus when analysing the consequences of price changes. The
implications of price changes for equity will depend on the pattern of marketed surplus 
across households (with differing welfare weights) while the implications for efficiency 
depend on how aggregate marketed surplus responds to these price changes. In Chapter 
3 we focus mainly on the marketed surplus of wheat, the major foodgrain in Pakistan,
and show how we can gain useful insights into the determinants of household marketed
surplus using cross-section data from household surveys. We further argue that 
agricultural household models are useful in deciding how our empirical analysis should 
be formulated, what variables should be included and how the model should be 
specified. The constraints imposed by the nature of the available data (e.g. the presence 
of influential observations, endogeneity and sample selection) are also highlighted and we
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show how they can be overcome. Our results confirm the belief that much of the 
marketed surplus (i.e. government procurement and rural consumption by rural 
non-producers) originates on large farms with small farms being self-sufficient or net 
consumers. This pattern reflects the unequal distribution of land in Pakistan and 
suggests that high procurement prices will have adverse effects on equity (ignoring wage 
effects) since many small farms and the landless are net consumers. However, it is 
also the case that the elasticity of marketed surplus is high so that low procurement 
prices may lead to substantial efficiency losses. This trade-off between equity and 
efficiency is analysed in more detail in Chapter 6. The high price elasticity suggests 
that small changes in prices may have substantial effects on government procurement, 
the level of rural food surpluses to be transferred to urban areas, and foreign exchange 
earnings. These effects should all be taken into account when formulating pricing
policy.
When we include the agricultural sector in the consumer sector for the purposes of 
analysing pricing policy it is no longer the case that economic efficiency is necessarily 
desirable for this sector. Thus, it may be appropriate to tax or subsidise some 
agricultural (purchased) inputs and the levels of tax or subsidy should depend on the 
pattern and responsiveness of use across farms. In Chapter 4 we analyse the pattern of
chemical fertilizer use across farm households using the Indus Basin Survey. We argue
that in empirical analyses it is important to treat separately households which do not
apply fertilizer because they are constrained, say, in the credit market, and those who 
do not apply fertilizer because at current relative prices it is not profitable for them to 
do so. We therefore use a ’double-hurdle’ model, which enables us to take account of 
zeros which can arise in more than one way, to explain the variation in fertilizer use 
across farms. We use a simple model of behaviour under uncertainty as the basis of 
our empirical investigation and our interpretation of the results. These results suggest 
that, although the productivity of fertilizer may be higher on larger farms because of a 
greater endowment or access to complementary inputs and technical knowledge, the 
presence of uncertainty and increasing relative risk aversion dominates and we observe 
lower fertilizer intensities on larger farms. We also find that lack of access to credit
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to finance fertilizer purchases is more constraining on smaller farms. One policy 
implication of the results is that if one assumes that markets for risk are unlikely to 
emerge in the short to medium run then this should influence the choice of policy 
instruments used to, say, raise revenue from the agricultural sector.
It is generally agreed that in developing countries, because of the imperfect 
operation or absence of many markets (in particular factor and risk markets) and the 
nature of government involvement in the economy, market prices of commodities may 
not reflect their true social value to the economy. When evaluating government policies 
and investment decisions it is necessary to take account of this divergence between 
social and market prices. Fortunately, from the point of view of pricing policy, much 
of the standard tax analysis goes through as before but with producer prices being 
replaced by shadow prices and by viewing the difference between shadow and consumer 
prices as a shadow tax. In Chapter 5 we show how data which are often available for 
many developing countries can be used to calculate a set of economy-wide shadow 
prices and how these can be used to evaluate possible reforms of trade and 
industrialization policies. The model presented is based on the well-known 
Litüe-Mirrlees procedure for calculating shadow prices and it is easy to manipulate for 
the purposes of sensitivity analysis. Our discussion of industrialization and trade policies 
in Pakistan since Independence shows that there has been a gradual movement away 
from quantitative restrictions on domestic production and foreign trade in favour of 
manipualting price incentives for investment in various industries. The complexity of 
the price and tax system has also been such that there have been unintended 
consequences, in particular the effective taxation of exporting industries. We also argue 
that when there already exists industries in which there are large fixed investments the 
appropriate short-run policies appear inconsistent with those suggested by longer-term 
objectives, reflecting the low short-run marginal social cost of production.
In §1.2 and §1.3 we discussed the standard models for tax analysis, showed how 
these can be adapted to incorporate the special features of the agricultural sector and the 
limitations on the policy instruments available to the government, and described how the 
theory of tax reform can be used to identify welfare-improving marginal reforms in the
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tax and price system. We further argued that risk averse governments with politically 
sensitive expenditures to finance may be more willing to undertake piecemeal reforms. 
In Chapter 6 we present a model specific to Pakistan which is intended to allow 
normative analysis of the instruments available to the government in the mid 1970s. 
Using data for this period we calculate and compare the marginal social costs of raising 
additional revenue across the various price and tax instruments available to the
government. We use these to identify possible welfare-improving reforms in the existing
system for the mid 1970s. However, our results also carry lessons for policies beyond 
this period and we use these to comment on policies followed in the 1980s and to set 
out recommendations for future policy. From the policy viewpoint we found that there 
was substantial scope for agricultural price reforms which provided large efficiency gains. 
However, we emphasise that there is a strong trade-off between equity and efficiency 
and one should examine the possibilities for providing subsidized rationed commodities 
or income support schemes. Since such schemes in rural areas may be administratively 
burdensome it might be that low procurement prices for commodities for which poorer 
households are net consumers may be desirable. We also highlight the importance of 
analysing price reforms in a general equilibrium framework especially when there exist 
’distortions’ in other commodity and factor markets so that individual price changes can
have substantial efficiency and equity effects which arise through the net demand
responses in these markets. We show that such considerations are particularly important 
when considering reforms in the system of agricultural prices.
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Chapter Two: The Organization of Apiculture in Pakistan 
§2.1 Introduction
Policy makers in Pakistan in the late 1950s and early 1960s placed great emphasis 
on the importance of increasing agricultural output, especially foodgrains. This reflected, 
in part, the desire to create a surplus in the agricultural sector which could then be
used to finance investment in the industrial sector. Higher agricultural ou^ut would 
also relax the foreign exchange constraint enabling the import of capital required by 
modem industry. Further, larger food supplies could be used to keep food prices down 
in urban areas (especially in the face of an increasing population) and wages low, thus 
increasing the profitability of investment in the industrial sector.
In order to create a surplus in the agricultural sector it was deemed necessary to 
invest in agriculture to stimulate output growth and rural incomes. Therefore, the early 
1960s saw increased goverment investment in improving irrigation facilities, especially 
the provision of tubewells, and also in the production and distribution of chemical 
fertilizers (Bose, 1972). This in turn laid the basis for the introduction of the new
high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds in the late 1960s. Yields from these ’improved’ 
seeds were substantially higher than those from ' the ’traditional’ varieties if used in 
conjunction with chemical fertilizers, regular irrigation and the appropriate farm practices.
The central objective of this chapter is to present a description of the organization 
of agricultural production and the nature of agricultural practices in Pakistan. The data 
set at our disposal is that of the Indus Basin Survey (IBS) which covered the 1976/7 
summer (kharif) and winter (rabi) seasons. This survey concentrated mainly on 
agricultural households in and around the Indus Basin, an area well endowed with water 
resources. We are not aware of any other work which has attempted to use the IBS 
for analyses similar to that presented here.
The Indus river stretches from the far north of Pakistan to the far south where it
enters the sea. Although the focus of the survey on the Indus Basin means that other
areas not as well endowed with water resources, i.e. the rainfed or ’barani’ areas of
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Baluchistan and NWFP, are under-represented or excluded altogether (as with 
Baluchistan) it is nevertheless the case that a very high percentage of farms are located 
in the Indus Basin area and an even higher percentage of agricultural output originates 
here.
In §2.2 we discuss the relevant characteristics of households in the IBS. We 
briefly examine, in turn, land tenure, the labour market, the use of draught animals and 
tractor services, irrigation practices, access to and use of credit, the role of land leasing 
and the cropping pattern. Specific constraints perceived by farmers are also highlighted.
It is often argued that while the new production technology was essentially scale 
neutral government policy created an environment where it was more profitably 
employed, and therefore more quickly adopted, on larger farms, leading to a more
unequal distribution of income than that which already existed (see Griffin, 1974). In 
§2.3 we test the relationship between productivity, i.e. physical output per acre for each 
crop, and farm size. However, we also argue that such simple regressions do not throw 
much light on the issues which theory suggests may influence productivity levels. More 
useful approaches are discussed and we suggest a research agenda which we think is
more appropriate from a policy viewpoint. In §2.4 we apply production function
analysis in an attempt to identify the factors which explain the variation in output levels 
across farms. We find that these results reinforce our findings in §2.2 that credit and 
irrigation constraints lead to a wide variation in input levels and farm practices across 
farms, reduce the use and productivity of crucial inputs such as fertilizer, and lower 
yields. Unavailability of credit is seen to be an important constraint on smaller farms.
The use of data for the mid 1970s, although somewhat dated, has a certain 
attraction. The Green Revolution began to take effect in Pakistan around the mid 
1960s. Government policy was geared towards increasing the use of HYV seeds and in 
disseminating knowledge of the appropriate farm practices, e.g. the use of chemical
fertilizers and efficient water management. An analysis of the situation in the mid 
1970s will therefore contribute to an evaluation of the effectiveness of government 
policy in achieving its objectives. We are also very fortunate to have access to 
preliminary results from a very comprehensive study of agricultural practices in the early
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1980s. This covers households throughout the four provinces of Pakistan, i.e. Punjab, 
Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan, and enables us to present a more up-to-date picture of 
agriculture in Pakistan in §2.5.
In the conclusions to this chapter we argue that behaviour under uncertainty and 
the imperfect operation of many markets can help us to understand the observed 
diversity in agricultural behaviour and the variability in input levels, farm practices and 
yields. In order to formulate welfare improving policy reforms one needs to identify 
the factors which constrain yields and to incorporate those features into our economic 
models.
§2.2 The Indus Basin Survey (IBS)
In this section we examine data from the IBS in an attempt to get some picture
of the nature of agricultural organization and practices in Pakistan in the mid 1970s.
However, it should be kept in mind that the survey data relate to households located in 
and around the Indus Basin. It is therefore probable that households located in barani 
(i.e. rain fed) areas are under-represented. For instance, there are no households in the 
sample located in Baluchistan, an area not very well endowed with irrigation facilities. 
Such sample bias must be allowed for when interpreting the description of the data 
which follows, especially when focusing on constraints facing farmers and the importance 
of these constraints across farms with various characteristics. It must be remembered 
though that most of the farms in Pakistan are located around the Indus river and an
even larger percentage of output originates here. In 1972, for example, Baluchistan 
accounted for only 4% of the total rural population of Pakistan.
In all, 2002 households were surveyed using, according to informal discussion, a 
milti-stage cluster sampling technique. Nearly 60% were located in the Punjab with 
37% and 3% located in Sind and NWFP respectively (see Table 2.1). Focusing on
total cropped acreage, 78% of farms were less than 12.5 acres, but this percentage 
varied across provinces with the corresponding figures being 74%, 85% and 70% for 
Punjab, Sind and NWFP respectively. For most heads of household (90%) agriculture is 
their sole occupation.
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Table 2.1
Distribution of Farms According to Acreage and Location
Farm
A creage
A ll
P a k is ta n Punj ab S ind NWFP
Less than  5 681 (0 .3 4 ) 334 (0 .2 8 ) 322 (0 .4 3 ) 21 (0 .3 5 )
5 -1 2 .5 880 (0 .4 4 ) 543 (0 .4 6 ) 316 (0 .4 2 ) 21 (0 .3 5 )
12 .5 -25 .0  315 (0 .1 6 ) 210 (0 .1 8 ) 91 (0 .1 2 ) 14 (0 .2 3 )
25 and over 126 (0 .0 6 ) 103 (0 .0 8 ) 19 (0 .0 3 ) 4 (0 .07 )
T o ta l 2002 1190 748 60
Note: Acreage refers to cropped acreage. Province figures do not include 
four households categorized as milk producers which did not have 
province code. Percentages are given in brackets.
a
Source :  Indus Basin  Survey (1976).
Table 2.2
Distribution of Farms According to Land Tenure
Tenure All  P a k i s t a n Punj ab Sind NWFP
Pure Owner 1115 (0 .56 ) 804 (0 .6 7 ) 271 (0 .3 6 ) 36 (0 .6 0 )
Pure Tenant 592 (0 .30 ) 197 (0 .1 7 ) 379 ( 0 .5 1 ) 16 (0 .27 )
Owner-Landlord 75 (0 .04 ) 38 (0 .0 3 ) 34 (0 .0 4 ) 3 (0 .05 )
Owner-Tenant 220 (0 .11 ) 151 (0 .1 3 ) 64 ( 0 .0 9 ) 5 (0 .08 )
To ta l 2002 1190 748 60
Note : Owner- land lords  and o w n e r - t e n a n t s  a re  those  who own lane 
but  a l s o  h i r e - o u t  and hi r e - i n  land  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Source :  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976) .
36
§2.2.1 Land Tenure
The sample is predominantly made up of pure owners which constitute 56% of
total households (see Table 2.2). Pure tenants are the next most important group 
accounting for 30% of farm households. The rest of the sample is made up by 
owner-landlords (4%), i.e. those that own and hire-out land, and owner-tenants (11%), 
i.e. those that own and hire-in land. The relative importance of tenure categories varies 
across provinces. Tenancy is much more prevalent in Sind than in Punjab or NWFP. 
Of those who own their land nearly 70% inherited it, 20% purchased it in the market 
and 10% both inherited and purchased their land. In Pakistan, as in many developing 
countries, the sale of land is quite uncommon and is usually undertaken only as a last
resort. Therefore most land exchanged is on a contractual (i.e. tenancy) basis.
In the sample, land hired-in is subdivided into sharecropped-in, rented-in and 
contracted-in. We do not have detailed information on the exact definitions of such
transactions. However, we can speculate as follows. Sharecropping involves the sharing 
of outputs and possibly inputs whereas renting and contracting involves only the 
payment of cash for securing the use of land. Renting is usually undertaken on a 
yearly basis while contracting can cover periods of more than one year.
Households contracting-in, renting-in or sharecropping-in some part of operated land 
accounted for 3.5%, 4.5% and 37% of total households respectively. Households usually 
undertook only one mode of land transaction, although 12 households which rented-in 
land also contracted-in. Also the hiring-in and hiring-out of land simultaneously was 
not common. Over 55% of households owned all the land they operated.
Sharecroppers were asked who made certain sharecropping decisions. Over 50% 
said that decisions regarding which crops were planted and when and where they were 
planted were taken both by landlord and tenant (see Table 2.3). Over 60% said that 
decisions as regards chemical fertilizers (henceforth referred to just as fertilizer) were 
taken mutually and 60% also said decisions regarding seeds were taken mutually. It is 
clear that in most cases landlords have a strong influence on sharecropping decisions.
Table 2.4 presents data on the share of total fertilizer inputs provided by the 
landlord. Since owner-tenants have their own land total fertilizer use includes both
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Table 2.3
Sharecropping Decision Making (%)
D ecis ion  On
Crops P l a n t e d :
- which
- where
- when 
F e r t i 1i z e r s  
Seeds
D e c i s io n  taken  bv:
S ha rec roppe r  L and lo rd
28
28
35
17
24
22
20
10
19
16
Mutual
50
52
55
64
60
Source:  Indus Bas in Survey (1976) .
Table 2.4
Landlord-Tenant Fertilizer Shares (%)
N it ro g en  Share 
Landlord  = 1 
50:50 
Tenant  = 1 
No. o f  H slds .  
% Users
All
S ha rec roppe rs
11
56
19
739
80
Owner- 
Tenan ts
5
17
40
173
83
Pure
Tenants
16
67
12
564
79
Phosphate  Share 
Land lo rd  = 1 
50 :50  
Tenant = 1 
No. o f  H s l d s .
% Users
13 
63
14 
739
39
4
19
44
175
35
15
75
6
564
40
Source:  Indus Bas in Survey (1976)
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fertilizer for own land and for sharecropped land. We therefore focus on pure tenants. 
The most common situation is where landlord and tenant each provide half of the 
fertilizer applied. This is so for both nitrogen and phosphate applications. For both
nitrogen and phosphate around 15% of sharecroppers have the landlord providing all of
the nitrogen. The percentage of households where the tenant provides all of the 
nitrogen or phosphate is 12% and 6% respectively. Note also that with owner tenants 
this percentage is much higher at around 40%. This may reflect the absence of input 
constraints, e.g. credit availability.
The picture for output shares is very similar. For wheat, rice and cotton around
90% of pure tenants retain half of their output. With sugarcane only 57% of pure
tenants retain a 50% share of output while 36% retain all their output (it may be the
case that these latter tenants pay in cash or have hired land from the sugar refining
industry and that payment is deducted from sales value when sold to the refinery). It 
does appear, however, that for the main crops a 50:50 share agreement dominates.
The fact that sharecropping is widespread suggests that it helps those who enter
into such agreements to achieve something which otherwise could not be achieved or
that other forms of contract are less effective in some respect. In developing countries
markets for draught power and labour are often non-existent or, where they exist, are 
imperfect. Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) explain this phenomenon through the 
difficulty of monitoring the operation of such market transactions. For instance,
households who oWn draught animals are often reluctant to hire-out animals to others
(except possibly to relatives) and will only do so if they are accompanied by a member 
of their own family. This reflects the fear of overuse and/or underfeeding of animals 
and the high costs of monitoring such practices. Problems with synchronic timing of
farm operations reinforce these difficulties since farmers will prefer to have an assured 
access to such services. The labour market suffers from similar difficulties. For certain 
tasks it is nearly impossible to measure output (and thus link pay to the performance of 
well-defined tasks), especially when the quality of the task is important, e.g. weeding 
tasks. The costs of monitoring these activities are very high so farmers prefer to 
allocate them to family labour. So the synchronic timing of agricultural activities and
39
the search costs involved attach a premium to the ownership of, or assured access to, 
labour or other factors of production at peak periods.
The imperfect nature of markets for draught power, tractor power and labour may 
mean that households who own such factors will transact on the land market so as to 
match land to their ’fixed’ (or imperfectly mobile) factors. We use this argument in
our attempt to explain land transactions below (see §2.2.6). Alternatively, farmers will
interlink transactions in various markets in order to alleviate such difficulties. For
example, landlords may provide credit to tenants (or to farm labourers) in return for
their labour at planting and harvesting. If the labourer receives a proportion of final
output then there is an incentive to be diligent at planting. A higher wage may be
paid at harvesting to give the labourer an incentive to return at harvest time. After 
harvest, credit and other contracts can be honoured simultaneously. Such interlinking of 
transactions reduces search cost for both parties, provides tenants or labourers with 
access to credit and overcomes the problems associated with information acquisition and 
default in the credit market. We discuss credit transactions in more detail below (see 
§2.2.5). For a detailed survey of issues concerning the interlinking of transactions in 
agriculture see Bell (1988).
§2.2.2 Labour
The preference for family labour, especially for certain agricultural tasks, has 
already been mentioned above. The IBS contains data on the number of days worked 
on and off the farm for each household and, within each household, for various 
categories of household members (i.e. head of household, men over 15, women over 15 
and children under 15). These data are also disaggregated by month. Whereas all 
household members contribute to on-farm work the extent of the supply of off-farm 
work varies across household categories. The percentage of households with positive 
off-farm work ranges from 10-17%, 6-9%, 2-3% and 1.5-3% for heads of household,
males over 15, women over 15 and children under 15 respectively (see Table 2.5). So
off-farm work is not very common especially among females and children.
Unfortunately we do not have detailed data on method of payment or level of
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Table 2.5
Households with Off-Farm Labour Supply (%)
Month
1976
A pr i l
May
June
J u ly
August
September
October
November
December
1977
January
February
March
Head of 
Households
13.4  
10.2
15.1 
12.6
16.5
15.5
12.5 
11.7
17.1
Male Over 
15 Years
8.1
6 .5  
7 .9  
8. 2
9 .0
8 .5
8 . 1  
8.0  
9.1
Female Over Child Under 
15 Years 15 Years
14.0
13.2
13.2
8 . 8  
8 . 2  
8 .6
2. 6
2.2
2 .7  
2 . 4  
3 .0
2. 8  
2 .9  
2.6  
2. 8
2 .9
2 .5
3 .0
2 .7  
1 . 6
1.9
1.9 
2.0
1 . 8
1.9 
1.8 
2 .5
1 . 6
1.7
2. 2
Source :  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976).
Table 2.6
Ownership of Draught Animals and Tractors (%)
Number o f
Animals/
T r a c t o r s
B u f fa lo  B u f fa lo  Bu l lock  Bu l lock  T r a c to r  
(Mature)  (< 4 y r s )  (Mature)  (< 3 y r s )
0 26 .2 38.2 13.2 78 .7 95 .5
1 24 .0 24.5 3 .0 11.7 4 .4
2 21 .2 19.4 60 .4 6 .6 0
3 10.4 7 .6 4 .5 1.9 0.1
4 7 .7 5 . 0 14.5 0 . 4 0
5 - 10 8.8 4 .7 3 .8 0 .6 0
>10 1.7 0 .3 0 .6 0 0
Source :  Indus Basin  Survey (1976).
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wages. We are therefore not in a position to analyse important features of labour 
contracts, e.g. the labour contracts on tenant farms and the extent of interlinking 
involving labour. Such data are often available from village-level studies and the 
analysis and interpretation of the data are made easier by the intimate knowledge 
researchers may have of the village (see, for example. Bliss and Stem, 1982).
§2.2.3 Draught Animals and Tractors
Ownership of, or at least access to, either draught animals or a tractor is crucial 
for the cultivation of land. Markets for the hire of draught animals are often not well 
developed in developing countries. Therefore, transactions in the land market may 
reflect ownership of these factors of production (see §2.6).
From Table 2.6 we can see that the majority of households own some draught 
animals. Those who do not own any must have access to their services for ploughing 
and other agricultural activities. The hire of tractor services is of course an alternative. 
Also, a household with only one draught animal may enter into an arrangement which 
involves the mutual exchange of draught animals with another farmer, possibly a brother 
or a close relative. Less than 5% of farmers in the sample owned a tractor.
§2.2.4 Irrigation
The main sources of irrigation were canals and public and private tubewells (see 
Table 2.7). Just over 9% of households said they owned a private tubewell and 50% 
of these had one or more partners. Of farmers with a private tubewell (or access to a 
private tubewell), 70% had diesel-run tubewells, while others were run on electricity. 
Below we present results which indicate that variations in irrigation practices account for 
a large proportion of the variation in per acre yields across crops. Also, our analysis 
of answers to questions concerning constraints facing farmers will suggest that lack of, 
or inadequate, irrigation facilities is a common complaint.
§2.2.5 Credit
Along with the increased use of HYV seeds there has been an increase in the
42
purchase of crucial inputs, e.g. fertilizers, from the market. Whereas the expenditure on
many of these inputs is incurred at the start of the production cycle the revenue from
output sales is not received until the end of the cropping season. This introduces the
need for credit for many farmers.
Before creditors are willing to provide loans they will require information on the 
individual characteristics of potential debtors and their intended uses of credit The 
acquisition of such information is often costly to obtain and asymmetrically held. 
Debtors will have an incentive to provide misleading information or to hide information 
that might adversely affect their chances of securing credit or the terms on which credit 
is obtained. Access to the required information is often less costly the greater the 
number of transactions between the parties involved. It is for these reasons that either 
or both of the parties may attempt to interlink credit transactions with those in other 
markets. Large landholders may give credit to labourers or tenants in return for a 
pledge of labour at peak periods. Such interlinking also saves on search costs for both 
parties. Similarly, traders or commission agents may provide credit (or inputs on credit) 
in return for the sole right to the marketed surplus of farmers.
Because information acquisition is less costly on a local basis (reflecting the greater 
incidence of interaction at village level) credit markets are usually fragmented (see 
Aleem, 1990). This, combined with a lack of interaction with areas outside the village 
can act as a barrier to entry and possibly present local money lenders with monopoly 
positions. However, when analysing credit transactions one must take account of, inter 
alia, the presence of collateral and its level, the potential for securing collateral in the 
event of default, the ease of liquidation of the collateral, features of the environment 
which deter strategic default, the interest rate and other terms of interlinked transactions 
(e.g. the price paid to labour at peak periods or the price paid for marketed surplus). 
Transactions are also often interlinked in a manner which attracts ’good’ debtors or 
encourages debtors to provide useful information. Unfortunately we do not have enough 
detailed information to examine the terms on which credit is provided and other details 
of credit transactions. Neither do we have sufficient detail to analyse the extent and 
nature of interlinking in land, labour and credit markets. The collection of such
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Table 2.7
Source of Irrigation (%)
Month
Source February March June J u ly November December
C 52 .0 51 .2 68 .2 68 .6 56 .6 16.9
PuT 4 .3 4 .3 0 .2 0 . 4 3 .9 47 .2
PrT 9 .2 9 .7 0 .6 1.0 8 .4 5 .8
C+PuT 8 .4 8 .3 11.7 11.0 9 .0 10.4
C+PrT 9 .3 9 .2 16.1 15.2 11.2 7 .6
C+PuT+PrT 0 .3 0 .3 0 .4 0 .5 0 .3 10.3
C+PW 0 .4 0 .3 1 .2 1 .2 0 .9 0 .3
C+T+PW 0 0 0 .2 0 .2 0 .1 0 .5
T+PW 0 .7 0 .7 0 .1 0 .1 0 .5 0 .1
No Source 15.2 15.7 1.0 1.5 8 .9 0 .7
)te  : C = C a n a l , PuT = Pub1i c Tubewel1 , PrT = P r i v a t e Tubewell am
PW = P e r s i a n  Wheel.
Source :  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976).
Table 2.8
Households Using Credit for Production Purposes (%)
Farm
Acreage
All
Households
Pure
Owners
Pure
Tenants
Owne r - 
Land lo rds
Owner- 
Tenants
Less th an  5 15.1 13.6 20 .8 0 18.2
5 -1 2 .5 25.7 15.0 39 .7 38.1 23 .4
12 .5 -2 5 .0 29.1 20.1 44 .3 2 0 .0 27.8
Over 25 26.9 26 .4 27.8 37.5 22.6
All 25 .9 19.1 38.3 32 .0 24 .6
Source :  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976) .
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information is costly and more easily undertaken on a village level. We do, however, 
have data which indicate the source of credit and the constraints facing farmers.
Households were asked if they had used credit for production purposes in the 
previous year and over 25% replied that they had. It is possible that credit is not 
explicitly given but is implicit in interlinked transactions, e.g. as part of sharecropping 
contracts, and not included here. The percentage using credit was lowest among pure 
owners and owner-tenants and also increased over the farm size categories (see Table 
2.8). The main reasons given for not using credit (see Table 2.9) were, in order of 
importance, ’too much trouble’ (47%), ’no need’ (22%), and ’did not know how’ (18%). 
The responses ’too much trouble’ and ’no need’ were most common among 
owner-landlords and also on larger farms - whereas the response ’did not know how’ 
was least common among owner-landlords, and more common on smaller farms. These 
replies reinforce the view that small farms do not have access to credit markets even 
though these are the farms most likely to need credit due to lack of their own cash 
balances.
Where households had used credit they were asked the source of credit (see Table
2.10). Among pure owners the main sources were agricultural banks and relatives, with 
commercial banks and money lenders acting as secondary sources. With pure-tenants, 
landlords and relatives were the main sources with agricultural banks, commercial banks 
and market lenders being secondary sources. Owner-landlords relied mainly on 
agricultural banks and relatives as main sources of credit using commercial banks and 
money lenders as secondary sources. Among owner tenants the main sources of credit 
were agricultural banks, relatives and landlords, with commercial banks and market 
lenders acting as secondary sources. The importance of relatives as a main source of 
credit decreases with farm size while the importance of agricultural banks as a main 
source of credit increases with farm size. Among households which said they used 
credit it appears that 41% relied on one source of credit only and 58% on two sources, 
so that 50% of those using credit obtained it from three sources. Unfortunately we do 
not have any information on the terms of credit, i.e. collateral, loan amount or interest 
rates. Access to banks as a source of credit is seen as desirable by farmers probably
Table 2.9
Why Households Did Not Use Credit (%)
Tenure___________________   Farm Size
Reason
All
Households
Pure
Owners
Pure
Tenants
Owne r - 
Landlords
Owne r - 
Tenants
1 2 3 4
No need 21 .9 22.8 18.9 28.8 21.6 21 .6 18.5 20.9 0.29
Not Know How 18 .4 18.0 22.2 9.6 15.0 22 .7 20 .0 19.8 0.11
Too Much Trouble 47 .2 46 .4 47.7 53 .9 48 .5 40 .5 48.3 46 .3 0.51
No One to Guarantee 2 .7 2,1 4 .7 0 2 . 4 3 .8 2 .6 3.1 2 .0
Other 2 .2 2 .4 1.6 3 .8 1.8 2 .2 2 .8 2 .4 1.0
I n t e r e s t  too High 7 .5 8 .2 4 .9 3 .9 10.8 9 .2 7 .8 7 .4 6 .4
No. o f  Ohs. 1488 904 365 52 167 185 540 449 314
) te :  Farm s i z e  i s d i v i d e d  i n t o farms (1) Less than 5, (2) 5 - 1 2 .5 ,  (3) 12 .5-25 . 0 and (4) Over 25
- a l l  in  a c r e s .
Source:  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976) .
J:.
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Table 2.10
Main Source of Credit bv Tenure and Farm Size 
Farm Tenure Farm S ize Source Source
All
Reason Households
Pure
Owners
Pure
Tenants
Owner- 
Landlords
Owner- 
Tenants
1 2 3 4 2 3
R e l a t i v e s 19.8 27 .5 11.4 17.4 26.4 46 .9 2 4 .7 14.6 12.9 31.2 20 .4
Landlord 40 .2 - 82.5 - 22.6 21.9 53 .8 44 .9 16.4 10.2 5 .0
Money Lender 3.1 7.1 0 .9 4 .3 9 .4 6 .2 0 .5 4 .9 3 .4 9 .2 15.0
A g r i c u l t u r a l  Bank 25.2 46 .9 2 .6 43.5 28.5 18.7 13.2 23 .2 49.1 28.7 22 .7
Commercial Bank 5 .4 9 .5 0 .9 8.7 7.5 3.1 1.1 8.1 8 .6 14.5 32 .7
Other 6 .2 9 . 0 1.7 26.1 5 .6 3.1 6 .6 4 .3 9 .5 5 .9 4 .2
No. o f  Obs. 515 211 228 23 53 32 182 185 116 303 260
Note: The breakdown over farm te n u re and s i z e i s  g iven  for the main source o f  c r e d i t on ly . See a l s o no te  to
to  Table 2 .9  
Source:  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976) .
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because of the availability of loans at low interest rates. However, smaller farms are
often excluded from these sources (usually because of lack of collateral) and, if credit 
from relatives is not forthcoming, they are pushed into using money lenders and the 
informal credit market where interest rates are probably much higher.
Households were also asked how they would allocate additional credit (see Table
2.11). Use of extra credit ’to purchase more fertlizer’ (27%) was the most common 
response, the percentage giving this response decreasing with farm size and being lowest 
among owner-landlords. The second most common response was ’to purchase bullocks’ 
(24%), the percentage giving this reply being highest among the smaller farms and 
among pure tenants. The percentage who would use extra credit to purchase a tractor 
(21%) or thresher (2%) increased with farm size and was highest among 
owner-landlords. This is consistent with the view that large farms lease out land
because of the constraints on fixed assets such as family labour and draught power.
Similar patterns applied to the use of extra credit to purchase a tubewell.
The percentage of households applying chemical fertilizer increased with farm size 
and was highest among owner-landlords and owner-tenants (see Table 2.12). Those who 
did not apply fertilizer were asked their reason for not doing so. The most common 
response was ’shortage of money’ (63%), followed by ’no need’ (18%) and by ’not 
available’ (12%). The percentage quoting ’shortage of money’ as the main reason 
decreased with farm size and was substantially lower in the largest farm size category 
and among owner-landlords. The percentage replying ’not available’ is not much 
different over farm-size categories.
Households were asked whether or not they thought they were getting optimum 
yields. Although the exact interpretation of this question is unclear the answers do 
throw light on constraints as perceived by farmers. Over 97% of farms said that they 
did not think they were getting optimum yields (see Table 2.13). The main reason 
given was ’insufficient irrigation’ (45%), but ’insects and disease’ (21%), ’monsoon 
flooding’ (13%) and ’lack of fertilizer’ (9%) were also common responses. Lack of
fertilizer seemed to be a more important reason on smaller farms and on pure owner 
and pure tenant farms, while ’monsoon flooding’ was a more common response on pure
Table 2.11
Use of Additional Credit
Farm S ize
Pure
Owner
Pure
Tenant
Owner
Landlord
Owner
Tenant
1 2 3 4 All  
Use 1
Households 
Use 2 Use 3
Purchase Bullocks 18.3 38 .7 8.2 15.6 34 .4 27 .4 24.1 11.6 23 .7 5 . 4 4 .6
Purchase T ra c to r 27 .0 7 .8 52.1 20.3 6.1 13.2 22.8 41 .0 21.5 4 . 4 1.9
Purchase Thresher 3 .0 0 .3 6.9 1.4 0 1.0 0 .5 0 .2 0 .8 6.1 2 .3
Wedding 0 .6 1.2 0 0.5 1.9 1.0 0 .5 0 .2 0.8 1.9 2 .3
Purchase Tubewell 11.2 2 .2 11.0 13.2 3.8 8 .4 9 .7 10.4 8.7 5 .6 2 .7
C h i l d r e n ' s  Educa t ion 2 .9 5 .3 0 1.4 5 .2 4 .7 2 .6 1.4 3 .4 8.5 9 .2
Purchase P e r t i 1i z e r 26.1 28 .5 11.0 31.1 34 .0 28 .9 27.1 19.1 26.8 34.2 19.0
Level F i e l d s 5 . 4 6 .3 8.2 6.1 4 .7 7 .4 5 .9 3.8 5 .8 9 .3 9 .6
Improve Watercourse 1.6 2 . 0 0 0.5 3 .3 1.8 0 .6 1.4 1.5 2 .5 4 . 0
Purchase Imported Seed 2 .3 4 .3 0 3.8 4 .3 2 .8 3 .0 2 .4 2 .0 17.8 25.3
Other Prodn. Purposes 1.2 2 .7 2 .7 3.3 0 .9 3 .0 1.7 0 .9 1.9 3 .0 15.4
Other Consumpn Purposes 0 .2 0 .7 0 2.8 1.4 0 .6 0 .8 0 .9 0 .8 0 .6 3 .6
00
Note: Households gave t h r e e  u s e s  fo r  a d d i t i o n a l  c r e d i t  in  o rd e r  o f  im por tance .  The breakdown over 
farm te nu re  and s i z e  i s  fo r  use one only .  See a l s o  no te  to Table  2 , 9 .
Source:  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976) .
Table 2.12
Use of Chemical Fertilizers
Farm Tenure Farm S ize
Response
Pure
Owner
Pure
Tenant
Owner
Landlord
Owner
Tenant
1 2 3 4 All
Households
Not A v a i l a b l e 8 .4 16.8 33.3 15.6 9.1 13.2 12.6 10.9 12.2
Shor tage  o f  Money 67 .4 56.0 33.3 71 .9 68.2 63 .2 65 .4 56 .4 63.5
Do Not Need 16.3 16.8 33.3 3.1 20.5 14.5 11.8 23 .6 15.6
Not Know How 1.4 0 .8 0 0 2 .3 0 .7 1 .6 0 1.7
Other 5 .6 8.0 0 6 .2 0 6 .6 7 .9 7 .3 6.3
P r i c e  too High 0 .9 1.6 0 3.1 0 2 .0 0 .8 1.8 1.3
% o f  U se rs :
by t e n u re 79 .6 78 .6 93.3 85.5 - - - - 80.5
by farm s i z e - - - - 78 .0 78 .6 79 .2 86.8 80.5
Note:  The response  i s  in  answer to the  q u e s t i o n  ’ I f  you don’ t use chemical f e r t i l i z e r s ,  why n o t ? ’ 
See a l s o  no te  to Table  2 .9  
Source:  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976).
Table 2.13
Reasons Given for Non-Optimum Yields^
Farm Tenure Farm Size*
Pure Pure Owner Owner
1 2 3 4
A ll Households
Response
Owner Tenant Landlord Tenant Reason
One
Reason*
Two
Reason
Threi
In s e c t s /D i  sease 18.8 23.3 27.8 20.1 19.1 20 .4 21;3 20 ,5 20.6 29.1 19.2
Lack o f  F e r t i l i z e r 9 . 0 11.1 5.6 6 .4 12.0 10.5 9 .3 5 .7 9 .2 23 .5 19.7
Monsoon F looding 10.4 21 .7 5 .6 9 .6 11.0 14.4 14.4 11.6 13.5 12.8 6 .5
Lack o f  Good Seed 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.0 2 .4 1.3 0 .5 1.9 1.3 6.6 12.4
Shor tage  o f  Power 0 .9 0 .5 0 1.8 2 .4 1.0 0 .3 0 .5 0.8 2.1 2 .7
Lack o f  C re d i t 1 .0 0 .2 1.4 1.8 1.0 0.7 1 .0 0 .7 0.8 4 .3 8 .6
I n s u f f .  I r r i g a t i o n 50 .4 32 .6 48.6 49.3 4 4 .0 42 .6 45.1 49 .3 45 .0 12.8 13.2
Labour Shor tage 0 .2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .5 0.1 0 .7 2.1
Other 8.1 9 .2 9.7 10.1 8.1 9.1 8 .0 9 .4 8.7 5 .9 12.1
i t h o u t  optm. y i e l d s 97 .3 96.5 96.0 99 .6 95 .0 97.5 97 .9 97 .0 97.3
g
Note: (1) See no te  to Tab le 2 .9
(2) The breakdown a c c o rd in g  to farm s iz e  and farm tenu re  i s  for  the f i r s t  r e a s o n  on ly .
(3) 2.3% of  households  w i th  non-optimum y i e l d s  d idno t  g ive  a second rea s o n .
(4) 3.4% o f  households  w i th  non-optimum y i e l d s  d id  not  g ive  a t h i r d  r e a s o n .
Source:  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976) .
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tenant farms. Insufficient irrigation was a less common constraint on pure tenant farms. 
The fact that inadequate supply of irrigation leads to lower levels of fertilizer use was 
further highlighted by the responses to the question ’with adequate supply of irrigation 
at all times what would you do as regards your use of fertilizer? Nearly 90% replied 
that they would increase their levels of application.
Households were also asked if they had fallow land and, if so, why? Nearly 77% 
had fallow land in kharif with 80% having fallow land in rabi (see Table 2.14). The 
percentage having some fallow land increased with farm size and was lowest among 
pure tenants. Again ’shortage of irrigation’ (69%) was the main reason for having 
fallow land and seemed more important for pure owners and owner-tenants. Others said 
that land was left fallow mainly ’to increase fertility’ (16%), this being a less common 
reason among the smallest farms. ’Shortage of money’ was quoted by 3% of 
households this answer being more common among very small farms, and also among 
pure tenants and owner tenants. ’Shortage of labour’ seemed to be a problem (although 
minor) among the largest farms and for owner-landlords, while ’lack of equipment’ was 
a constraint on very small and very large farms and among pure owners and 
owner-landlords. The figures quoted pertain to the rabi season but the answers for the 
kharif season were very similar.
The answers to the above questions suggest that the main constraints facing farmers 
were insufficient irrigation, lack of credit and lack of fertilizer. The three constraints 
are closely linked. Access to credit would help farmers purchase and apply more 
fertilizers while improved irrigation would make it profitable to apply more fertilizer. If 
access to public irrigation, i.e. canals and public tubewells, is restricted then credit will 
also be necessary to finance the installation of private tubewells. Inability to secure 
credit, especially institutional credit, was more of a problem on smaller farms probably 
reflecting lack of collateral and influence. It is common, however, to see groups of 
small farms band together to purchase a tubewell. Later we present results from our 
production function estimates which indicate that variations in the level and standard of 
irrigations and in the level of fertilizer applied are statistically significant in explaining 
the variation in the output levels of the four major crops.
Table 2.14
Reasons for Fallow Land
Farm Tenure Farm S ize
Reason Pure
Owner
Pure
Tenant
Owner
Landlord
Owner
Tenant
1 2 3 4 All
Rabi
Households 
Khari f
Shor tage  o f  I r r i g a t i o n 74.3 60.7 58.3 67.2 71 .2 68 .6 70 .8 68.5 64.2 69.5
Shor tage  o f  Labour 0 .3 0 .3 3 .3 0 .5 0 0 .2 0 1.5 0 .4 0 .5
Shor tage o f  Money 1.8 4 .6 0 4 .2 5 .3 2 .0 2 .7 2 .8 2 .8 2 .7
Lack o f  Equipment 1.2 0 .5 5 .0 0 .5 2 .3 1.0 0 .4 1.8 1.1 1.1
To In c re a s e  F e r t i l i t y 13.2 25.1 20 .0 12.7 11.4 19.1 16.2 14.4 16.8 16.3
Other
% wi th  Fallow Land
9 .2 8 .9 13.3 14.8 9 .9 9.1 9 .9 11.1 14.7 9 .9
- K h a r i f 86 .7 62.2 80.0 86.4 60.1 69 .7 81 .0 90 .4 - 76 .9
- Rabi 81 .7 73.8 80.0 86.4 51.8 76 .3 86.6 90 .0 79.8 -
Note: The breakdown a c c o rd in g  to farm tenu re  and s i z e i s for rab i season  only . See a l s o  no te to Table 2 . 9 .
inN)
Source:  Indus Basin  Survey (1976) .
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§2.2.6 Land Leasing
Because of the problems associated with the hiring of some factor services, 
especially labour and draft power, households are often unable to adjust factor services 
to land owned by hiring these services in or out. So households may adjust land 
cultivated to match factor endowments when markets for these factor services are 
imperfect or non-existent. In this section we test this hypothesis. For our purpose we 
use a simple model developed by Bliss and Stem (1982, ppl41-166 - henceforth, BS). 
We assume that households have a ’desired cultivated acreage’ (DCA) which is an 
increasing function of family labour supplies and draught or motive power. With 
perfect adjustment the net amount of land leased-in would be the difference between 
DCA and the amount of land owned. We assume, however, that for various reasons 
households are unable to perfectly adjust so as to cultivate their exact DCA. We 
suppose that the actual net amount leased in (NLI) is related to the difference between 
DCA and land owned.
In our model we use a quadratic approximation for DCA so that focusing solely 
on draught power (V) and man-power (M), ignoring interaction terms, we would have:
DCA = c + P ,V  + 4- p jM  + p,M" (2.1)
In our regressions we will also include a number of other variables which may also 
determine DCA (see Table 2.15). Net land leased-in (NLI) is then defined as:
NLI = a[DCA - L] (2.2)
where L is land owned by the household and a  is a constant. If a < l then households 
are unable to adjust land cultivated to exactly match their DCA. We could of course 
make a  an increasing function of, say, land owned, if we thought that a household’s 
ability to adjust towards its DCA increased with land owned possibly reflecting the 
relaxation of some constraints (e.g. willingness of others to lease to the household or 
credit constraints). However, this is not undertaken here. Substituting (2.1) into (2.2):
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NLI = oc + a p jV  + apjV^ + a p , M  + ap^M^ -ocL (2.3)
From equation (2.2) we see that:
< " )
Also from equation (2.1) we have: 
9DCA
W = p. + 2p, V (2,5)
and p, + 2P, M (2.6)
By estimating equation (2.3) using regression analysis we can obtain values for a  and 
Pi (i=l to 4). We can therefore estimate values for equations (2.5) and (2.6) which 
describe how much more land households would see themselves able to cultivate as V 
and M increased respectively. However, it must be borne in mind that this model is 
very simple and we use it for exploratory purposes only. We first present some results 
and then comment on some empirical problems that emerge.
The results of our regressions are presented in Table 2.16 and a definition of all 
the independent variables given in Table 2.15. Various interaction terms for factor 
services were experimented with but none of these emerged as significant. From Table 
2.16 we see that estimated coefficients had the expected signs. We estimate that 
0=0.59 which is much lower than the value of 0.78 estimated by BS. Using (2.5) we 
can calculate the change in a household’s DCA when it obtains an extra unit of draught 
or tractor power as 0.61 acres and 3.95 acres respectively (remember that draught power 
is in units of Rs1,000 and tractor power in Rsl0,(X)0). For the former, BS calculated a 
value of about 3 acres.
In our sample the average price for a pair of mature bullocks was about Rs2,750. 
This implies an increase in DCA for an extra pair of bullocks of 1.66 acres. Using 
(2.6), with p,=0, we see that an extra male adult increases DCA by 1.72 acres. In 
our sample the average cultivated acreage per Rs1,000 draught power and per adult male 
were 1.55 and 6.25 respectively. These values are much greater than the marginal
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Table 2.15
Définition of Variables in Leasing Regression
V a r i a b l e
L
Y
MEN
WOMEN
BOYS
GIRLS
CHILD
PTUBE
EDUC
JOB
SIND
NWFP
IMMP
IMMI
D éf in i  t i o n
Acreage owned by household
Value o f  d raugh t  power ( R s l , 0 0 0 ) .  I t s
square  i s  VSQ.
Value o f  t r a c t o r s  ( R s l0 ,0 0 0 ) .  I t s  
square  i s  TSQ.
No. o f  men over  15 y e a r s .
No. o f  women over  15 y e a r s .
No. o f  boys between 10-15 y e a r s .
No. o f  g i r l s  between 10-15 y e a r s .
No. o f  c h i l d r e n  (male and f em a le ) .
Dummy fo r  a cc es s  o f  tu b e w e l l .
Years o f  formal e d u c a t io n  for  head 
o f  household .
Dummy fo r head w i th  a no the r  o c c u p a t io n .  
Dummy fo r l o c a t i o n  in  S ind .
Dummy fo r l o c a t i o n  in  NWFP.
Dummy fo r immigrant from w i t h i n  P a k i s t a n
Dummy fo r  immigrant from I n d ia .
Table 2.16
Leasing Model: Quadratic Approximation
V a r ia b l e C o - e f f i c i e n t t - s t a t i  S t i c
I n t e r c e p t 2.348 2.99
L -0.588 -52 .26
V 0.358 7 .79
VSQ -0.001 -3 .86
T 2.403 5.95
TSQ -0 .040 -2.31
MEN 1.014 4 .3 4
WOMEN 0.422 1.61
BOY -0 .062 -0 .2 4
GIRL 0.127 0.48
CHILD 0.072 0.61
PTUBE 3.617 2 .99
EDUC 0.279 2 .72
JOB -1.277 -1 .14
SIND 2.572 3.65
NWFP -3.383 -1 .75
IMMP 1.408 1.13
IMMI -2 .012 -1.91
No. o f  Obs. 
R2= 0.61
= 2002
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effect of an extra unit of each factor on DCA, a result consistent with those of BS.
Comparing our results with those for the village of Palanpur in BS we find that 
an average household in Pakistan with an extra pair of bullocks would want to cultivate 
an extra 1.66 acres but would only be able to lease in 59% of this, i.e. 0.98 acres. In 
Palanpur an average household with an extra pair of bullocks wanted to cultivate an 
extra 3 acres but was able to lease in only 78% of this, i.e. 2.34 acres. There could 
be many reasons for these differences (for example, non-equivalence of bullock units or 
a greater amount of draught power required to plough an extra acre in Pakistan) so we 
do not speculate any further here. Also, an average household in Pakistan with an 
extra adult male would wish to cultivate an extra 1.72 acres but would only be able to 
lease in an extra 1.01 acres while a household in Palanpur would wish to cultivate an 
extra acre but could only lease in 0.78 acres. Possible reasons for this difference may 
include a greater availability of outside jobs for a household in Palanpur compared to 
the average rural household in Pakistan.
The significance of variables PTUBE and EDUC may be capturing greater 
initiatives or planning in households which own a private tubewell or have more years 
of formal education. Also the positive coefficient on the dummy for Sind suggests that 
the extent of leasing-in is greater in this province. We saw earlier that tenancy was 
also more common in Sind than in other provinces. A poorer quality of land on 
average in Sind may also be a factor.
Although our results coincide with a priori expectations we should point out some 
problems with our model. Firstly, we assume that the ability to adjust land cultivated 
to factor endowments is similar for both those who lease-out and those who lease-in. 
Secondly, we interpret zeros as a decision that land owned already equals a household’s 
DCA. It may be the case that some of these zeros reflect an inability or unwillingness 
to hire in land, in which case the model is not appropriate and we should us a model 
such as the ’double-hurdle’ model presented in Chapter 4. However, given the 
exploratory nature of our analysis we refrain from undertaking such a task.. Thirdly, 
the value of draught power or motive power may not be capturing the important 
characteristics and some households may have access to others draught power from, say.
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a brother.
Finally, the nature of the data is such that influential observations greatly affect the 
coefficient estimates. For instance, the largest value for LOWN is 750 acres whereas 
the next largest value is just above 400 acres. The inclusion of the former observation 
greatly affects the estimates of a , the coefficient on LOWN, reducing it from 0.59 to 
0.45. Fortunately, however, it does not appear to affect the marginal effect on DCA of 
an extra unit of factor services. But the exclusion of this observation did reduce our 
R2 from 0.60 to 0.46. The presence of such observations is always a problem in such 
data sets as the one used for our analysis. One method of reducing the impact of 
extreme observations is to express the variable in log form but with the presence of 
many zeros this option is not available to us. A more detailed discussion of the effect 
and detection of influential observations is given in the Appendix B (to Chapter 3).
§2.2.7 Cropping Pattern
When analysing cropping patterns we use a kernel smoothing technique to describe 
the relationship between cropping behaviour and farm size. For any given landholding 
(i.e. the x-variable) we calculate a smoothed y-value (say, for cropping intensity) as the 
weighted average of the y-values of all the x’s lying within the kernel, with the 
weights decreasing the further the x’s are from the particular landholding in question 
(see Deaton, 1989, Appendix, for a more detailed discussion). The larger the kernel the 
smoother the curve. In all our calculations we used a kernel of 20 acres. Since there 
are very few very large farms, for the largest landholdings there will also be very few 
other observations within the kernel chosen. In this case the weighted y-value for these 
observations will not be very smoothed. In the extreme there will only be one
observation in the kernel and the calculated y-value will be the actual or observed 
y-value. This explains the lack of smoothness to the right of most of the diagrams. 
When using the diagrams to capture the general pattern of the data we therefore 
concentrate our comments on the left side of each diagram.
In Figure 2.1 we have plotted the relationship between cropping intensity and farm 
size. Cropping intensity in the rabi and kharif seasons are defined as the ratio of total
Figure 2o1ô Cropping Intensity
Total, -- RobL KharLf
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S
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Note: RobL and KharLf are the proportion of cultivated Land cropped In each
season. Total Is the sum of both. The Lack of smoothness for farms over 100 
acres reflects the small number of large farms.
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cropped acreage to total cultivated acreage in rabi and kharif respectively. The
difference is accounted for by fallow land. Total cropping intensity is the sum of rabi
and kharif cropped acreage divided by total cultivated acreage. We can see that
cropping intensity decreases with farm size, being roughly 70% on the smallest farms in 
both seasons but falling to 40% on farms of 100 acres.
The four major crops grown in Pakistan are wheat, rice, cotton and sugarcane
which in 1976/7 accounted for 35%, 10%, 10% and 5% respectively of total cropped
area (Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1985). Wheat is by far the most important rabi
crop. Rice and cotton are the main kharif crops while sugarcane is planted in kharif
and harvested at the end of the rabi season. For all crops improved varieties
dominated. Out of the 2002 sampled households, 1472 (73%) planted improved wheat 
and 202 planted traditional wheat, two of the latter also planting improved wheat. The 
mixing of wheat with other crops was not common. The number of farms planting 
improved rice was 787 (39%), while 102 planted traditional rice with 8 planting both. 
Improved cotton was planted by 911 (45%) farms, while 166 planted traditional cotton
with only 4 planting both. Improved sugarcane was planted by 776 (39%) farms and
traditional sugarcane was planted by only 32 farms (over both seasons). No farms 
planted both improved and traditional sugarcane. It is common for sugarcane stumps
left over from the fresh sugarcane harvest to be left in the ground to produce a crop in 
the following year. This practice is called ratooning.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 describe the allocation of land between the four major crops
(improved and traditional varieties combined). In Figure 2.2 a household is given a 
y-value of one if it planted the various crops, zero otherwise. The y-axis can be 
interpreted as the proportion of households allocating some land to each crop. This 
proportion increases with farm size for all the major crops. Although the four major 
crops have higher mean returns they also require adequate and timely applications of 
water and fertilizer. This implies an initial outlay of funds for the purchase of these 
crucial inputs. If larger farms have more reliable water supplies and access to credit 
then they may be more willing to allocate land to these crops. We therefore observe 
more small farms allocating all their land to such crops as maize and sorghum (in
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Figure 2.2: Crop RLLocatlon
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kharif) or pulses (in rabi). In constructing the curve for all crops we sum the zero-one 
y-values for each crop for each household. So if a household planted all four crops it 
will have a value of four. This curve reconfirms that larger farms are more involved 
with the major crops.
Figure 2.3 focuses on households with positive allocations for each crop. It shows 
that for each crop, among households with positive allocated acreage, the percentage 
allocated to that crop decreases with farm size. We can focus on each season 
separately. In rabi we can combine wheat and sugarcane and view them as 
high-yielding but purchased-input-intensive crops. We find that the percentage of 
cropped area allocated to this group also decreases with farm size: decreasing from over 
80% for farms less than 10 acres to less than 70% for farms around 55 acres. The 
fact that large farms allocate a smaller proportion of cropped acreage to high 
mean-yielding but more risky crops is consistent with increasing relative risk aversion. 
When we focused only on ’improved’ varieties the same pattern emerged. Given the 
high proportion of cropped acreage allocated to wheat in rabi it would dictate the slope 
of the combined curve (i.e. for both wheat and sugarcane) in Figure 2.3. It is often 
argued (see, for example, Hazell, 1988) that, because of uncertainty in production and 
the possible ineffectiveness in transporting grains from surplus to deficit areas in the 
event of regionalized crop disasters, small farms will allocate a larger percentage of 
farm area to these crops in order to ensure adequate food supplies in bad years.
Focusing on the kharif season and the combined group of rice, cotton and 
sugarcane, a different pattern emerges. All farms less than 70 acres allocate between 
74-77% of cropped acreage to this group of crops, this being slightly higher on larger 
farms. It may be that this reflects a greater availability of scarce water on larger farms 
in kharif and this could counteract any effect from increasing relative risk aversion. 
Unreliable water supplies increase the risk associated with high-yielding crops.
§2.3 Output Levels and Farm Size
There is much debate in the development literature concerning the relationship 
between farm size and output per acre [for studies relating to Pakistan, see Salam
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(1978, 1981a), Khan (1979), Khan and Maki (1980), and Mahmood and
Nadeem-Ul-Haque (1981)]. Many of the early studies were carried out on Indian data
relating to the 1960s (see Bhalla and Roy, 1988, for references). These studies
suggested an inverse relationship between productivity and farm size thus, some argued, 
reinforcing distributional arguments for land reform with efficiency considerations. For
example, Comia (1985, p532) argues that land reform ’ would bring about a resource
use more in line with the factor endowment of developing countries by increasing labour 
absorption (especially self-employment), while forestalling premature labour-displacing
mechanization (Also, it) would likely be more beneficial in countries where land
concentration is high.’ (bracketed words added). For governments who see the level of 
agricultural output (more specifically, the level of marketed surplus) as a bottleneck to 
economic development such arguments might be persuasive.
Various reasons may be advanced to explain why output per acre may be related
to farm size (or other agricultural characteristics). These include;
ta^ Credit: An important characteristic of the new HYV seeds is the need to use
purchased inputs such as fertilizers or pesticides if one is to avail of their potentially 
high yields. This in turn requires an outlay of funds prior to revenue receipts from
output sales. For most farmers this implies a need for credit. Small landholders often
find it difficult to gain access to the formal credit market usually because they cannot 
provide the collateral required to secure a loan. Where they do have access, the risk 
of default and the higher transaction costs of small loans make it less likely that they 
will receive the credit they would demand in the market at the ’going’ price. 
Therefore, small landholders frequently find themselves pushed into the informal credit 
market, i.e. village moneylenders, local shopkeepers or large land-owners, where interest 
rates are much higher than in the formal market reflecting the higher risks and
transactions costs and possibly monopoly elements.
On the other hand, large landholders can supplement their own savings with credit 
from agricultural or commercial banks which in many cases is subsidized by the 
government. Differences in cost of credit imply differences in input costs leading to
lower level of inputs and lower output on small farms. For example, subsidized credit
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for the purchase of tractors makes it more profitable for large landholders to use them, 
and farms with access to tractors may have better preparation of the soil and be in a
position to sow at a more timely date thus increasing the productivity of all inputs. If
the above arguments are valid then large farms should have greater access to, and be 
able to secure a greater amount of, cheaper credit thus enabling them to apply more
inputs per acre and achieve higher yields.
(bl Technologv: To capture the higher yields from HYV seeds farmers must not only
apply the right amount of inputs but must do so at the right time and in the right
way. These skills need to be acquired. If large farms have greater access to
knowledge, e.g. formal education or agricultural advisers, then their practices are likely 
to be more efficient and output levels consequently higher. Government progranunes 
aimed at diffusing new technologies may be concentrated on larger farms, reflecting a
desire to increase total output and marketed surplus, and the cost effectiveness of 
policies which focus on a smaller number of larger farms units.
Larger landholders are in a stronger position to exert influence on politicians and
the bureaucracy. In fact politicians are often from the ranks of large landholders. 
Political influence can ensure that government schemes are tailored to meet the needs of 
large landholders, e.g. access to HYV seeds, irrigation facilities, credit or electricity. 
This enables large landholders to have better farm practices and, consequently, higher 
output per acre.
fcl Nature of tenure agreement: It is often suggested that, due to insecurity of tenure or 
output sharing (but not cost sharing), tenant farmers will apply inputs less intensively
than others and have lower output as a result. However, tenancy agreements often 
involve output and cost sharing and can act as a means of spreading risks (see Bliss
and Stem, 1982, pp53-65) so that one may find that output per acre is higher on tenant 
farms. Also tenant farms may have access to credit despite insecurity of tenure and
lack of collateral since credit can be provided by landlords. Alternatively, if credit- or 
asset-constrained farms lease out land to others who are not constrained then one may 
observe tenant farms having higher inputs and yields.
tdl Uncertaintv: Where returns are uncertain risk averse farmers may apply inputs less
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intensively. If the degree of risk aversion (appropriately measured) is negatively 
correlated with farm size then inputs and output per acre may be positively correlated 
with farm size. The effect of uncertainty and risk aversion on input and output levels 
may also depend on the ability of farmers to allocate land between risky and less risky 
crops.
(el Irrigation: Public irrigation schemes involve decisions on where public tubewells and 
canals are located. Those who are fortunate enough to be located near public tubewells 
or canals can have access to a reliable and regular source of irrigation which increases 
yields substantially. To the extent that large landholders can exert greater influence on 
the location of public irrigation facilities this can increase yields on larger farms. Also 
private tubewells are probably only profitably installed on farms over 10 acres.
However, efficient rental markets or farmer co-operatives can overcome this problem and 
make water use more divisible (see Chaudhry, 1978, and Kaneda and Ghaffar, 19**, for 
a discussion of irrigation in Pakistan).
Opportunitv cost of labour: Subsistence farmers who have little land and very few 
employment opportunities are likely to attach a low marginal value to time, both their 
own and that of other family members. One should then observe high labour-land
ratios and higher yields on small farms. This is reinforced by the tendency of large 
farms to make greater use of hired labour which may have additional costs in the form 
of a requirement to monitor their efforts (see Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986).
(gl Land Oualitv: Sen (1975) argued that population density would be higher in areas 
with good land so that small farms may have higher quality land. Therefore, while the 
relationship between farm size and productivity may be found to be negative when 
analysing countrywide data, this relationship within villages (with presumably similar land 
quality) would disappear.
During the agricultural year farm households must decide, inter alia, how much 
land to cultivate (and lease in or out), how much land to allocate to individual crops, 
and when to plant and harvest each crop. These decisions will depend on many things
including the household endowment of factors, the workings of factor and output
markets, and the factor intensities of the various crops. The amount of land allocated
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to each crop will be influenced by the uncertainty of yields and the households attitude
to -risk. For example, one expects risk averse households to allocate a smaller acreage
to risky crops and more to less risky but lower mean-yielding crops. Alternatively,
households with a large land endowment may, in the presence of imperfectly functioning
labour markets, allocate more land to labour-intensive crops. Therefore, it is possible
that the presence of uncertainty or imperfectly functioning markets affects the crop
allocation decision as well as the allocation of factors to each crop.
Analyses of the relationship between farm size and productivity usually regress (the
log of) the total value of farm output on (the log of) operated holdings. According to
Comia (1985, p514):
The modem version of the controversy on the size effect started with the 
publication in the 1950s of the results of the Indian Farm Management Studies, 
which showed that there was an inverse relationship between farm size and land 
productivity. Subsequent empirical investigation leaves little doubt about the 
validity and generality of this phenomenon observed in many developing countries
of Asia and Latin America characterized by widely different natural and climatic
conditions, types of soils, agrarian stmctures and cropping patterns’
Explanations of this relationship have focused on the findings that small farms have a
more intensive use of labour in each crop activity, cultivate a higher proportion of
available land on the farm in each season, and have a more intensive use of land
during the year. The studies by Carter (1984) and Comia (1985) confirm these
findings. Carter (1984) used data from the Farm Management Surveys of Haryana, an
Indian state, for the agricultural years 1969-72. His estimates:
 indicate (after correcting for sample selection bias) that small farms
would produce 15% less output then large farms given the same inputs. This 
result may reflect better access of large farms to yield increasing green 
revolution technology. Certainly no explanation of the inverse relationship 
is to be found in terms of technical efficiency. Ih e  inverse farm size 
productivity relationship, which exists despite the technical efficiency of 
small farms, must therefore be the result of greater input intensitiy per 
hectare on small farms’ (ppl41-2, bracketed words added)
His results also suggested that, contrary to the findings of Sen (1975), the within village
inverse relationship was not significantly different from the relationship between villages.
This finding is consistent with that in Bhalla and Roy (1988) who, using Indian data
for the mid 1970s, found that the inverse relationship between farm size and
productivity, although diluted, persisted when they controlled for various land quality
characteristics (e.g. soil texture, colour and depth, and surface drainage and the rate of
FLaure 2.4: Labour Use
Total Perm  Casual
F arm Size (flares)
Note: Permanent labour (Perm) Includes family and non-fomlly members. 
Casual has been multiplied by ten.
days/acre/yi
150
120
240120 180 3000 60
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percolation). Likewise Cornia (1985), analysing farm-level data from the Farm 
Management Surveys for 15 countries for the years 1973-79, found that both land use 
and resource use intensity (e.g. labour, capital and intermediate goods) both decreased 
with farm size, as did land productivity.
These results suggest that a higher ratio of operated to total farm size, a higher 
cropping intensity, and a more intensive use of labour and other inputs (all on small 
farms) combine to produce higher productivity on small farms. In §2.2.7 we also saw 
tliat in Pakistan small farmers had both a higher proportion of landholdings under 
cultivation and a higher proportion of cultivated land under crops (i.e. less fallow land) 
in each season, implying a higher cropping intensity over the whole year. Using the 
kernel smoothing technique described in §2.2.7, we also find that total labour use per 
acre decreases with farm size, reflecting the reliance of smaller farms on the labour of 
permanent household members (see Figure 2.4). TTie focus of most studies has been on 
the value of total farm output but we abstract from land use intensity and cropping 
patterns and focus on individual crop yields.
The results presented in Table 2.17 are based on regressions with the log of 
physical output per acre (individually for each crop) as the dependent variable. For 
each crop two regressions are run: (a) has the log of total cropped acreage (summed 
over all crops), LANDL, as the only independent variable along with a constant term, 
while (b) also includes the log of the proportion of total cropped acreage allocated to 
the crop in question (CROPL). In §2.2.7 we showed that, on average, small farms 
allocate a higher percentage of land to more risky crops in rabi (i.e. to wheat and 
sugarcane) but that this relationship disappeared in kharif, and was even slightly 
reversed. One might expect that the greater the percentage of land allocated to risky 
crops the higher the risk and therefore the lower the input levels and yields. We hope 
that the coefficient of CROPL in regression (b) will pick up this effect. In this case 
the coefficient on LANDL can be interpreted as a ’pure farm-size effect’, i.e. after 
controlling for risk levels.
Focusing on the (a) results we see that for both wheat and sugarcane there is a 
positive relationship between physical output per acre and farm size, with a doubling of
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farm size consistent with a 6% increase in yields. For both rice and cotton there is a 
negative relationship with a doubling of farm size consistent with a 141% and 9% 
decrease in yields respectively. The large negative coefficient for rice may reflect the 
labour intensity of the production process, the lower cost of monitoring family labour 
and the high level of husbandry skills involved. The positive relationship for sugarcane 
may reflect the importance of reliable water supplies and liquidity over a longer period. 
The positive relationship for wheat may also reflect the higher yields on well-irrigated 
larger farms. Since cotton requires less water and its harvest is labour intensive this 
may explain the negative relationship.
Table 2 .17
LANDL CROPL R2
Wheat :
(a ) 0.06*** - 0.01
(b) 0.03 -0.66*** 0.05
Rice :
(a) -1.41*** - 0.01
(b) -0.01 -0.41*** 0 .04
Cot ton :
(a) -0 .09** - 0.01
(b) 0.10* 1 53*** 0.05
Sugarcane :
(a) 0.06*** - 0.01
(b) 0.06** -0 .01 0.01
No. o f  
Obs.
1456
711
772
748
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is the log of physical output per acre 
for each crop. The results under (a) are based on regressions with the log of total 
cropped acreage (LANDL), i.e. for all crops, as the independent variable; (b) has 
both LANDL and the log of proportion of total cropped acreage under the crop 
(CROPL) as independent variables. All regressions were run with an intercept term. 
’***’, ’**’ and indicate significance at the 1%, 2% and 10% levels
respectively; all other variables are insignificant at the 10% level. Where necessary 
the results have been corrected for sample selection bias using the Heckman (1979) 
technique.
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Turning to the (b) regressions we find that for wheat, rice and sugarcane the
coefficient on CROPL is negative, although statistically insignificant for sugarcane. 
These suggest that farms allocating a higher percentage of land to risky crops could be 
compensating for the greater risk by applying lower inputs per acre with consequent 
lower yields. For wheat this explains some of the positive relationship in (a) since we 
have seen that large farms allocate a lower proportion of land to wheat (see Figure
2.3). This is also the case with sugarcane, although the coefficient on CROPL is
insignificant, possibly due to multicollinearity. With rice the negative relationship
between farm size and the percentage of land allocated to rice was not as pronounced.
The greater labour use on smaller farms may account for the negative relationship in
(a), since rice is very labour-intensive. The positive coefficient for CROPL among 
cotton producers is harder to explain but could be due to economies of scale for cotton. 
Since small farms allocate a larger proportion of land to cotton this helps to explain
some of the negative relationship between farm size and yields in (a). In fact, the 
’pure farm-size effect’ is positive, although statistically significant only at the 10% level.
Our results therefore suggest that the relationship between physical yields and farm 
size is crop specific. The large proportion of land allocated to whej^t may dilute the 
negative relationships for rice and cotton so that our earlier findings that cropping 
intensity is higher on small farms may dominate any analysis of the relationship 
between the value of total farm output and farm size, i.e. one might expect to find a
negative relationship. Above we argued that a higher level of risk on farms which
allocate a higher percentage of land to risky crops leads to such farms applying less
inputs. We now give a brief description of fertilizer use which, in the following 
section, is shown to be statistically significant in explaining the variation in crop yields.
The regressions run are the same as for Table 2.17 except that the dependent 
variable is now the log of total (nitrogenous) fertilizer use per acre. Table A2.1 shows 
that the proportion of farms applying fertilizer increases with farm-size category. 
However, Table 2.18 shows that, among farms with positive levels of fertilizer use, for
wheat, rice and sugarcane there is a negative relationship between per acre application
levels and farm size, although it is not statistically significant for wheat. For cotton the
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coefficient of LANDL is insignificantly positive. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Salam (1978) for the Punjab region. So it appears that although the 
proportion of farms applying fertilizer increases with farm size, among users the per 
acre levels decrease with farm size. This latter finding is consistent with the presence 
of increasing relative risk aversion, since one would expect that, if anything, fertilizer 
productivity (and therefore input) levels were higher on larger farms reflecting better 
water availability and, possibly, information on good practices.
Table 2 .18
N it rogen  Use.  Farm S ize  and Land A l l o c a t i o n
No. o f 
Obs.
1126
529
LANDL CROPL R2
Wheat :
(a ) -0 .03 - 0.001
(b) -0 .03 -0 .18* 0.020
Ri ce :
(a ) -0.26* - 0 .05
(b) -0 .09* -0 .25* 0 .04
Cot ton :
(a) 0 .02 - 0 .04
(b) -0 .02 -0.01 0 .05
Sugarcane :
(a ) -0.08* - 0 .02
(b) -0 .14* -0 .13 0 .04
625
568
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is the log of nitrogen applied per acre 
for each crop. The results under (a) are based on regressions with the log of total 
cropped acreage (LANDL), i.e. for all crops, as the independent variable; (b) has 
both LANDL and the log of proportion of total cropped acreage under the crop 
(CROPL) as independent variables. All regressions were run with an intercept term.
indicates significance at the 1% level; all other variables are insignificant at the 
10% level. Where necessary the results have been corrected for sample selection 
bias using the Heckman (1979) technique.
In all cases, except for cotton, the introduction of CROPL into the regressions does 
not change the sign of the coefficient on LANDL. The negative coefficients for 
CROPL are consistent with the argument that the greater percentage of land allocated to 
risky crops the higher the risk level, and farms compensate for this by applying lower 
inputs (i.e. fertilizer) per acre. The fact that we find a negative coefficient for LANDL
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in (a), in spite of higher risk on smaller farms is consistent with the presence of 
increasing relative risk aversion.
Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986, p531) point out that when testing for a
relationship between productivity and farm size one should introduce a distinction
between acreage owned by an operator and operational scale. Their model has three 
independent variables, i.e. land operated, land owned and family size. Output per acre
operated is the dependent variable. Controlling for land operated and family size, an
increase in land owned should increase output per acre if tenanted land is less
productive (possibly reflecting higher credit costs). Controlling for land owned and 
family size, an increase in land operated should decrease output per acre mainly because 
of increased labour costs, reflecting a greater use of more costly hired labour.
Similarly, controlling for land owned and land operated, an increase in family size 
implies lower labour costs and higher output per acre.
The results from our estimation of the BR model are presented in Table 2.19. In 
most cases the variables have the expected signs though not always statistically 
significant. The coefficient for LOWN, although small, is significantly positive for 
wheat and rice, but is not significantly different from zero for cotton or sugarcane. In 
all cases the coefficient of LOPRL is significantly negative with elasticities in the range 
1-2.3%. Only for rice is the coefficient for MENL significantly different from zero 
(and positive, with an elasticity of 1.3%). When other variables representing the 
number of women, boys, girls and children were included they were highly insignificant 
as were the squared terms for all variables when the quadratic form was fitted. The 
absence of any significant relationship for cotton or sugarcane may reflect the existence 
of contracts between producers and girmers/refiners which may alleviate problems 
regarding access to credit or technical knowledge.
The results indicate a somewhat mixed picture as regards the relationship between
physical output levels and farm size across crops. However, one can speculate 
somewhat as to the likely reasons for the relationships which have emerged. For 
example, rice is a relatively labour- and husbandry-intensive crop and small farms apply 
more family labour per acre. This is reinforced by the positive coefficient for adult
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males (and negative coefficient for LOPRL) in Table 2,19. We also found that among 
rice producers who applied fertilizer the per acre level applied decreased with farm size. 
The negative relationship for cotton could also be due to lower labour costs on small 
farms and the fact that cotton is not a particularly water-intensive crop. Wheat and 
sugarcane yields do respond sensitively to good water availability and management. 
Also, sugarcane has high liquidity requirements given its relatively long growing season. 
These factors seem to dominate or eliminate any inverse relationship which may arise 
from greater fertilizer application (for sugarcane) and cheaper labour costs on small 
farms. In all cases a lower percentage of land allocated to risky crops operates to 
reduce risk (and increase input levels), although (in the case of fertilizer at least) 
increasing relative risk aversion may explain why we still observe a negative relationship 
between resource use and farm size.
Table 2 .1 9
P r o d u c t i v i t v .  Land Tenure and Familv Labour
Wheat Rice Cot ton Sugarcane
I n t e r c e p t 2.06** 6.53** 5.48** 5.13**
LOWN 0.001** 0.004** 0 .00 0.001
LOPR -0.23** -0.13** -0 .10* -0.19**
MEN 0.00 0.13** 0 .0 0 -0 .02
No. o f  obs. 1456 711 772 748
R2 0.03 0 .02 0.01 0.03
Note: Dependent variable is the log of output per acre for each crop. Independent 
variables are land owned (LOWN;in acres), land operated (LOPR;in log acres) 
and the number adult males in the family (MEN;in logs). The use of ’acres’ 
instead of ’log acres’ for land owned reflects the presence of zeroes for this 
variable. ’**’ and ’*’ indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, 
all other variables being insignificant at the 10% level. Where appropriate results 
have been corrected for sample selection bias using the Heckman (1979) technique.
Studies undertaken using data for the Punjab for the years 1972-74 also give mixed 
results. Sal am (1978) found that only for improved wheat were yields significantly 
different across farms being significantly higher (at a 10% level) on larger farms. Khan 
(1979) also found that output was higher on larger farms, but output here referred to 
the total value of farm output. Khan and Maki (1980) found no relationship between 
physical output and farm size for improved varieties of wheat and rice. Mahmood and
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Nadeem-Ul-Haque (1981) found a u-shaped relationship. However, not only were they 
focusing on the total value of farm output, but they were also using grouped data.
We began this section by highlighting the fact that physical output per acre for 
each crop varies widely across farms. We then went on to suggest reasons why output 
levels might differ. If larger farms have greater access to credit or technical knowledge 
then we expect productivity to be positively correlated with farm size. On the other 
hand, small landholders have a greater (per acre) supply of cheaper family labour which 
can operate to increase yields on smaller farms. The important point is that there exist 
many reasons which can explain the variations in productivity across farms, some which 
tip the balance in favour of higher productivity on small farms others which suggest 
that large farms will exhibit higher productivity levels.
An appropriate agenda for economic analyses in this area is as follows. One must 
first try to explain why yields vary across farms. The analysis at this stage should 
identify variations in input levels and farm practices. One then asks why input levels 
and farming techniques differ. For instance, one may find that extension services and 
access to and the terms of credit are biased in favour of larger farms and these in turn 
imply higher applications of purchased inputs and more effective farm practices. The 
final step is to ask if government policy can influence this situation and, if so, whether 
and how to do so. Again the market for credit is instructive. Greater access to 
cheaper credit for large farms may reflect problems of assymetric information. It is 
doubtful if state banks can overcome such problems and are probably less able to do so 
than the fragmented private market. The experience of state banks in developing 
countries is often one of high default rates with cheaper credit being allocated mainly to 
large farms (see Bell, 1988, for a detailed survey of the issues involved, and Aleem, 
1990, for an analysis of credit policy in Pakistan).
From the perspective of the above agenda simply regressing output per acre on 
total cropped acreage in itself is not very useful. What these regressions capture is the 
net result of the various forces at work and their relationship to farm size. They do 
not identify the precise reasons for the variation in productivity levels. Also, higher 
output per acre is an appropriate measure of greater efficiency only if land is the sole
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scarce factor. At best, one can say that an inverse relationship implies that efficiency 
considerations reinforce distributional arguments for land reforms which redistribute large 
landholdings among the landless or among small holdings. Such results can therefore 
be used to ensure that land reform remains an issue when it comes to government 
policy making. However, it is also important to recognize that higher yields on small 
farms may not reflect greater ’efficiency’ if it arises from higher input levels.
If one accepts that land redistribution is not really on the agenda, at least for the
forseeable future, then one should focus on why productivity levels vary and how 
government policy can and should influence the determining factors. This approach is 
valid whether the relationship is negative, positive or non-existent Whether or not 
variations in productivity levels are related to farm size is not per se the important 
question from a policy viewpoint, although if we do find such a relationship then this 
may help to explain the existence of wide variations in productivity levels. Broadly 
speaking governments wish to use appropriate policy instruments to encourage the spread 
of ’best practice’ techniques and to raise productivity levels. The appropriate choice of 
policy instruments will require a comparison of the social costs and benefits of reforms. 
The objective of empirical work should be to concentrate on identifying the factors 
which explain the variation in productivity levels (and these may or may not be
correlated with farm size) and the role of government in affecting these factors.
Separating land into acreage operated and acreage owned and also including family 
size as an independent variable does go some way in focusing on particular household 
characteristics which theory suggests may influence productivity levels. In this respect 
these results are more useful. In the next section we estimate production functions for
each crop with input levels and farm practices as independent variables. Such an
approach enables us to identify the particular inputs and practices which help to explain 
variations in output levels. The use of fertilizers is a good example. Above we found 
that although the percentage of households using fertilizers increases with farm-size 
categories, among those that do apply fertilizers the level applied per acre decreases
with farm size. Anticipating the results of the next section we also find that the level
of nitrogenous fertilizer applied per acre significantly affects productivity levels for each
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crop. These results beg the question: What determines whether or not households apply 
fertilizers and the levels applied? Output prices, fertilizer prices and access to credit 
and fertilizer supplies will obviously play a role in the answer. One should also 
incorporate uncertainty into any analysis of this kind. In Chapter 4 we analyse fertilizer 
use in more detail.
§2.4 Farm Practices and Crop Production Functions
In this section we analyse the variation in input and output levels and in farm 
practices for the major crops in Pakistan in an attempt to identify the factors which
explain output variations. The crops analysed are improved varieties of wheat, rice, 
cotton and sugarcane. Production functions are estimated for each crop and the model 
is described in Appendix A (to this chapter). In our sample of 2002 farms, 1472
planted improved wheat, 787 improved rice, 911 improved cotton and 776 inproved 
sugarcane. We have already discussed cropping patterns in §2.2.7. For all crops it 
was necessary to delete observations, mainly due to missing values for output or
fertilizer. A crude examination of the percentage deletions by farm-size category
suggested that while the deletions for missing output values were not correlated with
farm size, those for missing fertilizer values were. The latter is to be expected since 
the missing values were for large farms that had fertilizer use above a certain level so 
that the value did not fit into the number of spaces allocated when coding the data. In 
our analysis we test for sample selection bias arising from these deletions. The
deletions reduce our samples to 1352, 688, 728 and 729 observations for wheat, rice, 
cotton and sugarcane respectively. Fertilizer deletions accounted for 87%, 23%, 12% 
and 23% for each crop respectively. A crude examination of the data suggests that 
only for wheat do total deletions appear to be correlated (positively) with farm size.
We now discuss the explanatory variables used in our regression analyses. The
definitions of all variables are collected in Table 2.20 and a statistical summary is 
presented in Table A2.2. We can divide variables into ’direct’ and ’proxy’ variables
where the former refer to inputs and practices which affect outputs directly (e.g. the 
level of fertilizer or ploughings, or the quality of farm practices such as the manner in
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which fertilizer is applied) and the latter are only correlated with such variables and act 
as their proxies. If we had detailed information on all direct variables then we would 
not expect the proxy variables to emerge statistically significant from our regressions. 
However, to the extent that we do not, these variables may be statistically significant in 
explaining variations in output levels.
§2.4.1 Chemical Fertilizers
It is their responsiveness to high doses of nitrogenous fertilizer that has been 
treated as the hallmark of new seed varieties. However, it is not the level of fertilizers 
alone which leads to higher per acre yields but also the timing and sequence of inputs.
The productivity of fertilizers depends greatly on the use of other inputs such as
irrigation, weeding and ploughing. Good agricultural practice involves the use of the 
correct levels of inputs and the correct timing of their applications.
Sal am (1975) refers to the recommended (presumably by a national agricultural 
research institute/station) level of nitrogen for Mexi-Pak wheat, local rice, cotton and 
sugarcane as 57, 27, 32 and 79 (all kg/acre) respectively. For phosphate the 
recommended levels quoted for these crops were 34, 34, 23, and 34 (all kg/acre)
respectively. In the case of rice the nitrogen level recommended for improved varieties
would probably be higher. Research stations recommend that half of the nitrogen and 
all of the phosphorous and potash should be applied as a basal dressing at the time of 
sowing. The remainder of the nitrogen should be applied as a top-dressing at the time 
of the first irrigation. The irrigation immediately following this top-dressing is crucial 
to fertilizer productivity. If wheat is grown unirrigated then all the fertilizer should be 
applied as a basal dressing at the time of sowing. Without irrigation the productivity 
(marginal and average) of fertilizer is lower. The yield-maximizing level of nitrogen 
without irrigation is suggested to be around 28 kg/acre. Therefore, profit-maximizing 
levels will also be much lower without irrigation. The optimal level of fertilizer also 
depends on whether or not the seeds were sown at the appropriate time. With late 
sowing (e.g. December for wheat) recommended nitrogen levels are reduced by around 
20% compared to sowing at the appropriate time (e.g. mid November for wheat).
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Table 2.20
Definition of Variables Used in Repressions
Dependent Variable
YPA: Output per acre (kgs)
Independent Variables
NPA:
PPA:
NTOPD:
FMPA:
SPA:
PLANT:
IRRN:
IRRS:
RAUN:
NRAUN4:
PLOUGH: 
PLANK: 
HARROW: 
HOE: 
WEED: 
AGE: 
EDUC 
TRAC 
BVAL 
CROPR: 
CROPK: 
PARCEL: 
JOB: 
SLSAL: 
GSAL: 
SVSAL: 
PTEN: 
OTEN: 
MCON 
OWNL 
OWNT 
CRACRE: 
SIND: 
NWFP:
Nitrogen per acre (kgs)
Phosphate per acre (kgs)
Nitrogen applied as a top dressing (Dummy) 
Farmyard manure per acre (kgs)
Seed per acre (kgs)
Planting before critical planting date(Dummy)
Number of irrigations
Level of water supply (Dummy)
Irrigation prior to planting (Dummy). A dummy, 
RAUN5, for irrigation within five weeks of 
planting is also included 
Irrigation within four weeks following planting 
(Dummy). A dummy, NRAUNO, for both NRAUN4=1 
and PLANT=1 is also included 
No. of ploughings 
No. of plankings 
No. of harrowings 
No. of hoeings 
No. of weedings 
Age of head of household 
Years of formal education of head of household 
Ownership of tractor (Dummy)
Value of draught power (Rs 100(X)/acre)
Percentage of cultivated land cropped in rabi 
Percentage of cultivated land cropped in kharif 
Number of parcels into which land is divided 
Household head having another occupation (Dummy) 
Land defined as slightly saline (Dummy)
Land defined as generally saline (Dummy)
Land defined as severely saline (Dummy)
Household defined as pure tenant (Dummy)
Household defined as owner-tenant (Dummy) 
Household defined as mixed consolidator (Dummy) 
Household defined as owner-landlord (Dummy) 
Household defined as owner-tenant (Dummy) 
Cropped acreage 
Household located in Sind 
Household located in NWFP
Note: Where squared terms are included the number ’2’ is added to the end 
of the relevant variable above, e.g. EDUC and EDUC2.
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Control of weeds is also important since weeds compete with wheat for nutrients. 
Pre-sowing ploughings and weedings can help control weeds. More will be said of 
these activities below.
It is important to remember that ’optimum’ fertilizer levels from a 
profit-maximizing viewpoint are probably lower at farm level reflecting inappropriate 
farm practices, constraints on credit and the use of complementary inputs, and different 
relative prices due to varying credit, transport and labour costs. Also, the presence of 
risk operates to reduce input levels when risk averse farmers maximize their expected 
utility of wealth.
The IBS contains information on the amount of nitrogen, phosphorous, farmyard
manure and green manure applied. Earlier we saw that there was a negative 
relationship between farm size and the per acre level of nitrogen applied (for those 
applying some fertilizer) but that a higher proportion of larger farms applied some 
fertilizer. This is consistent with some earlier studies for Pakistan for the early 
seventies. Sal am (1978) and Mahmood and Nadeem-Ul-Haque (1981) found that smaller 
farms used more fertilizers but the latter study used the total level of fertilizer used 
on-farm and also grouped data. However, Khan (1979) found that larger farms used 
more ’non-traditional’ inputs such as fertilizers, hired labour and farm machinery than 
smaller farms, but he also analysed the total value of fertilizer used on-farm.
The average level of nitrogen applied is lower than the recommended levels given 
earlier for all crops, particularly so for wheat, rice and sugarcane. However, as pointed 
out earlier, actual farm practices and conditions are substantially inferior to those in 
research stations. If farm tasks and practices, complementary to fertilizer use, are 
inferior then the average and marginal productivity of fertilizer will be lower and the
profit-maximizing level of fertilizer use below recommended levels. Even taking this 
into account actual application levels appear very low. One can interpret this as
sub-optimal use of fertilizer on farms, evidence of inefficient farm practices, the
presence of credit and other input costs or a behavioural response to uncertainty. 
Alternatively, one might think that households have some other objective. A more 
detailed analysis of fertilizer use is presented in Chapter 4.
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The number of fertilizer applications is also provided in the survey (FERTN) and 
is concentrated around 1-2 with between 45-60% applying more than once. In the 
absence of data on the timing of fertilizer applications (relative to planting of seeds) we 
assume that those who had two or more applications applied fertilizer as a basal 
dressing sM  as a top dressing. So we use a dummy variable to represent whether or 
not fertilizer was applied as a top dressing (NTOPD). We also use a zero-one variable, 
PHOS, which takes the value one if phosphate was applied, zero otherwise. For wheat 
and rice around 20% apply phosphate with a corresponding figure of 32% for cotton 
and sugarcane 32%. For wheat, rice and cotton around 25-30% applied farmyard 
manure but for sugarcane the percentages were 66% and 43% respectively.
§2.4.2 Seeds
The main sources for improved seed were ’own-farm’ and ’neighbours’ for wheat, 
rice and sugarcane with ’village market’ and ’government’ acting as minor sources. For 
cotton the main source of seed was the ’government’ followed by the ’market dealer’,
’on-farm’ and ’village market’. The average level of seed applied per acre (SPA) did
not vary significantly over farm size except for sugarcane and rice where the level was 
significantly lower on the largest farms when compared to the smallest.
The IBS also gives data on the completion date for planting. For wheat we take 
the critical planting date (CPD) as 1st December with 71% of farms finishing planting
before this date. We use a dummy variable to represent this in our regressions
(PLANT12; 1 if planted before 1st December, zero otherwise). The CPD for rice and 
cotton was taken as 1st July (PLANT7) with 38% and 98% finishing planting before 
this date respectively. For cotton 61% finishing planting before 1st June. The CPD 
for sugarcane was taken as 1st April (PLANT4) with 70% finishing planting before this 
date. This is a very simple way of capturing the returns to sowing at the appropriate 
time and the CPDs are based on discussions with agricultural economists in Pakistan.
Sal am (1976), analysing agricultural practices in the Punjab, found that many 
farmers continued to sow wheat after the normal sowing time was over, many sowing 
as late as January. This is consistent with our data. It is often found that the
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harvesting time for cotton leaves inadequate time for seed-bed preparation. This is often 
also the case with rice harvesting, especially basmati rice which takes a longer time to 
mature than other varieties. Although sowing after the CPD does not improve output
for a crop (for given seed and other inputs), taken in isolation it may do so when all 
seasons and crops are taken together, i.e. it may be consistent with greater total farm 
output total farm output Salam also observed that farmers try to compensate for late 
sowing by applying more nitrogeneous fertilizer, something which was also found in the 
BS study of Palanpur in northern India. This is inconsistent with the recommendations
for late sowers where the recommended level of nitrogen is roughly half that for timely
sowers. However, it may be due to an ’income’ or ’relaxed constraint’ effect since by 
leaving the previous crop longer yields and income increase thus providing more
own-fiinds to finance the purchase of inputs.
§2.4.3 Ploughing, Weeding and Hoeing
Pre-sowing ploughings help control the spread of weeds which compete with crops 
for soil nutrients. They also provide a good seedbed. Hand-weeding and hoeing also
reduce the spread of weeds. Many observers think that an improvement in these
activities would increase yields substantially. The number of ploughings on land sown 
with each crop is available from the survey (PLOUGH). The level of ploughing is 
quite high; the percentage of farms with zero ploughings was less than 3% for all 
crops. The average number of ploughings is about 5 but this is a bit higher for
sugarcane.
The level of hand-weeding (WEED) is very low for wheat with less than 3%
undertaking any hand-weeding and 6% any hoeing (HOE). However, for other crops 
the number undertaking hoeing increases to 50-75% of farms for rice, cotton and 
sugarcane (the percentage being higher for cotton and sugarcane). It was most common 
for those undertaking hoeing to do so 1-2 times for each crop. The extent of 
ploughing may be one reason for the low level of weeding and hoeing. The number 
of harro wings is also available (HARROW). Less than 3% of farmers carried out any 
harrowing.
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§2.4.4 Irrigation
Both the level and timing of irrigation affect output. We do not have precise data 
on the level of irrigation, i.e. water applied. The number of irrigations, however, is 
available in the survey (IRRN). Almost all farmers carry out some irrigation with most 
irrigating between 5 and 15 times. The average number of irrigations is higher for rice 
and sugarcane than for wheat and cotton. The timing of irrigation relative to the time 
of planting is very important, and proper practices can significantly increase the 
productivity of fertilizers and other inputs. Irrigation just prior to sowing and just 
subsequent to sowing increase productivity substantially. Also wheat must be irrigated 
regularly, ideally at around three week intervals.
We use a zero-one variable to reflect whether or not the farmer irrigated prior to 
sowing (RAUN), or (alternatively) within five weeks prior to sowing (RAUN5). 
Similarly we use a zero-one variable to capture whether or not the crop was irrigated 
within four weeks of sowing (NRAUN4). We also introduce another zero-one variable 
(NRAUNO), which takes on the value 1 if there was an irrigation within four weeks of 
sowing and if seeds were planted before the critical planting date. For wheat and rice 
over 95% of farmers irrigated prior to sowing, for cotton 72% and for sugarcane 44%. 
The percentage of farms irrigating within five weeks prior to sowing was 70%, 67%, 
91%, and 40% for wheat, rice, cottgn and sugarcane respectively. Also 53%, 27%, 
67% and 50% both irrigated within five weeks prior to sowing âod planted before the 
CPD. For each crops around 60% irrigated within five weeks of sowing. 
Unfortunately, we have no way of adjusting for the quality of irrigations, e.g. efficient 
channels or sufficient water.
Farmers were also asked, for each month, whether irrigation conditions were 
’adequate’, ’in short supply’ or ’too much’. The zero-one variable IRRS was set equal 
to 1 if supply was ’adequate’ or ’too much’ during the few months prior to CPD, 
otherwise it was set equal to zero. The percentage with adequate irrigation supply was 
between 30-40% for each crops. The fact that the irrigation practices are so good, as 
measured by the number and adaquacy of irrigations, reflects the nature of the sample.
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§2.4.5 Other Variables
The IBS provides information on other variables which may be of use in 
explaining some of the variation in YPA over farms. These variables are explained 
briefly below and fall mostly under the heading of ’proxy’ variables. As mentioned 
earlier, to the extent that input levels and other farm practices are already captured by 
the variables described above one expects that many of the following variables will 
emerge as insignificant in our regressions with YPA as the dependent variable.
(a) CROPR: This variable represents the percentage of cultivated land which was 
cropped in rabi. One can argue that a higher cropped level reflects a diligent farmer. 
However there may be reasons other than laziness for some land being left fallow, e.g. 
lack of access to certain inputs, liquidity constraints or bad land. A similar variable for 
the kharif season is also included (CROPK). In this case a lower value may also mean 
that nutrients in the soil are more plentiful than if the land was cropped and these are 
available for absorption by the rabi crop. Alternatively, cropping in kharif can act as a 
control on weeds and this increases the productivity of inputs in rabi. This may be 
reinforced if fertilizers are also applied in kharif. Given the extent of ploughing in the 
sample it is likely that the additional effect of kharif cropping on weed control is 
minimal.
(b) AGE: This is the age of the farm operator. One might think that the older the
farmer the more farming experience he possesses and is therefore more productive.
Alternatively one may think that old farmers tend not to be up to date with modem
methods and less productive as a result. A noticeable feature of the replies is that they 
cluster around multiples of five.
(c) EDUC: This is the number of formal years of education received by the head of 
the household. It is often argued that educated farmers are more likely to be aware of 
good practices and also more receptive to them. Educated farmers can read leaflets and 
instructions on how to apply inputs and are therefore not solely reliant on physical
instruction. For the whole sample about 75% of farmers had no formal education.
Salam (1981a), using 1972-73 data for Pakistan, found that farmers with a higher level 
of education applied more fertilizer per acre.
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(d) PARCEL: Land holdings may be in one unit or several disjoint parcels. This 
variable represents the number of parcels of land. 55% of farms had land in more 
than one parcel.
(e) JOB: Operators were asked whether they had another occupation or profession.
If they had then JOB was set equal to 1, zero otherwise. Farmers with other 
occupations to fall back on in difficult agricultural periods may be less careful with 
their practices and less productive. Alternatively, another occupation may mean less 
aversion to risk and a higher level of inputs being applied as a result or may provide 
more liquidity for purchasing inputs. However, less than 7% had another occupation. 
Unfortunately, we do not have information on whether or not other members of the 
family had a job outside agriculture.
(f) SAL: Land is divided into four categories, namely, non-saline, NSAL; slightly 
saline, SLSAL; generally saline, GSAL; and severely saline, SVSAL. This is obviously 
a crude measure of soil quality but the best available. The variables SLSAL, GSAL 
and SVSAL are included as explanatory variables, so their coefficients are relative to 
households with non-saline land.
(g) POWN: Tenure status is given as either pure owner, POWN; pure tenant, PTEN; 
mixed consolidator, MCON; mixed owner-landlord, OWNL; and mixed owner-tenant, 
OWNT. The dummies PTEN, MCON, OWNL and OWNT are included as explanatory 
variables with their coefficients interpreted as relative to pure owners.
(h) BVAL: This represents the value of draught power (Rs10000) owned by the 
household. Greater draught power enables better land preparation and higher standards 
for other activities thus increasing output levels.
(i) TRAC: Less than 4% of operators own a tractor. Where the operator owns a
tractor TRAC is set equal to 1, zero otherwise. As with draught power access to a
reliable supply of tractor services may balance the effect of ownership. Salam (1981a),
using Pakistani data for 1972-73, found that tractor farms had higher output per acre 
and higher fertilizer input per acre.
(j) SIND,NWFP: Land and practices are thought to be of superior quality in the
Punjab. The dummy variable SIND takes the value 1 if the farm is located in SIND,
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zero otherwise. Just over 25% of farmers are in Sind. A zero-one variable for NWFP 
is also included. Less than 4% of households were located in NWFP. The variables 
SIND and NWFP will therefore indicate whether or not the level of output per acre is 
on average significantly different in Sind or NWFP than in the Punjab.
(k) LANDCR: We have already discussed the effect of land size on productivity.
This variable is the amount of land cropped in the relevant season.
§2.4.6 Results
In this section we present the results of our production function analyses for each 
crop. A description of the function employed in the analyses is presented in Appendix 
A and the definitions of the variables used are given in Table 2.20. Two sets of 
results are presented for each crop: labelled RUNl and RUN2. In RUN! only 
households using fertilizers are included whereas RUN2 includes all producers of the 
relevant crop.
To enable the use of logs for fertilizer (NPA) and irrigation (IRRN) variables we 
add a constant to each variable. In RUNl this applies only to IRRN since this 
variable has some zero abservations. We use the log of (I+c) as an explanatory 
variable where I is the number of irrigations and we choose a value for c so as to 
maximise R^. The range of values over which we searched was c=l,2,..,10. A similar 
procedure was used in RUN2 for fertilizers. We use the log of (N+g) as an 
explanatory variable and choose g to maximize R^. The range of values over which 
we search is g=5,10,15,20,25 and 30. In RUN2 we choose the combination of g and c 
which maximizes R^. This procedure may be justified by noting that the soil already 
contains some nitrogen and moisture.
Tables 21 to 24 present the results for each crop. The coefficients, their 
t-statistics, the elasticity of output with respect to each variable and their marginal 
products (MP) are all presented (for statistically significant variables). Elasticities and 
MPs are calculated as described in Appendix A. Where variables enter in log form 
elasticities and MPs are taken at the geometric means and where variables enter in a 
linear form, along with their square, elasticities and MPs are taken at the arithmetic
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Table  2.21
Dete rm inan ts  o f  V a r i a t i o n  in  Output  Per  Acre (W hea ts
V a r i a b l e
RUNl
MP
RUN2
MP
I n t e r c e p t 3.861 -  - 3.083 - -
(11 .24) (10 .11)
NPAL 0.173
(5 .50 )
0.173 4 .13
NPAL7 0.199
(7 .2 7 )
0 .199 4 .24
PPA 0.008 0.008
(2 .6 3 ) 0.047 2 .60 (2 .6 2 ) 0 .044 2.73
PPA22 -0 .016
( - 2 . 3 7 )
-0 .016
( - 2 . 2 8 )
NTOPD 0.076
(1 .8 4 )
7.9% 0.094
(2 .2 5 )
9.8%
FMPA2 0.003 0.004
(1 .71 ) (1 .9 8 ) 0 .030 0.02
FMPA23 -0 .002
( - 0 .6 8 )
-0 .003
( - 1 . 0 7 )
SPAL 0.208
(3 .12 )
0.208 3.07 0.243
(3 .8 3 )
0.243 3.30
IRRN3 0.368
(4 .9 8 )
0.368 22.18
IRRN4 - - 0.478
(7 .0 5 )
0.478 24.30
IRRS 0.070
(2 .0 8 )
7.2% 0.063
(2 .01 )
6.5%
RAUN5 0.025
(0 .5 8 )
NRAUNO 0.012
(0 .32 )
0.031
(1 .0 2 )
BVAL 0.160
(1 .2 2 )
0 .190
(1 .5 9 )
BVAL2 -0 .002
( - 0 .1 8 )
-0 .004
( - 0 .4 1 )
TRAC 0.111
(1 .2 5 )
0.133
(1 .5 6 )
PLOUGH 0.038
(1 .0 2 )
0.041
(1 .2 4 )
PL0UGH2 -0.002
( - 0 .4 9 )
-0 .002
( - 0 .5 8 )
PLANK -0.036
( - 0 . 9 7 )
-0 .027
( - 0 .8 2 )
PLANK2 0.004
(1 .1 1 )
0.003
(0 .93 )
HARROW 0.239
(2 .0 9 ) 0.008 127
0.203
(1 .91 )
HARR0W2 -0 .047
( - 1 . 7 6 )
-0.041
( - 1 .5 7 )
WEED 0.009
(0 .1 5 )
-0.001
( - 0 .0 2 )
WEED2 -0 .008
( - 0 . 4 1 )
-0 .005
( - 0 .2 4 )
con td .
Note
HOE 0.129 0.219
(1 .05 ) (1 .8 7 )
H0B2 -0.018 -0 .048
( - 0 .2 7 ) ( - 0 . 7 1 )
AGE 0.004 0 .010
(0 .70 ) (1 .6 5 )
AGE22 -0.005 -0 .009
( - 0 .7 4 ) ( - 1 . 5 8 )
EDUC -0 .020 -0 .017
( - 1 .4 3 ) ( - 1 . 3 3 )
EDUC2 0.003 0.003
(2 .3 4 ) (2 .1 6 )
PARE 0.008 0.006
(0 .23 ) ( 0 .2 1 )
JOB -0.005 -0 .061
( - 0 .8 4 ) ( - 1 . 0 2 )
SLSAL - 0.077
(1 .1 4 )
GSAL -0.095 -9.0% -0 .082
( - 2 .1 2 ) ( - 1 . 9 8 )
SVSAL -0 .180 -16.5% -0 .129
( - 4 .4 3 ) ( - 2 . 9 4 )
MCON 0.560 0.549
(1 .52 ) (1 .4 5 )
OWNL 0.051 0.025
(0 .5 8 ) (0 .2 9 )
OTEN 0.098 0.093
(1 .88 ) (1 .9 3 )
PTEN 0.042 -0.001
(0 .98 ) ( -0 .0 0 2 )
SIND -0 .234 -21.0% -0 .273
( - 4 .7 1 ) ( - 4 . 3 3 )
NWFP 0.035 -0 .035
(0 .3 8 ) ( - 0 . 3 4 )
CRPRL 0.105 0.105 86.2 0.101
(2 .3 0 ) (2 .5 1 )
CRPK 0.580 0.818
(2 .09 ) -0 .029  -26.1 (3 .3 7 )
CRPK2 -0 .527 -0 .747
( - 2 . 1 3 ) ( - 3 . 6 7 )
LANDCR -0 .028 -0 .034
( - 1 . 0 3 ) ( - 1 . 3 7 )
N 1100
R2 0.26
; : (1)  B i s  the e s t i m a t e d  c o e f f i c i e n t . E the e l a s t
wi th r e s p e c t  to the r e l e v a n t  v a r i a b l e  (or  s i
s h i f t  i f  a dummy v a r i a b l e )  and MP i s  the mar
the r e l e v a n t  v a r i a b l e .
(2)  M u l t i p ly  c o e f f i c i e n t  by lO"^.
(3)  M u l t i p ly  c o e f f i c i e n t  by 10"*.
(4)  See Table  2 .20 fo r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  v a r i a b l e s .
-7
- 1 2 . 1
-24.1
0.101
-0 .036
75 .7
30.1
1352
0 .35
produc
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Table 2 .2 2
Determ inan ts  o f  V a r i a t i o n  in  Outout P e r  Acre tR ice ) i
RUNl RUN2
V ar iab le B E MP B E MP
I n t e r c e p t 3 .856 2.732
(6 .68 ) (4 .8 9 )
NPAL 0.282 0.282  8.73 -
(5 .3 5 )
NPAL25 - 0.416 0.416  6.15
(5 .3 7 )
PPA 0.001 0.001
(0 .2 2 ) (0 .1 9 )
PPA22 -0.001 -0 .002
( - 0 .3 6 ) ( - 0 . 7 0 )
NTOPD 0.168 18.0% 0.193 21.3%
(2 .2 3 ) (2 .6 9 )
FMPA2 0.003 0.002
(1 .15 ) (0 .8 2 )
FMPA23 -0 .004 -0 .003
( - 2 .1 7 ) ( - 1 .4 6 )
IPA2 0.105 0.020
(0 .10 ) (0 .03 )
IPA22 -0.001 0.002
( - 0 .1 1 ) (0 .2 5 )
PLANT? 0.091 0.087
(0 .84 ) (1 .53 )
SPAL - 0.013
(0 .2 5 )
IRRNIO 0.466 0.466 13.7 0 .530 0.530  14.1
(3 .07 ) (4 .0 5 )
IRRS 0.034 0.061
(0 .5 6 ) (1 .16 )
NRAUN4 0.036 0.082
(0 .46 ) (1 .4 3 )
NRAUNO 0.044 -
(0 .33 )
BVAL 0.595 0.717
(2 .03 ) 0 .100 349 (3 .05 ) 0 .120  378
BVAL2 -0 .146 -0 .192
( - 1 .6 7 ) ( - 2 . 4 8 )
TRAC 0.029 0.077
(0 .20 ) (0 .5 7 )
PLOUGH 0.063 0 .020
(0 .98 ) (0 .37 )
PL0UGH22 -0 .500 -0.071
( - 0 .7 9 ) ( - 0 . 1 4 )
PLANK -0 .064 -0 .009
( - 1 .1 7 ) ( - 0 .1 9 )
PLANK2: 0 .600 -0 .046
(0 .91 ) ( - 0 . 0 8 )
HARROW -0.610 -0.408
( - 1 .7 1 ) ( - 1 .4 2 )
HARR0W2 0.124 0.086
(1 .60 ) (1 .30 )
c o n td .
WEED -0.042 -0 .073
( - 0 .8 0 ) ( - 1 . 5 9 )
WEED2 0.008 0.017
(0 .80 ) (1 .2 7 )
HOE - -0 .032
( - 0 . 0 8 )
H0E2 - -0 .356
( - 1 . 0 3 )
AGE -0.011 -0 .005
( - 0 .9 6 ) ( - 0 . 4 9 )
AGE2* 0.015 0 .008
(1 .21 ) (0 .7 1 )
EDUC -0.008 0 .015
( - 0 .3 3 ) (1 .5 2 )
EDUC2* 0.300 -0.001
(1 .340 ( - 0 . 0 8 )
PARE 0.088 0 .086 0.086
(1 .42 ) (1 .6 8 )
JOB -0.098 -0.001
( - 0 .8 0 ) ( - 0 . 0 1 )
SLSAL 0.066 0 .048
(0 .49 ) (0 .4 5 )
GSAL -0.055 -0 .047
( - 0 .6 3 ) ( - 0 . 6 4 )
SVSAL -0.043 -0 .139 -13.0%
( - 0 .4 6 ) ( - 1 . 7 4 )
OWNL -0 .047 -0 .028
( -0 .0 3 1 ) ( -0 .0 2 1 )
OTEN 0.197 21.8% 0.183 20.0%
(2 .09 ) (2 .2 4 )
PTEN 0.209 23.0% 0.165 17.9%
(2 .70 ) ( 2 .5 5 )
SIND -0.321 -27.0% -0.311 -27.0%
( - 2 . 4 8 ) ( - 2 . 5 5 )
NWFP -0 .960 -62.0% -1.151 -68.0%
( - 2 .3 8 ) ( - 3 . 3 0 )
CRPKL 0.196 0.196 186 0.147 0.147
(2 .35 ) (2 .0 9 )
CRPR 0.847 1.215
(1 .78 ) 0 .050 44 .8 (3 .3 1 ) 0 .086
CRPR2 -0 .540 -0 .793
( - 1 .3 9 ) ( - 2 . 5 5 )
LANDCR -0.007 -0 .043
( - 0 .1 4 ) ( - 1 . 0 0 )
N 488 681
R* 0.25 0.:
33 .3
130
73 .4
Note:  (1)  B i s  the e s t i m a t e d  c o e f f i c i e n t ,  E the  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  ou tpu t
w i th  r e s p e c t  to  the r e l e v a n t  v a r i a b l e  (or  s imply  the p e r c e n ta g e  
s h i f t  i f  a dummy v a r i a b l e )  and MP i s  the marg ina l  p roduc t  o f  
the  r e l e v a n t  v a r i a b l e .
(2)  M u l t i p ly  c o e f f i c i e n t  by 10"*.
(3)  M u l t i p ly  c o e f f i c i e n t  by 10"6.
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Table 2 .23
D eterm inan ts  o f  V a r i a t i o n  in  Output Per  Acre ( 'CottonV
RUNl RUN2
Var iab le B E MP B E MP
I n t e r c e p t 2 .707 3.809
(2 .7 8 ) (7 .4 8 )
NPAL 0.232 0.232 1.95 - - -
(3 .1 7 )
NPAL15 - - - 0.275 0.275 1.57
( 3 .6 4 )
PPA2 -0 .030 0 .202
( - 0 .0 6 ) (0 .3 8 )
PPA22 0.005 0.003
(0 .4 3 ) ( 0 .2 4 )
IPA 0.012 0.013
(1 .7 5 ) 0 .036 2.49 (1 .8 7 ) 0 .030 2 .38
IPA22 -0 .008 -0 .009
( - 1 . 0 8 ) ( - 1 . 2 3 )
FMPA: 0.005 0.029
(0 .1 4 ) (0 .9 5 )
FMPA24 -0.001 -0 .086
( - 0 .0 1 ) ( - 0 . 3 7 )
IRRNIO 0.743 0.743 8.97 - - -
(2 .5 0 )
IRRN2 - - - 0.539 0.539 11.91
(4 .2 8 )
IRRS - - - -0 .002
( - 0 . 0 4 )
BVAL -0 .062 -0 .139
( - 0 . 1 2 ) ( - 0 . 3 1 )
BVAL2 -0 .159 -0 .027
( - 0 .3 5 ) ( - 0 . 0 6 )
TRAC 0.054 0.164
(0 .26 ) (0 .092 )
PLOUGH -0.035 0.018
( - 0 .3 8 ) (0 .2 3 )
PL0UGH22 0.600 -0.011
(0 .7 2 ) ( - 0 . 0 1 )
PLANK -0 .049 -0 .086
( - 0 . 5 7 ) ( - 1 . 2 2 )
PLANK22 -0 .090 0.005
( - 0 . 0 8 ) (0 .4 8 )
HARROW -0.037 0.056
( - 0 .2 6 ) (0 .4 8 )
HARR0W2 0.035 -0 .003
(0 .7 0 ) ( - 0 . 1 3 )
WEED -0 .002 -0.001
( - 0 .0 2 ) ( - 0 . 0 1 )
WEED2 0.001 0.002
(0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 8 )
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c o n td .
HOE 0.120 0.073
(1 .93 ) 0 .126 24.3 (1 .3 2 )
H0B2 -0.008 -0 .003
( - 0 .5 9 ) ( - 0 . 2 2 )
AGE -0 .004 -0 .019
( - 0 .2 4 ) ( - 1 . 4 2 )
AGE22 0.900 0.023
(0 .61 ) (1 .6 3 )
EDUC 0.030 0 .005
(0 .86 ) ( 0 .1 7 )
EDUC2 0.001 0.002
(0 .41 ) (0 .8 4 )
PARE -0 .006 -0 .020
( - 0 .0 9 ) ( - 0 . 3 2 )
JOB -0.337 -28.6% -0 .300
( - 2 .2 9 ) ( - 2 . 3 1 )
SVSAL -0 .084 -0 .102
( - 0 . 9 0 ) ( - 1 . 2 4 )
OWNL -0.113 -0 .126
( - 0 .6 3 ) ( - 0 . 7 4 )
OTEN 0.058 0.033
(0 .51 ) (0 .3 3 )
PTEN 0.071 0.022
(0 .7 8 ) (0 .2 7 )
SIND 0.282 32.0% 0 .314
(3 .02 ) (3 .7 2 )
CRPKL 0.137 0.108
(1 .31 ) (1 .2 0 )
CRPR 0.239 0 .244
(0 .3 6 ) (0 .4 1 )
CRPR2 -0 .339 -0 .358
( - 0 .6 4 ) ( - 0 . 7 7 )
LANDCR -0 .199 -0 .199 5.51 -0 .214
( - 3 . 3 5 ) ( - 4 . 0 8 )
N 558
R2 0.17
4ote: (1 ) B i s  the es t im a ted  c o e f f i c i e n t , E the e
wi th  r e s p e c t to the r e l e v a n t  var i a b l e  ( 0 :
s h i f t  i f  a dummy v a r i a b l e )  and MP i s  the
the r e l e v a n t v a r i a b l e .
(2) M u l t ip ly c o e f f i c i e n t  by 10"*.
(3) M u l t i p ly c o e f f i c i e n t  by 10"* .
-26
37.
-0 .214  5 .62
728
O.2 O
(4) M u l t i p ly  c o e f f i c i e n t  by 10"*
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T able 2 .2 4
D eterm inan ts  o f  V a r i a t i o n  in Output  Per  Acre TS’caneV
RUNl R1IN2
V a r i a b l e B E MP B E MP
I n t e r c e p t 8.141 7 .820
(15 .98) (19 .19 )
NPAL 0.118 0.118 40.98 - - -
(2 .4 3 )
NPAL6 - - - 0 .094 0.094 40 .64
(3 .6 2 )
PPA -0.002 -0 .002
( - 0 . 7 0 ) ( - 0 . 6 0 )
PPA2: 0.003 0 .003
(0 .47 ) (0 .5 3 )
NTOPD 0.015 0 .100
(0 .27 ) (0 .1 7 )
FMPA= -0 .006 -0 .003
( - 0 .5 0 ) ( - 0 . 3 2 )
FMPA24 0.001 0.001
(1 .41 ) (1 .3 6 )
SPAL 0.072 0.072 0 .56 0 .066 0.066 0 .50
(2 .08 ) (2 .1 2 )
IRRN2 0.222 0.222 180.6 - - -
(2 .91 )
IRRNl - - - 0 .184 0.184 160.4
(3 .1 0 )
IRRS 0.051 0 .095
(1 .07 ) (2 .2 0 ) 10.0%
IPA 0.002 0 .003
(0 .55 ) (0 .6 2 )
IPA22 -0 .002 -0 .002
( - 0 .3 5 ) ( - 0 . 4 2 )
BVAL 0.268 0 .360
(1 .3 1 ) ( 2 .0 7 ) 0 .060 3193
BVAL2 -0.138 -0 .148
( - 2 .3 0 ) ( - 2 . 6 6 )
TRAC 0.048 0.035
(0 .51 ) (0 .3 8 )
PLOUGH -1.182 -0 .122
( - 3 .1 1 ) 0.370 577.9 ( - 2 . 4 5 ) 0 .280 416 .2
PL0UGH2 0.016 0.011
(3 .2 4 ) (2 .7 2 )
PLANK 0.075 0.098
(1 .77 ) 0.039 92.91 (2 .5 2 ) 0 .100 235.9
PLANK2 -0 .007 -0 .008
( - 1 . 8 3 ) ( - 2 . 2 5 )
HARROW 0.015 0.100
(0 .1 5 ) (1 .1 1 )
HARR0W2 0.004 -0 .005
(0 .29 ) ( - 0 . 4 0 )
WEED 0.207 0.159
(2 .4 8 ) 0.045 2158 (2 .1 2 ) 0 .035 1704
WEED2 -0 .044 -0 .033
( - 1 .5 9 ) ( - 1 . 4 3 )
c o n td .
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HOE
H0E2
AGE
AGE22
EDUC
EDUC22
PARL
JOB
SLSAL
GSAL
SVSAL
MCON
OWNL
OTEN
PTEN
SIND
NWFP
CRPKL
CRPR
CRPR2
LANDCR
0.126
(2 .74 )
-0.036
( - 2 .8 0 )
-0.005
( - 0 .5 6 )
0 .004
(0 .44 )
-0.003
( - 0 . 1 6 )
0 .089
(0 .43 )
0.022
(0 .49 )
0.016
(0 .16 )
-0 .027
( - 0 .20)
-0 .084
( - 1 .5 0 )
-0 .042
( - 0 .6 5 )
0.671
( 1 .2 9 )
0.058
(0 .49 )
0.040
(0 .58 )
0.154
( 2 .5 3 )
0.151
(1 .07 )
0.168
(0 .94 )
0 .124
( 1 . 88 )
-0.398
( - 0 . 6 1 )
0 .312
( 0 .6 7 )
0 .039
( 1 . 02 )
0.050 596
16.
0 .124 2592
0.116  
(2 .7 4 )  
-0.031 
( - 2 . 5 9 )  
0 .003 
( 0 .3 4 )  
-0 .004  
( - 0 . 5 0 )  
0 .014  
(0 .7 5 )  
-0 .069  
( - 0 . 3 6 )  
0 .013 
(0 .3 2 )  
-0 .056  
( - 0 . 6 1 )  
-0 .035  
( - 0 . 3 0 )  
-0 .095  
( - 1 . 86 ) 
- 0.021 
( - 0 . 3 7 )  
0.871 
(1 .6 0 )  
0.120 
(1 03) 
-0 .007  
( - 0 . 11) 
0.169 
(3 .0 8 )  
0.188 
(1 .5 5 )  
0.202 
(1 .2 5 )  
0 .115 
(2 .0 3 )  
-0 .016  
( - 0 . 0 3 )  
-0 .006  
( - 0 . 01 ) 
0.023  
(0 .6 7 )
0 .056 600.4
9.1
18.4%
0.115 2292
N
R2
547
0.22
729
0.22
Note:  (1)  B i s  the e s t i m a t e d  c o e f f i c i e n t ,  E the  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  ou tp u t
w i th  r e s p e c t  to the r e l e v a n t  v a r i a b l e  (o r  s imply the  p e r c e n ta g e  
s h i f t  i f  a dummy v a r i a b l e )  and MP i s  the marg inal  p roduc t  o f  
the r e l e v a n t  v a r i a b l e .
(2) M u l t i p ly  c o e f f i c i e n t  by 10"^.
(3) M u l t i p ly  c o e f f i c i e n t  by 10"*.
(4) M u l t i p ly  c o e f f i c i e n t  by lO"'* .
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means.
The analysis presented here focuses on RUN2 which included both households
which applied fertilizers and those that did not. However, these results are very similar
to those from RUNl. In both runs observations with missing values for outputs, inputs
and (in RUNl) with nitrogen use equal to zero were deleted. We have therefore tested
for sample selection bias using the technique of Heckman (1979), but in all cases there 
was no evidence of such a bias. We now summarize the results presented in Tables 
21 to 24.
For all crops the level of fertilizer applied and the number of irrigations are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The elasticities of output with respect to the 
level of nitrogen applied were 0.20, 0.42, 0.27 and 0.09 for wheat, rice, cotton and 
sugarcane respectively. So, for example, a 10% increase in the level of nitrogen
applied to wheat increases wheat output by 2%. Only in the case of wheat did
variations in phosphate levels explain any variations in output - the elasticity was 0.04. 
Households applying nitrogen as a top-dressing had 10% and 21% larger outputs for 
wheat and rice respectively. The elasticity of output with respect to farmyard manure
was 0.03 for wheat but this variable was insignificant for other crops.
The elasticities of output with respect to the number of irrigations were 0.48, 0.53,
0.54 and 0.18 for wheat, rice, cotton and sugarcane respectively. In the cases of wheat 
and sugarcane households which felt they had ’adequate’ or better water supplies 
(IRRS=1) had a 6.5% and 10% higher output levels respectively. Only for wheat and
sugarcane did variations in seed levels significantly explain variations in output levels,
the elasticities being 0.24 and 0.07 respectively. The elasticity of cotton output with
respect to pesticide and insecticide expenditure (IPA) was 0.03 - only cotton producers 
applied pesticides and insecticides to any noticeable extent.
For wheat the elasticity of output with respect to the number of harro wings was 
less than 0.01, while the elasticity of cotton output with respect to the number of 
hoeings was 0.13. For sugarcane the elasticities of output with respect to the number 
of ploughings, plankings, weedings and hoeings were 0.28, 0.10, 0.03 and 0.06
respectively. For rice and sugarcane the elasticities of output with respect to the value
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of draught power (Rs10,000/acre) owned was 0.12 and 0.06 respectively. Ownership of 
draught power may enable more timely and higher quality farm practices and better 
quality ploughings before sowing which gives a better prepared seed-bed.
The elasticities of output with respect to the percentage of total landholdings 
cropped in the same season (CRPR/K) were 0.10, 0.15 and 0.12 for wheat, rice and 
sugarcane respectively. The positive sign may reflect less constraints on inputs, greater 
effort or higher quality of land. The elasticities with respect to the percentage of land 
cropped in the previous season were -0.04 and 0.09 for wheat and rice respectively. The 
negative sign for wheat may reflect the depletion of soil or time constraints, e.g. 
inadequate time to prepare soil. The positive coefficient for rice may reflect the 
nutrients left over from rabi or the benefits from good soil preparation for wheat.
The elasticity of rice output with respect to the number of parcels into which land 
holdings are divided was 0.09. This may reflect higher quality land or hard-working 
dynamic farmers who lease in parcels of land. Among cotton producers, households 
whose head had another profession had 26% higher output possibly reflecting a higher 
educational level and knowledge of efficient farm practices.
Variations in the quality of land help explain variations in output for wheat, rice 
and sugarcane. Among wheat producers those with ’generally saline’ or ’severely saline’ 
land have significantly lower output levels compared to households with non-saline land: 
8% and 12% lower outputs respectively. For rice, households with ’severely saline’ 
land have 13% lower output levels compared to those with non-saline land. Sugarcane 
producers with ’generally saline’ land had 9% lower output. The effect of tenure status 
also varies across crops. For wheat and rice owner-tenants have 9% and 20% higher 
outputs respectively, compared to pure owners. For both rice and sugarcane procucers 
pure tenants have 18% higher outputs respectively, again when compared to pure 
owners.
The effects of location are captured in the variables SIND and NWFP. In Sind 
producers have 24% and 27% lower output levels for wheat and rice respectively, but 
cotton producers have 37% higher output levels (all compared to Punjab). Only for rice 
do producers in NWFP have systematically lower output levels than for Punjab, output
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levels being 68% lower in NWFP.
In §2.3 we examined the relationship between land size and output levels and our
results suggested a relationship which varied across crops. In this section we have tried
to explain variations in output levels for each crop through variations in input levels 
and farm practices. For all crops the level of nitrogen applied and the number of
irrigations carried out help to explain a substantial amount of the variation. However, it
is important to note that only in the case of cotton has land size (i.e. total cultivated 
acreage) been significantly correlated with output level, after we controlled for input
levels and farm practices - cotton a 10% increase in the total area cultivated leading to 
a 2% lower output level.
We argued earlier that it is input levels and the standard of farm practices (in 
conjunction with some other factors, e.g. weather conditions) which determine output 
levels and not land size per se. When we regress output levels on land size without 
controlling for input levels etc. we must interpret any significant relationships in this 
light. For example, a positive relationship is explained by the fact that input levels, the 
standard of farm practices or land quality are positively correlated with land size and
this is what is being captured by the regression. However, in our production function
analyses we have tried to control for variations in these variables. Our results then 
indicate that keeping input levels etc. constant we find that only in the case of cotton 
are there lower output yields on larger farms. It could, of course, be the case that we 
have not included some important variables or that some of the variables which we 
have included do not adequately capture the relevant characteristic of an input and that 
these are correlated with land size. For instance, if the quality of irrigations varies a 
lot then the number of irrigations (IRRN) may not be an adequate variable. This type 
of argument is to be preferred here when explaining such relationships between land
size and per acre yields.
Table 2.25 presents the marginal products (MPs) of the various inputs for 
individual crops. The calculation of MPs is described in Appendix A. Since the level 
of inputs and the standard of farm practices vary across farms, so too will the MPs of 
the various inputs. To give some idea of the average standard of agricultural practices
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we present marginal products at some average (or representative) value. For inputs 
which enter our regressions in log form (e.g. nitrogen) the MPs are calculated at their 
geometric means while for variables which enter in linear form (along with their square) 
MPs are calculated at the arithmetic mean. It is common to ask whether inputs are 
applied at levels which are economically efficient in the absence of uncertainty, i.e. up 
to a level where the value marginal product (VMP) of an input equals its price. If the 
ratio (ER) of the VMP of an input to its price exceeds one then the input is being 
applied at a level below its profit-maximizing level (assuming fixed prices and MPs 
decreasing with input levels). We present these ratios for nitrogen in Table 2.25 for 
the various crops. The choice of nitrogen reflects the fact that it is relatively easy to 
calculate the cost of an extra unit of nitrogen input, i.e. the price of one kg of
Table 25
R a t io  o f  Value Marginal  P roduct to Output P r i c e fo r  N i t ro g en
Crop q MP ER
Wheat 0 .94 4 .2 4 1.23
Rice 0 . 8 0 , 1 . 2 0 6.15 1 .5 1 ,2 . 2 7
Cot ton 2 .6 7 ,3 . 2 1 1.57 1 .2 9 ,1 . 5 5
Sugarcane 0 . 1 2 , 0 . 1 6 40 .64 1 . 5 0 ,2 . 0 0
Note:  q i s  the o u tp u t  p r i c e  (R s /k g ) ,  MP i s  the  marg ina l  p roduc t  
o f  one kg o f  f e r t i l i z e r  and ER i s  the r a t i o  o f  the  va lue  
marg inal  p roduc t  o f  f e r t i l i z e r  to the p r i c e  o f  f e r t i l i z e r  
(Rs. 3.25/kg), p. Therefore, ER=q.MP/p. Results use RUN2 
estimates of marginal products. For rice, cotton, and 
sugarcane (for which output prices vary considerably) we 
choose two representative prices and thus have a range of ERs.
The average price of nitrogen quoted in the sample is Rs2.96/kg with little 
variation around this value. Of course, the cost of an extra application (kg) of nitrogen 
will be higher since we must allow for extra trade and transport, labour costs and credit 
costs. So calculations of ER use Rs3.25/kg as the price of nitrogen input which is just 
less than 1.1 times the average price in the sample. The average price of wheat 
quoted in the survey was Rs0.94/kg with little variation around this value. The prices 
quoted for rice varied widely with 94% of producers quoting a price in the range 
RsO.6-1.4/kg and 50% quoting a price in the range RsO. 8-1.2/kg. The price of cotton
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also varied widely with 74% quoting a price in the range Rs2.67-3.21/kg and 98% 
quoting a price in the range Rs2.67-3.35/kg. For sugarcane 41% of households quoted 
a price of RsO. 12/kg and 39% quoted a price of RsO. 16/kg. The prices used when
calculating ER for each crop are included in Table 2.25.
Given that the prices for any particular crop vary across households and that input
levels and agricultural practices (and, as a result, MPs) also vary, so too will the value
for ER for each household. The values for ER presented in Table 2.25 should
therefore be interpreted as average values. These exceed one for all crops: ER is 
around 1.3 for wheat and lies in the ranges 1.51-2.27, 1.29-1.55 and 1.50-2.CX) for rice,
cotton and sugarcane respectively. The value of 1.3 for wheat is substantially lower
than the value of 3.5 calculated by Bliss and Stem (1982) for Palanpur, a village in 
northern India. However, it should be borne in mind that the sample used here is 
taken from the irrigated areas around the Indus Basin river. This affects the 
productivity of inputs and may mean that farmers in the sample may not face the same 
constraints as those in areas less well endowed with irrigation facilities, e.g. barani 
areas. It is also the case that access to irrigation reduces farmers’ dependence on an 
uncertain event, namely, rainfall. Therefore, the risks facing farmers in our sample are 
possibly not as great. Unfortunately, we do not have any comparisons with other 
studies for Pakistan for any of the crops. It is possible to show (see Chapter 4) that 
when uncertainty is allowed for in our models of farmer behaviour then optimal
behaviour can involve values of ER greater than one. Indeed we would be surprised to 
find empirical studies which calculate a value of ER=1 given the uncertainty associated 
with agriculture.
The results from our production function analysis highlight the importance of two 
crucial inputs in determining output levels, namely, irrigation and fertilizers. This is 
consistent with the results of our analysis of the data in §2.2 which identified irrigation, 
fertilizers and credit as the major constraints facing farmers. Also, these constraints
were more restricting on smaller farms, although we did also find that among users of 
fertilizer the per acre level applied decreased with farm size. We now present findings 
from a more recent set of studies of agricultural practices in Pakistan.
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§2.5 Agricultural Practices in the 1980s
A major element in the 6th Five-Year Plan for 1983-88 (Govemmant of Pakistan, 
1983) was the recognition of the need to acknowledge the various constraints facing 
small farmers and to incorporate these into policy initiatives. The large increase in the 
provision of credit, targeted at smaller farmers, for the purchase of crucial inputs was a 
central part of the new strategy. In an effort to identify the constraints facing small 
farmers the government commissioned a study which was undertaken for the country as 
a whole (see Ahmad et al, 1986a and 1986b, and Sharif et al, 1986). In all, for the 
agricultural year 1984-85, around 1600 farms were surveyed. In this section we give a 
summary of some of the ’premilinary findings’ of this study. However, it is important 
to understand that these findings are based on crude analysis (mainly cross tabulations) 
with no detailed theoretical or empirical modelling involved. This section should 
therefore be viewed as a summary of the suggestions from the preliminary findings.
The statistical characteristics of the sample were very similar to those of the IBS. 
However, one additional feature was the addition of barani (i.e. unirrigated or rain fed 
areas) in the sample. The distribution of farms according to farm size and tenure were 
similar to the IBS. Farms located in unirrigated areas tended to be larger than 
elsewhere reflecting the lower productivity of such land. The predominant form of 
tenancy was sharecropping with equal sharing of output and purchased inputs being most 
conunon.
As with the IBS there was substantial variation in input practices and output levels. 
Awareness of recommended practices was quite low except concerning the application of 
seeds and the numbers of ploughings. It appears that those farmers who were aware of 
recommended practices showed a high rate of adoption of these practices. The most 
prominent reason for non-adoption, after unawareness, was lack of funds often due to 
lack of access to sufficient credit. Overall the standard of extension services was very 
poor, in particular as regards the knowledge of recommended farm practices held by 
field assistants. Also, field assistants tended to focus on larger farms. In Baluchistan 
and NWFP the coverage of extension services was minimal. Households which 
exhibited an awareness of recommended practices quoted radio as the main source of
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information, followed by newspapers and agricultural literature.
Very few households owned tractors (less than 1.5%) but smaller farms did not 
appear to experience any difficulty in hiring tractor services if  required. The hiring-out 
of labour was more common in unirrigated areas where labourers would immigrate to 
irrigated areas in search of employment. In general there was no systematic variation
in per acre yields with respect to farm size. However, there was substantial variations 
in yields across households with yields apparently higher on tenant farms. The reports 
suggested that this latter trend was explained by the access of tenants to information 
concerning farm practices and inputs via landlords. The higher yields on tenant farms 
was more pronounced among smaller farms.
The results pertaining to access and use of credit reinforced those from earlier 
studies (see, for example, Amjad, 1972; Gotsch, 1973; and Khan, 1975) which showed 
that smaller farms had difficulty in securing loans for production purposes. The 1970s 
witnessed a substantial increase in agricultural credit initially channeled through the 
Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, with commercial banks eventually becoming 
the dominant institutional source. In 1979 the federal government directed commercial 
banks to provided interest free credit to small farmers (i.e. those-with less than 12.5 
acres). However, the awareness of such a scheme was very limited, especially among 
smaller farmers. The survey shows that in Sind less than 20% of farmers were aware 
of the scheme. Large farms continued to have privileged access to institutional sources. 
The results of the survey suggest that only 15% and 7.6% of farms in Punjab and Sind 
respectively had access to institutional credit. This figure was much lower among farms 
with less than 12.5 acres.
The insistence by credit institutions on collateral was a major reason for the 
exclusion of small landholders from the formal credit market. Other studies (for 
example, Khan et al, 1986) have also highlighted the fact that larger farmers have been 
able to gain access to the cheap institutional credit, meant for smallholders, by falsely 
fragmenting landholdings. The main reasons given by respondents for not using credit 
were non-availability, complicated procedures, lack of information and the need for 
illegal gratification. Among households who managed to secure institutional credit larger
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farms received higher levels in per acre terms. The results suggest that the low use 
made by tenants of institutional credit was explained by their lack of land which could 
be used as collateral and their access to credit via their landlord. The use of 
institutional credit was virtually non-existent where relatives were the dominant source.
With restricted access to institutional forms of credit smaller farms turned to
non-institutional sources of credit, e.g. moneylenders, commission agents or 
friends/relatives. In Punjab 32% used non-institutional credit with 70% using this source 
in Sind. Again, small farms tended to get lower loan amounts per acre.
Non-institutional loans were on average smaller than institutional loans. Whereas 
institutional credit was used almost exclusively for production purposes, in particular the 
purchase of fertilizers, households using non-institutional credit often used it to fund 
consumption.
The continued inability of credit schemes to reach their targeted group has created 
a deep suspicion, both within Pakistan and elsewhere, about the effectiveness of such a 
strategy. In economics there has been a growth in the theoretical and empirical 
discussion of credit markets, their operation and the appropriate government policies (see 
Bell, 1988,for a detailed survey). The use of credit and its interlinking with other 
markets is an important areas of study in developing countries. While the survey 
discussed here did not analyse these issues in detail it does seem that the data collected 
are sufficiently detailed for such purposes and such an analysis promises to be very
fruitful.
In general the results of the survey were consistent with our suggestions in §2.2
and §2.3. Small farms tended to be constrained by access to credit, having to rely 
mainly on non-institutional sources. Although output yields were not systematically 
related to farm size, there was substantial variation across households. Awareness of 
best practices was positively correlated with farm size. However, adoption of 
recommended practices, given awareness, was not necessarily significantly correlated with 
farm size. This result is similar to those for fertilizer use described earlier using the 
IBS data and highlights the need for a more detailed analysis of variations in input use. 
This task is undertaken for fertilizer use in Chapter 4.
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§2J Conclusions
One of the features of agriculture in many developing countries is the existence of
a wide range of production techniques and household characteristics. It is common for
the use, level and method of application of various inputs to vary substantially across 
farms. Some households have access to irrigation or credit and some do not. Some 
farmers use bullocks while others use tractor services. Not all farmers use fertilizers
and, among those who do, the levels applied vary. In these respects Pakistani
agriculture is no different. A central objective of this chapter is to describe, and try to 
explain, the organization of agriculture in Pakistan. Broadly speaking, we find that
behaviour under uncertainty and the presence of market imperfections, especially for 
agricultural inputs, can help us in understanding agricultural decisions and the variation
in agricultural practices observed in Pakistan.
The level of husbandry skills required by modem agricultural technology, combined 
with the imperfect operation (or even non-existence) of some cmcial input markets has 
important implications for the decisions of agricultural households and the nature of their 
contracts in other markets. In §2.2 we use this approach to explain the decision
making of agricultural households in Pakistan. For example, we provide evidence to 
show that the combination of the synchronic timing of many farm operations, the need 
for reliable access to cmcial factor inputs and the imperfect operation of the markets for 
draught animals, credit and labour, leads farmers to transact in the land market so as to 
match land operated to these imperfectly mobile factors. The higher cost of hired 
labour, reflecting the need to monitor certain tasks carefully, can help to understand 
cropping decisions and the greater use of labour on smaller farms. Also, sharecropping 
appears to play a role in overcoming some of the informational problems associated 
with credit provision and in ensuring a reliable labour supply. Landlords and tenants 
may interlink transactions in markets through this share tenancy arrangement with, for 
example, the former providing credit and land for the latter in return for guaranteed 
labour at cmcial times.
An ongoing debate in development economics concerns the relationship between 
productivity and farm size and its explanation. Previous analyses of this relationship
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suggest that it is negative and that it reflects the greater proportion of landholdings 
under cultivation, the higher cropping intensity, and the higher resource (e.g. labour and 
fertilizer) intensity on smaller farms. Our results confirm this reasoning for Pakistan. 
Focusing on individual crop physical yields our results suggest that, although the 
relationship between farm size and yields is crop specific, in all cases a smaller 
percentage of land allocated to risky crops operates to decrease risk and to increase 
input levels and yields on larger farms. The observed negative relationship between 
yields and farm size for rice and cotton is consistent with the presence of increasing 
relative risk aversion. Further evidence of increasing relative risk aversion is provided 
by the fact that, although the percentage of farms applying fertilizer increased with 
farm-size category, among users the per acre level applied is negatively correlated with 
farm size, yet also negatively correlated with risk level in spite of the fact that small 
farms seem to allocate a higher proportion of landholdings to risky crops. We argue 
that the negative yield relationships for rice and cotton will counteract the positive 
relationships for wheat and sugarcane so that it is likely that the higher cultivating and 
cropping intensities on smaller farms will dominate, producing an overall negative 
relationship between farm size and the total value of annual output per acre. So the 
uncertainty of agricultural production, the absence of adequate insurance markets, and the 
greater ability of larger farms to diversify among crops (reflecting greater resources) can 
help to understand the varation in cropping patterns, input levels and yields across 
farms.
In §2.3 we argue that testing for a relationship between land size and productivity 
is only a first step in testing some of the relationships suggested by economic theory. 
From a policy viewpoint what is more interesting is the identification of the factors 
which underlie the variation in productivity levels. One can then focus on the operation 
of the relevant markets and institutions and highlight reforms which would improve farm 
practices, the availability of important inputs, and increase output. For instance, if 
credit is found to be the main factor curtailing the use of crucial inputs (such as 
fertilizers) then one must analyse the credit market in more detail and decide whether 
government policy has any role in improving the operation of this market.
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We also discussed the factors constraining productivity levels, as perceived by 
farmers. The availability of credit and adequate irrigation were seen as the main 
constraints. Without access to credit many farmers are unable to purchase crucial inputs 
such as fertilizers. Households without own-funds are forced to rely on non-institutional 
credit from the informal credit sector (i.e. moneylenders, friends or relatives) where 
interest rates are often much higher. Inadequate irrigation facilities reduces the 
productivity of inputs such as fertilizers and increases uncertainty in yields. A greater 
percentage of smaller farms perceived credit availability as a constraint.
In §2.4 we use production function analysis in an attempt to identify the inputs 
and practices which would explain the variation in crop yields. Variations in fertilizer 
and irrigation levels were statistically significant in explaining the variation in yields. 
This reinforces our earlier findings that these inputs were perceived as major factors 
constraining yields. Our finding that the ratio of the value marginal product of fertilizer 
to its price exceeded unity for all crops reinforces the importance of allowing for 
uncertainty and risk aversion when analysing agricultural household behaviour.
The results from more recent surveys for the mid 1980s suggest that these 
constraints still persist despite a substantial increase in institutional credit and tubewell 
finance. Larger farms still appear to have a disproportionate claim on subsidized 
institutional credit channelled through agricultural banks, despite evidence of a higher 
probability of default. The insistence by agricultural banks on collateral is a major 
reason for this bias. Many smaller farms were unaware of the possibility of cheaper 
credit and some complained of the need to provide ’illegal gratification’ in order to 
even be considered for loans. Also, the concentration of government extension services 
on larger farms also meant that smaller farms were often unaware of recommended 
practices. This suggests that an understanding of behaviour under uncertainty and the 
imperfect nature of markets for inputs and factors of production is still important if an 
economic analysis of the organisation of agriculture in Pakistan is to contribute to the 
formulation of welfare-improving policy recommendations.
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Chapter Three 
Marketed Surplus of Foodgrains in Pakistan
§3.1 Introduction
From the perspective of economic development and growth the agricultural sector in 
developing countries has been seen as both a source of government revenue to finance 
the modem industrial sector and as a provider of crucial inputs to the latter. While 
governments in developing countries have been keen to exploit the revenue potential of 
agriculture (as witnessed by the procurement of agricultural produce at prices below 
world prices) they have also been aware of the importance of agriculture in providing
inputs into major industries, many of which are important earners of foreign exchange,
as a supplier of essential wage goods (i.e. food), and as an important earner of foreign 
exchange directly.
When setting procurement prices for agricultural outputs governments have therefore 
had to be concerned with the consequences of low agricultural prices for the level of 
marketed surpluses, especially for staple foods. Since it is commonplace for 
governments to procure only a small percentage of total foodgrain production, reflecting 
the high level of consumption on farm, small changes in production can have substantial
effects on market surplus and procurement as well as foreign trade and earnings. From
a revenue-raising point of view, the efficiency effects of price changes depend on 
individual crop own- and cross-price elasticities. One must also take account of the 
proportion of total production which is consumed on-farm and the proportion sold or 
bought in the market, i.e. the marketed surplus (henceforth denoted MS). The 
consequences for income distribution of price changes depend on the pattern of net 
purchases or sales of foodgrains across households.
While there have been some studies which analyse the factors determining the level 
of government procurement of food over time (see Pinckney, 1989, for Pakistan) there 
are very few which study the level of MS. This reflects, in part, the absence of 
time-series data on levels of marketed surplus. The central purpose of this paper is to 
show how we can gain useful insights into the determinants of the level of MS using
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cross-section data from farm-household surveys. Our results have implications for 
agricultural policy in Pakistan and we analyse the implications for pricing policy in
more detain in Chapter 6. Here we concentrate mainly on wheat, the major staple food 
in Pakistan.
In §3.2 we describe the operation of the wheat marketing system in Pakistan. The 
use of agricultural household models to show how one can analyse the MS of 
foodgrains is the subject of §3.3. There we indicate the characteristics which are
important for a household when it comes to deciding on the level of on-farm 
consumption of foodgrains and market purchases or sales. The discussion of these 
models helps to decide how our empirical analysis should be formulated, what variables 
should be included and how the model should be specified. We give simple examples 
to show the likely direction and magnitude of household responses to various variables 
of interest. Then §3.4 focuses on the price elasticity of MS. We discuss the likely
determinants of this elasticity and calculate a value for Pakistan, showing that it unlikely 
ever to be negative. In §3.5 we give a general description of the pattern of MS 
according to farm size, tenure and location. We analyse the determinants of MS across 
households using the Indus Basin Survey (IBS) of agricultural households in Pakistan for 
the agricultural year 1976/77. We also try to trace the determinants of MS back to 
their effects on consumption and production. Some of the problems that commonly 
present themselves with data of this nature are highlighted and incorporated into our
analysis. §3.6 contains our conclusions and summary.
§3.2 Government Procurement and Market Structure
In this section we give a brief description of the wheat marketing system in 
Pakistan. Much of the information is drawn from Comelisse and Naqvi (1987) and 
Turvey and Cook (1976). We concentrate mostly on the procurement stage which is 
more relevant to farmers’ decisions regarding the level of their marketed surplus.
State support prices were introduced into Pakistan in 1959-60 together with a ban 
on the movement of wheat by private traders across provincial boundaries. The latter 
restriction ensures that markef-clearing prices in surplus areas are lower than otherwise
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would be the case thus enabling the government to attain given procurement targets at 
relatively low procurement prices. Usually wheat is planted around November and
harvested in April or May - this is the rabi season. Government procurement is 
concentrated between May and August. Procurement levels increased substantially after 
1972 with the introduction of procurement centres in rural areas (see Table 3.1). In the 
early seventies the government procured between 16-18% of production but this has 
increased since 1976 to between 20-30%. Higher levels of procurement have been 
reflected in reduced imports and an increase in government stocks.
About 60% of the total production of wheat is consumed on-farm and the 
government procures around 70% of wheat sold in the market. Between 75-80% of the 
marketed surplus of wheat originates on farms greater than 12.5 acres. The central 
government sets the procurement (support) price for wheat and also procurement targets 
at the provincial level. It then decides how much wheat it needs to import Each 
province is responsible for the collection of wheat and its allocation to the mills. 
Transfers to other provinces need to be agreed by central government. Deficit provinces 
pay all costs, i.e. procurement price plus handling, storage, and transport costs. The
Punjab is the major surplus producer, Sind is more or less self-sufficient while both
NWFP and Baluchistan are deficit areas. There is thus a substantial transfer of wheat 
from the Punjab to the latter two provinces: around 60% of total procured wheat or 
over 20% of the punjab harvest, which in 1976 would have been equivalent to 1.6 
times the combined wheat harvests of NWFP and Baluchistan.
Wheat traders can be divided into village shopkeepers (beoparis), commission 
agents, wholesalers and procurement centres. Village shopkeepers buy mainly from 
small farmers surrounding a village, then resell to other traders in larger quantities.
Beoparis purchase from both small and large farmers and sell in larger quantities to 
procurement centres or to mills. Often village shopkeepers, beoparis or large farmers 
will employ commission agents to find buyers. These agents sell mainly to procurement 
centres. Wholesalers, on the other hand, deal only with other traders and not with 
farmers. The fact that government procurement prices are widely advertised and wheat 
traders are numerous ensures that the market for the purchase of wheat from farmers is
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Table 3 .1
Wheat Supply in P a k i s t a n . 1970-19831
Year Y2 M3 TA+ PR5 ST* POP?
1970-71 6476 285 7579 1017 n . a . 60449
1971-72 6890 690 7166 841 n . a . 62640
1972-73 7442 1359 8249 208 n . a . 64911
1973-74 7629 1229 8671 1342 n . a . 66841
1974-75 7673 1344 8973 1253 n . a . 68829
1975-76 8691 1186 8859 1236 417 70876
1976-77 9144 499 9190 2339 728 72984
1977-78 8367 1052 10196 1842 255 75154
1978-79 9950 2236 10603 1086 347 77389
1979-80 10857 602 10552 2376 685 79691
1980-81 11475 305 11162 2955 1021 82061
1981-82 11304 360 11835 2989 1572 84501
1982-83 12414 353 11657 3131 2097 87125
Source :  P a k i s t a n  Economie Survey 1982-83 ( r ep roduced  from C o r n e l i s s e  
and Naqvi,  1987, Table  1, p5 ) .
Notes:  (1) All  va lu e s  a re  in  ’000 tons .
(2)  P ro d u c t i o n :  Sown in  O ctober ,  h a r v e s t e d  in  A p r i l .
(3)  Impor ts:  from Ju ly  to June.
(4)  To ta l  a v a i l a b i l i t y :  P ro d u c t i o n  o f  p r e v io u s  year  p lu s  im por t s .
(5)  Procurement:  from May to A p r i l .
(6)  S tocks :  measured in  A pr i l  a t  end o f  h a r v e s t  y e a r ,  j u s t  b e f o r e  
h a r v e s t
(7)  P o p u la t i o n :  in  m i l l i o n s ,  
n . a .  = not  a v a i l a b l e .
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very competitive. So we expect that the variation in prices received by farmers reflects 
trade and transport margins. Also, although some wholesalers carry stocks in order to 
enable regular supplies to mills, it is unlikely that they can exert much control over 
prices since they must compete with sales from government stocks.
The marketing system described thus far applies mainly to Punjab and Sind. The 
level of government procurement in NWFP is minimal as is the level of marketed 
surplus. Using data for 1982, Comelisse and Naqvi (1987) found that 79% of total 
procured wheat came from Punjab with 20% procured in Sind. Marketed surplus as a 
percentage of total production was 43%, 40% and 37% in Punjab, Sind and NWFP 
respectively. This is consistent with our results using the Indus Basin Survey (1976). 
Of this surplus the government procures 74%, 72% and 5% respectively. Due to the 
fact that government involvement in the wheat market is much lower in NWFP, prices 
received by farmers tend to deviate more from the procurement price. Since NWFP is a 
deficit area the open market price of wheat is usually substantially higher than the 
procurement price.
§3.3 Agricultural Household Models and Marketed Surplus
In most developing countries the agricultural sector dominates both in terms of the 
proportion of total oufr>ut originating from this sector and the numbers finding 
employment within the sector. Thus the majority of households rely on agriculture as a 
major source of income. The agricultural sector is also often responsible for a large 
proportion of exports and foreign exchange earnings. It is therefore of great importance 
to policy-makers to be able to predict the likely impact of government policies on
agricultural households and their behaviour. To do so one must appreciate that the 
characteristics of the agricultural sector differ substantially from those of other sectors.
For example, households both produce and consume certain commodities, and markets 
are often not as developed as in, say, the industrial sector. One needs to be careful to
incorporate these characteristics when predicting the impact on household behaviour of
changes in government policies, e.g. changes in procurement prices. In recent years 
much more emphasis has been placed on developing detailed agricultural household
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models when analysing the effect of policy changes or when explaining the observed
behaviour of agricultural households (see Singh et al, 1986).
In this section we set out a very basic model which enables us to discuss some of
the issues involved. Much of the analysis is based on Singh et al (1986). Consider a
household which maximizes utility, U, where:
U = U (Xa,Xm,X*) ( 3 . 3 . 1 )
with Xa and Xj^ representing the consumption of an agricultural staple and market-
purchased commodity, respectively. Xç^  is the consumption of leisure. The budget
constraint facing households is:
Pa(Y& ■ Xa) - w(L - F) ■ Pm Xj^  ^ = 0 ( 3 . 3 . 2 )
where pa, p ^  and w are the market prices of the staple, the market-purchased
commodity and leisure (i.e. the wage rate) respectively. The term (Ya - Xa) is the
marketed surplus (MS) of the staple good, the difference between a household’s
production (Ya) and its consumption. L is total labour input into household production
and F is labour supplied by family members, so that (L-F) is the amount of hired
labour, if positive, or off-family labour supply, if negative. The household also faces a 
time constraint:
X& + F = T ( 3 . 3 . 3 )
where T is the total amount of time available to the household to be allocated between
leisure and either on-farm or off-farm labour. The production technology for the staple 
produced by the household is given by:
Ya = Ya (L,A) ( 3 . 3 . 4 )
where A is the fixed amount of land available to the household. This implicitly 
assumes that households will transact in other factor markets in order to meet the input 
requirements of a fixed land supply, rather than the other way round.
Substituting into (3.3.2) for F and Ya we can rewrite the budget constraint as:
Pm + Pa %a + * X& = w T + n  ( 3 . 3 . 5 )
where n  = paYa(L, A) - wL, i.e. profits from the household’s production activities.
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The right-hand side of this equation is often referred to as ’full-income’. The model 
presented here, although obviously over-simplified, is adequate for the purposes at hand. 
In reality households may grow many crops (e.g. cash crops) and use many inputs (e.g. 
fertilizer). Also we have ignored uncertainty, which one would expect to be of
importance to agricultural households when making decisions such as the amount of land
to allocate to certain crops and the level of various inputs to apply.
We assume here that prices are fixed. Households choose X^, X ^ , Xg^  and L so 
as to maximize utility. To focus on the choice of L (labour input) we present the 
relevant first-order condition:
Pa ^ ( 3 . 3 . 6 )
This tells us that households should allocate labour to production up to the point where 
its marginal revenue product equals the wage rate. Notice that this equation contains 
only one endogenous variable, L, which can be solved for as a function of prices (f^ 
and w), the technological parameters of the production function and the fixed land area. 
The choice of L (and consequently of Y^) does not depend on consumption decisions.
Let the optimum choice of L be:
L* = L* (w, Pa, A) (3.3.7)
which gives a profit-maximizing level, n*, which can be substituted into (3.3.5). 
Households can now choose X^, X ^ and Xg^  to maximize utility subject to this new 
budget constraint:
Pm ^m  Pa ^ a  ^  ~  ^ (3.3.8)
where I* is the full income associated with profit-maximizing production decisions, i.e. 
I* = Ï + n* and Ï is exogenous income. The first-order conditions for utility 
maximizing decisions are:
au
axjjj -  ^Pm
au
aXa -  ^Pa ( 3 . 3 . 9 )
au = X,w
I l l
and the budget constraint as given by (3.3.8). X is the marginal utility of income.
The solutions to these equations gives us the standard demand curves for the various 
consumption goods, i.e.
Xj = Xj (pm, Pa, w. I*) for i = m, a, & (3.3.10)
Additional household characteristics, e.g. the number of household members, can be 
included as extra variables if these affect consumption. However, as long as these are 
viewed as fixed then this will not change the analysis. Notice that consumption is a 
function of I* so that profit-maximizing production decisions affect consumption
decisions. We can therefore treat production and consumption decisions as being
sequential even though they may be taken simultaneously. Household decision-making 
can be modeled as if  households first maximize profits from production and then choose 
consumption bundles subject to profit-maximizing full-income. Although production 
decisions can be taken independently of consumption decisions the reverse is not true
since consumption is a function of n*.
The recursive nature of the model presented here depends crucially on some of our 
assumptions. For example, the amount of the staple produced is determined 
independently of the amount consumed because the household can always buy or sell
wheat at the fixed market price. But if a market for a commodity does not exist or if 
production or consumption decisions affect market prices then the recursive nature of the 
model no longer applies. In both cases the relevant price is endogenous to the model 
and production and consumption decisions must be solved simultaneously.
It is often the case in developing countries that markets do not exist for certain 
commodities so that production must equal consumption for these commodities. In such 
cases it is useful to focus on the concept of the virtual (or shadow) price for the 
relevant commodity when analysing household decisions. The virtual price of a 
commodity can be defined as the price that would lead the household to make the same 
consumption and production decisions for the commodity if markets did exist as they do 
when such markets are absent.
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It may be plausible to assume that markets do not exist for certain 
produced-commodities, e.g. maize or other home-grown foodstuffs. For such
conunodities it is helpful to focus on the virtual price when analysing the consequences 
of various policy changes or in explaining observed behaviour. Take, for instance, the 
example where the price of a cash-crop increases. This increases household income 
which increases the demand for, say, maize. The virtual price must then increase so as 
to equate the household demand for maize with its production of maize. The increase 
in the virtual price of maize leads to a substitution away from maize in consumption (if 
maize is not a Giffen good) and a substitition towards maize in production.
In this paper we are concerned with explaining the variation of MS across 
households. In our data set we observe, for each household, the outputs of various 
crops and the distribution of these outputs over various claims. For the purpose of our 
analysis we assume that the production decisions have already being made so as to
maximize (expected) household utility subject to various constraints, and we observe the 
outcome of these decisions. Households now make decisions about the distribution of 
these outputs between, say, domestic consumption and market sales. Note that we do
not necessarily assume that the household model is recursive. We assume that when
the household makes decisions about the distribution of various outputs it does so 
knowing the outcome of its production decisions and the prevailing market conditions, 
e.g. prices. The resulting distribution decisions do not necessarily have to coincide with 
those expected (or intended) at the beginning of the season (e.g. at planting) but will
do so if expectations formed at this time actually materialize.
This approach is essentially one of households making decisions in light of known
endowments (i.e. outputs) and market conditions (e.g. prices or the existence, or
otherwise, of certain markets) so as to maximize household utility. Thus our model can 
be viewed as an exchange model. Such an approach is plausible given the uncertainty 
in agriculture and the distinct time division between production and consumption 
decisions. For instance, at the beginning of the season a household decides how much 
land to allocate to wheat and the appropriate level of inputs, given actual input prices, 
expected outputs and expected output prices at harvesting. If, at harvesting, actual
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results (e.g. outputs or prices) do not coincide with expectations then there is no reason
why the household should stick with its planned decisions unless it has entered into
fixed contracts or something of this nature. It can reassess the situation and decide,
say, how much wheat to retain for domestic consumption and how much to sell in the
market.
The particular objective of this paper is to explain the variation in the MS of
foodgrains (e.g. wheat and rice) across households. Let the MS of, say, wheat be:
MSw = Yw - (p. I, Z) (3.3.11)
where is the actual output of wheat and is the amount of wheat retained by 
households for domestic consumption. Prices of consumption goods are denoted by p (a 
vector) and I is full-income or wealth. Notice that although, post harvest, input costs 
have already been incurred and other incomes received (e.g. income from off-farm 
labour supply) we still use the term full-income. Whether or not we include these
factor incomes or input costs in ’exogenous income/wealth’ or along with profits (as we
do below) makes no difference to the analysis which follows. Here we can think as if 
income from off-farm labour supply is included in exogenous income, and profits as 
being net of input costs, since this is the most common way of presenting the analysis.
We assume that the household can consume three conunodities, namely wheat (w), 
other farm products (f) and market-purchased goods (m). Therefore the vector p
consists of three prices: p^ , pf and p^ . We can interpret Z as household
characteristics which affect consumption, e.g. the number of household members. We 
assume that households produce wheat, other farm-products and a cash-crop (c), and that 
the total cost of production is C.
With the above assumptions full-income, 1, can be written as:
1 = Ï + n
where
TT = PwYw + PfYf + PcYc - C (3.3.12)
Ï is fixed exogenous income and n  is profits from production. Households choose 
consumption bundles to maximize utility given prices and a fiill-income constraint. We
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can analyse the variation in MS across households by examining (3.3.11).
We interpret (3.3.11) as applying to a particular household (say, h). Consider now 
another household, k, where the only difference between k and h is that k has a larger 
endowment of wheat (possibly because it had an extra acre which was allocated to 
wheat). The effect of this larger endowment of wheat can be gauged by differentiating 
(3.3.11) with respect to Thus, dropping the subscript for convenience,
3ms _ . 3X 3n
W ~  -   ^ '  ÏÏT ^
Rearranging we get:
ms = 1 + 0 [1 - ei err] (3.3.13)
where e^g is the elasticity of MS of wheat, ej is the income elasticity of demand for
wheat and Cjj the elasticity of profits, all with respect to Y ^. The term 0 = X/MS is
the ratio of household consumption of wheat to its sales of wheat
To get some idea of the sign and possible magntitude of e^ ^g we can impose
some plausible values on (3.3.13). Immediately we can see that e(iig>l if C[e^<l.
Assume that the household retains 60% of output for domestic consumption, so that
0yy=1.5, and that the income elasticity of demand for wheat is 0.35. To select a value
for the elasticity of profits, Ojj, we assume two outputs (i = 1,2) with constant per unit
profit margin, nj. The elasticity of profits with respect to Y% is then:
"1 Y]
In this example we see that the more important is wheat (commodity 1) in terms of 
total farm output the nearer is e^ j to unity. If, at the optimum, per acre profits are 
equalized across crops and 70% of land is allocated to wheat then e^ = 0.70. 
Imposing these values on (3.3.13) implies a value of ^ g  = 2.13. Alternatively, if  50% 
of output is retained for domestic consumption then 0% = 1 and e^g = 1.75. Here we 
have assumed that per acre profits are constant over all ranges of Y%. However, it is 
easy to see that e^s is a decreasing function of n%. These examples are fairly crude
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but seem to indicate that we would expect e^g to exceed unity.
Equation (3.3.13) represents the elasticity of household MS of wheat to an increase 
in the household endowment of wheat, holding all other household characteristics (e.g. 
other endowments) constant. If the price of wheat varies across households then this
will also affect the level of MS. Differentiating (3.3.11) with respect to the price of 
wheat (remembering that we are keeping ^  endowments constant) we get:
®  - b ( 3 . 3 . 1 4 )
where is the compensated own-price elasticity of demand for wheat (a negative
number) and b is the marginal propensity to spend on wheat. In the next section we
present plausible values for these parameters. Imposing these values on (3.3.14) we 
have:
Wheat: r\^(y) = 0.35 (1.5) - 0.054 = 0.471 
Rice: ^ ^ ÿ )  = 0.49 (0.25) - 0.05 = 0.072
These are relatively crude estimates but indicate that we might expect this elasticity, the 
constant output price elasticity of MS, to be positive. In the next section we discuss 
the elasticity of MS as it is usually defined in the literature. The difference with this
elasticity here, r|^(y), is that we keep output (or endowments) constant.
Consider now the situation where the only difference between household k and 
household h is that k has a larger endowment (output) of a cash crop. This increases 
the full-income of k leading to an increase in consumption of wheat (a normal 
conunodity). Thus, from (3.3.11), we expect household k to have a lower MS of 
wheat. The same applies to a higher endowment of other farm products.
We can use the concept of the virtual price of a commodity to analyse the effect 
of a larger endowment of a commodity for which no market exists, i.e. households 
produce the amount they wish to consume. A larger endowment will imply a lower 
virtual price (so as to equate demand and supply) which in turn implies a lower 
full-income, a lower consumption of wheat and a larger MS of wheat. So if a 
particular farm product is non-traded we expect a larger endowment to lead to a higher 
level of MS of wheat. Compared to the case where we assumed it to be traded, the
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sign of the effect has changed from negative to positive. This highlights the importance 
of modeling markets correctly.
Notice that any difference between the household characteristics of h and k which 
increases the full-income of k will lead k to have a higher consumption of wheat and a 
lower MS. Also, if k has a greater preference for other commodities then it will 
consume more of these leaving less income to be spent on wheat and a consequent 
increase in its MS. The analysis here is partial in the sense that we are focusing on
differences between h and k keeping all other characteristics constant. So the
directional impact on the MS of wheat coincides with the sign of the relevant variable
on the right-hand side of a regression with MS as the dependent variable.
In §3.5 below we present the results of an empirical analysis of the MS of wheat 
and its variation across households. The model and discussion presented here give some 
indication as to which variables should be included as explanatory variables in our 
regressions which have MS as the dependent variable. Equations (3.3.11) and (3.3.12)
suggest that variables which reflect variations in household endowments of various 
commodities or household characteristics which capture household consumption 
preferences should be included. Notice, however, that we assumed that unit production 
costs and unit profit margins were constant across farms for each crop. If this is not 
the case then we must include some variable to capture variations in cost. For 
example, if we thought that unit costs were a decreasing function of farm size then we 
could include a farm-size variable as an explanatory variable (which would be expected 
to exhibit a negative coefficient reflecting the higher full-income on larger farms). 
Alternatively, if costs varied systematically across provinces then we could interpret
locational dummies in this light. Lack of data on the cost side may mean that we
must rely on such proxies in our regressions. However, one should appreciate that such 
dummies can pick up a variety of effects in practice (e.g. income effects or variations 
in the standard of infrastructural services). Before presenting our empirical results we
discuss some of the factors which determine the price elasticity of MS, in particular the
aggregate response for the economy as a whole.
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§3.4 The Price Elasticity of Marketed Surplus
Agricultural household models provide a very useful framework in which we can 
discuss household reaction to various policy changes. We focus here on how household 
production and consumption decisions change when faced with an increase in output 
prices. We are particularly interested in the factors which determine the own price 
elasticity of MS for the two major foodgrains in Pakistan, i.e. wheat and rice. Work 
with agricultural household models has highlighted the need to incorporate an additional 
profit effect alongside the traditional income and substitution effects of a price change. 
The positive profit effect on consumption of a price increase introduces the possibility 
of a fall in the MS of a foodgrain in response to an increase in its price. In this 
section we examine the various arguments concerning the sign and magnitude of the 
elasticity of MS and are particularly interested in the elasticity for the economy as a 
whole.
The marketed surplus of a household for any commodity is defined as the 
difference between household production and household consumption, i.e.
MS = Y(p) - X(p,I) (3.4.1)
where MS is marketed surplus, Y household production and X household consumption. 
Production is a function of output prices - we assume constant input prices to simplify 
the analysis. Consumption is a function of prices and total income, I. Total income 
can be divided into income from non-agricultural sources, Î, and profits from agriculture,
n :
I = Ï - ncp) (3.4.2)
where profits are a function of output prices. Differentiating (3.4.1) with respect to p, 
applying the Slutsky decomposition of a price change and Hotelling’s Lemma we get:
HS " ( 3 . 4 . 3 )
where r|™ and riY are the price elasticities of MS and production respectively, is 
the compensated elasticity of demand and b is the marginal propensity to spend on the
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commodity in question. It can be easily shown that these aggregate elasticities are 
weighted averages of individual farm household elasticities. For market surplus and the 
marginal budget share the weights are household MS as a proportion of total MS while 
for output and consumption the weights are household output and consumption 
respectively as a proportion of total MS. We now use this equation to discuss the 
various arguments forwarded regarding the size of relative to the elasticity of
production, qY, and also the sign of the former. We then analyse the data for Pakistan
in order to get a rough idea of the elasticities that are likely to emerge.
As a starting point we examine a paper by Mathur and Ezekel (1961) - henceforth
M-E. The basic argument in this paper concerns the sign of q"^. From (3.4.3) we 
see that for q*^ to be negative qY must be less than a weighted average of the 
compensated elasticity of demand for the commodity and its marginal budget share, with 
the shares of consumption and MS in production, respectively, as weights, i.e.
q"^ < 0  iff qY < ^  r ^ b  (3.4.4a)
where r^ = X/Y and r ^  = MS/Y are, respectively, the shares of consumption and MS 
in output, is the compensated elasticity of demand (a negative number), b is the 
marginal budget share and other variables are as before. Also:
q^  > qY i f f  qy > + £jn ^ ( 3 . 4 . 4 b )
M-E argue that in less developed countries, where there exists a large number of 
’subsistence’ farmers, q"^ is likely to be negative. They explain the basis of their
proposition as follows. ’Subsistence’ farmers do not produce enough foodgrains to meet 
’basic consumption’ needs yet we observe them selling a ‘surplus’ in the market. The
purpose of these sales is to raise cash to pay for ’fixed’ cash expenditures, e.g. cash
payments for land rent. The effect of a rise in price of foodgrains (relative to all
other prices) is that the farmer can now sell less wheat and still meet these fixed cash
requirements and can also increase his own consumption of foodgrains. So it appears
that what M-E had in mind was a farm household which has a cash rent to pay and 
its only source of cash liquidity (at least on the margin) is the sale of foodgrain in the
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market. For such households this constraint is assumed binding (in the sense that given 
their income and other household characteristics they would like to sell less food and 
consume more on-farm) and therefore determines the level of home consumption of 
food. By definition then an increase in price will always lead to a fall in market sales 
of foodgrain.
With the above assumptions the M-E hypothesis is quite valid. However, Dandekar 
(1964) refutes the validity of these assumptions for many less developed countries. He 
argues that the ‘subsistence farmer’ as portrayed by M-E, while he does exist, is not 
representative of many farmers in less developed countries. For our purposes we can 
divide farmers into four categories:
i) Small farmers whose output of foodgrains does not meet their basic
requirements. These supplement their consumption of foodgrain output with 
purchases of food from the market. They also purchase other goods from
the market. The cash necessary to purchase from the market comes from 
providing casual labour to other farmers, sales of other output produced on 
the farm (if such exists) or remittances from family members working in the 
urban sector or abroad, 
ii) Small farmers who neither buy nor sell foodgrains from the market. These 
farmers produce just enough foodgrains to satisfy their requirements. The 
consumption of other necessities is financed as in (i) above, 
iii) Small farmers who, while they have not retained as much foodgrains as they
would have liked, still sell a small amount of foodgrains in the market to
finance the consumption of other necessities. This category corresponds to 
M-E’s subsistence farmer. It is more useful to think of these as having no 
income other than that from the production of foodgrains and therefore being 
poorer than farmers in category (i) above, 
iv) Medium and large farmers who sell a relatively substantial proportion of their 
output in the market and whose consumption of other necessities easily 
covers basic requirements.
Dandekar argues that even though the final category of farmers typically account for a
120
smaller proportion of farm units they nevertheless usually account for a relatively large 
proportion of acreage and an even larger proportion of the MS of foodgrains.
Therefore, they carry a larger weight in the calculation of in (3.4.4) above. So it
is the behaviour of these farmers in response to a change in the output price of 
foodgrains that is relevant. The characteristics of these farmers are as follows:
a) Their output is responsive to price changes (i.e. r|y > 0). This is especially
true of very large farms which are run on a commercial basis. Use of 
modem inputs and access to credit is not a problem for many of these 
farmers. Indeed, Dandekar thinks that even for subsistence farmers rjy > 0 
since higher prices raise income levels, consiunption and health. Some of 
the extra income may also be allocated to improvements in farm utensils, 
better draught power and improved feeding of existing draught animals, which 
in turn increases output.
b) The cash received from market sales is used to finance the consumption of a 
wide range of other commodities, including food. Some of the extra income
is allocated to farm improvements and increases in the level of inputs, thus
raising output levels. Since basic food requirements have been covered the 
marginal budget share of food is much lower than unity (i.e. b < 1).
c) Market sales as a proportion of output can be 0.5 or higher, i.e. r ^  = 1-r^
>0.5.
These three factors all combine to make it very unlikely that qy < 0.
We now examine the data for Pakistan to get some idea as to the likely
magnitude of the aggregate elasticities of MS for wheat and rice, the most important
foodgrains in Pakistan. The breakdown of output over that procured by government,
consumed on-farm and sold to other consumers is presented in Table 3.2a. The
elasticities are aggregate elasticities for the economy as a whole so we are concerned
here with the overall elasticity of MS for the economy.
We can apply the values presented in Table 3.2 to (3.4.3) to calculate the 
elasticities of MS for wheat and rice as:
Wheat: = (2.50 x 0.15) - (1.50 x -0.35) - 0.054 = 0.864
Rice : = (i 25  x 0.15) - (0.25 x -0.49) - 0.050 = 0.260
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Table 3 .2
(a ) P rocurement.  Marketed Su rp lus  and Output  E l a s t i c i t i e s
Sector P rocured On-Farm Open Mkt. r s Tiy
Wheat 0 .25 0 .60 0.15 2 .50 1.60 0.15
Rice 0 .30 0 .2 0 0.50 - - 0 .15
S ’Cane 0 .30 0 .70 - 3.33 - 0 .5 0
Co t ton 1.00 1.00 0 .4 0
(b) E l a s t i c i t i e s .  Output and Marginal Budget Shares
tlY
Wheat
Rice
0.15
0.15
2 .50
1.25
0.40
0.36
0 .60
0.63
0.35
■0.49
0 .054
0.050
S ources :  A g r i c u l t u r a l  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  P a k i s t a n  (1985) ,  P a k i s t a n  S t a t i s t i c a l  
Survey (1985) ,  M ic ro -N u t r i e n t  Survey (1976) ,  Ahmad and Ludlow 
(1987) and Askari  and Cummings (1976) .
Note:  t^y i s  the own-pr ice  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  o u t p u t ,  r i s  the r a t i o  o f  ou tp u t  
to  marke ted  s u r p l u s ,  s i s  the r a t i o  o f  s u r p lu s  to government 
p rocurem en t ,  r§ i s  the r a t i o  o f  s u rp lu s  to o u t p u t ,  r^ i s  the share  
o f  consumption in  o u t p u t ,  i s  the compensated e l a s t i c i t y  o f  
demand and b th e  marginal  budget  s h a re .
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Ali (1988, p21) derives alternative higher estimates for the price elasticities of output for 
wheat (0.327) and rice (1.92). These imply an if ”  for wheat and rice of 1.29 and 
2.47 respectively. The values from Table 3.2 also indicate that the output elasticities 
for wheat and rice would have to be less than -0.19 and -0.29 respectively for the 
corresponding surplus elasticities to be negative (see equation 3.4a). Since these figures 
are highly unlikely so too is a negative surplus elasticity for either commodity. Finally, 
the surplus elasticities will exceed their corresponding output elasticities where the latter
exceed -0.31 and -0.46 for wheat and rice respectively (see equation 3.4b). Therefore,
if the chosen values are representative, it is very unlikely that the surplus elasticity of 
wheat or rice for the economy as a whole will ever be lower than the relevant output 
elasticity for the economy.
We now turn to the household characteristics which determine whether or not 
households sell in the market and analyse the determinants of the level of MS across 
households.
§3.5 Determinants of Marketed Surplus of Wheat
In this section we analyse the MS of foodgrain in Pakistan for 1975/6. We focus 
mainly on wheat for which we have the relevant data. However, we also make some 
references to rice in passing. We are interested in identifying the characteristics of 
those households which sell wheat in the market and the factors which determine the 
level of their marketed surplus. Initially for the purpose of analysing the distribution of 
MS over households we divide farms into four categories according to total acreage: (1) 
less than 5.0 acres, (2) 5.0 - 12.5 acres, (3) 12.5 - 25.0 acreas and (4) over 25 acres.
From Table A3.la  we see that the percentage of farms with zero MS of wheat
decreases over farm size category, is highest in NWFP and lowest in Punjab. It is also 
substantially higher for pure tenants. Among households with positive MS the 
percentage of the operator’s share sold in the market increases over farm-size category. 
Of the total sample MS, 80% originates on farms with acreage greater than or equal to 
12.5 acres.
For rice the story is much the same (see Table A3, lb). The percentage of
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households with zero MS decreases with farm-size. Also, among households with MS>0 
the percentage of output sold increases with farm-size, being especially high for 
households with farm-size exceeding 25 acres. In our sample very few households in 
NWFP grow rice and those that do have MS<0. The percentage of households with 
MS>0 is similar in both Punjab and Sind, both just less than 50%. Also, a greater 
percentage of owner-landlords appear to have zero surplus. Of the total sample surplus 
70% originates on farms with acreage greater than or equal to 12.5 acres.
Some idea of the distribution of landholdings across households in Pakistan for 
1972 and 1980 can be obtained from Table A3.2. The picture is much the same in 
both years. Focusing on 1980 we see that although 76% of farms are less than 5 
hectares (12.35 acres) these account for only 36% of total farm area and only 39% of 
total cultivated area. So land in Pakistan is very unequally distributed.
The above analysis supports the view that even though larger farms constitute only 
a small percentage of total farm units they account for a relatively large proportion of 
farm area and an even larger proportion of the MS of foodgrains. We now describe a 
model which can be used as the basis for an empirical analysis of the variation of MS 
across households.
§5.5.7 The Model
In our model we think of a farm household post harvest. For each household the 
level of various outputs are known, as are market prices. The household now has to 
decide how much of each commodity to consume and how much to buy or sell in the 
market. We focus here on wheat and can set out a simple model as follows:
M S^ = Qw - Cyy (3.5.1)
Cw = p . + P .Y  + P,Pw  + P ,N  + p .Z  (3.5.2)
Y = PwQw + PqQo - PyY + wL (3.5.3)
where M ^, and C%, are the household’s MS, production (or endowment) and
consumption respectively. Household consumption is a function of income (Y), prices
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(P), the number (and composition) of household members (N), and other household
characteristics (Z). Wheat, ’other’ outputs and variable inputs are denoted by subscripts 
w, 0  amd v respectively. Here we have used a specific function where consumption is 
linearly related to the relevant variables, but this is just for the purposes of discussion, 
and we argue below that there are important difficulties when it comes to estimating 
such models in practice. Income is defined as the value of outputs (endowments) minus 
input costs plus any other sources of income such as off-farm labour income.
Since we view endowments and income as fixed the only decision remaining for 
the household is its level of wheat consumption. The level of MS is derived as the 
difference between the fixed wheat endowment and the desired level of consumption, 
and can be positive, negative or zero. Substituting income into the consumption 
equation we can estimate the ps using household data. Substituting back into the
equation for MS we can calculate the response of MS to various parameters, say, prices 
and income. So, for example, dropping the subscript w for convenience,
g =  l - p . p ;  - p . :  ^ = P ,  - P.Q
Often it is difficult to calculate input costs but one could assume these to be a function 
of, say, farm size or farm tenure, and interpret the coefficients accordingly.
Although the structure of the above model adequately captures the decision making 
of agricultural households there are problems when it comes to estimation. Consider the 
simple consumption model where:
C = p’x  + u
where C is consumption, X is a vector of explanatory variables (which will include 
those in the reduced-form consumption function from the system described by equations 
3.5.1 to 3.5.3), p is a vector of parameters to be estimated and u is a stochastic error 
term. The estimation problems arise from (a) the correlation of some explanatory 
variables, X, with the error term, u, so that E(X’u)?K), (b) sample selection, (c) 
influential observations, and (d) heteroskedasticity. We discuss these in turn.
There are many reasons why E(X’u ) ^  when estimating the consumption function
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described above. For example, the error term may capture the fact that certain
households may have a preference bias towards wheat consumption and this is not
allowed for in our X variables. If there is a preference for home-grown wheat then 
one might expect that households with a bias towards wheat will have a higher level of 
wheat production so that E(Qy^’u)>0. Therefore, estimated coefficients are biased and
inconsistent.
More generally, if any of the explanatory variables are measured with error then 
their coefficient estimates are biased and inconsistent. These errors may be due to
substantive measurement problems such as those arising from difficulties in specifying an 
appropriate definition of income to use in the consumption function, or just ordinary
measurement problems in data collecting and processing. It is quite possible that the
measurement of income we use (calculated from our data) may not include income from 
all sources or that we are unable to capture the cost side adequately. If any of these 
measurement errors are systematically correlated with another explanatory variable (e.g. 
farm size) then its coefficient estimate is also biased and inconsistent. To circumvent
this problem we fall back on a reduced-form MS equation which includes only fixed or 
quasi-fixed household characteristics as explanatory variables (e.g. farm size, household
composition, land tenure, location or market prices).
Because of the way that the data are collected we also have problems with sample 
selection bias. The Indus Basin Survey contains data on the level of output and the 
distribution of output over various claims, e.g. landlord, family consumption and market 
sales. Households can have positive, zero or negative MS. However, for both 
households with zero MS and negative MS we observe zeros, i.e. we do not have any 
information on purchases from the market. It is therefore necessary to focus on 
households with MS>0. An analysis of this truncated sample must then take into
account its non-random nature. Applying classical regression techniques (i.e. OLS) to 
non-randomly selected samples gives biased and inconsistent estimates This results from 
the fact that population values of u are excluded from the sample in a way that 
systematically depends on X. Then the conditional expectation of u is not equal to 
zero and u is likely to be correlated with X, so that E(X'u)?K). It can be shown that
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in such selected samples:
E(uj) = aXj
where is the inverse of Mill’s ratio and a  is a constant. To enable us to get
consistent estimates of population parameters from a selected distribution we use the
Heckman (1979) technique. This interprets the problems which arise when applying
OLS to non-randomly selected samples as one of specification error or omitted variables. 
First we get a consistent estimate of Aj by applying a probit analysis to the full sample 
and use this estimate as an explanatory variable in an OLS regression. If the 
coefficient on Xj is significantly different from zero then we can reject the null
hypothesis that sample censoring for the model is an unimportant phenomenon.
However, although the coefficient estimates emerging from this technique have desirable 
large sample properties (i.e. consistency) they are inefficient compared to maximum 
likelihood estimates.
A preliminary analysis of the data highlighted the presence of influential
observations, i.e. those which lie outside the pattern set by the majority of the data.
Influential observations are usually located far from the centre (i.e. majority) of the data 
and are referred to as ’leverage points’. Such points can have an unreasonable 
influence on regression estimates when we use OLS. One way of reducing the impact 
of such observations (and the one adopted here) is to use the logs of the relevant
explanatory variable (see Appendix B to this chapter for a more detailed discussion).
A central assumption in OLS regressions is that all error terms have the same
variance, i.e. the assumption of homoskedasticity of the error terms. If households with
higher levels of income (e.g. those with large farms) have more flexibility over their 
choice of how much to sell in the market and how much to retain for own-consumption 
then this assumption may be invalid, i.e. we may have heteroskedastic errors. It is 
reasonable to expect that households at or near subsistence levels of consumption are
unable to change the amount they sell in the market by very much if they are to meet
minimum household requirements. We may therefore observe that the consumption and 
MS levels of households with higher incomes exhibit higher variances, i.e. some rich
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households consume relatively high levels of wheat while others consume relatively low 
levels possibly reflecting ability to purchase or an acquired taste for more expensive 
wheat substitutes. In such circumstances estimated coefficients are inefficient, i.e. they 
no longer have the property of minimum variance. The estimates are still, however,
unbiased and consistent.
It is a common approach in the presence of heteroskedasticity to transform the data
so as to reduce the dispersion in the tails of the distributions of variables. One such
transformation is to express the data in log form. Since the use of logs for the
relevant variables also reduces the impact on the estimates of observations which lie a 
long distance from the centre of the data we decided to transform the relevant data in 
this manner. However, we keep in mind throughout that this is imposing a functional 
form on the data and where possible experiment with other functional forms.
Finally, we say a few words about the use of the Heckman (1979) technique in 
our truncated sample. Notice that if we have data on all the explanatory variables for 
the observations deleted from the sample (i.e. where observed MS=0) then we could run 
a tobit regression. However, since we do not have wheat prices for these observations 
we would have to estimate prices using the Heckman technique. For example, let
MS = + P ,P  + u
and P = a , + + e
where Xj are explanatory variables, the variables X  ^ form a subset of X ^, P is the 
price of wheat, and u and e are stocastic error terms. We do not observe prices for 
households with MSzO. However, we can calculate the appropriate inverse of Mill’s 
ratio, X, by substituting for P in the MS equation. We then use X, as an extra 
explanatory variable when estimating the price equation using the truncated sample. The 
predicted prices (for the full sample) can then be used in a tobit regression run on the 
full sample to estimate the MS equation. Such a technique was experimented with and 
we found that only provincial location variables were significant in the price equation. 
Also, the results from the tobit are suspect: for example the price elasticity of MS was 
negative. This may reflect the presence of heteroskedasticity which in limited-dependent 
variable models leads to inconsistent estimates. In fact modest heteroskedasticity can
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cause parameters to be misestimated by a substantial amount (see Maddala, 1983, 
ppl78-182). We therefore do not present the results from the tobit regressions.
§5.5.2 The Data
We now discuss the data used in our empirical analysis. The Indus Basin Survey 
(IBS) provides data on total cropped acreage (LAND). The data show that the 
percentage of land allocated to wheat decreases with farm size but that absolute wheat 
acreage increases with farm size. We may therefore expect an increase in LAND to 
increase wheat production and MS, i.e. the production effect dominates the negative 
effect of increased income on MS. We also have data on the prices received by 
farmers for their wheat output (WHPR). Higher prices have a production effect as well 
as an income and substitution effect in consumption. The sign of the income effect on 
consumption depends on whether a household is a net buyer or seller of wheat, being 
negative for the former and positive for the latter. Therefore, the net consumption 
effect of a price change can be positive or negative. In §3.4 we argued that we 
expect, on average, the price elasticity of MS to be positive.
Data are also available on the method used to transport wheat to the market.
Wheat was usually transported using a bullock or donkey and cart (70%) but was 
sometimes man-carried (12%). We include zero-one variables representing modes of 
transport as explanatory variables. We distinguish between five modes of transport: 
tractor and trolly (TRAC), bullock and cart (BULL), donkey (DONK), man-carried 
(MAN) and various other methods (OTHTR). Each variable is set equal to one if the 
household used this method of transport, zero otherwise. If per unit costs vary 
according to transport method then these dummies should emerge as statistically
significant from our regressions. For instance, if ’bullock and cart’ is a more costly
mode of transport than other methods then this will reduce income for households
relying on this mode and lower consumption with a consequent increase in MS. 
However, if per unit costs are equalized across modes of transport then these dummies 
should be insignificant in our regressions. Information is also available on the distance 
wheat is transported to the market (DIST).
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Other variables used as independent variables are: whether or not the household 
used credit for production purposes (CREDIT), whether or not the head of the 
household had an outside job (JOB), the nature of the tenure agreement (where PTEN 
is 1 if the household is a pure tenant, OTEN is 1 if it is classified as an owner-tenant 
and OLRD is 1 if it is classified as an owner-landlord - otherwise the relevant variable 
is set equal to zero), and location in the Punjab (PUNJ) or in NWFP. All these 
variables are introduced as zero-one variables. It is possible that households which rely 
on credit do so because at the beginning of the season they do not have the funds 
required to finance the purchase of necessary inputs. We can interpret this as such 
households having lower exogenous income and therefore expect them to have a higher 
MS. However, one must be aware that answers to such questions may not be very 
revealing since credit may be replacing decreased consumption as a source of input 
finance. Also, access to credit may enable the purchase of agricultural inputs such as 
fertilizer and thus increase production and MS. In contrast, income from an outside job 
increases consumption and decreases MS. Alternatively, if an outside job entails more 
frequent contact with urban areas then this enables the household to purchase flour, 
especially cheaper rationed flour. This preference for urban flour reduces consumption 
of home-grown wheat leaving more for sale in the market.
The number of household members is disaggregated into: (i) men over 15 - MEN, 
(ii) women over 15 - WOMEN, (iii) boys 10-15 - BOYS, (iv) girls 10-15 - GIRLS, 
and (v) male and female children - CHILD. Literature on the extent of poverty and 
inequality often distinguishes between the total number of household members and this 
number translated into ’equivalent units’. This use of ’equivalent scales’ in meant to 
capture the differing food requirements of households with different age and gender 
characteristics. For instance, a household with five members made up of five adults 
will have a greater food requirement than another with two adults and three children. 
This approach can be contrasted with the view that household endowments (particularly 
of food) are distributed unequally or unfairly among its members (say, in comparison to 
individual requirements). It is often suggested that females fare badly when it comes to 
the intra-household allocation of food, sometimes referred to as ’gender bias’ (see, for
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example, Deaton, 1989).
When the head of a household decides how much of home-produced food to retain 
for consumption (given endowments) his decision will reflect the number of household
members, their classification according to age and sex, and any ’gender bias’ which may 
be present. For our analysis therefore the ’equivalent scales’ may have to be 
augmented by the ’gender bias’. Also it must be true that all these factors are taken 
into account by the head of the household when making the relevant decisions. While 
equivalent scales are frequently available this is not true of any measurement of gender
bias. However, if the equivalent scales are measured from demand analysis then they
will include this gender bias effect. Rather than experiment with equivalent scales we
disaggregate household members according to age and gender and examine their effect 
on consumption, production and marketed surplus.
We now move on to discuss the results of our empirical analysis. First of all we
concentrate on the results from our probit regressions which are useful and interesting in
their own right. We then turn to the results from our analysis of the truncated sample 
using the Heckman (1979) method to correct for sample selection bias.
%3.5.3 Probit Results
An analysis of the IBS data shows that a greater percentage of smaller farms do
not sell wheat in the market. For farms less than 5 acres 87% have zero MS whereas
only 22% of farms over 25 acres do not sell wheat (see Table A3.la). This also
applies to rice growers where 67% of households with holdings less than 5 acres do
not sell rice whereas for households with over 25 acres only 18% do not have a 
positive MS (see Table A3.lb). In this section we are interested in identifying the 
household characteristics which determine whether or not a household sells foodgrains in
the market. We run probit regressions for the full sample of wheat producers.
However, we leave the interpretation of coefficients until our discussion of the results of
the OLS regression run on the truncated sample.
The definitions of variables used in our empirical analyses are given in Table 3.3
and data statistics in Table A3.3. Our probit results are presented in Table A3.4. As
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Table 3 .3
Summary o f  V a r i a b l e s  used in  R e g re s s io n  Analyses
Dependent V a r i a b l e :
MS : Leyel  o f  marketed s u rp lu s  (k g s ) .
FC : Family  consumption o f  wheat ( k g s ) .
Y: Wheat ou tp u t  ( k g s ) .
MSD : Dummy fo r  whether or not  household  has  s u r p l u s .
Independent  V a r i a b l e s :
LAND
WHPR
NUMTOT
MEN
WOMEN
BOYS
GIRLS
CHILD
NUMOTH
DIST
BULL
DONK
MAN
TRAC
CREDIT
JOB
PTEN
OTEN
OLRD
SLSAL
GSAL
SVSAL
PUNJ
NWFP
X
Number
Number
Number
Number
Number
Number
o f
o f
o f
o f
o f
o f
To ta l  cropped ac re ag e .
P r i c e  o f  wheat (R s /kg ) .
Number o f  household  members.
a d u l t  males in  fam i ly ,  
a d u l t  females in  fam i ly ,  
boys (<15 y e a r s )  in  fam i ly ,  
g i r l s  (<15 y e a r s )  in  f am i ly ,  
c h i l d r e n  (<10 y e a r s )  in  fam i ly ,  
women, boys,  g i r l s  and c h i l d r e n .
D is ta n c e  g r a i n  has to be t r a n s p o r t e d  ( m i l e s ) .
Dummy fo r t r a n s p o r t  o f  g r a i n  by b u l l o c k  and c a r t .
t r a n s p o r t  o f  g r a i n  by donkey and c a r t ,
t r a n s p o r t  o f  g r a i n  by m a n -c a r r i e d ,
t r a n s p o r t  o f  g r a i n  by t r a c t o r  and t r o l l y
use o f  c r e d i t  for  p r o d u c t i o n  pu rp o s es ,  
head o f  household  hay ing  an o u t s i d e  jo b .  
y a r i a b l e  which e q u a l s  1 i f  pure  t e n a n t ,
y a r i a b l e  which eq u a l s  1 i f  o w n e r - t e n a n t .
Dummy y a r i a b l e  which e q u a l s  1 i f  o w n e r - l a n d l o rd .
Dummy fo r ’ s l i g h t l y  s a l i n e ’ land ,
fo r  ’g e n e r a l l y  s a l i n e ’ 
fo r  ’ s e y e r e l y  s a l i n e ’ 
y a r i a b l e  which e qua l s  
y a r i a b l e  which e qua l s
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
fo r
fo r
fo r
fo r
fo r
Dummy 
Dummy 
Dummy 
Dummy
In y e r s e  o f  M i l l ’ s r a t i o .
land .
land.
1 i f  l o c a t e d  
1 i f  l o c a t e d
in  Punjab  
in  NWFP.
Notes: Farm tenure dummies are measured relatiye to ’pure owners’, transport 
dummies relatiye to ’man-carried’, salinity dummies relatiye to ’non-saline’ 
land, and locational dummies relatiye to location in Sind. Variables entered 
in squared leyels haye SQ added to end of yariable name while those entered in 
logs haye L added. When presenting results f t ,  t> ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 2%, 5% and 10% leyels. The test statistics are calculated 
as in Heckman (1979) and Greene (1981). The full sample has 1437 wheat 
producers and the truncated sample ha 529 households.
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expected the coefficients of LANDL and NUMTOT are highly significant suggesting that
an important determinant of whether or not a household sells wheat in the market is the
per capita level of its endowment. We use LANDL in place of LAND as an 
explanatory variable because when the latter was used we had problems with 
heteroskedasticity (the classical and robust t-statistics were very different) which in 
limited-dependent models gives inconsistent estimates.
Since the wheat price is not included as an explanatory variable the model is to 
be interpreted as reduced form. We mentioned earlier that an analysis of prices (after 
correcting for sample selection bias) suggested that locational factors determined prices 
with households located in Punjab and NWFP facing lower prices. In the reduced form 
probit the coefficient of PUNJ was not statistically different from zero but that for 
NWFP was statistically negative at the 10% level. When we allocated regional average 
prices to households without marketed surplus and included these in the probit the 
coefficient on NWFP was still significantly negative (at 10% when prices were included
in Rs/kg and at 5% when the log of this value was included) probably reflecting the
fact that markets there are less developed with little government involvement by way of 
procurement.
Using the non-parametric (kernel smoothing) regression technique discussed in §2.7 
we plot the relationship between both the average predicted and actual probabilities 
against farm size. The predicted uses the probabilities predicted by the probit model
while the actual uses the zero-one values as the variable on the y-axis, and the 
smoothing technique (kemel=20 acres) helps to smooth out any individual household 
idiosyncracies which are not captured in our model. We see that both curves track 
each other closely and this gives us added confidence in our model (see Figure 3.1).
Using 0.5 as the cut-off point and treating all predicted probabilities at or above this
point as having positive MS, we compared this with the actual zero-one values. The
model gave correct predictions for 73% of households: 18% of the sample were 
predicted as not having sales when they actually had, while 8% were predicted as 
having when they had not.
Figure 3.1
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%3.5.4 Marketed Surplus Results
In this section we present the results of regressions which use the truncated sample 
and include the inverse of Mill’s ratio, X,, as an extra explanatory variable. We also 
try to identify the source of the effects, i.e. whether they work through production or 
consumption or both, and discuss the pattern of the land and price elasticities of MS
across farm size.
- Farm Size: The coefficient of total cultivated land (LAND) indicates that a 10% 
increase in cultivated land leads to an 13% increase in MS (see Table 3.4). Extra land 
has both output and income effects. If some of the extra land is allocated to wheat
then output of wheat should increase. However, the land that is not allocated to wheat
may absorb more of a fixed family labour supply, especially if extra hired labour is not 
used or if hired labour is more expensive thus decreasing wheat output and MS. In
Chapter 2 (see §2.7 and Figure 2.2) we saw that the proportion of total cropped
acreage allocated to wheat decreases with farm size. Extra land also brings more
income which increases consumption of wheat and possibly leads to a fall in labour
supply, thus decreasing the MS of wheat on both counts. The estimated elasticity
incorporates all these effects and reinforces our earlier result that most of the total MS 
of wheat originates on large farms.
Notice that the functional form imposes the restriction that the elasticity is constant 
whereas the observation that the proportion of extra land allocated to wheat decreases
with farm size suggests that the output elasticity may vary across farm size. Combined
with the possibility that the marginal budget share for wheat decreases with income, this
suggests that the land elasticity of MS should vary with farm size. We therefore also 
experiment with a quadratic approximation. However, it must be remembered that the 
results are suspect because of the presence of influential observations for the farm size 
variable. Moving to this functional form the adjusted-R^ increases from 0.55 to 0.58 
(see Table 3.5). Using the non-parametric regression technique we plot the fitted land
elasticity against farm size and find it decreases as expected (see Figure 3.2).
Focusing on family consumption and production (see Tables 3.6 and 3.7) we find 
that a 10% increase in LAND implies a 6% increase in wheat consumption and a 11%
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Table 3 . 4
Marketed S u rp lu s :  L o g - l i n e a r  model
I n t e r c e p t  3 . 2 4 f t  2,11* 2 .11*
LANDL 1 . 3 4 t t  1 . 5 7 f t  1 . 5 7 f f
WHPRL 1 . 4 6 f t  1 . 4 6 f t  1 . 4 3 f f
NUMTOTL -0.15**
MEN - -0 .02  -0 .02
WOMEN - -0.03
BOYS - -0 .02
GIRLS - -0.05*
CHILD - -0 .004
NUMOTH - - -0 .02*
DIST 0 .05  0 .04  0 . 0 4 f t
TRAC 0 . 7 3 f t  O . S l f f  0 . 8 3 f f
BULL 0 .38* 0.51** 0.52**
DONK 0 .26  0 .38  0.39*
OTHTR 0 .07  0 .12  0 .13
PTEN - 0 . 9 3 f t  - l . l l f f  - l . l O f f
OTEN -0 .18  -0.23  -0 .22
OLRD -0 .34* -0.40* -0 .41*
CREDIT 0.17* 0.21* 0.21*
JOB 0 .15  0 .12  0 .13
SLSAL 0.43** 0.45* 0.44*
GSAL -0.59* -0.67* -0 .67*
SVSAL -0 .17  -0 .16  -0 .16
PUNJ 0.40** 0.39* 0.38*
NWFP -0 .25  -0 .56  -0 .54
X 0 .83** 1.27** 1.26**
R2 0 .55  0 .56  0 .56
Note: See n o te s  to Table  3 .3 .
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Table 3 . 5
Marketed S u rp lu s :  Q u a d ra t i c  model
I n t e r c e p t
LAND
LANDSQ
WHPR
WHPRSQ
NUMTOT
MEN
WOMEN
BOYS
GIRLS
CHILD
NUMOTH
DIST
TRAC
BULL
DONK
OTHTR
PTEN
OTEN
OLRD
CREDIT
JOB
SLSAL
GSAL
SVSAL
PUNJ
NWFP
X
18385ft
59 6 f t
- 2 . 3 4 f t
10609
-2723
-137ff
920*
2885*
1445
1218
44.07
-3173ff
-983
-1289
932
-609
249
-1793
-406
325
-4137
7129ff
17916ff
6 0 3 f t
- 2 . 4 0 f f
10607
-2815
-296** 
-255 
160 
59 .8  
-166**
902*
2966**
1550
1280
-1 4 .2
-3038f f
-766
-1320
956*
-734
179
-1786
-481
365
-3347
6904ff
18039ff
5 9 6 f t
- 2 . 3 5 f f
10455
-2649
-3 2 4 f f
85 .8
900*
2871*
1510
1218
63 .4
3123ff
-918
1308
880
-776
312
1864
-389
402
-3715
6994ff
R2 0.58 0 .58 0 .58
Note: See no te s  to Table  3 .3 .
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Table 3 .6
Consumption:  L o g - l i n e a r  and q u a d r a t i c  models
I n t e r c e p t  4 . 5 5 | t  4 . 6 6 f t  331 223
LANDL 0 . 6 3 f t  0 . 6 3 f f
LAND - - 102 f t  102f t
LANDSQ - - -0 .13  -0 .13
WHPRL 0 .26  0 .23
WHPR - - -1511 -1472
WHPRSQ - - 606 587
NUMTOT - - 32 .71 f
NUMTOTL 0 . 1 8 f t
MENL - 0.11**
MEN - - - 80.21
NUMOTH - - - 19.72
NUMOTHL - 0.09*
DIST 0 .004  -0 .004  -171 -166
TRAC 0 . 4 1 f f  0 . 4 2 f f  771 777
BULL 0.28** 0.28** 332 315
DONK 0 .19  0 .20  227 227
OTHTR 0.25**  0.26** 421 395
PTEN - 0 . 4 4 f f  - 0 . 4 7 f f  -544* -557*
OTEN -0 .1 2  -0 .13* -212 -229
OLRD 0 .15  0 .14  642 647
CREDIT 0 .06  0 .06  113 127
JOB -0 .30** -0.30** -593 -551
SLSAL 0 . 6 0 f f  0 . 5 8 f f  828* 813*
GSAL -0 .15  -0 .15  -491 -473
SVSAL -0 .08  -0 .07  -106 -111
PUNJ 0 . 6 6 f t  0 . 6 5 f f  859** 839**
NWFP 0.97** 0.91** 2505* 2398*
X 0 .29  0 .32  168 215
R2 0 .5 0  0 .50  0 .44  0 .44
Note: See n o te s  to Table  3 .3 .
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Table 3 .7
P r o d u c t io n :  L o g - l i n e a r  and q u a d r a t i c  models
I n t e r c e p t 4 . 4 2 t t 4 . 3 6 t t -23373ff -23022ff
LANDL 1 . 0 9 t t l . l l f f - -
LAND - - 928 f f 928ff
LANDSQ - - - 3 . 6 0 f f - 3 . 6 0 f f
WHPRL 0 . 7 9 t t 0 . 7 8 f f - -
WHPR - - 10089 9933
WHPRSQ - - -2153 -2078
NUMTOT - - -104** -
NUMTOTL -0.003 - - -
MEN - - - -293*
MENL - -0 .05 - -
NUMOTH - - - -52 .5
NUMOTHL - 0.03 - -
DIST 0.03 0.01 576 556
TRAC 0 . 5 9 t t 0 . 6 0 f f 4159** 4145**
BULL 0 . 3 8 t t 0 . 3 9 f f 2497* 2562*
DONK 0 . 3 3 t t 0 . 3 5 f f 2450* 2450*
OTHTR 0.18 0.21* 543 651
PTEN -0.13 -0 .15 -1939* -1889*
OTEN 0.07 0.06 17.8 83 .2
OLRD 0.003 -0.01 -350 -370
CREDIT 0 . 1 5 t 0.15** 1223 1170
JOB -0.15 -0 .16 -1776 -1945
SLSAL 0 . 6 3 t t 0 . 6 1 f f 1781 1844
GSAL -0.44** -0.46** -2923 -2995
SVSAL -0 .06 -0 .06 -553 -535
PUNJ 0 . 6 3 f t 0 . 6 3 f f 1942 2019
NWFP 0.45 0.46 -1515 -1088
X 0 .6 7 f 0 .6 8 f 9032ff 8845ff
R2 0 .70 0 .70 0 .68 0.68
Note:  See n o te s  to  Table  3 .3 .
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increase in wheat production. The consumption effect reflects higher incomes and the
production effect is consistent with our findings in §2.3 that wheat yields increase with 
farm size.
- Wheat Price: A higher price (WHPR) can have both output and consumption effects. 
The output effect arises from the allocation of a greater amount of total cultivated land
to wheat as well as due to increased per acre yields because of higher input levels.
This acts to increase wheat surplus. The negative pure substitution effect in
consumption also leads to an increase in MS. This is reinforced by a negative income 
effect for households who are net consumers of wheat in the market. Households with 
a positive MS have a positive income effect on consumption which acts to decrease
their MS of wheat. Our estimate, that a 10% increase in price leads to a 14%
increase in MS, suggests that any increased consumption effect from higher income is 
swamped by the other effects. This contrasts with our earlier calculations (using
aggregate values), at the end of §3.4, which suggest a corresponding 8.6% rise in MS. 
However, if we replace the price elasticity of output of 0.15 with the estimate of Ali 
(1988, p21) of 0.327 we get a price elasticity of MS at nearly 1.3 which is similar to 
our estimate here. As with the land elasticity we expect that price elasticities vary 
according to farm size reflecting varying responses in terms of land allocation, 
agricultural input use and consumption. The quadratic approximation does not give a 
statistically significant price response and using the F-test we are unable to reject the 
null hypothesis that both the coefficients for price and its square are equal to zero. In 
spite of this we plot the price elasticity against farm size using the non-parametric
technique and find that it decreases with farm size (see Figure 3.2). The very high 
price elasticities on small farms reflects, in part, their low MS levels.
When family consumption is taken as the dependent variable we find that its price
elasticity is not significantly different from zero, i.e. we are not able to reject the null
hypothesis that the income and pure substitution effects cancel out (see Table 3.6).
However, on the production side we do find that a 10% increase in prices implies an
8% increase in wheat production. This figure is much higher than other estimates and 
may be due to the fact that we may not have controlled for some crucial factors which
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are correlated with prices. For example, households with higher prices may be located 
in areas which have efficient trade networks due to the concentration of government 
procurement. Alternatively, these households may also have higher rice prices so that 
the wheat-rice rotation is more profitable than wheat/cotton or sugarcane so that these 
households allocate a greater proportion of total cultivated acreage to wheat.
- Family Size: Extra family members can increase both the production and consumption
of wheat, the net effect on MS depending on their relative contributions to each. The
results suggest that a 10% increase in the number of family members leads to a 1.5% 
fall in MS, equivalent (at the geometric mean) to a 23.6kg of wheat per extra family 
member. However, one expects that the effect on MS can vary according to the age 
and gender composition of the change. When NUMTOT was disaggregated according to
age and gender we found for all categories, except girls, we could not reject the null
hypothesis (at the 10% level) that their output and consumption effects cancelled out.
For girls the coefficient was significantly negative at the 10% level, suggesting a fall in 
MS of 77kg per extra girl possibly reflecting that while extra girls increase wheat 
consumption they do not contribute to wheat production. Since we expect that children 
have minimal contribution to output, but presumably do increase consumption, the sign
of the coefficient suggests that the consequent fall in per capita income induces an 
increase in labour supply from other household members. This sort of income effect
may also be present for women, boys and girls so that an increase in their number 
induces an increased labour supply from adult male members of the household. It is 
also useful to keep in mind another possible general equilibrium response to increased 
labour supply: households with more labour may allocate more of total cultivated land 
to more labour intensive crops. However, whether or not crops competing with wheat
in rabi are more or less labour intensive is a moot point.
We also categorized household members into ’males over 15’ and ’others’
(NUMOTH). All households had at least one male over 15 and less than 1% of
households had zero ’others’. Eliminating the latter the coefficient of NUMOTH was 
significantly negative at the 10% level. However, we still could not reject the null 
hypothesis that for adult males the consumption and production effects cancelled out.
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When both MEN and NUMOTH were entered in logs they were both insignificantly 
different from zero. The results changed when we used the quadratic model (see Table 
3.5) where we also found a significantly negative effect on MS for an extra family
member, but when we disaggregated NUMTOT we found that this negative effect was 
attributable to adult males and children, an extra family member from each category 
leading to a fall in MS of 296kg and 166kg respectively. The negative effect of males 
was reinforced when we grouped other family categories into one group (NUMOTH).
Using family consumption and wheat output as the dependent variables we can 
trace the origin of the effect of family size and composition on MS (see Tables 3.6 
and 3.7). Focusing on consumption and the log-linear model we find that a 10%
increase in the number of family members leads to a 1.8% increase in wheat 
consumption, equivalent to an increase of nearly 34kg for an extra family member. 
When we disaggrated NUMTOT according to age and gender none of the categories 
were significantly different from zero. However, when non-adult-male family members 
were grouped into NUMOTH, we got consumption elasticities of 0.11 and 0.09 for adult 
males and ’other family members’ respectively, equivalent to 72kg and 25kg extra
consumption per extra member respectively. With the quadratic model the coefficient of
NUMTOT was significantly positive and indicated an increase of 33kg in wheat 
consumption for an extra family member. However, when we disaggregated NUMTOT 
none of the component parts were significantly different from zero.
On the production side the results from the log-linear model do not suggest a 
significant relationship between output and the number or composition of family 
members. This may be because households with, say, an extra adult male allocate a 
higher proportion of land to other crops and this cancels out any output effect resulting 
from higher labour input per acre. Alternatively, one might take this as evidence of a 
well functioning labour market with households hiring in or out labour according to 
landholdings. However, in Chapter 2 we saw that per acre labour use decreases with 
farm size and we interpreted this as resulting fi-om imperfectly functioning labour 
markets. Results from the quadratic model suggest that households with an extra adult 
male actually produce 293kg less wheat which suggests that the land allocation argument
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may be important.
Other Variables: The negative coefficients on PTEN and OTEN reflect rent 
payments, and therefore lower income, by tenants in the form of wheat - tenants share 
output with landlords before allocating the remainder between family consumption and 
marketed surplus. As expected, the coefficient is greater, in absolute terms, for pure 
tenants who on average have a 60% lower surplus compared to a 20% lower surplus 
for owner tenants, both relative to pure owners. The insignificant coefficients for these 
variables when output is the dependent variable suggest that the lower MS for tenants 
comes from the consumption effect only, i.e. it does not reflect lower wheat output. 
Likewise, the negative coefficient for owner-landlords appears to also come from a 
consumption effect, higher consumption levels reflecting extra income from leased-out 
land.
The signs and relative values of the salinity variables suggest that these are not 
adequately capturing variations in land quality - we expect all to be negative and 
increasing (in absolute terms) as salinity increases. Households using tractor and trolly, 
bullock and cart, or donkey to transport grain appear to have higher MS levels than 
those who man-carried the wheat or used other methods. These households seem to 
have both higher consumption and higher production, the former probably reflecting 
higher income and the latter higher productivity because of ownership of tractors or 
draught power. The insignificant coefficient for DIST may mean that our price variable 
already incorporates transport costs.
Households using credit for production purposes also have higher levels of MS and 
higher production seems to be the source. Also, households located in Punjab have 
both higher wheat consumption and higher wheat output. The former reflects the taste 
preference for wheat in this province (households in Sind consume more rice), while the 
latter may reflect a greater land allocation to wheat for similar reasons or even higher 
yields. The higher MS in Punjab may also arise due to its higher level of government 
activity in terms of procurement.
- Sample Selection Bias: Finally, there is evidence of sample selection bias in both 
the marketed surplus and production equations, this being more pronounced in the
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quadratic models. Focusing on the MS equation we can explain the sign of the 
coefficient of X (say, a) and the effect of sample selection bias as follows. The sign 
of a  is the the same as that for the covariance between the error terms in the probit 
and MS equations, say a. Since factors which increase the probability of being 
included in the truncated sample also operate to increase the level of MS, a  is positive. 
Therefore, a  will also be positive. It can also be shown that dA/dx, where x is an 
explanatory variable, is negative (positive) if the coefficient of x in the probit equation 
is positive (negative). Standard omitted variable analysis then tells us that that, since 
o>0, omitting X from our MS regression using the truncated sample would negatively 
(positively) bias the estimated coefficient of x in such a regression if the coefficient of 
X in the probit equation is positive (negative) so that dX/dx is negative (positive). So 
when X was omitted the coefficients corresponding to those in Table 3.4 were lower in 
absolute terms.
§3.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this section we summarize our results and indicate the lessons that can be taken 
from our analysis. Our discussion of agricultural household models (AHMs) highlighted 
the need for care when modelling the behaviour of agricultural households and analysing 
the likely impact of government policies. When formulating models one must try to 
incorporate the heterogenous characteristics of rural households. An example of this is 
the existence of a profit effect for agricultural producers and the different direction of
this effect over small and large producers.
The framework of AHMs is a useful basis for the formulation of more specific 
and simpler models. We showed how they can be used to indicate the important
variables which should be included in our model of MS and how the model should be 
set up. With simple examples we were able to show the likely direction and magnitude 
of household responses to various parameters of interest. In §3.4 we focused on the 
household characteristics which determine the size of the price elasticity of MS. Using 
parameters for Pakistan for the mid 1970s and ’low’ estimates of production elasticities, 
we calculated an aggregate elasticity of 0.86 for wheat and 0.26 for rice. We also
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argued that these elasticities are unlikely to be negative and are likely to exceed their 
output elasticities.
Our analysis of the pattern of MS across households according to farm size, tenure 
and location reinforced our initial belief that MS was much higher on large farms,
reflecting the highly skewed nature of per capita landholdings. Using a simple model
of MS we pointed out the estimation problems likely to be encountered, their origins 
and possible solutions. The problems of measurement error, sample selection, 
heteroskedasticity and influential observations are likely to be common to many 
agricultural household data sets because of the way they are collected and given the 
highly skewed distribution of landholdings in many developing countries. Therefore, one 
should be careful to take account of these problems when selecting models and data to 
estimate household behaviour. We have shown here how many of these can be
overcome for our particular analysis.
The results from our probit analysis confirm that there is a strong positive
correlation between the probability of having MS and farm size. We also found that
households located in NWFP have a lower probability of having market sales reflecting 
the fact that markets there are less developed with little government involvement by way 
of procurement.
Using the inverse of Mills’ ratio as an explanatory variable in our regression of 
MS on household characteristics for our selected sample we derived consistent estimates 
of reduced-form parameters. We interpreted our results with arguments to explain their 
sign and magnitude and tried to trace their origins back to their effects on production 
and consumption. We found evidence that both the land and price elasticities of MS 
decreased with farm size. Also, as expected, the price elasticity of MS was
substantially greater than one. Extra land increases both wheat output and wheat 
consumption (reflecting higher income), with the output effect dominating. The origin 
of the positive price effect on MS semed to be on the production side, suggesting that 
the positive income effect from higher prices (for those with market sales) cancelled out 
the negative pure substitution effect in consumption.
Extra family members led to lower MS levels reflecting higher consumption of
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wheat. However, wheat production levels were not correlated with the number of adult
males or other members in the family. Rather than interpreting this as evidence of a
well- functioning labour market, we suggest that the negligible effect of household 
numbers on wheat production may reflect the reallocation of land away from wheat 
which cancels out the higher wheat yields per acre due to extra labour supply. We 
also found evidence of a consumption preference for wheat in both Punjab and NWFP. 
Our results confirm the need to allow for sample selection bias when dealing with 
truncated samples as we do here. We explain the origin of the positive sign on the 
inverse of Mill’s ratio, X, and the sign of the bias when X was not included as an 
extra explanatory variable.
Although the analysis is not specifically focused on policy there are some 
implications for pricing policy. These relate to the pattern of MS across households 
and how levels of MS change in response to price changes. The data show that MS
decreases with farm size with large farms being net producers and smaller farms having
low or zero MS or even being net producers. Landless labourers will also be net 
consumers and these are often among the poorest social groups. Therefore, low wheat 
procurement prices are attractive from a distributional viewpoint. However, the high 
price elasticity suggests that there will be large efficiency losses connected with low 
wheat prices. We return to this trade-off between equity and efficiency in Chapter 6.
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Chapter Four
An Empirical Analysis of Fertilizer Use in Pakistan
§4.1 Introduction
The introduction of high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat and rice in Pakistan in 
the mid 1960s was heralded as a major breakthrough in the problem of food supply. 
A crucial characteristic of these new HYVs was their high yields when used in 
conjunction with chemical fertilizer (henceforth just fertilizer) and controlled irrigation. 
Great emphasis was placed on increasing the supply and use of fertilizer. Fertilizers 
were still regarded as of crucial importance by the mid 1980s - of the total increase in 
agricultural output envisaged by the Sixth Five Year Plan (Government of Pakistan, 
1983), 48% of it was expected to come from increased use of fertilizer.
Although the technology associated with HYVs is essentially regarded as being 
neutral to scale, constraints such as those arising from inadequate irrigation, an inability 
to secure (or secure terms for) credit, and access to extension services, can bias the 
technology towards larger farms. These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 
2. In this chapter we focus on the use of fertilizer. The data presented in Chapter 2 
show that just over 80% of the sample applied fertilizer, this percentage being highest 
on farms of 25 acres and over. However, our simple analysis of fertilizer use did not 
indicate any systematic relationship between land size and per acre levels applied. In 
most studies of fertilizer use, as in that of Chapter 2, zero observations are dropped. 
This approach has serious drawbacks since the application of classical OLS regression 
techniques to such truncated samples leads to inconsistent estimates and fails to analyse 
the process by which these zeros are generated. In empirical analyses it is important to 
treat separately households which do not apply fertilizer because they are constrained, 
say, in the credit market (and would not apply fertilizer no matter what relative prices 
they faced) and those who do not apply fertilizer because at current input and output 
prices it is not profitable for them to do so. We can think of the former group as not 
having ’access’ to fertilizer (or to other purchased inputs). Here we present a 
double-hurdle model which incorporates these zeros into the analysis and examines
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whether or not fertilizer is used and, if so, how much is used.
The issues relevant in explaining the wide variation in fertilizer use across 
households are also relevant for other crucial inputs. Also, although our analysis uses 
data for the mid 1970s, preliminary results of a more recent survey for Pakistan also 
seem to support much of what we find here. Therefore, the policy implications of our
results may be pertinent both to other purchased inputs and the present.
In §4.2 we give a general description of the important characteristics of the HYV 
technology and of the evolution of agricultural policy in Pakistan. In §4.3 we give a 
brief outline of the theoretical models used to analyse the variation in inputs across 
households, with particular emphasis on the role of uncertainty. The data are described 
in §4.4 and the double-hurdle model used in our empirical analysis in §4.5. Results are
presented in §4.6 followed, in §4.7, by conclusions.
§4.2 The Green Revolution
The introduction of HYVs in developing countries has been seen as a substantial 
step towards satisfying the large increases in food demand concomitant with rapidly 
growing populations in these countries. However, the use of HYV seeds is only one
aspect of a complex technology which involves the use of other crucial inputs and farm
practices. The potential returns from this new technology can only be realised if the 
appropriate combination, level and timing of inputs and farm practices are adopted. The 
response of yields to fertilizer, especially in the presence of irrigation, was seen as the 
hallmark of the new varieties. However, high levels of fertilizer and irrigation alone do 
not achieve these yields. Also important are the timing and method of their application 
and the presence of the appropriate farming techniques, e.g. sowing and weeding 
practices. As Hussain(1989, p235) put it:
As suggested by its name, ’seed engineering’ consists in embodying in 
a new variety a menu of characteristics picked from a population of 
extant varieties left behind by human and natural selection. The 
central feature of the HYV seed is that it is but one component in
an interdependent network of inputs (such as fertilizer and water)
and farm practices (such as weeding and controlling diseases and pests).
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This technical modernization of agriculture in developing countries has been labelled the 
green revolution. The major technological advances have been for cereals such as 
wheat and rice, especially for the former. Therefore, in much of the discussion that 
follows we focus on these grains.
The exploitation of the advantages of HYV seeds requires knowledge of the 
appropriate inputs and farm practices. The acquisition of this knowledge and skills 
takes time and governments can play a central role in dissemination. To accelerate the 
diffusion of this modem technology governments have taken an active role and 
emphasised investment in extension services. At the initial stages of adoption, imported 
HYV seeds do not necessarily possess the characteristics appropriate for the domestic 
climatic and soil conditions. Whereas traditional varieties are robust to variations in 
natural conditions, HYVs need to be fitted to the particular local biochemical 
environment. Investment in basic research is necessary to improve on the initial stock 
and to develop varieties more suitable to local conditions. Also, because HYVs often 
have an inbuilt obsolescence (i.e. the yields from seeds retained from output decreases 
over time), new stocks need to be continually developed to maintain both their high 
yields and resistance against disease. Investment in extension services must be 
maintained if improved farm practices and new knowledge are to be adopted as they 
become available.
Because the increased use and productivity of fertilizer is related to the introduction 
of HYV seeds it is common to view the use of HYV seeds, fertilizer and irrigation as 
a single innovation. However, the use of fertilizer can also be treated as a separate 
component (as can irrigation) which enhances productivity even without the adoption of
the complete HYV package. Indeed, the use of fertilizer had started to increase prior
to the introduction of HYV seeds, mainly due to improved supply and increased 
irrigation. The popular view is that the subsidization of fertilizer consumption was an
effort to overcome the initial resistance of farmers to adopting fertilizer by making its
application more profitable. Prior to any judgement on the effectiveness or desirability 
of such a policy one must understand the process of diffusion and the various obstacles 
and constraints facing farmers which restrain the adoption and increased use of fertilizer.
150
A conventional approach to an innovation is to view its diffusion as a sigmoid 
time path with consumption (adoption) taking-off slowly at first, increasing rapidly and 
then tapering off towards total adoption. At the early stages there are farmers who 
have adopted and those who have not. Lack of complementary inputs such as 
irrigation, or inefficient farm practices because of lack of familiarity with the new 
technology, may make it unprofitable to adopt. Credit difficulties also restrict demand 
by farmers. If farmers originally produced much of their own inputs then adequate 
credit markets may not have emerged to finance the movement to market transactions. 
The credit that is available may be channeled towards larger farms. However, in 
response to difficulties the nature of farming contracts may change.
After the initial stages two forces will be driving demand: the increase in demand 
due to an increase in the number of adopters (i.e. fertilizer widening) and the increase 
in demand arising from those who have adopted applying more fertilizer to their crops 
(i.e. fertilizer deepening). Increases in the expected profitability of the new technology 
increase adoption and application levels. As farm practices improve and the supply and 
use of complementary inputs increase, the profitability of the new technology increases 
and more farmers adopt or apply fertilizer at higher levels. Because of the high returns 
to appropriate timing of applications, improvements in the supply of fertilizer at the 
right time and place will also increase demand.
The inability of some farmers to secure any or enough credit may prevent them 
from applying as much fertilizer as they would wish. Further, inadequate irrigation 
decreases yields. One would expect that in such circumstances the role of price in 
stimulating increased demand by increasing expected profitably to be somewhat 
diminished. This follows from the LeChatelier-Samuelson Principle which shows that in 
the presence of any rigidity (here constrained irrigation and credit) the responsiveness to 
prices in other markets is reduced. For example, if the relative price of fertilizer (to 
output prices) is reduced then even with fixed irrigation the returns to additional 
fertilizer are increased and demand also increases. Since irrigation is a complement to 
fertilizer the removal or relaxation of this constraint allows farmers to also increase 
irrigation thus leading to an additional increase in the productivity of fertilizer. This
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leads to a further increase in fertilizer demand. Therefore, the responsiveness of 
fertilizer demand to relative input-output prices is higher when farmers can vary their
use of irrigation.
One of the main reasons for subsidizing fertilizer since the early days of the Green 
Revolution was the desire to induce farmers to apply it and at higher levels. This 
raises the question of the effectiveness and desirability of low prices in this regard
compared to extension services. In Chapter 2 we saw that the reasons given by 
farmers for not applying fertilizer were ’lack of access to credit’ and ’no need’ (the
latter may reflect lack of knowledge of the productivity of fertilizer). It seems unlikely 
that lower fertilizer prices would improve access to credit, and the inducement to
non-users to start using may be weak. To maintain higher application levels amongst 
those who are using subsidies must be continued.
Compare this to extension services. These increase the awareness of farmers as to 
the productivity of fertilizer and also help to increase total factor productivity through 
the spread of improved farm practices. When extension services also incorporate
improved knowledge of complementary inputs, such as irrigation and credit, they shift 
the production function further upwards. Therefore, there is a lasting effect in terms of
higher levels of fertilizer applied. Focusing on the design of these services also makes
policy makers more aware of other important requirements such as the availability of 
fertilizer at the right time and place.
A crucial element in a cost-benefit comparison of extension services expenditure
with price subsidies will be the effectiveness of the services in increasing the awareness 
of the potential productivity of fertilizer. Increasing awareness also involves improving 
knowledge of best farm practices. We do not review here the vast literature on the 
most effective form of extension services but point out that important constraints include 
adequate training of field staff and proper remuneration, as well as the need to 
incorporate the resources and constraints of farmers when designing such services (see, 
for example, Gamser, 1988).
The increasing cost of fertilizer subsidies, especially when the total amount of 
fertilizer applied increases over time, has been a continuing burden on government
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finances. For example, by 1979/80 (1980/81) fertilizer subsidies accounted for 11% 
(84%) of ’development subsidies’, which in turn accounted for nearly 46% (55%) of 
total subsidies (i.e. current plus development), which in turn were 3% (1.9%) of GDP. 
By 1985/6, although total subsidies had fallen to 1.5% of GDP and development 
subsidies to less than 30% of total subsidies, fertilizer subsidies accounted for nearly all 
of the development subsidies. Subsidies to irrigation, pesticides, wheat seeds and 
petroleum products (together these constitute the whole of development subsidies) had 
either been reduced drastically or eliminated altogether (see Pakistan Economic Survey, 
1986/7, pp 44-45). The size of these subsidies has been a major factor in their 
withdrawal since 1980. Also, in spite of the size of these subsidies, there is no reason 
to believe that they have a lasting effect in terms of higher productivity.
Preliminary results from a more recent survey in Pakistan for the mid 1980s (see 
Sharif et al, 1986, and Ahmad et al, 1986) suggests that the inability to secure any or 
enough credit is still the most important reason cited by farmers for not applying inputs 
at recommended levels. In spite of the substantial increase in availability through 
formal institutions (i.e. Agricultural Development Banks, Commercial Banks and
Cooperatives) smaller farms, in particular, experience problems in securing these loans. 
The main reasons cited for not using credit were ’non availability’, ’complicated
procedure’ and the need for ’illegal gratification’. These problems were more prominant 
among smaller farms and tenants, the latter reflecting the requirement of land as 
collateral. When the government directed formal institutions to provide subsidized credit 
to smaller farms, often interest free, they were reluctant to do so given their
unwillingness or inability in the event of bankruptcy to secure land given as collateral. 
Many of the loans were given to larger farms which split their holdings into smaller 
units using the names of relatives. The surveys found that many smaller farms were 
not even aware of the existence of such loans. For example, in the Sind survey they 
found that only 19% of all households were aware. A study by Khan and Sarwar
(1986) for the Punjab found that only 44% of ’targeted’ loans went to smaller farms 
(less than 12.5 acres). Small farms have therefore had to resort to the informal credit 
market where interest rates are substantially higher. These findings led to calls for a
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major overhaul of the distribution mechanism of subsidized credit so that it reaches its 
targeted group more effectively.
The surveys also indicate that problems with extension services still exist Field 
assistants are very often unaware of recommended practices and seem to concentrate on 
larger farms. While the overall level of knowledge of recommended agricultural 
practices was found to be very poor this absence was more pronounced among smaller 
farms. This suggests that there is a lot of room for improvement in the effectiveness 
of the ’training and visit’ agricultural extension scheme operating in Pakistan.
When using time-series data to estimate the price responsiveness of fertilizer 
demand one needs to allow for improvements in farm practices (from, say, increased or 
improved extension services or from familiarity with new techniques), supply and use of 
complementary inputs (e.g. irrigation), the supply of fertilizer (which may lead to 
improvements in the availibility of fertilizer at the right place and time), and availability 
of credit. Improvements in all of these factors have undoubtedly taken place in 
Pakistan. In the early 1960s there was a substantial increase in irrigated acreage 
reflecting improved availability of canal water and a large increase in the number of 
private tubewells installed (see Figure 4.1). The main beneficiary was sugarcane, a very 
water intensive crop, whose yields increased substantially (see Figure 4.2). Relative 
fertilizer-output prices were kept stable throughout this period (see Figure 4.3) and the 
domestic supply of fertilizer increased (see Figure 4.4). Fertilizer offtake increased 
further from 1965 when both imports and domestic production expanded.
In 1967 HYV wheat seeds were introduced and wheat yields increased dramatically. 
The government instigated a strong campaign to increase the adoption of this new 
technology, apparently bordering on coercion at times (see Gotsch and Brown, 1980, 
pp23-25). The number of tubewells installed increased as did the availability of both 
domestic and imported fertilizer (urea mainly). Then, in 1968 HYV rice seeds were
introduced. The spread of new HYV seeds and the increase in irrigated acreage led to
a dramatic rise in agricultural incomes. The late 1960s saw an attempt to capture some
of this income and distribute it more widely. Both fertilizer and procurement prices
were increased. The ratio of fertilizer-output prices reached a high in 1975 but
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decreased thereafter between 1975 and 1979 while procurement prices continued to rise. 
From 1975 to 1979 fertilizer offtake increased dramatically as did imports of fertilizer. 
The area allocated to HYVs continued to increase, especially for wheat (see Figure 4.5) 
mainly at the expense of traditional varieties.
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw renewed emphasis on the timely provision of 
inputs including fertilizer, seeds, pesticides and credit. The amount of credit chaimeled 
through formal institutions (e.g. the Agricultural Development Bank, Commercial Banks, 
and co-operatives) increased dramatically (see Figure 4.6). Greater emphasis was placed 
on private tubewell installation. Although credit and irrigation subsidies increased
substantially, subsidies for pesticides were removed in 1982. In 1980 fertilizer prices
rose by over 50% and, although procurement prices also rose, relative fertilizer-output 
prices increased. The early 1980s also saw an enormous rise in the domestic 
production of fertilizer as new plants came on-stream. As a result fertilizer imports fell 
sharply. New cotton varieties were introduced in 1984, greatly increasing cotton yields.
So, since the 1960s, irrigated acreage, credit availability (especially after the mid
1970s) and fertilizer supply have shown a continuous upward trend. Emphasis on
extension services to improve farming practices have also increased. However, relative 
fertilizer-output prices have fluctuated. There have also been a number of isolated 
events which affect fertilizer availability and demand in a one-off manner. For example, 
1964/5 had fertilizer shortages and 1965/6 saw war with India (with the consequent
cut-off of American Community Aid) and severe drought. In 1970/1 West Pakistan and 
East Pakistan separated and there was again severe drought. In August and September 
of 1973 there were floods in Punjab and Sind and a severe drought between April 1974 
and February 1975. In 1976 the cotton crop was adversely affected by excessive
rainfall and pest attacks and fertilizer supply shortages occured in 1977. In spite of 
these events fertilizer offtake has shown a continuous upward trend.
There have been a few attempts to estimate the price elasticity of demand for 
fertilizer using time-series data for Pakistan (see Hamdani and U1 Haque, 1978, for a
critical review). However, major difficulties encountered include the strong time-trend in
most of the relevant variables, the presence of many isolated interruptions such as
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drought and war, and the small number of observations. Gotsch and Brown (1980, pp. 
45-6), regressing fertilizer demand on relative fertilizer prices (which fluctuate over time) 
and a time trend, derived an estimate of 0.83 for the price elasticity of demand. The 
time trend accounts for most of the variation in fertilizer demand, possibly reflecting 
improvements in all the non-price aspects of fertilizer productivity.
§4.3 Theory
Given the nature of farming, where input costs are incurred some time prior to the 
receipt of revenue, uncertainty will impinge on household production decisions. Inputs 
must be applied before households are in a position to know with much confidence the 
level of output that will emerge. It is therefore essential that the theory used to 
explain farm household decisions should incorporate uncertainty. We can think of 
output as a function of a random variable 9 (e.g. climatic conditions), the level of 
variable inputs x (a column vector with typical element jq), and the level of fixed 
factors K (including land). We write
y = F(0,x,K) (4.1)
where y is output. Households are assumed to maximize the expected utility of wealth;
E[U(Z -k qF - p’x)] (4.2)
where U is the utility function, Z the wealth from other agricultural and non-agricultural 
sources, q the price of the output and p the column vector of input prices - we can 
view these prices as present values. Prime superscripts denote row matrices. Choosing 
Xj to maximize E[U(.)] we get, for any input i:
E(qFi) E(qFj) E[U’ ]
  ( 4 . 3 )
Pi E[qFjU’ ]
where Fi=3F/3xj, U’ is the first derivative of the utility function with respect to wealth. 
Assuming that U’ is a decreasing function of wealth W (i.e. the utility function is 
concave) and that qFj and W are positively related, then qFj and U are negatively
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related so that the the numerator on r.h.s. of (4.3) exceeds the denominator. This
implies that the ratio of the expected value marginal product of an input to its price,
i.e. E(qFi)/pj, is greater than unity. This ratio will be higher the greater the correlation
between qFj and W and can obviously differ over inputs. Note that in the absence of
uncertainty profit maximizers apply inputs up to levels where their value marginal
products equal the input price, i.e. the equivalent ratio is one.
To enable us to say more on the impact of household characteristics on decision 
making in an uncertain environment we assume multiplicative uncertainty, i.e.
F(0,x) = 9 f(x) (4.4)
The effect of uncertainty is represented by a factor, 0, which scales output up or down.
We can think of uncertainty about q being incorporated into 0. Setting q=l, p now
represents mean relative factor-output prices. The first-order conditions for Xj give:
f j  E(0)  E(0)  E(U’ )
Pi E(U’0)
( 4 . 5 )
Notice, from (4.5), that this ratio is constant over all inputs and, from (4.4), that the 
ratios of marginal products of inputs is independent of the state of nature, 0. If U(W) 
is a concave function and U’ and 0 are negatively correlated then the ratio in (4.5) is 
greater than unity (see Bliss and Stem, 1982, pp72-3).
One can analyse how the choice of inputs will vary with wealth in this model. 
This will depend on the shape of the utility function chosen and how risk aversion 
changes with wealth. We can think of total wealth being made up of stochastic assets 
or income (where the value of assets or income is related to agricultural conditions) and 
non-stochastic assets or incomes (where the value of assets or income are not related to 
agricultural conditions). So:
W(0,x,B) = B + Y(0,x) (4.6)
where B is non-stochastic wealth and 0Y/00>O. Households choose x to maximize 
G(x,B,0)=E[W(.)], with W(.) defined as in (4.6). Interpreting x as the optimum level 
we have:
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dx GxB
(4.7)
dB
Since G^x is negative by the second-order conditions, the sign of dx/dB is determined 
by that of Gxg. Assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion Bliss and Stem (1982,
pp73-4) show that Gxb is positive, i.e. a farmer with relatively more non-stochastic
wealth will apply more variable inputs. Likewise, if we rewrite equation (6) as:
W(9,x,B,X) = X [B + Y(.)] (4.6)’
we can show that, in this case, GxX [replacing B in (4.7) with A.] is negative (positive) 
if we assume increasing (decreasing) relative risk aversion. Therefore, ’if we compare 
two farmers who have identical patterns of wealth holding, but one has more of
everything than the other, the richer farmer will have lower (per acre) levels of each
input’ (Bliss and Stern, 1982, p75). For example, if land is the only source of wealth 
then larger farms would, under the above assumptions, apply lower levels of inputs.
The above highlights the fact that the relationship between land size and the
fertilizer-land ratio depends cmcially on the relationship between risk aversion and
wealth, and the make-up of wealth in terms of stochastic and non-stochastic components. 
We argued earlier that although the HYV technology may appear to be neutral to scale 
when considered from the point of the actual physical inputs applied, when one takes 
account of potential constraints such as access to credit, information or cmcial inputs, 
scale becomes important for choice of technique. If these constraints are correlated with 
land size then the latter may be a surrogate for a whole range of important factors.
Also, ’safety-first’ models (see, for example. Bell, 1972) suggest that smaller farms will 
have lower fertilizer-land ratios reflecting the potentially catastrophic effects of falling
below some ’disaster’ level of income. Therefore, in empirical analyses it is necessary 
to be careful when interpreting results (e.g. the coefficient of farm size) and using them 
for policy prescriptions. For a survey of various theoretical models see Feder, Just and 
Zilverman (1985).
Other factors which determine the level of fertilizer applied are those which reflect 
differences in productivity. In §4.2 we discussed factors which affect productivity. In
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general variables which reflect good farming practices and the availability of 
complementary resources should be included. Higher input productivity increases 
expected profitability and can therefore lead to higher levels of input. As with the 
demand for any commodity, relative prices are also important.
§4.4 Model
A common observation from farm-household surveys in developing countries is that 
many households do not apply any (chemical) fertilizer. Many empirical analyses of 
fertilizer use have chosen to eliminate such observations from the sample and focus only 
on households with positive applications of fertilizer. In fact, this is what we have 
done in Chapter 2 in our analysis of the relationship between farm size and fertilizer 
use. Such an approach is not satisfactory since the elimination of observations based on 
values of the dependent variable can lead to sample selection bias in the estimates. 
Applying least squares to the full censored sample (i.e. with zeros included) the 
coefficient estimates are biased even in large samples (see Pudney, 1989, §4.11). An
alternative approach is to apply the Tobit regression technique to the full censored 
sample. However, this ignores the fact that the zeros can be generated by more than 
one process. The zeros can reflect the decision by households not to apply fertilizer 
given the prices they face and the characteristics of the household (e.g. its level of
fixed factors which affect the productivity of fertilizer). This is the interpretation behind 
the Tobit model. Alternatively, the zeros may reflect, for example, a lack of own 
funds or an inability to secure credit, lack of knowledge about the productivity of 
fertilizer, or the non-availability of fertilizer because of (say) the remoteness of the
farm. In this sense zeros may arise for reasons other than thise embodied in the single
equation Tobit framework. We will use the term ’lack of access’ to describe this 
collection of impediments to fertilizer use. The double-hurdle model allows us to 
distinguish between these two mechanisms by which zeros can be generated.
The ’double-hurdle’ model used to ’explain’ the level of fertilizer applied has two 
equations: one which ’explains’ access to fertilizer and the other which explains the 
level applied once access arises. These are:
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uj = a  Zi + T|i (4.8)
Vi = P’xi + £i (4.9)
where the vector z contains variables which determine access, the vector x contains
variables which determine the level of fertilizer applied, p  and a  are vectors of 
parameters to be estimated, r) is a random disturbance term with mean zero and 
variance one, e is a random disturbance term with mean zero and variance , and i
refers to a household or group of households. A prime superscript denotes a row 
vector. Since uj is a zero-one variable, equation (1) corresponds to the usual probit 
equation so we refer to it as the ’probit stage’. The variable yj is the level of 
fertilizer applied and is censored at zero so we refer to this equation as the ’tobit 
stage’. Note that it is (4.9) which is derived from the theory presented in §4.4. We 
can think of (4.8) as saying that when q= 0  household i will not use fertilizer 
regardless of its productivity or price. However, (4.9) tells us that even if i^=l we
may still observe zero for fertilizer use because, foe example, its price is too high and 
productivity low.
Note also that the common assumption of normality for e is not appropriate for
our sample since it attaches a positive probability to negative values of y. We
therefore view y as a latent variable. Dropping subscript i for convenience, we think
of the observed variable y* arising as values:
y* = y if y>0 and u>0 
= 0 otherwise
Therefore the observed y* are generated by the following process:
y* = max (y,0)
The log-liklihood function for this double-hurdle model is described in Atkinson,
Gomulka and Stern (1984, pl7). We also assume that E(T)e)=0.
For the double-hurdle model we can write the conditional expectation of y* as 
follows:
E(y*ix) = O(a’z) [p’x 0 (p ’x/o) + a  (p(p’x/a)] (4.10)
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where 0(.) and (p(.) are the cumulative and probability density functions respectively for 
the standard normal. Notice that the term in square brackets is the conditional
expectation of y* for the Tobit model (see Pudney, 1989, Appendix 2). In the 
double-hurdle model this needs to be multiplied by 0 ( a z ) ,  the probability of access.
Differentiation with respect to xj (where i.e. xj appears in both equations) gives:
^^dxj * = (p(a’z) aj D + <D(a’z) O(p’x) pj (4 .11)
where D is the term in square brackets in (4.10). Notice that if  xj does not affect
access then oy=0 and we have only the second term on the r.h.s of (4.11). Also note
that in this case we have the equivalent calculation for the Tobit model multiplied by 
the probability of access. In fact as E(r|j) approaches we get the Tobit model.
Also, in the special case where there is only a constant in the first hurdle, so that 
there is a constant probability of having access to fertilizer, we have the p-Tobit of 
Deaton and Irish (1982).
§4.5 Data
We now turn to the data used in our empirical analysis. The data come from the 
Indus Basin Survey (IBS) which is described in Chapter 2 in more detail. Farmers 
were asked a series of questions which help to identify the constraints they faced and 
(of more relevance to our analysis here) their reasons, where relevant, for not using 
fertilizer. We focus on households growing improved wheat varieties (1351 households) 
for our analysis.
Households were asked if they used fertilizer last year and if not why not. Over
88% answered yes. Of the 12% not using fertilizer, 71% quoted ’shortage of money’
as the main reason, while nearly 2% quoted ’price too high’ (see Table 4.1). Other 
reasons given for not using were ’not available’ (6.4%), ’do not need’ (10.3%), ’other’ 
(5.2%), with 5.2% not giving any reason. Interpreting ’shortage of money’, ’not 
available’ and ’do not need’ as indicating lack of access then 87% of households who 
did not use fertilizer did not do so due to lack of access.
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Tabl e 4 .1
Use o f  Chemical  P e r t i 1i z e r s
Farm Size All
Response 1 2 3 4 H’ s l d s
Not A v a i l ab l e 2 . 5 4 . 9 0 7.1 3 . 6
Shor t age  o f  Money 53.7 43 . 9 28. 6 21 . 4 43 . 6
Do Not Need 11.2 4 . 9 0 7.1 6.3
Other 5 . 0 1.6 2 . 9 0 2.8
P r i c e  Too High 1.2 1.6 0 0 1.2
Used Las t  Year 26 . 2 43.1 68.6 64.3 42.5
No. o f  Households M 123 14 252(19%)
Used Thi s Year(%) 78.2 82.3 85.4 70.2 1099(81%)
Note:  The response  i s  i n  answer to the q u e s t i o n  ’ I f  you d i d  not  use 
chemical  f e r t i l i z e r s  l a s t  y e a r ,  why n o t ? ’ Sample i s  households  
not  u s i n g  f e r t i l i z e r  t h i s  y e a r , i . e .  252 househo l ds .  Each column 
g i v e s  the p e r ce n t a g e  o f  households  i n  each f a r m- s i z e  c a t eg o r y  
q uo t i ng  each answer.  Al l  numbers,  except  those  u n d e r l i n e d ,  a r e  
p e r c e n t a g e s .  All  households  app l y i ng  f e r t i l i z e r  t h i s  year  a l s o  
a p p l i e d  l a s t  y ea r .
Source:  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976) .
Table  4 . 2
Reasons for  Not Using C r e d i t
Farm Size All
Response 1 2 3 4 H’ s l d s
No Need 18.4 21 . 7 29 . 4 22.6 22.1
Not Know How 21.1 18.1 15.0 9 . 7 18.2
Too Much Trouble 44.1 46. 8 41.1 61.3 45.5
No One To Guarantee 3 . 0 3.3 1.7 0 2. 8
Other 2 . 7 1.7 3. 3 0 2 . 2
I n t e r e s t  Too High 10.7 8.3 9 . 4 6 . 4 9 . 2
No. o f  Households 29 . 2 50. 2 17.6 3 . 0 1025
Note:  The r esponse  i s  i n  answer to the q u e s t i o n  ’ I f  you d i d  not  use 
c r e d i t  for  p r o d u c t i on  purposes  l a s t  y e a r ,  why n o t ? ’ The 1025 
not u s i n g  c r e d i t  were 75% of  sample househo l ds .  Near ly  22% o f  
those  not  u s i n g  c r e d i t  l a s t  year  d i d  not  apply  f e r t i l i z e r  t h i s  
ye a r .  Each column g i ve s  the  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  househo lds  i n  each 
f a r m- s i z e  c a t e g o r y  quo t i ng  each answer .  Al l  numbers,  except  
t hose  u n d e r l i n e d ,  a r e  p e r c e n t a g e s .
Source :  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976) .
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Since ’shortage of money’ was the main reason for not using fertilizer it is worth 
examining this constraint further. Farmers were asked if they had ’used credit for
production purposes last year’, and if not why not. Over 75% of the sample said they 
did not (see Table 4.2), this percentage being higher among those using fertilizer (88%) 
compared to non-users (72%). The main reason for not using credit was given as ’too
much trouble’ (45%). Around 18% and 3% quoted ’do not know how to borrow’ and
’cannot get anyone to guarantee’ respectively as the reasons for not using credit.
Interpreting these three reasons as lack of access (due to lack of knowledge or the
relatively high fixed cost of acquiring credit as perceived by these households) then the 
data suggests that over 65% of households would not respond to higher ou^ut prices or 
lower input (fertilizer) prices by securing more credit and applying more inputs (at least 
for ’small’ price changes). Around 22% of the sample quoted ’do not need credit’, this 
figure being lower among non-users of fertilizer (13%). Around 9% of households 
quoted ’interest rate too high’. Therefore, this suggests that around 30% of those not
using credit would be in a position to respond to a higher wheat-fertilizer price ratio by 
increasing their use of fertilizer, i.e. they are not constrained by lack of access to funds 
to purchase inputs.
Farmers were also asked if they thought they were achieving ’optimum’ yields, and 
if not why not. Although the interpretation of and replies to the question are highly 
subjective, the answers can be suggestive. We focus on two of the answers.
’Insufficient irrigation’ was quoted as the main reason for sub-optimum yields by over 
50% of the sample. This can have the effect of reducing the productivity of fertilizer 
and thus lead to lower levels being applied. ’Lack of fertilizer’ was quoted as the
main reason by 7% of households, this figure being higher (13%) for non-users of 
fertilizer (see Table 4.3). This answer could be taken as an indication of lack of 
access to fertilizer.
In §4.4 we presented a ’double hurdle’ model which we will use to examine the 
factors which determine the level of (nitrogenous) fertilizer applied by farms. The 
model has two equations. The first, the probit stage, identifies whether or not a 
household has ’access’ to fertilizer. The second, the tobit stage, is meant to explain the
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Table 4 .3
Non-Optimum Yi e l d s :  F e r t i l i z e r  C o n s t r a i n t
Farm Size  
( a c r e s )
F i r s t
Reasons
Second Th i r d No. o f  
H’ s l ds
Less  than 5 6 . 3 ( 1 1 . 2 )  2 7 . 0 ( 3 7 . 5 )  2 4 . 2 ( 2 2 . 5 )  367
5 to l e s s  than 12.5 7 . 2 ( 1 3 . 0 )  2 2 . 8 ( 3 2 . 5 )  19 . 8 ( 2 3 . 6 )
12.5 to l e s s  than 25 7 . 1 ( 1 7 . 1 )  2 4 . 6 ( 2 8 . 6 )  1 9 . 2 (1 1 . 4 )  24Û
25 or  over  6 . 4 ( 1 4 . 3 )  2 3 . 4 ( 1 4 . 3 )  2 5 . 5 ( 3 5 . 7 )  41
A ll 6 . 9 ( 1 3 . 1 )  2 4 . 3 ( 3 2 . 5 )  2 1 . 1 ( 2 2 . 2 )  1351
Non-optimum Yie l ds 9 8 . 1 ( 9 9 . 2 )  9 8 . 1 ( 9 8 . 2 )  9 6 . 9 ( 9 8 . 8 )
Note:  Responses a r e  answers to the q u e s t i o n  ’ I f  you do not  t h i n k  t h a t  
you a r e  g e t t i n g  optimum y i e l d s ,  why n o t ? ’ Households  gave up to 
t h r ee  r ea s ons .  Numbers in  b r ac k e t s  r e l a t e  to households  not  
app l y i ng  f e r t i l i z e r  t h i s  y e a r ,  i . e .  approx.  19% of  the  1351 
hous eho lds .  Numbers in columns g ive  the  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  households  
i n  each f a r m- s i z e  c a t eg o r y  quo t i ng  ’ l a ck  o f  f e r t i l i z e r ’ as the 
r eason  for  not  a c h i ev i ng  optimum y i e l d s .
Source :  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976) .
level of fertilizer applied, given ’access’. We now describe the data used in both stages. 
Probit Stage:
(i) FACC: this takes the value one if the household quoted ’not available’ or ’do not
need’ as the reason for not using chemical fertilizer; zero otherwise.
(ii) CRDUM: this takes the value one if the household quoted ’do not know how to
borrow’, ’too much trouble’ or ’cannot get anyone to guarantee’ as the 
reason for not using credit for production purposes last year; zero otherwise.
(iii) NOPTIM: this takes the value one if the household gives ’lack of fertilizer’ as the
main reason for not achieving optimum yields; zero otherwise;
(iv) AGE/EDUC: the age and number of years of formal education of the operator
respectively. These reflect experience or knowledge or the ablility to acquire 
knowledge.
(v) DISTV/C: these represent the distance of the farm from the nearest village and
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nearest city respectively. This captures difficulties of access (or the transport 
costs involved).
(vi) PTEN/OWNL/OWNT: equals 1 where household is classified as ’pure tenant’,
’owner-landlord’ and ’owner-tenant’ respectively; zero otherwise. The base 
for comparison is ’pure owners’.
(vii) PUNJ/NWFP: equals one if household located in Punjab or NWFP respectively;
zero otherwise. The base for comparison is location in Sind.
Tobit Stage:
Other variables needed to estimate the model are those which determine the level
of fertilizer used once we assume that a household has access. Obvious variables to
include are those which affect the productivity of fertilizer. Our estimates of the
production function in Chapter 2 suggest certain variables. However, the 
complementarity of inputs (e.g. number of harrowings, ploughings etc.) with fertilizer can 
lead to bias in the estimates if these variables are included, reflecting the fact that the 
levels of complementary inputs are determined simultaneously. We therefore use only
two of the variables suggested by our production function analyses, namely, the use of 
phosphatic fertilizer (PHOS) and the application of nitrogen as a top dressing (NTOPD). 
To the extent that these represent knowledge of best-practice techniques they can be
viewed as exogenous in our model. Other variables included are:
(a) TOTASS: this is the value of total assets for the household. It includes the value
of buffaloes, bullocks, milk cows, beef cattle, sheep, goats and chickens, as
well as the value of tractors and threshers. In the event of total or partial 
crop failure households may either rely on income from animal husbandry or 
the renting out of draught or tractor services. Alternatively these assets may 
be sold.
(b) LAND: This is the total cropped acreage of the household in the rabi season.
(c) CMYLR: This takes the value one when a household used a money-lender as a
source of credit. Interest rates in the informal credit market are much higher 
than in the formal credit market and so the net price of fertilizer prices 
financed from such informal sources is higher. The fact that, on the margin, 
households resort to moneylenders suggests that they are constrained in other 
sources.
(d) NOPTIMl: This takes the value one if ’lack of fertilizer’ was quoted as any one
of the three reasons for suboptimal yields; zero otherwise. Alternatively we
use N0PTIM2 which takes the value one when this answer was given as the
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second et third most important reason for sub-optimal yields; zero otherwise.
(e) JOB: This variable takes the value 1 if the operator had another occupation or
profession.
(f) El/2/3: When landlords participate in costs and receive part of the output there may
be situations where it is optimal for the operator (tenant) to apply inputs to 
a level where the ratio of the marginal product of the input to its price 
exceeds unity. We can put this more formally. Imagine an operator who 
produces output y using inputs ?q (i=l,2). The price of output is p and of 
 ^ inputs wj (i=l,2). The landlord’s share of total output is r and of input
costs is Sj (i=l,2). The operator, if he is allowed to choose input levels, 
maximizes:
n  = (1 - r) F - (1 - s ,)  w, X, - (1 - s J  w^ x^
where F = py. By examining the first-order conditions for optimal inputs 
one can see that the profit-maximizing farmer will apply input 1 (think of it 
as fertilizer) up to a level where:
F, 1 - s,
Wj 1 - r
where F^/Wj is the ratio of the value marginal product of input 1 to its 
price, which we call the efficiency ratio HR. With decreasing returns a 
higher value of ER implies lower input levels.
When r>Sj then ER>1. For owner operators obviously r=s  ^=0 so that 
ER=1. This also holds for tenants who pay a fixed rent for land without 
landlords sharing in costs or outputs. Around 67% of households had ER=1. 
The efficiency ratio will also equal unity when the share of the landlord’s 
costs equals his share of output (i.e. Sj =r>0) - this was the situation for 
about 15% of households. The dominant arrangement was where outputs and 
costs were split equally. Less than 7% of farmers had an agreement where 
landlords shared outputs but not costs (i.e. Sj =0, r>0), while less than 0.5% 
were in an arrangement where landlords shared costs but not ou^uts (i.e. 
Sj >0, r=0). Over 8% of operators had an arrangement whereby the 
landlord’s share of costs exceeded his share of outputs (s^  >r) while over 
10% had an arrangement whereby the landlords’s share of output exceeded 
his share of costs (r>si). To capture these incentive effects we include 
ER=(1-Sj )/(l-r) as an independent variable and expect a negative sign.
Some 37 households (3.4%) had an arrangement whereby s^  =1 which implied
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a value for ER=0 - profit-maximizing operators would effectively maximize 
outputs using inputs up to a level where their marginal products were zero. 
Also a further 53 (4.8%) farmers were in an agreement where ER<1. One 
could argue that where the landlord has a larger share of costs than of 
output then it is reasonable to expect that he will also decide on the level 
of inputs to be applied and that this level would be set (ignoring
uncertainty) at ER=1. This essentially views such tenant operators as hired 
workers. To capture this aspect of tenancy agreements we introduce another 
variable ER2 which takes the value 1 if ER=<1 mid if the landlord also 
decided on input levels. Otherwise ER2=ER. Tenants were asked which 
party to the agreement decided on the level of fertilizer to be applied. 
Where they answered ’landlord’ or ’mutual’ (we assume that this response is 
either an optimistic view by tenants or that both agree to maximize total 
profit) we take this as the landlord deciding on the level of inputs. One 
might still think that a situation where ER<1 is not acceptable. We allow 
for this by using another variable ER3 which equals unity if ER2<1, 
otherwise ER3=ER2.
(g) IPRIVAINAD/IMIX: In Chapter 2 we described the sources of irrigation used by
households (from September to February). Where households relied mainly
on private sources IPRIV=1, zero otherwise. Where households did not have
access to any source of irrigation for more than two months IINAD=1, zero 
otherwise. Where households relied on a mixture of public and private 
(including Persian wells) irrigation IMIX=1, zero otherwise. The base for 
comparison are households who relied on public irrigation, mainly canal
irrigation.
(h) TW: takes the value one if the household owned a tubewell, zero otherwise.
(i) NUMTOT: This is the number of household members. The application of fertilizer
is a labour intensive task. The cost of family labour may be much lower 
than hired labour. This increases the cost of fertilizer applied by hired 
labour. One may therefore expect households with more family labour to 
apply higher levels of fertilizer. Alternatively, one can think of households 
as viewing labour as an endowment of non-stochastic wealth. In the event 
of partial or complete crop failure households can work in agricultural-related 
or non-agricultural related activities. This source of income may be viewed 
as non-stochastic. To capture this we disaggregate NUMTOT into ’males 
over 15’ (MLOF), ’females over 15’ (FMOF), ’boys aged 10-15’ (BOYS), 
’girls aged 10-15’ (GIRLS), and children less than 15 (CHILD). Given the 
low incidence of women, boys and girls working off-farm we expect that this 
non-stochastic human wealth effect will show up in the MLOF coefficient.
(j) WHPR: The IBS provides data on total expenditure on and total use of fertilizer
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for each household. Total expenditure includes both nitrogenous and 
phosphatic fertilizer. We can therfore calculate the price paid for nitrogen 
only for those households which purchased nitrogen and not phosphate (768 
households). The price of nitrogenous fertilizer was fixed at Rs2.96/kg in 
1976/77 and we calculate this price for 40% of households, with 80% of 
households having a price 10% either side of this figure. Households 
without prices were assigned their regional averages.
The price of wheat (which we assume to be the relevant marginal price) is
taken directly from the survey. Some 63% of households do not sell any
wheat in the market, their produce going towards ’family consumption’ or 
other on-farm consumption. The wheat price was concentrated between 
Rs0.9/kg and Rs 1.0/kg, with 42% of surplus households quoting Rs.0.938 and 
27% quoting RsO.964. In 1976 the procurement price for wheat was 
Rs0.99/kg, while the average market price was Rsl. 12/kg. We calculated 
regional averages for prices and households without quoted prices were 
assigned their relevant regional average. Given the fixed nature of prices 
there is little variation in WHPR, the ratio of the wheat price to the 
fertilizer price.
(k) GSAL/SLSAL/NSAL: these take the value one if land was categorized as ’generally
saline’, ’slightly saline’ or ’non saline’ respectively, zero otherwise. The 
base is households with ’severely saline’ land.
Variables (v)-(vii) above were also included as determinants of the level of fertilizer
applied.
§4.6 Results
We now turn to the results of our empirical investigations. We first present the 
results from our analysis of access and then from the double-hurdle model. Statistical 
significance is taken with respect to the 95% confidence level unless specifically stated. 
Whereas in an OLS regression the consequence of heteroskedasticity is only inefficient 
(but unbiased) estimates, estimates from probit regressions and models like the ’double 
hurdle’ model used here are also inconsistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
Since heteroskedasticity is common in analyses of behaviour using agricultural household 
data (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion) we present the White (1980) 
t-statistic and use it as a diagnostic statiistic to test for the presence of
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heteroskedasticity. We refer to it as the ’robust’ t-statistic. Also, if the classical and
robust t-statistics are ’close’ then one might interpret this as evidence of model 
acceptability. The presence of heteroskedasticity, as well as the problem of influential 
observations (see Chapter 3 for a discussion), lie behind our use of the log of cropped 
acreage in the empirical analysis.
^4.6.1 Access
In this section we present the results of some preliminary analyses of the variables 
used in the ’first hurdle’ or probit stage of the model, i.e. in (4.8). Since it is a 
common argument that small farms are more resource constrained than large farms we 
test for relationships between these variables, which are used to identify households 
which do not have ’access’ to fertilizer, and farm size. In particular we concentrate on 
the relationship between whether or not a household applied fertilizer (’use’), whether or 
not it is deemed to have access (as defined in §4.3), and farm size.
Table 4 . 4
Access and Use of  F e r t i l i z e r  and C r e d i t  ( P r o b i t s )
Dependent  Var i ab l e  I n t e r c e p t  LAND
(1) Use o f F e r t i l i z e r  0.71 ( 6 . 5 )  0 . 09  ( 1 . 6 )
(2)  Access to F e r t i l i z e r  (FACC) 0 . 70  ( 5 . 6 )  0.31 ( 4 . 8 )
(3)  Shor t age  o f  Money -0 .09  ( - 6 . 6 )  -0 .28 ( - 4 . 0 )
(4)  Access to Cr e d i t  (CRDUM) -0.31 ( - 3 . 1 )  0 .15  ( 3 . 2 )
-  Too Much Trouble -0 . 34  ( - 3 . 3 )  -0 .03 ( - 0 . 6 5 )
(5)  F e r t i l i z e r  C o n s t r a i n t  (NOPTIM) -1 .42  ( - 9 . 5 )  - 0 .03  ( - 0 . 4 5 )
Note:  LAND, i . e .  t o t a l  c u l t i v a t e d  a c r e age ,  i s  the  on ly  e x p l a n a t o r y  
v a r i a b l e .  Numbers in b r acke t s  a r e  t - s t a t i s t i c s .
The results of various probits with farm size (in logs) as the only explanatory 
variable are presented in Table 4.4. In the first probit the dependent variable is a 
zero-one variable taking the value one if a household applies fertilizer, zero otherwise.
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We find that the use of fertilizer is not significantly correlated with farm size. In the 
second probit the dependent variable takes the value one if households gave ’not 
available’, ’shortage of money’ or ’do not need’ as reasons for not using fertilizer, zero 
otherwise. We interpret these answers as lack of access with the implication that such 
households would not apply fertilizer even if relative prices changed. We find that 
access is significantly positively correlated with farm size. The main reason for lack of 
access was ’shortage of money’ and probit three indicates that this reason was also 
significantly negatively correlated with farm size.
The importance of ’shortage of money’ as a constraint led us to analyse the 
reasons for not using credit. In probit four households are defined as not having access 
to credit if they answered ’too much trouble’, ’not know how’, ’no one to guarantee’ or 
’other’; and the dependent variable takes the value one (zero otherwise). We find a 
significantly positive relationship between farm size and access to credit. However, 
when we take ’too much trouble’ as the only indicator of lack of access we find that 
there is no significant relationship. It may be that ’too much trouble’ reflects easier 
sources of credit. For example, some farms will have the choice between own funds 
and cheap credit from agricultural banks. They may decide not to use cheap credit if 
the application procedure was complicated and necessitated bribes. They then rely on 
own funds to finance purchases and so should be categorized with households giving 
’no need’ as the reason for not using credit. Finally, probit five shows that when the 
dependent variable takes the value one if households gave ’lack of fertilizer’ as the 
main reason for sub-optimum yields (zero otherwise) we find that this is also 
insignificantly related to farm size.
These results indicate that although the positive relationship between fertilizer use 
and farm size is only significant at the 90% level, access and farm size are more 
strongly and more significantly related. The main reason for lack of access to fertilizer 
was shortage of money. This indicates the importance of credit markets and is 
consistent with the policy, followed since the mid 1970s, of increasing credit availability. 
However, in spite of the substantial increase in credit availability through agricultural 
and commercial banks, these constraints still existed in the early 1980s (see §4.2). This
FLgure 4.7: ProbabLLLtg of Recess and Use
—  PRXS - P R Z  --PRZO
Prob.
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Note: PRXS us the probabuLuty of use given access; PRZ us the probabuLuty 
of access; PRZO us the probabuLuty of observing positive use (Le. PRXSxpRZ)
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suggests that the design of schemes to get this extra credit to those who are more
constrained in this respect could be improved, i.e. the targeting of credit should be 
made more effective.
^4.6.2 Double-Hurdle Model
Earlier we discussed certain variables which could be used to indicate households 
which do not have access to fertilizer, as defined in §4.3. In the probit stage we use 
two alternate sets of variables. Firstly, we identify households without access directly 
using the answers to the question concerning why households did not apply chemical 
fertilizer last year, i.e. FACC. Secondly, we use the answers to the questions
concerning non-use of credit and non-optimum yields, i.e. CRDUM and NOPTIM, to 
indicate access. The comparison of the two is useful since identification of access
directly through a variable like FACC is not always possible in data sets so that one 
often has to fall back on indirect variables such as CRDUM and NOPTIM. When we 
experimented with models which used both sets of these variables and the others 
described in §4.5 in the ’probit’ equation we encountered problems with convergence 
and specification. The results presented here use both sets separately and exclude the 
other variables which, in any case, were always insignificant.
In Figure 4.7 we plot the relationship between farm size and both the probabilility 
of access, i.e. O (a’z), and the probability that households apply fertilizer, i.e. O (a’z) 
0 (P ’x/o). These probabilities are moving averages calculated using the non-parametric 
technique described in §2.7 and in Deaton (1989). We can see that both the
probability of access and the probability of having positive fertilizer levels increase with 
farm size. This reinforces the results above where we found that access to credit, the 
main constraint on fertilizer demand, is also positively correlated with farm size.
The purpose of the tobit stage is to explain the variation in fertilizer use across 
households once they are deemed to have access. The most significant variable is 
LAND, the log of total cropped acreage. To transform the estimated coefficient into 
elasticity form we divide (4.11) by (4.10). Simce farm size does not appear in the 
probit stage of the model the first term on the r.h.s of (4.11) drops out. The elasticity.
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Table 4 .5a
Access and Use of  Chemical F e r t i l i z e r s  (D ouh le -hu rd le  Model 1
C o e f f i c i e n t  t - s t a t  Robust t
P r o b i t  S tage :
I n t e r c e p t  -2 .30  -5 .7 0  -5 .3 0
**FACC 4.14  9 .90  9 .20
Tob i t  S tage :
I n t e r c e p t  -99.60  -4 .1 0  -4 .3 0
**LAND 79.50 19.00 16.00
**T0TASS 0.58 4 .3 0  3 .80
**NUMTOT 1.62 3 .90  3 .70
DISTV -0 .37  -0 .11 -0 .09
DISTC -0 .38 -0 .9 0  -0 .9 0
E2 7.44  0.81  0 .88
WHPR 0.98 0 .06  0 .07
CMYLR 8.20 0 .66  0 .58
**PH0S 40.50 6 .10  6 .10
**NT0PD 42.20 6 .40  6 .40
**TW 30.70 4 .6 0  4 .8 0
JOB 8.70 0 .89  0 .92
*SLSAL 20.60 -2 .0 0  -1 .7 0
GSAL 10.80 1.40  1.30
NSAL 0.16 0 .02  0 .02
**OWNL -26 .80 - 2 .0 0  -2 .0 0
OWNT 2.30  0 .29  0.28
PTEN 7.12 1.10 1.10
IPRIV 0.23 0 .03  0 .03
**IINAD -59 .90 -4 .1 0  -3 .2 0
IMIX -5 .38  -0 .3 6  -0 .30
NOPTIMl -3.51 -0 .71  -0 .7 0
PUNI -15 .80 -1 .4 0  -1 .3 0
NWFP -12.60  -0 .89  -0 .88
** a  79.60 41 .00  30 .00
L og-1i k e l i hood at  optimum -5568
L og-1ik e l ih o o d  for  p-Tobi t  -5724
L og-1i k e l i hood for  Tobit  -6169
Number o f  o b s e rv a t io n s  1351
Note:  See Appendix C for n o te s .
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Table 4.5b
Access and Use o f  Chemical F e r t i l i z e r s  (D oub le -hu rd le  Model 1
C o e f f i c i e n t  t - s t a t  Robust t
P r o b i t  S tage:
I n t e r c e p t  2.02 12.00 11.00
**CRDUM -0.52 -2 .7 0  -2 .6 0
**NOPTIM -0 .80 -3 .2 0  -2 .7 0
Tobi t  S tage:
I n t e r c e p t  -90.00 -3 .6 0  -3 .8 0
**LAND 78.30 17.00 14.00
**TOTASS 0.59 4 .2 0  4 .00
**NUMTOT 1.78 4 .1 0  4 .0 0
DISTV -2.70  -0 .8 0  -0 .66
DISTC -0.44  -1 .0 0  -1 .0 0
*E2 -17.70 -1 .9 0  -1 .80
WHPR 2.20  0 .13  0 .16
CMYLR 10.00 0 .76  0 .67
**PHOS 49.60 6 .90  6 .40
**NTOPD 47.60 6 .80  6 .80
**TW 31.70 4 .6 0  4 .70
JOB 7.94 0 .79  0 .80
**SLSAL 27.80 2 .70  2 .40
GSAL 7.39 0 .89  0 .87
NSAL -3.47 -0 .4 6  -0 .46
OWNL -16 .60 -1 .2 0  -1 .2 0
OWNT 7.06 0 .85  0.81
PTEN 7.79 1.20 1.20
IPRIV -1.87  -0 .2 4  -0 .2 4
**IINAD -79 .70  -5 .7 0  -4 .60
IMIX -14 .80  -0 .9 9  -0 .82
NOPTIMl -7.81 -1 .5 0  -1 .50
PUNI -4 .02  -0 .3 6  -0 .32
NWFP -9 .74  -0 .6 7  -0 .66
** G 83.70 37 .00  25.00
L ik e l ih o o d  a t  the optimum -5715
Number o f  o b se rv a t io n s  1351
Note:  See Appendix C for no te s .
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calculated at the sample means of the explanatory variables, comes out at 0.6: a 10% 
increase in farm size leads to a 6% increase in fertilizer applied to wheat (see Table 
4.5a). At the sample means for total cropped acreage (7.11 acres), wheat acreage (4.52 
acres) and fertilizer applied to wheat (115.04 kgs), assuming that an extra acreage is 
allocated to wheat implies a fall in per acre fertilizer levels from 25.4 kg per acre to 
23.3 kg per acre. To the extent that we have controlled, through other variables, for 
productivity differences, we might interpret this coefficient as evidence of increasing 
relative risk aversion: ceteris paribus, households with more land apply lower levels of 
fertilizer per acre. This conclusion might be reversed if one thought that the 
productivity of fertilizer was lower on larger farms, say, due to a lower standard of
agricultural practices, and this variation in productivity was not captured by the other 
variables in the regression. Our discussion in §4.2 suggests that, if anything, practices 
are better on larger farms because of the concentration of extension services on these 
farms. A similar elasticity (0.61) emerges when we replace FACC by both CRDUM 
and NOPTIM (see Table 4.5b).
It is very common to find studies which regress fertilizer use on just farm size, 
controlling for no other household characteristics. In Chapter 3 our results from such a 
regression, applied to the truncated sample, found no systematic relationship between 
these variables. When we used the double-hurdle model for such an analysis (i.e.
without controlling for other variables) we found a significant positive relationship and
an elasticity of 0.69, implying lower per acre fertilizer levels on larger farms. This 
higher elasticity suggests that the combined net effect of the other variables which we 
did not control for is to increase relative fertilizer levels on larger farms. We return to 
this issue below.
Many of the theoretical models (see, for example, Feder, 1980) examine the
allocation of land between a ’modem’ crop and ’traditional’ crops, usually where the 
former has higher average yields but a greater risk of lower yields (see Feder et al, 
1985). In the above regressions the dependent variable is total (nitrogenous) fertilizer 
applied to the area under improved wheat while LAND is total cropped acreage. We 
ran an alternative regression using the double-hurdle model with both LAND and the
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Table 4 . 6
Access and Use o f  Chemical F e r t i l i z e r s  (D oub le -hu rd le  Model 1
C o e f f i c i e n t  t - s t a t  Robust t
P r o b i t  S tage :
I n t e r c e p t -2.32 - 5 .8 0 -5 .4 0
**FACC 4.08 9 .9 0 9 .20
Tob i t  S tage :
I n t e r c e p t -97.00 -4 .5 0 -4 .0 0
**LANDW 93.60 15.00 12.00
LAND 0.36 0 .05 0.05
**TOTASS 0.66 5 .5 0 5 .3 0
**NUMTOT 1.22 3 .3 0 3 .10
DISTV -2.31 -0 .8 0 -0 .62
DISTC -0.27 -0 .71 -0 .69
E2 6.31 0 .76 0 .87
WHPR -6.35 -0 .4 3 -0 .36
CMYLR 3.68 0 .33 0.27
**PHOS 40.50 6 .8 0 6 .70
**NTOPD 36.80 6 .2 0 6 .20
18.20 3 .0 0 3 .10
JOB 2.77 0.31 0.31
*SLSAL 19.60 2 .1 0 1.80
GSAL 10.00 1.40 1.40
NSAL 3.65 0 .55 0 .57
**OWNL -25.20 -2 .1 0 -2 .0 0
OWNT 0.55 0 .08 0 .07
PTEN 1.64 0 .28 0.28
IPRIV -5.04 -0 .7 5 -0 .7 7
**IINAD -45.50 -3 .3 0 -2 .7 0
IMIX -5.93 -0 .41 -0 .31
NOPTIMl -5.31 -1 .2 0 -1 .2 0
PUNJ 7.87 0 .77 0 .69
**NWFP 42.10 3 .20 3 .10
** o 71.80 42 .00 30.00
[ - l i k e l i h o o d  at the optimum -5472
Log-1ik e l ih o o d  for  p-Tobi t  -5647
Log-1ik e l ih o o d  for Tobi t  -6169
Number o f  o b s e rv a t io n s  1351
Note: See Appendix C for  notes.
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percentage of total cropped acreage under wheat (LANDW) as explanatory variables 
together with the others described earlier (see Table 4.6). Here the coefficient on 
LAND can be interpreted as the effect on total fertilizer applied to wheat when a
household has greater total cropped acreage but the same pattern of allocation between 
’modem’ and ’traditional’ crops. The decisions of how to allocate given land between 
various crops and how much fertilizer to apply to each crop are joint decisions. 
Theoretical models suggest that farmers with a comparative advantage in growing 
modem (high yield and high risk) crops will allocate more land to these crops. 
Comparative advantage will reflect endowments of factors (e.g. irrigation facilities or 
knowledge) which are used intensively in the production of modem crops and possibly 
reduce the variability of retums. Also, an ability to secure sufficient credit, maybe on 
more favourable terms, also enhances comparative advantage because of the
purchased-input intensity of modern crops. However, farmers allocating more land to 
the more risky modem crops may compensate for the higher risk by reducing the levels 
of variable inputs such as fertilizer. The coefficient of LANDW captures this effect. 
The relationship between farm size and fertilizer intensity will depend on the farmer’s 
attitude to risk and how the pattern of stochastic and non-stochastic wealth varies with
farm size.
In our results the coefficient of LAND is significantly positive and implies an 
elasticity of 0.73, i.e. a 10% increase in total cropped acreage leads to a 7.3% increase 
in the level of fertilizer applied to wheat. At the sample means (and keeping the
percentage of total cropped acreage under wheat constant) this implies a fall in per acre 
fertilizer levels from 25.4 kg per acre to 24.7 kg per acre. This is consistent with 
increasing relative risk aversion. The coefficient of LANDW is positive and significant 
and implies an elasticity of 0.73. At the sample averages this also implies that a 10% 
increase in the percentage of total cropped acreage allocated to wheat (from 0.64 to 0.7) 
leads to a fall in fertilizer intensity from 25.4 kg/acre to 24.7 kg/acre. This supports 
the view that households allocating more land to more risky ’modem’ crops compensate 
for the additional risk by reducing input intensity for the modem crop.
The positive coefficient of TOTASS is consistent with decreasing absolute risk
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aversion: ceteris paribus, households with more non-stochastic wealth apply more 
fertilizer. Since farm size is held constant this implies that fertilizer intensities are 
positively related with TOTASS: calculated at the sample means this implies that a 
household with non-stochastic wealth of Rs26,535 would apply an extra kilogram of 
fertilizer per wheat acre compared to a household with only Rsl6,980 of non-stochastic 
wealth. The results were very similar when we subtracted the value of tractors and 
threshers (possible sources of differential productivity) from TOTASS which is consistent 
with the suggestion that this variable is capturing the presence of absolute risk aversion.
The positive coefficient of NUMTOT is consistent with that found by Srinivasan 
(1972, p416) and implies that, at the sample means, an extra family member leads to 
an extra 1.39 kg of fertilizer applied to wheat (equivalent to 0.3 kg/acre), or that an 
extra 3.25 household members would lead to an extra kilogram of fertilizer per wheat 
acre. Bliss and Stem (1982, p75) suggest that we could interpret this in terms of 
labour being a safe asset (compared to cultivation) so that more family labour is 
equivalent to a higher level of non-stochastic assets (B in equation 4.6 above). If adult 
males are the only family members working off-farm then this effect will be associated 
with the number of adult males in the family (unless females and young male labour 
substitutes for adult male family members on-farm enabling adult males to work off the 
farm). In Chapter 2 we argued that the incidence of females and children working 
off-farm was very low. Indeed, when we disaggregated NUMTOT by age and gender 
only the number of adult males was significant (and positive). Alternatively, if one 
views fertilizer application as a labour-intensive task and the cost of family labour as 
being lower than for hired labour then the positive coefficient on NUMTOT captures 
this lower cost of applying fertilizer for households with a larger number of family 
members. Additionally, if one thinks that households have a preference for home-grown 
wheat then those with more family labour will seek higher output levels through 
applying more inputs.
The variables PHOS (whether or not phosphate was applied) and NTOPD (nitrogen 
applied as a top dressing) are meant to capture good fertilizer application practices. 
Their positive coefficients reflect the higher productivity of fertilizer on farms which
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Table 4 .7
Mag n i tude  o f  S i g n i f i c a n t  Zero-One V a r i a b l e s
V a r ia b l e  E(Y|X)i % Change^ Change In
F e r t i 1i z e r / A c r e
PHOS
1 136.8
0 101.6
NTOPD
1 137.9
0 101.1
TW
1 132.5
0 105.8
SLSAL
1 128.6
0 110.7
OWNL
1 93.1
0 115.8
IINAD
1 69.1
0 117.7
+0.35 +7.77
+0.36 +9.84
+0.20 +5.89
+0.16 +3.95
0 .20  -5 .01
-0.41 -10 .73
Note: (1) Sample average  o f  f e r t i l i z e r  l e v e l s ,  E(Y|X),  c a l c u l a t e d
u s in g  e q u a t io n  (3 ) ,  and the sample average  o f  e x p l a n a t o r y  
v a r i a b l e s ,  X.
(2)  P e rc e n ta g e  change in E(Y|X) when dummy v a r i a b l e  t a k e s  the 
va lue  one compared to when i t  i s  z e ro .
(3)  This  i s  the change in E(Y|X) d iv i d e d  by the sample mean o f  
wheat a c r e a g e ,  i , e  4.53 a c r e s .  I t  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  as the 
change in  per  ac re  l e v e l s  a p p l i e d .
apply phosphate and where nitrogen is also applied as a top dressing. Their coefficients 
imply an extra 7.8 kg and 9.8 kilogram of fertilizer per wheat acre for households 
applying phosphate and nitrogen as a top dressing respectively (see Table 4.7). Because 
of their close association with the ’first hurdle’ or probit stage we were worried that 
these variables may be endogenous. However, when we excluded these from the model 
the results were very similar.
Households whose land was classified as ’slightly saline’ (SLSAL) also appear to 
apply an extra 3.9 kg of fertilizer compared to households with saline land. However,
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the insignificance of the other land quality variables (i.e. GSAL and NSAL) makes one 
suspicious that these are not capturing this effect adequately. SLSAL was significant 
only at the 10% level when LANDW and when both CRDUM and NOPTIM were 
included.
Households that owned a tubewell (TW) also apply an extra 5.9 kg of fertilizer 
per wheat acre. This probably captures the greater degree of control over the timing 
and level of irrigation and also less uncertainty about availability of the right amount at 
the right time. Another interpretation is that tubewell ownership also signifies a greater 
interest and involvement in ’modem’ agriculture and a consequent stock of knowledge 
about the appropriate farm practices. Households which were classified as having 
inadequate irrigation supplies (IINAD) apply 10.7 kg of fertilizer less per wheat acre 
compared to households who had reliable public irrigation. However, the source of 
irrigation, i.e. private, public or a combination of both, does not appear to affect 
fertilizer levels. These results reinforce the importance of irrigation in increasing the 
productivity of fertilizer.
The nature of land tenure does not seem to influence fertilizer levels, except for 
’owner-landlords’ who apply lower levels. The significant negative coefficient of OWNL 
may reflect constrained resources which may in turn lie behind the decision to lease out 
land on a sharecropping basis. This also suggests that the Cheung (1969) view of 
leasing-in/out does not work perfectly since, if it did, production techniques and crop 
selection would be invariant to tenure type. When CRDUM and NOPTIM were used in 
the probit stage the coefficient of OWNL, although negative, was insignificant. 
However, in the same regression the coefficient of ER2 (which is meant to capture the 
incentive effects of the sharing of input costs and output levels) was significantly 
negative at the 10% level: where landlords have a higher share of output than of input 
costs tenants apply lower fertilizer levels.
When LANDW was included NWFP had a significantly positive coefficient. Other 
than this case provincial location did not appear to have any separate effect on fertilizer 
levels. Also, the insignificance of the price variable, WHPR, is not surprising given its 
small variation across households. This reflects the policy in Pakistan in the 1970s of
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Table 4 .8
R eg res s io n  o f  S i g n i f i c a n t  E xp lana to ry  V a r i a b l e s  on LAND
V a r ia b l e I n t e r c e p t LAND
(1) TOTASS -5.11 11.26
( - 3 .5 ) (1 6 .1 )
(2) NUMTOT 5.24 2.81
(10 .9 ) (1 2 .3 )
(3) PHOS -0.76 0 .24
( - 7 .3 ) ( 4 .9 )
(4) NTOPD -0.77 0 .24
( - 7 .6 ) ( 5 .0 )
(5) TW -0.58 0 .10
( - 5 .6 ) ( 2 .0 )
(6) SLSAL -0.51 -0 .09
( - 4 .9 ) ( - 1 . 8 )
(7) OWNL -2.49 0 .30
( - 9 . 3 ) ( 2 .6 )
(8) IINAD -1.48 -0 .08
( - 8 .4 ) ( - 0 . 8 7 )
Note: (1)  and (2)  a re  r e g re s s io n s  w i th  log o f  t o t a l  c u l t i v a t e d  
a c r e a g e , LAND, as the only e x p l a n a to r y  v a r i a b l e .  ( 3 ) - ( 5 )  
a re  p r o b i t  r e g re s s io n s  with  LAND as th e  on ly  e x p l a n a to r y  
v a r i a b l e .
fixing fertilizer and wheat prices and should not be interpreted as lack of response to 
relative prices. So, at least for this time period, cross-section data are unlikely to be 
useful for estimating the price elasticity of demand for inputs.
Finally, from the results of the double-hurdle model (see Table 4.6) we saw that 
the elasticity of fertilizer applied to total wheat acreage with respect to LAND was 0.6. 
For these estimates we controlled for other characteristics such as productivity. 
However, when all explanatory variables except LAND were dropped from the ’tobit’ 
stage of the double-hurdle model we calculated a farm size elasticity of 0.69. This 
suggests that the combined effect of the other variables is to increase relative fertilizer 
levels on larger farms. To examine the relationship between farm size and the other
significant explanatory variables we regressed them on farm size using OLS for
continuous variables (i.e. TOTASS and NUMTOT) and probits for zero-one variables. 
The results are presented in Table 4.8. These show that both TOTASS and NUMTOT 
are significantly positively related to farm size, and that the probabilités of applying
phosphate, of applying nitrogen as a top dressing and of being classified as an
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owner-landlord are higher on larger farms. The probability of having ’slightly saline’
land is negatively related to farm size, but only significant at the 10% level, while the 
probability of having inadequate irrigation has no significant relationship with farm size. 
Although all these variables combine to increase fertilizer intensity on larger farms
(probably reflecting higher fertilizer productivity) they are not strong enough to change
the inverse relationship between farm size and fertilizer intensity. So the presence of 
increasing relative risk aversion, which has the effect of decreasing fertilizer intensity on 
larger farms, would appear to dominate all other (productivity and non-stochastic wealth) 
effects which combine to increase fertilizer intensity on larger farms.
§4.7 Conclusions
One of the stylized facts in developing countries is the wide variation in 
agricultural per acre input and output levels across farm households. In Chapter 2 we 
discussed this variability in detail for Pakistan using our data set for 1976/7. In this
chapter we have focused on the variation in the level of nitrogenous fertilizer applied to 
improved wheat varieties. Since the increased use of fertilizer from the late 1960s is
closely linked to the diffusion of HYVs, we described the nature of the new technology
and highlighted the complementary nature of many inputs and farm practices. One of
the conclusions from the analysis was the implications of the functioning of other
markets, in particular the credit market, for the demand for fertilizer. An inability (or 
unwillingness) to secure any or enough credit was a major constraint on fertilizer use
and we found this to be positively correlated with farm size. In spite of the large 
increase in credit availability through formal institutions this problem does not seem to 
have been alleviated by the mid 1980s.
Previous empirical analyses of fertilizer demand have neglected the need for a 
model which incorporates the mechanism by which the data were generated, in particular 
the separation of households not applying fertilizer into those who do not have access
(due to, say, lack of credit or own funds to finance purchase) and those who have
access but do not apply (due to, say, low profitability). The model used here tackles 
this problem and also incorporates the effect of uncertainty on input decisions. The
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simple theoretical models presented suggest that input levels are lower in the presence 
of uncertainty. Also, both the distribution of wealth between stochastic and 
non-stochastic components and the behaviour of farmers in response to additional 
exposure to risk determine the pattern of input intensity across farm size. Of course, a 
greater availability of knowledge, credit or complementary inputs (e.g. irrigation) also 
increases factor productivity and, therefore, intensity. Our results indicate that the 
factors which we expect affect fertilizer productivity (e.g. use of phosphate, application 
of nitrogen as a top dressing and access to reliable irrigation) are positively correlated
with farm size and have the effect of increasing fertilizer intensity on larger farms.
However, the presence of uncertainty operates to reverse this effect. Although larger 
farms have a higher level of non-stochastic wealth which, in the presence of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, has the effect of increasing fertilizer intensity with farm size, the 
presence of increasing relative risk aversion means that the net relationship between farm 
size and fertilizer intensity is negative. Thus, while in the absence of uncertainty one 
may expect to observe fertilizer intensity increasing with farm size, reflecting their 
higher productivity of fertilizer, the presence of uncertainty appears to reverse this 
relationship.
Our results therefore highlight two separate areas for government policy. Firstly, 
there are the problems faced by farmers, in particular those with small landholdings 
(plots), in securing adequate credit, irrigation and access to knowledge provided by
extension services. Preliminary results on more recent data sets suggest that these 
conclusions were still valid for the 1980s. In spite of the large increase in credit on
favourable terms smaller farms appear to be unaware of or unsuccessful in obtaining this 
extra credit. One therefore needs to examine carefully the effectiveness of existing 
schemes in targeting this credit. The poor knowledge of farmers of recommended farm 
practices highlights similar problems in the diffusion of best-practice farming techniques 
through extension service schemes.
Secondly, the government should examine ways in which the creation of insurance 
markets can help to dilute the risk faced by farmers. Although our analysis did not 
attempt to discuss possible methods, we can point out that, if one accepts that such
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markets are unlikely to emerge (at least in the short to medium term) then one should 
look at ways in which the government can bear some of this risk through its price and 
income distribution schemes or in its selection of policy instruments, say for example, to 
raise revenue. It may be desirable to incorporate this into any reform of the credit 
markets since fear of losing land is often an important reason for farmers deciding not 
to take credit.
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Chapter Five 
Shadow Prices and Industrial Policy in Pakistan
§5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 we saw that there are many reasons why the market price of 
commodities may not reflect their true social value to the economy. When appraising 
government policies and the social value of public and private investments it is therefore 
necessary to allow for this divergence between relative social (or shadow) prices and 
relative market prices. We described how shadow prices can be used to identify
welfare improving reforms in indirect taxes and government controlled prices. Shadow 
prices can also be used to evaluate possible reforms of trade and industrialization policy.
The main objective of this chapter is to calculate a set of shadow prices for 
Pakistan for 1975-6. Much of the chapter relies on the method set out in Ahmad, 
Coady and Stem (1988). However, we have revised and extended this paper in a 
number of ways. Firstly, we set out a more general model for the calculation of 
shadow prices which allows for the possibility of partially traded and non-traded
commodities. This model is relatively easier to set up and manipulate, say, for the
purposes of sensitivity analysis. Secondly, we can now use direct price comparisons 
between domestic and world prices which were not previously available. This eliminates 
the need to use crude assumptions to calculate these ratios and the results help to 
emphasise important issues which need to be considered when formulating 
industrialization and trade policies. Thirdly, we discuss how optimal short-term
government policies (e.g. pricing and taxation policies) can deviate from optimal 
long-term policies due to the presence of non-linearities such as fixed costs or 
constrained government policies.
In §5.2 we give a brief description of the evolution of industrialization and foreign 
trade policies in Pakistan and summarize previous attempts at calculating their effect on 
the structure of incentives and relative prices. In §5.3 we discuss the principles 
employed to calculate shadow prices and §5.4 describes the data at our disposal. The 
results of our analysis are presented in §5.5, and §5.6 sets out some general 
conclusions.
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§5.2 Industrializadon and Foreign Trade Policy in Pakistan
Since Independence in 1947 the various governments in Pakistan have undertaken 
extensive intervention in the economy in an attempt to manipulate the incentives facing
domestic producers. While these interventions have taken various forms all have had
the consequence that the system of relative prices facing producers and consumers have 
diverged substantially from relative shadow prices. In this section we first give a brief 
description of government industrialization and trade policies in Pakistan since 
Independence. Much of the description is based on information from Ahmed and 
Amjad (1984), which in turn draws on many other studies of policy in Pakistan, e.g.
Papanek (1967), Soligo and Stem (1965), Lewis and Guisinger (1968), Lewis (1970),
Little et al (1970), Falcon and Papanek (1970), and Guisinger (1981). We show that
there has been a gradual movement away from quantative restrictions on domestic 
production and foreign trade in favour of the manipulation of price incentives (see 
Guisinger and Scully, 1991, for a more detailed discussion). We then give a brief
summary of previous attempts to empirically analyse the effects of government policy on 
price incentives.
§5.2.7 The Evolution of Policy
At Independence the manufacturing sector in Pakistan (both East and West) was 
minimal, reflecting their previous position as major supplier of primary raw materials to 
manufacturing industries in India. The main preoccupation of the newly installed 
parliamentary government concerned the rehabilitation of refugees, the setting up of a
defence capability, price stability, and industrialization of an economy previously 
dominated by agriculture. Price controls were introduced and government policies
focused on the promotion of industrial growth through such incentives as accelerated 
depreciation allowances, tax concessions on industrial profits and the duty-free import of 
capital goods. In September 1949 sterling devalued as did the Indian rupee. The 
decision by Pakistan not to devalue had important ramifications since, at that time, 
nearly 67% of Pakistani exports (e.g. jute and cotton) went to the UK and India and 
almost 68% of its imports originated in these two countries. India viewed the Pakistani
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decision as an attempt to extract higher prices for its major exports, particularly jute, 
and retaliated by suspending trade. This forced Pakistan to abandon its liberal import 
policy in September 1949 when it introduced loose trade controls. The outbreak of the 
Korean war in June 1950 led to an increased demand for raw materials with a 
consequent hike in their international prices. This presented an opportunity for Pakistan 
to diversify its trade to other countries in the sterling area and to relax import controls. 
In February 1951 India recognised the new exchange rate and trade was resumed, albeit 
at a much reduced level.
The initiation of peace negotiations between the superpowers in mid 1951 
precipitated a downturn in the world prices of raw materials so that the terms of trade 
went against Pakistan with the consequent fall in export earnings and recession. The 
liberal import policy continued until mid 1952 but expectation of new import controls, 
because of a deteriorating balance of payments position, encouraged stoclq)iling. The 
balance of payments position was further worsened by food shortages. The ’open 
general licence’ scheme (i.e. open to all producers) for imports was suspended in 
November 1952 and a stricter import licensing system introduced with a bias towards
’essential’ raw materials and preferential treatment given to those who had imported 
during 1950-2. Since these were also the main domestic producers this policy operated 
so as to give an element of monopoly. The relatively high premium on consumer
commodities, reflecting tighter control on imports of consumer items, encouraged their 
domestic production and high industrial growth. Export duties and price controls on 
agricultural commodities kept raw material prices low, further increasing the profitability 
of agro-based industries. Interregional movements of grain were tightly controlled and
banned in some instances. Also, major industrial investments had to be sanctioned by 
the government. The industrial and import lisconcing systems were seen as being
corrupt and also responsible for the low capacity utilization in industry.
With the introduction of military pacts with Western countries in 1954, Pakistan
secured significant aid flows from USA, Canada and Australia. As import substitution 
possibilities reduced and agriculture remained stagnant the country experienced a 
slowdown in growth. In an attempt to promote agricultural and export growth the
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rupee was devalued in July 1955 (by 30% in relation to sterling). However, an initial 
growth in exports did not persist and a more elaborate Export Promotion Scheme was 
introduced which entitled exporters to import licences to the extent of 25-40% of the 
value of exports for manufacturers and 15% for the exporters of raw materials. In an 
effort to stimulate agricultural output emphasis was placed on an improved distribution 
system for major agricultural inputs. However, by 1956 the balance of trade had 
entered into deficit reflecting declining exports and increasing imports due to growing 
development needs and increased imports of wheat and rice (reflecting more food
shortages). A coup d ’etat in October 1958 saw the introduction of a military
government under Ayub Khan, which later converted to a presidential form of 
government.
The new government of 1958 immediately imposed strict controls on prices, 
imports, black-market transactions and tax evasion. However, by mid 1960, prices were 
decontrolled and restrictions on investment decisions and foreign trade relaxed. The 
value of import liscences was increased and new exports encouraged (the list of 
’approved’ exports was replaced by a ’banned’ list). Greater emphasis was placed on 
the reduction of government intervention and increasing reliance on market forces.
Priority was given to agriculture and export-oriented industries. The Export Bonus 
Scheme, introduced in January 1959, gave import permits to exporters, initially to the
value of 10-40% of export values but later made more uniform at 20-30% of export 
values. These permits were transferable and earned a premium of 100-190% of face 
value, reflecting the tight restrictions on the import of consumer goods, especially luxury 
items. The list of imports which could be purchased under the scheme was expanded 
as was the eligibility criteria for exporting industries. The number of ’automatically 
approved’ imports was increased and the ’open general liscence’ scheme reintroduced in 
March 1961 and included industrial items, agricultural items and also consumer goods. 
In order to facilitate planning by private firms ’advance liscencing’ was introduced in 
the first half of 1962. In 1964 a ’free list’ of goods which could be imported without 
liscences was introduced and the list expanded to 50 items by the end of 1964, 
although import duties were increased from 5% to 20%. In 1965, for the first time.
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the government announced import policy for the whole year. Other incentives included 
the Export Credit Guarantee Scheme, Export Preferential Licences, the setting up of an 
Export Market Development Fund and also of Trade Offices and Display Centres abroad. 
Easier access for imported raw materials helped to increase capacity utilization. 
Although exports increased consistently until the late 1960s the trade gap widened
because of imports of raw materials and capital goods and the increased import of food.
There was also a large increase in the level of foreign loans.
War with India broke out in September 1965 leading to an increase in defence
expenditure and a fall in the inflow of foreign loans. Together with a bad harvest in 
1966 these led to foreign exchange constraints and a fall in industrial growth. As a 
result import controls were made more strict. Although the introduction of high-yielding 
variety seeds was reflected in increased agricultural output, the unrest of winter 1968 
was followed by the fall of the Ayub Khan government in March 1969 and the
re-imposition of martial law. Civil War broke out in March 1971 and East Pakistan
separated to become what is now called Bangladesh. In West Pakistan the Peoples’
Party came to power in December 1971 with a parliamentary form of government
An important task of the new Peoples’ Party government was to find new markets 
for commodities previously ’exported’ to East Pakistan (e.g. oilseeds, raw cotton, 
tobacco, foodgrains, cotton fabrics, yam and thread, machinery, drugs and medicines,
tobacco manufactures and cement) and new sources for goods previously imported from 
there (e.g. jute goods, tea, paper and products, and matches). In an attempt to promote 
agricultural and export growth, in May 1972 the rupee was devalued from Rs4.76/dollar 
to Rsll/dollar - the devaluation of the dollar in Febmary 1973 by 10% implied a 
Rs9.9/dollar exchange rate. Export duties on rice and cotton were introduced but the
government failed in its attempt to re-introduce ’compulsory’ procurement of wheat in 
1972/73 due to pressure fi'om a powerful farming lobby. Fertilizer prices were almost 
doubled between September 1972 and August 1973 and distribution of the majority of 
fertilizer was only through government centres. The Export Bonus Scheme was 
abolished and restrictive importing liscencing replaced by a ’free’ and ’tied’ list. All 
imports not in these lists were banned. However, access to foreign exchange was still
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tightly controlled by the government, and import duties were reduced.
As well as introducing land reforms and increasing the procurement price of 
agricultural goods by almost 100% the government immediately set about nationalizing 
major industries previously controlled by a relatively small number of families. Initially 
nationalization was limited to intermediate and capital goods industries but was later 
extended to include others. In January 1972 the government nationalized 31 major
manufacturing enterprises covering ten subsectors, including textiles, sugar refining, 
forestry, natural gas, cement, fertilizers, chemicals, heavy engineering, machine tools, 
ceramics, automobiles, steel mills and petroleum products. Later the vegetable ghee 
industry was included and in August 1976 the government took control of cotton 
ginning factories, and rice husking and flour mills. Exports of cotton and rice were
also controlled by the public sector since 1973. In an attempt to remove the substantial
power held by the large families due to their control of both industrial and financial
interests, the banking and insurance sector was nationalized.
The policies implemented by the new government led to a substantial rise in
exports. However, world events and unfavourable agricultural conditions combined to 
give low growth. The oil price hike in 1972-73 led to rising prices for major imports 
(e.g. petroleum and oil products, wheat, edible oils, fertilizers, chemicals, metals and
machinery) and a fall in international demand for exports. A series of agricultural 
disasters further contributed to a fall in exports. Floods and pest attacks in 1973 and 
1976 devastated large areas of cultivated land with adverse effect for exports of raw 
cotton (so that Pakistan was unable to reap the benefits of a hike in the world price of 
cotton). Recession in the cotton textile industry led to reduced export duties which
were eventually abolished in 1974. The export duties of some raw cotton varieties 
were also reduced, or abolished completely for other varieties. The increased cost of 
raw cotton, balancing-modemization-replacement capital, and imported raw materials led 
to the introduction of rebates for textiles and other exported manufacturing products.
In spite of the high inflation rate of over 30% between 1972-74 the government
invested heavily in large public investments (e.g. infrastructure and heavy capital goods 
industries) which had long gestation periods. The justification for these investments lay
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in a national policy of self-reliance in such areas as food, fertilizers, energy and basic 
industries. These investments were financed mainly through foreign aid and deficit 
financing and were intended to set up a capital goods base in the country. Remittances 
from abroad increased dramatically in the mid 1970s but it is often argued that, because 
of uncertainty concerning government policies about investment and nationalization, much 
of these were chanelled towards consumer goods thus exacerbating inflation. With
exports stagnating and imports remaining high despite tougher import restrictions, the 
balance of payments deteriorated further. A bumper wheat crop in 1976 was not 
sufficient to prevent political opposition in early 1977 which eventually led to the
overthrow of the Peoples’ Party and the imposition of martial law.
President Zia immediately set about a process of gradual denationalization. In
September 1977 agro-based industries were privatized and heavy industries, e.g. chemicals 
and cement, were made more open to private investment. So as to encourage the
expansion of private investment both fiscal and non-fiscal incentives were introduced. 
Economic controls were relaxed and bureaucratic procedures simplified, in particular for 
sanctioning private sector investment. Emphasis was placed on agricultural and export 
growth. In an attempt to remove pricing distortions, agricultural input subsidies were 
reduced and procurement prices for major crops increased. The rationing of wheat flour
and sugar was ended in 1985 and price controls on edible oils lifted. Export industries
were entitled to rebates of trade tariffs (from 3% to 35% of export value),
’compensatory rebates’ of domestic indirect taxes varying between 7.5% and 12.5% of 
export values (for cotton textiles, engineering goods, canvas, fertilizer, acetate yam, 
cutlery, carpets, sports goods and surgical instruments and other commodities), income 
tax rebates of 55% of the amount of income tax and super tax payable, duty-free
import of certain new machinery and equipment under the Balancing Modernization and 
Replacement Scheme (which now included ’new investment’ and ’expansion’ investment), 
duty-free import of certain raw materials and access to imports that would otherwise be 
banned, and access to cheap credit. Export Processing Zones were set up to encourage 
investment by foreigners, including Pakistanis living abroad. Exporting firms located in 
these zones could import machinery and raw materials free of import duties, and were
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exempt from all federal, provincial and municipal taxes. These policies along with good 
weather helped to stimulate growth. However, inflation and foreign debt remained high, 
as did the deficit on the balance of payments despite substantial increases in emigrants’ 
remittances.
From the above one can see that, since 1970, the government has employed a 
wide range of incentives in order to stimulate agricultural growth and promote the 
export of both agricultural and manufacturing commodities. Before one can judge the 
appropriateness of such incentives one needs to indentify which industries are socially 
profitable and we turn to this in §5.5.
§5.2.2 Empirical Studies
One of the most common methods of analyzing the system of indirect taxes and
other government controls is the calculation of effective protection rates (EPRs). The
EPR of an industry is defined as its value added at domestic prices less that at world
prices, as a proportion of value added at world prices. It is a positive, as opposed to
a normative, concept which purports to identify the resource-pull effects of government
indirect tax and trade policies. However, as an indicator of resource pull it is not 
completely reliable since
’it is possible that without this assumption (of fixed coefficients for 
intermediate inputs) the effective protection given to an activity rises, 
but this induces such strong substitution of intermediate inputs for primary 
ones, that the primary factor use in that industry actually falls’ (Dixit 
and Norman, 1980, pl63).
Also the results of EPR studies are often interpreted in a way which suggests that the 
tax rates (or effective protection provided by trade taxes) on industries with high EPRs 
whould be reduced while those on industries with low EPRs should be increased. This 
is very similar to the argument for uniform taxes which requires very special 
assumptions in order to be optimal (see Chapter 1). A comparison of the EPR of an 
activity with its nominal protection rate (NPR) captures the effects of input taxes on 
domestic value added. For example, if input taxes are negligible then the EPR and 
NPR will coincide, while, for a given output tax (domestic or trade), the higher the 
input taxes (domestic or trade) the lower the EPR for the activity.
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In Chapter 1 we saw that when distortions which create a divergence between 
relative producer and shadow prices exist in the economy one should use shadow prices 
when evaluating government policies and identifying welfare-improving reforms. Since 
the EPR approach does not take into account divergences between market prices and 
social opportunity costs (or shadow prices) for non-traded and factor inputs, it cannot be 
legitimately used in this manner. It is important to appreciate that EPRs do not tell us 
what protection should be given but only what (in a rather narrow sense) is given as a 
result of tariffs, quantitative restrictions and domestic taxes. If we evaluate non-traded 
inputs at shadow prices then we have essentially moved to the notion of domestic 
resource costs, and the additional step of evaluating factor inputs at shadow prices takes 
us to our system of shadow prices.
A comparison of the EPR for manufacturing activities for 1963/4, 1970/1, and 
1972/3 is presented in Table 5.1. The broad features are as follows. Firstly, both the 
NPRs and EPRs are highest for consumer goods, followed by investment goods and 
then intermediate goods. Secondly, NPRs underestimate the degree of protection in 
virtually all cases. It is also noticeable that seven industries (i.e. sugar, edible oils, 
other textiles, motor vehicles, rubber products, fertilizers and metal products) had 
negative value added at world prices in 1963/4, and yet all except for fertilizers were 
among those industries with the highest NPRs. By 1970/1 none of these industries had 
negative value added at world prices. This may reflect movements in world prices or 
increased technical efficiency in production but it is also the case that the levels of 
nominal protection have been consistently falling over time.
Another approach used to summarize the system of indirect taxes in Pakistan is the 
’effective tax’ approach recently formulated by Ahmad and Stem (1986). The effective 
tax on an activity is defined as the increase in government revenue as a result of a 
unit increase in the output of that activity. These were calculated for Pakistan for 
1975/6 using data very similar to those used here to calculate shadow prices. The 
calculations, presented in Table 5.2, assume 100% forward shifting of taxes and that 
imports are complementary to domestic production.
By comparing nominal with effective taxes we can capture the extent of taxation
Table 5 .1
Nominal and E f f e c t i v e  P r o t e c t i o n  Rates
1963/4
fo r  M anufac tu r ing  A c t i v i t i e s
1970/1 1972/3
NPR EPR NPR EPR NPR
Consumer Goods
Sugar 215 nva 266 585 57
E d ib le  O i l s 106 nva 54 130 62
C ot ton  T e x t i l e s 56 733 76 172 0
Other T e x t i l e s 350 nva 141 317 88
P r i n t i n g  and P u b l i s h i n g 28 22 43 36 57
Soaps 94 178 43 106 34
Motor V eh ic le s 249 nva 270 595 61
Simple Average 157 nc 128 277 63
I n t e r m e d ia t e  Goods
Wood and Lumber 73 1150 85 197 108
L ea th e r  Tanning 56 567 76 177 0
Rubber P roduc ts 153 nva 55 132 48
F e r t i 1i z e r s 15 nva 25 64 na
P a i n t s  and V arn ishes 102 257 56 134 34
Chemicals 81 300 56 106 34
P et ro leum  Produc ts 107 -6 121 274 65
Paper Produc ts 94 376 57 177 69
Simple Average 85 nc 66 158 43
Investment  Goods
Nonmetal l i e  Mineral  P d t s . 154 335 76 182 70
Cement 75 64 76 182 70
Bas ic  Metals 66 525 96 220 32
Metal P roduc ts 95 nva 102 235 64
N o n e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 89 355 81 188 44
E l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 60 138 83 192 47
Simple Average 90 nc 86 200 50
All  I n d u s t r i e s
Simple Average 110 nc 92 52
Source; Guisinger (1978).
Note: nva=negative value added, nc=not calculable because of presence of negative value-added industries, 
na=not available.
Table 5 .2
Nominal and E f f e c t i v e  Taxes in  P a k i s t a n ,  19757^
Sec to r
01 Wheat
02 Rice
03 Cotton
04 Sugarcane
05 Tobacco Growing
06 O i l s e e d s
07 P u lse s
08 Other Crops
09 L i v e s to c k
10 F i s h in g
11 F o r e s t r y
12 Mining & Q uarry ing
13 Grain M i l l i n g
14 Rice M i l l i n g  & Husking
15 Ed ib le  O i l s
16 Sugar R e f i n in g
17 Gur and Khandsari
18 Tea B lend ing
19 F i s h  & P r e p a r a t i o n s
20 C o n fe c t io n e ry  & Bakery
21 Other Food I n d u s t r i e s
22 Beverages
23 Tobacco P ro d u c t s
24 B id i s
25 Cotton  Yarn
td te t d i f f t d i f f / t <
-0 .020 -0 .014 0.006 -0.321
0.000 0.023 0.023 -
0.000 0.010 0.010 -
0.000 0.009 0 .009 -
0.188 0.198 0 .010 0 .054
0.000 0 .010 0 .010 -
0.000 0.020 0 .020 -
0.000 0.007 0.007 -
0.000 0.005 0.005 -
0.000 0.011 0.011 -
0.000 0.008 0.008 -
0.013 0.044 0.031 2.436
0.000 -0.048 -0 .048 -
0.000 0.045 0.045 -
0.092 0.139 0.047 0.504
0.268 0.287 0.019 0.071
0.000 0.016 0 .016 -
0.070 0.112 0.043 0.615
0.000 0.026 0 .026 -
0.105 0.185 0 .080 0.763
0.003 0.043 0 .040 15.431
0.076 0.166 0.091 1.193
0.720 0.777 0 .057 0.079
0.000 0.065 0.065 -
0.028 0.087 0 .059 2.096
too
26 Cot ton  Ginning
27 Cot ton  T e x t i l e s  (Large S ca le )
28 Cot ton  T e x t i l e s  (Small Sca le )
29 S i l k  & S y n t h e t i c  T e x t i l e s
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & H os ie ry
31 T h r e a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s
32 C arpe ts  & Rugs
33 Made-up Garments
34 Footwear (N on-rubber)
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e
36 Paper & P r o d u c t s
37 P r i n t i n g  and P u b l i s h i n g
38 L ea the r  & P ro d u c t s
39 Rubber Footwear
40 Rubber P ro d u c t s
41 P h a rm a c e u t i c a l s
42 F e r t i l i z e r
43 Perfumes & Cosmet ics
44 P a i n t s  & V arn is h es
45 Soaps & D e te r g e n t s
46 Chemicals
47 P l a s t i c  P ro d u c t s
48 Pe t ro leum  P ro d u c t s
49 Cement
50 Glass & P ro d u c t s
51 Non-metal Mineral  P ro d u c ts
52 Bas ic  M eta ls
53 Metal P ro d u c t s
54 I ron  & S t e e l  Remoulding
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery
0. 000 0.,024 0..024 -
0.,022 0.,095 0.,073 3..277
0..000 0.,060 0..060 -
0. 079 0,,194 0,,115 1..451
0..083 0.,157 0.,074 0..886
0. 000 0..079 0.,079 -
0..000 0.,091 0.,091 -
0..000 0,,148 0.,148 -
0..014 0,,073 0,,059 4,,124
0,.000 0,,050 0.,050 -
0..064 0,,149 0.,085 1.,317
0,,000 0,,080 0,,080 -
0,,011 0,,032 0,,021 1,,987
0,,000 0 .107 0.,107 -
0,,310 0,,379 0,,069 0,,221
0.,000 0,,169 0.,169 -
-0,,267 -0 .152 0 ,115 -0 ,431
0.,344 0 ,453 0.,109 0.,316
0 .288 0 ,400 0 ,112 0 .391
0,,121 0,,187 0 ,066 0 .545
0 ,053 0.,138 0,,085 1 .612
0 .290 0 .398 0 ,108 0 ,372
0,,311 0,,350 0,,039 0 .125
0 ,120 0 .271 0,,151 1 .250
0.,207 0.,399 0,,193 0 .932
0,,004 0.,096 0.,092 23 .997
0,,000 0.,076 0,,076 -
0,,073 0,,152 0,,079 1 .082
0 .000 0 .035 0 .035 -
-0,,078 0 .029 0 ,107 -1 .368
0.,000 0 .082 0 ,082 -
0 .000 0 ,096 0 ,096 -
N)
O
to
58 B ic y c le s
59 T ra n s p o r t  (Large  S ca le )
60 S h i p b u i l d in g
61 T ra n s p o r t  Equipment (Small S ca le )
62 O f f i c e  Equipment
63 S p o r t s  Goods
64 S u rg ic a l  I n s t r u m e n t s
65 Other Large S c a l e  Manufac turing
66 Other Small S c a l e  Manufac turing
67 Low-cost  R e s i d e n t i a l  Bu i ld ing
68 Luxur ious  R e s i d e n t i a l  Bui ld ing
69 Rural  B u i l d in g s
70 F a c to ry  B u i l d i n g s
71 P u b l i c  B u i l d i n g s
72 Roads
73 I n f r a s t r u c t u r e
74 Ownership o f  D well ings
75 E l e c t r i c i t y
76 Gas
77 WTiolesale & R e t a i l  Trade
78 Road T ra n s p o r t
79 Rail  T ra n s p o r t
80 Air  T ra n s p o r t
81 Water T r a n s p o r t
82 T e l e v i s i o n
83 Radio
84 Phone,  T e l e g ra p h  & Post
85 Banking & I n s u r a n c e
86 Government
87 S e rv ic e s
0. 000 0. 100 0.,100 -
0. 003 0.,112 0.,109 33. 643
0. 000 0. 065 0.,065 -
0. 000 0.,099 0.,099 -
0. 000 0.,067 0.,067 -
0. 000 0.,054 0.,054 -
0.,471 0.,534 0,,063 0.,133
0..000 0.,095 0.,095 -
0.,000 0.,081 0.,081 -
0.,000 0,,095 0,,095 -
0,,000 0,,037 0,,037 -
0.,000 0,,103 0,.103 -
0.,000 0,,076 0,.076 -
0,,000 0 .029 0..029 -
0,,000 0,.126 0,.126 -
0,,000 0,.035 0,.035 -
0,,000 0,.216 0..216 -
0 .402 0 .544 0 .141 0,,351
0 .000 0 .012 0 .012 -
0 .000 0 .084 0 .084 -
0 .000 0 .111 0 .111 -
0 .000 0 .097 0 .097 -
0,.000 0 .014 0 .014 -
0,,000 0 .067 0 .067 -
0.,000 0 .034 0 .034 -
0,,000 0 .034 0 .034 -
0..002 0 .044 0 .041 16 .697
0,,000 0 .045 0 .045 -
0..003 0 .016 0 .013 4 .172
too
u >
Source: Ahmad and Stem (1988), Table 3, pp. 63-65.
Notes: t^ and are nominal and effective taxes respectively, and are given as percentages 
of purchaser prices. Also, - t^.
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of an activity arising from the taxation of its inputs, inputs into these inputs and so on. 
To the extent that the consequences of cascading taxation were not taken into account 
when setting tax rates one can interpret divergences between effective and nominal rates 
as the unintended consequences of the tax system. So one could use the results as the 
basis of arguments for tax rebates, as is often done by exporting activities in Pakistan.
For example, a study by Khan (1978) for the mid 1970s suggested that many exporting
activities (e.g. cloth, canvas, carpets, shoes, sports goods and surgical instruments) are 
effectively taxed by the protection system. The results from the effective tax study 
suggest that the degree of cascading in the indirect tax system is high. In the mid 
1980s compensatory rebates, ranging from 7.5% to 12.5% of export value, were given to 
many exportables. The results in Table 5.2 suggest that these rebates were appropriate 
although maybe slightly higher than the extent of intermediate taxation. Also, major 
exports such as carpets and rugs, made-up garments, cotton textiles, sports goods and 
surgical instruments, which are exempt from nominal taxes, are effectively taxed through 
the taxation of intermediate inputs to the extent of 5-15% of market values.
§5.3 Principles for the Computation of Shadow Prices
The shadow price of a good is defined as the increase in social welfare which
would arise if an extra unit of public supplies were to be made available. This 
definition requires us to calculate the full consequences of an extra unit taking into 
account all the interactions of the economy and then to evaluate the changes using some 
definition of social welfare. This is the definition that underlies the standard 
cost-benefit manuals (see e.g. Little and Mirrlees, 1974; or Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen, 
1972) and it can easily be shown that this is essentially required for a cost-benefit test 
to correctly identify a social improvement - see Drèze and Stem (1987). Modelling the 
consequences of a small change in public supplies is, in principle, a formidable task and 
most methods of calculating shadow prices involve shortcuts in an attempt to simplify 
this task. One of the best known procedures is that of Little and Mirrlees (1974) - 
henceforth LM - and this is the one followed here. We shall describe the method 
briefly below indicating some of the most important assumptions involved in its
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justification.
Once shadow prices have been calculated they can be put to use in a much more 
disaggregated way than would be possible when using a fully articulated model of the 
economy. And they can also be adapted to incorporate different views about, for 
example, the functioning of labour markets more easily than would be possible in a 
completely specified general equilibrium model. Hence whilst one loses something in 
the description of the economy, in particular concerning the effects of big changes or 
the use of short-cuts which may do violence to the reality, there is much to be gained 
in terms of disaggregation and flexibility.
The method employed here to calculate shadow prices is that presented in LM
which is based on a set of guiding principles which stand in place of a fully articulated 
model. These simple rules give us robust estimates of shadow prices without having to 
go through difficult and often dubious modelling. Firstly, shadow (or accounting) prices 
for traded goods should be based on world or border prices: ’border prices can be used 
as accounting prices for all traded goods, because they represent the opportunity costs or 
benefits of using or producing a traded good’ (LM, p68). The terms shadow and 
accounting prices will be used interchangeably in this paper.
Secondly, ’when considering the use of a non-traded good whose output will be
consequentially expanded then the accounting price is equal to the marginal social costs 
of production’ (LM, p70). In practice when computing a system of accounting prices 
this marginal social cost rule is generally used for all non-traded goods, and that is the 
method adopted here. The assumptions involved in using the rule across the board in 
this way are rather stringent and involve strong assumptions concerning the optimality of 
government policy (they are discussed formally in Drèze and Stem, 1987). One hopes, 
however, that in the terms of the broad sectoral accounting prices calculated here they 
are not overly ntisleading and they do have the advantage of not requiring detailed
demand information. For more disaggregated sectoral work one can be more refined,
asking in particular how much of an extra input used comes from extra production and 
how much from extra consumption. Some sensitivity analysis to the marginal social 
cost assumptions is provided by calculating shadow prices under various alternative
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assumptions concerning which goods are traded and which are not
Thirdly, the method takes explicit account of the way in which a project affects 
the distribution of income between public and private sectors and across individuals: 
’Thus government consumption, government saving, private consumption and private 
savings may all be considered to have different social values’ (LM, p71) and ’we put 
considerable weight on the use of shadow wages as a means of allowing for the effects 
of a project on equality’ (LM, p72), and ’The profits from a project are, of course, 
weighted according to whom they accrue’ (LM, p72). The estimates of shadow prices 
thus incorporate judgements on income distribution, most notably through the shadow 
wage.
The method requires the classification of goods as being imported, exported or
non-traded at the margin. If it is assumed that extra supplies of a good are met 
through imports, then the sector is treated as imported, and similarly for the other
possibilities. Notice that the classification therefore depends, in part, on government
policy - if there is a quota on a good which can be imported but the quota will not 
be changed than we must treat the good as non-traded. One also has to consider how
world markets and domestic production and consumption activities are likely to change
over the future. Hence one should never be completely confident about the 
appropriateness of one particular set of classifications and, accordingly, we shall
investigate a number of them in this paper.
The numeraire, or the unit of account for cost-benefit calculations, in the LM 
method is uncommitted foreign exchange in the hands of the government. All domestic 
values are converted to a foreign exchange equivalent, and incomes committed to
particular uses (e.g. the consumptions of certain groups) are evaluated relative to
uncommitted government income. The calculation of shadow prices for goods which are 
traded at prices which may be treated as fixed on the world market is, in principle, 
straightforward. If the good is imported then its shadow price is the c.i.f. price, plus 
transport and distribution costs at shadow prices. Note that trade taxes are excluded. 
If a good is exported, the shadow price is the f.o.b. price less transport and distribution 
costs at shadow prices. What matters is the foreign exchange earnings or savings as a
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result of the increased supply. These foreign exchange earnings may have a different 
value from that given by the official exchange rate but the relative values of traded 
goods are given by their relative world prices. Also, where world prices are not fixed 
one uses marginal revenues or marginal costs.
The shadow price for non-tradeables proposed by LM is the marginal cost of an 
extra unit, valuing the inputs at shadow prices. The calculation of the marginal cost of 
non-traded goods at shadow prices therefore requires us to know the input requirements 
and the shadow prices of these inputs. The inputs will be traded goods, non-traded 
goods and the factors of production. Thus to calculate the shadow price of one 
non-traded good we must know the shadow prices of the other non-traded goods. One 
also needs to know the shadow prices of factors and we return to these below.
The calculation of the shadow prices of non-traded goods then proceeds by 
decomposing the cost of a good into its constituent elements of taxes, payments for 
traded goods and payments for each factor involved. The appropriate shadow prices are 
then applied to each element (zero in the case of taxes). This is possible using an 
input-output table provided (i) we can classify goods as traded or non-traded; (ii) we 
are prepared to make the assumption that the coefficient matrix. A, represents marginal 
requirements (at the relevant level of production); and (iii) we are able to decompose 
value-added into constituent payments to factors.
To calculate the shadow price of non-traded commodities we therefore need to 
calculate the shadow values of domestic factors of production used in their production. 
We have to calculate the opportunity cost, defined in terms of social welfare, of the 
employment of and payment to each type of factor. If the employment of an extra
unit of a factor does not involve a payment to it over and above its earnings
elsewhere, and those earnings represent its marginal product at market prices, then Ihe 
shadow value of the factor may be calculated by multiplying the market price of the 
factor by the ratio of shadow price to market price for the type of goods the factor 
might have produced. This ratio is often called a ’standard conversion factor’ (SCF).
Given that the numeraire is foreign exchange this SCF may be interpreted as the
reciprocal of a ’shadow exchange rate’ (used in other methods of cost-benefit analysis).
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It should be emphasised, however, that there is no single SCF. The SCF we choose 
should depend on the bundle of goods that the factor would have produced elsewhere. 
This would differ, for example, between rural and urban workers (see Drèze and Stem, 
1987, for further discussion).
§5.5. i  Labour
Where the employment of an extra unit of a factor gives rise to earnings above 
those which would have been earned elsewhere then the payment to the factor overstates 
the cost since we have to take account of the benefits arising from the extra 
consumption. If c is the payment to the factor and m its earnings elsewhere (assumed 
equal to the marginal product), both at market prices, then the shadow price (i.e. the
shadow wage rate - or SWR) is the (appropriate) SCF times
c - p(c - m) (5.1)
where p is the value of extra income to the factor in terms of government revenue 
(which is taken as the numeraire). The SCF used to convert c and m from market to 
shadow prices is a weighted average of the accounting ratios (ARs), defined as shadow 
prices divided by market prices, of the appropriate bundle of goods. In the case of m 
the appropriate bundle of goods is that containing the commodities which labour would 
have produced elsewhere and, in the case of c, that containing commodities consumed 
by the worker.
Examples of the use of SCF and (5.1) are as follows. If labour is hired from a
competitive labour market then c=m so that SWR is simply the SCF times c.
/■
Alternatively, if the government attaches no value to extra income to the workers 
because, say, it thinks it has overwhelmingly important uses for further funds, then p=0 
and the SWR is again calculated as the SCF times c, even if o m .  Also, if
redistribution of income can be achieved using non-distortionary policy instruments then 
p=l and the SWR is again the SCF times c. However, if both p>l and o m  then the 
SWR will be lower reflecting the social value of extra consumption. It is therefore 
clear that the SWR will depend on the functioning of the labour market
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Note that we have assumed that only one worker leaves employment elsewhere for 
each job created. However, if more (or less) than one leaves, as is the case of 
Harris-Todaro type models of the labour market (see Harris and Todaro, 1970), this can 
be easily incorporated into (5.1). We also assumed that previous earnings m were equal 
to the marginal product elsewhere, e.g. in the rural sector. But if labour was earning 
an amount a (say on a farm) and its marginal product m was less than a (both in 
previous employment) then the earnings of those left on the farm increases by {a-m) 
and his income increases by {c-d) so that the total increase is still (c-m). There is 
therefore a wide class of possibilities for the SWR depending inter alia upon the 
priority on government expenditure, the redistributional policy instruments available to the 
government, the structure of the labour market and labour’s marginal product elsewhere.
§5.5.2 Capital
Value added, conventionally measured, generally constitutes payments to labour, 
land, capital and an element of pure profits. The social cost of labour (i.e. the SWR) 
has been discussed above and the social cost of land will be discussed in Appendix C 
to this chapter. The social cost of capital is made up of depreciation (the amount 
needed to maintain capital), valued at shadow prices, plus an interest cost (i.e. fixed and 
working capital stock valued at shadow prices and multiplied by an accounting rate of 
interest or social discount rate). The social discount rate (SDR) is the rate at which 
the social value of the numeraire (foreign exchange in the hands of the government) 
falls through time. A necessary condition for the optimality of public sector investment 
is that the SDR equals the social rate of return (SRR) on the marginal public sector 
project. Marginal here implies that the project breaks even at shadow prices. If we 
view government borrowing (or lending) activities on the world financial market as a 
marginal project, with foreign exchange as the numeraire and facing fixed interest rates, 
the SRR is simply the interest rate the government faces on the world capital market, 
so that the SDR also equals the international interest rate. One might also argue that 
whether or not it is optimal borrowing will be the marginal source of funds.
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§5.5.5 Pure Profits
Pure profits or monopoly rents do not involve any direct resource inputs. Using
equation (1), thinking of m as zero, and interpreting c as pure profits we have the 
social cost of a transfer from government to profits equal to:
(1 - |X) c
where p. is now the welfare weight on capitalist income, so that a unit of capitalists’ 
income contributes p to social welfare. For a public sector firm we can treat p=l so
that there is zero social cost. As with labour above we must also multiply by an SCF
reflecting a weighted average of accounting ratios for commodities in the capitalists’ 
consumption bundle. If p  is zero, i.e. we attach zero weight to capitalists’ income,
then we simply multiply pure profits by the SCF.
§5.4 Data
The results presented in the next section are based on an 87-sector input-output 
table derived from the FIDE 118-sector matrix for the year 1975-76 (FIDE, 1985). We 
have used the smaller number of sectors since we wish to match the input-output data 
to tax revenue information for the calculation of shadow prices and in the analysis of 
tax reform. The 87 sectors must be classified, as we saw in the preceding section, into 
traded and non-traded activities. This classification is based on an assumed response of 
supply to demand changes. We consider only marginal changes. If a change in
demand leads to a change in imports (exports) then the good is treated as importable
(exportable) on the margin. If the change leads to an adjustment in home production
then the good is treated as non-traded.
One can make different sets of plausible assumptions concerning these adjustments 
and they are, in part, dependent on government policy. Accordingly we work with two 
rather different classifications. In case A we have 52 traded goods and 35 non-traded, 
and this has the maximum number of traded sectors (see Table A5.1). In going from 
case A to case B we have reclassified an extra fourteen sectors as non-traded to allow 
for the possibility of binding quotas giving 49 non-traded sectors in all. These
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categories include: (16) ’sugar refining’, (18) ’tea blending’, (29) ’silk and synthetic 
textiles’, (30) ’woollen textiles’, (35) ’wood, cork and fiimiture’, (36) ’paper and 
products’, (40) ’rubber products’, (41) ’pharmaceuticals’, (43) ’perfumes and cosmetics’, 
(46) ’chemicals’, (48) ’petroleum products’, (59) ’transport (large-scale)’, (61) ’transport 
equipment’, and (62) ’office equipment’. We have based this reclassification on PIDE 
(1983, Vol. 1, p97) in which implicit nominal protection rates (NPRs), which use 
market prices, are compared with explicit NPRs, which use published tariff rates. When 
the former exceed the latter, then quotas are taken as binding. Also, in this case, 
tariffs are redundant from a protection point of view and act solely to capture some of 
the economic rents accruing to import quota-holders as government revenue. Whilst the 
PIDE study was conducted for the year 1981, we have made the supposition that the
position is not dissimilar from the earlier period 1975/76.
In practice, within an input-output category, there may be several commodities 
which are non-traded, or which have quotas associated with them, and others which are 
clearly traded. When classifying sectors as traded or non-traded we have tried to use 
informed judgement on the basis of data relating to imports and exports. The shadow 
prices emerging from this ’aggregate’ analysis can, however, be used as data inputs into 
more detailed analyses, in which commodities may be more adequately identified as
tradeable or non-tradeable.
Once we have assembled information on inputs, outputs and taxes, and classified 
sectors into tradeables and non-tradeables we can then apply the guidelines set out in 
§5.3 to calculate shadow prices. We work in terms of accounting ratios (ARs) which 
are defined as the shadow price of a commodity divided by its market price. It is also 
useful to define the border price ratio (BPR) of a commodity as the border price 
divided by the market price. The values of the input-output table are in purchaser (i.e. 
market) prices which include taxes and trade and transport margins. So, for example, 
an input-output column, representing the various inputs used by a given industry, will 
include the price paid by the industry (inclusive of trade and transport costs and indirect
taxes) for the input. There will also be separate entries for the tax paid on the output
of this industry and payments to factor inputs. Summing over all entries then gives the
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total value of the industry output at purchaser prices.
§5.4.7 Exported Commodities
The shadow price of an exportable commodity used in a domestic project is its 
world price, minus the shadow cost of the trade and transport (henceforth referred to as 
transport) saved by not exporting the commodity, plus the shadow cost of the transport 
incurred in getting the commodity from its domestic producer to the user, i.e.
p Î  = - Pr (&ri - &ri) (5 2)
where p f  i s  the shadow p r i c e  o f  commodity i ,  p [^^  is  th e  bo rde r  p r i c e  o f
commodity i ,  p^ i s  the shadow p r i c e  o f  t r a n s p o r t ,  a^i  i s  the t r a n s p o r t
incurred in getting i to the border and ^  is the transport incurred in getting i from the 
domestic producer to its user. To calculate the border price we assume that:
p f °^  = Pi (1 + t i  + Pr%ri)  ( 5 .3 )
where pj is the purchaser price of i, ^ the taxes on the exports of i, p^  is the price of
transport, and represents transport to the border. Both tj and p  ^ should be
interpreted as proportions of the purchaser price of i. Producers of export commodity i
receive pf®^ at the border but must also pay export taxes and transport costs to the
border. Any difference between the domestic price of commodity i and its net export 
price (i.e. its border price less export taxes and transport costs) encourages the domestic 
producer to redirect output to either domestic consumption or exports. For example, if 
p ^ b  exceeded the r.h.s of (5.3) then the domestic producer would increase profits by 
exporting more output. So (assuming a competitive domestic market) domestic users
will have to pay a p^  which satisfies (5.3). The social cost of using commodity i
domestically is the foreign exchange forgone, minus the social value of the transport
saved by not having to get i to the border, but plus the social value of the transport 
incurred in getting i from the domestic producer to the domestic consumer - see (5.2).
If we assume that the social cost of tlie transport of i from the domestic producer
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to the domestic consumer equals the transport cost saved (at shadow prices) by not 
having to get i from the domestic producer to the border (i.e. £^) then, using (5.2)
and (5.3) we can write the shadow price of i as:
Pi — Pi (1 + t j  + Pr&ri)  ( 5 .4 )
The accounting ratio for export commodity i, AKj, is then defined as:
ARi = ^  = (1 + t i  + p r a f i )  = BPRj ( 5 .5 )
where the first equality follows from (5.2).
The commodities with major export taxes in 1975-6 were rice, raw cotton and 
leather products. For rice we have actual border and domestic price comparisons for 
both IRRI and basmati varieties from Cheong and D'Silva (1984, p34-5). We use a 
weighted price for IRRI and basmati using their total domestic output values at market 
prices as weights. To calculate shadow prices for cotton and leather we add export 
duties and transport costs (assumed to be 25% and 20% of market prices of cotton and 
leather respectively). The shadow price of other exported commodities is calculated
using the transport margins from the input-output table (summation over the coefficients 
of sectors 77 to 81 in Table A5.1). If we choose commodity units such that purchaser 
prices are one then shadow prices can be interpreted as accounting ratios. The ARs for 
exported commodities (here also equal to their BPRs) are presented in Table 5.3.
§5.4.2 Imported Commodities
The shadow price of imported commodities is defined as the world (cif) price plus 
the social cost of transport incurred in getting the import to the user, i.e.
Pi = P i ' ^  + Pr &ri (5 6)
Since purchaser prices include taxes and transport costs we assume:
P i ' ^  = Pi (1 - t i  - P fUr i )  ( 5 .7 )
Table 5 .3
Border P r i c e  R a t io s  for  Impor ted and Expor ted  Commodjtj_e.s
01 Wheat
02 Rice
03 Co t ton
04 Sugarcane
05 Tobacco Growing
06 O i l s e e d s
07 P u l s e s
08 Other Crops
09 L i v e s to c k
10 F i s h i n g
11 F o r e s t r y
12 Mining & Quarry ing
13 G ra in  Mi 11ing
14 Rice M i l l i n g  & Husking
15 E d ib le  O i l s
16 Sugar R e f i n i n g
17 Gur and Khandsar i
18 Tea B lend ing
19 F i s h  & P r e p a r a t i o n s
20 C o n f e c t io n e r y  & Bakery
21 Other  Food I n d u s t r i e s
22 Beverages
23 Tobacco P r o d u c t s
24 B id i s
25 Cot ton  Yarn
26 Cotton  Ginning
27 C o t ton  T e x t i l e s  (Large Sca le )
Tota l
Imports
Import
D u t ie s
S a le s Transpor t
Margins
Border P r i c e  R a t io
Taxes Imports Expor t s
2296.06 0 .00 0 .00 0.12 1.30 1.12
0.05 0 .00 0 .00 0.24 0.76 2.51
0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0.18 0 .82 2 .42
0 .00 0 .00 0 .0 0 0.18 0 .82 1.18
26.57 5 .90 0 .00 0.12 0.66 1.12
78.22 9.02 10.29 0.11 0.65 1.11
0 .00 0 .00 0 .0 0 0.12 0.88 1.12
546.75 195.78 13.50 0.12 0 .50 1.12
5 .12 0 .00 0 .00 0.06 0 .94 1.06
0 .00 0 .00 0 .0 0 0.13 0 .87 1.13
115.45 0 .00 0 .0 0 0.19 0.81 1.19
3973.44 88.90 21 .67 0.10 0.87 1.10
0 .0 0 0 .00 0 .00 0.05 0.95 1.05
0 .0 0 0 .00 0 .00 0.19 0.81 1.19
2061.02 11.50 0 .00 0.11 0 .89 1.11
6.01 1.90 0 .00 0.11 0 .57 1.11
0 .00 0.00 0 .0 0 0.11 0.89 1.11
1724.18 59.00 0 .0 0 0.05 0.92 1.05
1.49 0 .00 0 .0 0 0.15 0.85 1.15
0.18 0 .00 0 .0 0 0.22 0.78 1.22
797.76 7 .70 13.90 0.23 0.75 1.23
12.42 9 .40 0 .0 0 0.22 0.02 1.22
19.06 0.00 0 .0 0 0.12 0.88 1.12
0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0.12 0.88 1.12
65.11 0.23 0 .0 0 0.01 0.62 1.01
79.33 10.68 0 .0 0 0.06 0.58 1.06
301.96 0.69 0 .0 0 0.02 0 .62 1.02
N)
0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0.12 0.88 1.12
129.25 4 .20 0 .00 0.15 0.41 1.15
114.02 41.00 1.41 0.19 0.44 1.19
1751.18 525.50 10.52 0.16 0.53 1.16
14.59 1.30 0 .00 0.03 0.88 1.03
6.02 0 .00 0 .00 0.02 0.98 1.02
0 .62 0 .00 0 .00 0.06 0 .94 1.06
184.48 0.00 2 .44 0.00 0.98 1.00
492.31 86.90 31.06 0.19 0.57 1.19
33.27 0.00 3.62 0.20 0.69 1.20
91.48 1.80 0 .00 0.02 0.96 1.50
0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0.19 0.81 1.19
469.71 97.70 23.82 0.20 0.55 1.20
441.39 2 .40 0 .00 0.13 0.87 1.13
890.06 0.00 0 .00 0.23 1.33 1.23
32.17 23.50 1.82 0.10 0.12 1.10
19.63 87.90 9 .09 0.13 0.69 1.13
19.54 0.00 0 .00 0.13 0.87 1.13
1678.04 185.50 27.96 0.12 0.75 1.12
281.36 0.00 25.46, 0.11 0.85 1.11
5782.76 320.00 0 .00 0.15 0.80 1.15
0 .00 0.00 0 .00 0.15 0.85 1.15
166.66 61.30 17.03 0.11 0.31 1.11
218.65 0.00 0 .00 0 .14 0.86 1.14
2167.37 545.60 106.47 0.22 0.61 1.22
905.56 46.30 12.73 0.17 0.76 1.17
0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.22 0.78 1.22
746.05 0.00 0 .0 0 0.11 0 .89 1.11
2964.95 431.10 95,45 0.10 0.77 1.10
2025.42 303.90 72.46 0.09 0.75 1.09
26.07 0.00 0 .0 0 0.10 0 .90 1.10
2270.00 613.30 166.20 0.10 0.59 1.10
144.63 0.00 0 .0 0 0.10 0.90 1.10
0 .00 0.00 0 .0 0 0.04 0.96 1.04
116.76 0.00 0 .00 0.11 0.89 1.11
28 Co t ton  T e x t i l e s  (Small Sca le )
29 S i l k  & S y n t h e t i c  T e x t i l e s
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & H osie ry
31 T h r ' b a l l s  and 0 t h .  T e x t i l e s
32 C a rpe t s  & Rugs
33 Made-up Garments
34 Footwear (Non-rubber)
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e
36 Paper  & P ro d u c t s
37 P r i n t i n g  and P u b l i s h i n g
38 L e a th e r  & P ro d u c t s
39 Rubber Footwear
40 Rubber P ro d u c t s
41 P h a rm a c e u t i c a l s
42 F e r t i l i z e r
43 Perfumes & Cosmetics
44 P a i n t s  & V arn ishes
45 Soaps & D e te rg e n t s
46 Chemicals    z / . y o  u . i z  u . / j  i . iz, w
4 7  P l a s t i c  P ro d u c t s   .  25.46, 0.11 9 ' ? ^  î ’ î i  ^
48 P e t ro leum  P ro d u c t s
49 Cement
50 Glass  & P ro d u c ts
51 Non-metal Mineral  P ro d u c ts
52 Bas ic  Meta ls
53 Metal P ro d u c t s
54 I ron  & S t e e l  Remoulding
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery
56 Other N on-e lec .  Machinery
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery
58 B ic y c le s
59 T ra n s p o r t  (Large S c a l e )
60 S h i p b u i l d in g
61 Trans .  Equip.  (Small S ca le )
62 O f f i c e  Equipment
63 S p o r t s  Goods 9.73 2 .80 0.00 0 .04 0.68 1.04
64 S u r g i c a l  I n s t ru m en ts 25.25 0 .00 0 .00 0.13 0 .8 7 1.13
65 Other  LS M anufac tu r ing 473.51 65.60 25.33 0.11 0 .69 1.11
66 Other  SS M anufac tur ing 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.07 0 .93 1.07
67 Low-cost R e s i d e n t i a l  Bldg 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 1.00 1.00
68 Luxur ious  R e s i d e n t i a l  Bldg 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 1.00 1.00
69 Rura l  B u i l d in g s 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 1.00 1.00
70 F a c t o ry  B u i ld in g s 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 1.00 1.00
71 P u b l i c  B u i l d in g s 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 1.00 1.00
72 Roads 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 1.00 1.00
73 I n f r a s t r u c t u r e 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 1.00 1.00
74 Ownership o f  Dwell ings 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 1.00 1.00
75 E l e c t r i c i t y 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
76 Gas 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 1.00 1.00
77 Wholesa le  & R e t a i l  Trade 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0.02 0.98 1.02
78 Road T ra n s p o r t 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 1.00 1.00
79 R ai l  T r a n s p o r t 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0 .0 0 1.00 1.00
80 Air  T r a n s p o r t 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 1.00 1.00
81 Water T r a n s p o r t 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 1.00 1.00
82 T e l e v i s i o n 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.03 0 .97 1.03
83 Radio 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0.03 0 .97 1.03
84 Phone,  T e l e g ra p h  & Post 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0 .04 0 .96 1.04
85 Banking & Insu rance 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.02 0 .98 1.02
86 Government 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.01 0 .99 1.01
87 S e r v i c e s 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 0.02 0.98 1.02
NJ
cr>
Source: Import duties and sales taxes are taken from Government of Pakistan, Memorandum to the Budget, various
years. Total imports and transport margins are taken from PIDE (1985).
Notes: Total imports, import duties and sales taxes are in Rs. million. The border price ratios for imports 
(i.e. pp(/pi) are calculated using (5.7) in the text while those for exports (i.e. i^^Wpj) 
are calculated using (5.3) in the text. The ratio for imported fertilizer is calculated using 
data from Chemonics (1985). The ratio for exported rice was calculated using data from Cheong and 
D’Silva (1984, pp34-5), where we used the f.o.b prices of IRRI and basmati rice divided by domestic 
wholesale prices, and calculated a weighted average using the value of their domestic production as
weights. For exported raw cotton and leather we use (5.3) and export duties of Rs. 980.5
million and Rs. 595.5 million, together with transport margins of 25% and 20% (of border prices) 
respectively. Transport margins are given as a % of market prices.
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where tj are import taxes (tariffs and sales taxes) and other variables are as before. 
Using (6) and (7) we can write the shadow price of i as:
p f  = Pi (1 - t i  - P r a r i )  + p? a^i  ( 5 .8 )
The accounting ratio for import commodity i, ARj, is then defined as:
ARi -  ^  -  (1 - t j  - p^a^i ) + Pr a r j  ( 5 .9 )
= BPRj + Pr a r i
where we choose units so that the market price of i is unity. Notice that the shadow 
prices for imported commodities depend on the shadow price for transport. Since 
transport is a non-traded commodity its shadow price is taken as its marginal social cost
of production and so depends on the shadow price of other non-traded commodities.
The shadow price for all non-traded commodities depend on the shadow price of traded
and non-traded inputs. Therefore, the shadow prices for imported and non-traded
commodities must be calculated simultaneously, whereas the shadow prices for exported
commodities are simply their world prices. From (5.9) we see that the AR for
imported commodities is made up of their border price ratio plus an adjustment for
transport. PIDE (1985) presents gross absorptions of imports at purchaser prices.
Deducting taxes and transport margins (derived from the relevant rows of the
input-output table) we get imports at border (i.e. c.i.f.) prices and calculate the BPR
using (5.7). The relevant data are presented in Table 5.3.
%5.4.3 Non-traded Commodities
Since the shadow prices of imported and non-traded commodities depend on each 
other they must be calculated simultaneously. Table 5.4 presents such a system of
equations (for 3 commodités and one factor). Here we think of n commodities (i = 1, 
... ,n) for which an increase in demand can be met from either a fall in exports, an
increase in imports or an increase in domestic production. Let cq, pj, and 'yj be the 
proportion of the increase in demand for good i which is met from domestic production.
Table 5.4
Shadow Prices for Non-traded Commodities
p. = P , ( « , a  J  + P , ( “  S . )  + p , + P , ( Y , a , , ) + P , ( Y : * , , )  + P, + P , ( P , * , . )  + P i ^ P . * , ,  ) + P , (P .% , ,  ) + P . * . ,
P. = P. + P; ( * ,% : , )  + P , ( G , a , , )  + P T (Y ,* , : )  + P T t T , * : , )  + P T ^ ? , * , , )  + p f t P , * , , )  + P ^ P . % > ^  + P I ^ P , * : , )  + P . * . .
P, = P , ( G , a . , )  + P, ( « : % . , )  + P , ( « , * , , )  + P * ( ? , * : , )  + P T f ? : * , , )  + P T ^ Y ,* , , )  + + P l ^ P , » , , )  + p f ^ P , * , , )  + P . * . ,
p“ = + P . ( " .  a . ,  ) + PT(7, a , :  ) + P*(P , a , .  ) - " p f
p ^ =  + P , ( " :  a , , )  + PT(7, a , , )  + P*(P,  * , . )  + p i  ^
p ^ =  + P , (G ,  a , , )  + pT(7, a , , )  + P l ( P ,  * , , )  + P3
(a)  P i ,  p f  and p f  ( i  = 1, 2,  3) a r e  the  shadow p r i c e s  fo r  commodity i when i t  is  produced d o m e s t i c a l l y ,  im por ted  and 
e x p o r te d  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  p^ i s  the  shadow p r i c e  o f  f a c t o r s  and pj  i s  the bo rde r  c . i . f  p r i c e  o f  commodity i .
(ij) a | j  i s  the input  o f  commodity i r e q u i r e d  to produce one u n i t  o f  commodity j .
(c)  Uj, Pi and Yi a re  the  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  commodity i which i s  met from domestic  p r o d u c t i o n ,  e x p o r t s  and im por t s ,
r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  and sum to u n i t y  . We assume th a t  s e c t o r  3 i s  t r a d e  and t r a n s p o r t  and ( i n  the  a n a l y s i s )  t h a t  a , = l  (so
th a t  Y3=p3=0). For o th e r  commodit ies  we assume th a t  e i t h e r  ct j=l ,  p ,= l  or  Yi=l .  So the i s s u e  o f  p a r t i a l l y - t r a d e d
commodit ies  i s  not  d e a l t  w i th  in  our  a n a l y s i s .
00
This  model can be w r i t t e n  in  m a t r i x  n o t a t i o n  as (with  prime d eno t ing  row v e c t o r s )
p ’= v ’ [I - 8Â ]-:  and V’=p^pÀ.
where: p i s  a v e c t o r  o f  shadow p r i c e s  for  n o n - t r a d e d  and impor ted  commodit ies  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
i . e .  p tpi 5 • * ' ’P n ’P i ’ ' • • ’Pn^ *
Pw i s  a v e c t o r  o f  b o r d e r  (world)  p r i c e s  for  expo r ted  and im por ted commodit ies  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  and the  shadow 
p r i c e  o f  f a c t o r  in p u t s^  i . e .
Pw = [ p ^ , . . . ,  Pn> p ^ , . . . , p n  >P^] and p f  i s  the shadow p r i c e  o f  f a c t o r  in p u t s  (one for  each o f  F f a c t o r s ) .
0 i s  a d iagona l  m a t r i x  w i th  d ia gona l  [ a , ,  . . .  , a^,  y , , . . .  ,Yn]
P i s  a d iagona l  m a t r i x  w i th  d iagonal  [Pj . . .  P%,l (n  t im e s ) ,  1(F t i m e s ) ] .
Assuming N = 3 (and s e c t o r  3 i s  t r a d e  and t r a n s p o r t ,  a n o n - t r a d e d  i n p u t )  and F = 1 ( c a l l e d  s e c t o r  4)  then: ro
VO
%1, ^12 a , ,  0 0 0 A A l l ^12 ^13 0 0 0 •
a 2 1 a2 2 a 02 3 0 0 a2 1 a2 2 a 2 3 0 0 0
3^ 1 ^3 2 ^3 3 ^3 1 ^3 2 ^3 3 3^ 1 ^3 2 ^3 3 ^3 1 ^3 2 ^3 3
a 11 a 1 a 02 13 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
%2 1 ^2 2 a , ,  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
^3 2 ^3 3 ^3 1 ^3 2 %3 3 0
a
4 1
0
a
4 2
0
a
4 2
0
0
0
0
1
0
where the a j j ’ s a re  the  t o t a l  i n p u t -o u tp u t  c o e f f i c i e n t s .
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exports and imports respectively so that:
04 + Pi + Yi = 1
Writing the equations in Table 5.5 in matrix notation (and assuming n commodities) we 
have:
p’ = p ’ 0 À  + p ^ p À  (5.10)
where the prime superscript denotes a row vector. The vector p ’ is made up of
elements which are the shadow prices of non-traded and imported commodities, i.e.
P L Pi >' ••> Pu’Pi »' ' •> Pn J 
where p is a vector of shadow prices for non-tradeables and pP^  a vector of shadow 
prices for importables. The row vector has as elements the f.o.b. prices of exports
(which are also the shadow prices of exports in this model), the c.i.f. prices of imports
and the shadow prices of factors (taken as exogenous in this model), that is:
,  r  X X C C f  1
Pw ~ I Pi > • • • > Pn> Pi > • • • » Pn»P -I 
where p^ is a vector of f.o.b. prices for exports, p^ a vector of c.i.f. prices for
imports, and p^ a vector of shadow prices for factor inputs (there may be F>1 factor
inputs, e.g. land, labour and capital). The matrix 9 is a diagonal matrix with the
following diagonal elements
9 — [(Xj, ... >otjj>Yj, ••• >Yn]
The matrix p is also a diagonal matrix with the following diagonal elements:
p = [pj, ... ,Pn, l(n-i-F times)]
The matrix Â (with typical element âjj) has dimension (2n x 2n) made up of
input-output coefficients, where:
= âi+n,j = iJ = 1 to n
where ajj is the input of commodity i used to produce one unit of commodity j (taken 
from the input-output coefficient matrix A). If we assume that commodity r is transport
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then:
and
^i,j+n -  ^i+n,j+n = 0 for i r and i,j = 1 to n
\,j+ n  “  %+n,j+n ~ %j for i,j = 1 to n 
The matrix À (with typical element âjj) has dimension [(2n+F) x 2n] where:
ajj -  ajj
^i+n,j =
âj j+n = 0 for i r
â r j+ n  =  aq
^i+n,i+n = ^
^2 n+f,i+n = 0
where i = 1 to n, j = 1 to n, f  = 1 to F, and F is the number of factor inputs. If 
we interpret a^ as the input of factor f required to produce one unit of output j then:
^zn+fj = aq 
Rearranging (5.9) we get:
p’ = V’[I - 9A]-i
where V’ = p ^  0 À.
In the results presented below we classify commodities as either importable, 
exportable or non-tradeable and so do not allow for the case of partially-traded goods. 
This classification is presented in Table A5.1. Note also that if we define units such 
that the value at market (purchaser) prices equals unity then shadow prices and 
accounting ratios coincide and we can use these terms interchangeably. The purpose of 
describing the general case above is that it allows the simultaneous representation of the 
various classifications chosen but also shows how the method can be extended easily to 
the partially traded case.
^5.4.4 Factors of Production
To calculate the shadow prices of non-traded commodities (and the social 
profitability of traded sectors) we need to calculate the shadow cost of factor inputs.
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Since each factor input can have a different shadow price we need to separate value 
added (VA) into payments to each factor input. Here we take the sub-groups labour, 
land, capital and a residual (or pure profit). The input-output table available from PIDE 
(1985) gives a single value for VA and does not separate payments across factor inputs. 
We therefore calculate these payments using other data. Employment costs for
large-scale manufacturing were taken from estimates calculated from the Census of 
Manufacturing Industry (CM!) for the 118-sector classification. However, since the
values for VA in the input-output tables were lower than those for large-scale 
manufacturing from the CMI, the employment costs have been adjusted downwards (by 
a factor of 0.66 - see PIDE, 1985, p33) to match the input-output estimates. We have 
assumed other employment costs as follows (see Appendix C for a more detailed 
discussion): 0.5 of VA in agriculture and small-scale industries, and 0.6 of VA in 
construction and services. For agriculture we have taken the opportunity cost of land at 
market prices as 0.3 of VA. For capital coefficients we have used more aggregate data 
from the Government of Pakistan (1982 and 1983a) and have derived them as 
investment (i.e. 10% of capital stocks) divided by gross output at market prices. The 
residual of VA after these elements have been deducted is ’pure profit’. It is 
sometimes positive and sometimes negative. Given that it is an item derived as a 
residual after many assumptions it is not likely to be accurate. We have ignored it in 
the calculation of shadow prices which essentially involves treating it as a transfer 
payment with no social cost. The breakdown of VA into labour, land, capital and the 
residual is presented in Table 5.5.
In calculating ARs for non-traded activities (and the social profitability of traded
activities) we need the ARs for traded activities (discussed above) and for the
disaggregated VA terms. For land we assume throughout an AR or land conversion
factor (LCF) of 1.6 (see Appendix C for discussion). For the labour accounting ratio,
or the wage conversion factor (WCF), we experiment with the values of 1.4, 1.15 and
0.9. It should be noted that there may be several models which could yield these 
WCFs. Rewriting (5.1):
WCF = SCF [c - \i {c - m)]
c
Table 5 .5
Breakdown of  Value Added (VA)
01 ^'heat
02 Rice
03 Cot ton
04 Sugarcane
05 Tobacco Growing
06 O i l s e e d s
07 P u l s e s
08 Other Crops
09 L iv e s to c k
10 F i s h in g
11 F o r e s t r y
12 Mining & Quarry ing
13 G ra in  M i l l i n g
14 Rice M i l l i n g  & Husking
15 E d ib le  O i l s
16 Sugar R e f in in g
17 Gur and Khandsari
18 Tea Blend ing
19 F i s h  & P r e p a r a t i o n s
20 C o n fe c t io n e ry  & Bakery
21 Other Food I n d u s t r i e s
22 Beverages
23 Tobacco P roduc ts
24 B id i s
25 C o t ton  Yarn
Labour C a p i t a l Res idua l Value A(
0.2812 0.0202 0.0923 0.5625
0.2356 0.0202 0.0741 0.4712
0.2879 0.0202 0.0950 0.5758
0.3308 0.0202 0.1122 0.6616
0.3696 0.0202 0.1277 0.7391
0.3006 0.0202 0.1001 0.6012
0.1178 0.0202 0.0270 0.2357
0.3114 0.0202 0.1044 0.6228
0.2842 0.0202 0.0935 0.5684
0.4305 0.2784 0.1520 0.8609
0.3952 0.0202 0.1379 0.7904
0.3189 0.0400 0.0875 0.6378
0.0335 0.0920 -0 .0498 0.0756
0.0498 0.0920 -0 .0414 0.1004
0.0274 0.0920 -0.0401 0.0792
0.0400 0.0920 0.0255 0.1575
0.0435 0.0166 0.0270 0.0871
0.0565 0.0920 0.0254 0.1738
0.0372 0.0920 0.0169 0.1460
0.0536 0.0920 0.0348 0.1804
0.1415 0.0920 0.1125 0.3459
0.1661 0.0920 0.0844 0.3425
0.0278 0.0920 0.0183 0.1380
0.1648 0.0166 0.1483 0.3297
0.0919 0.0920 0.0664 0.2503
NJN)W
26 Cot ton  Ginning 0.0133 0.0920 -0 .0176 0.0876
27 Cot ton  T e x t i l e s  (Large S ca le ) 0.1547 0.0920 -0 .0369 0.2097
28 Cot ton  T e x t i l e s  (Small S ca le ) 0.1138 0.0166 0.0972 0.2275
29 S i l k  & S y n t h e t i c  T e x t i l e s 0.0802 0.0920 -0.0272 0.1450
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & H os ie ry 0.0985 0.0920 0.0220 0.2124
31 T h r e a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s 0.0853 0.0920 0.0582 0.2355
32 C arpe t s  & Rugs 0.1387 0.0920 0.0868 0.3174
33 Made-up Garments 0.1049 0.0920 0.1794 0.3763
34 Footwear (N on-rubber) 0.1822 0.0920 0.0931 0.3672
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e 0.1804 0.0920 0.1110 0.3833
36 Paper & P ro d u c t s 0.0875 0.0920 0.1063 0.2858
37 P r i n t i n g  and P u b l i s h i n g 0.0846 0.0920 0.0961 0.2726
38 L ea th e r  & P ro d u c t s 0.0337 0.0920 0.0747 0.2004
39 Rubber Footwear 0.0496 0.0920 -0.0406 0.1009
40 Rubber P ro d u c t s 0.0456 0.0920 0.0235 0.1611
41 P h a rm a c e u t i c a l s 0.0294 0.0920 -0.0159 0.1055
42 F e r t i 1i z e r 0.0570 0.0920 0.1774 0.3263
43 Perfumes & Cosmet ics 0.1649 0.0920 -0.1099 0.1470
44 P a i n t s  & V arn is h es 0.0046 0.0920 -0 .0554 0.0411
45 Soaps & D e te r g e n t s 0.0428 0.0920 -0.0043 0.1305
46 Chemicals 0.1021 0.0920 0.1232 0.3173
47 P l a s t i c  P ro d u c t s 0.1704 0.0920 0.1210 0.3834
48 P e t ro leum  P ro d u c t s 0.0263 0.0920 0.0324 0.1506
49 Cement 0.0901 0.0920 0.0269 0.2089
50 Glass  & P ro d u c t s 0.2066 0.0920 -0.1822 0.1164
51 Non-metal M inera l  P roduc ts 0.1357 0.0920 0.0425 0.2702
52 Bas ic  Metals 0.0638 0.0920 0.0236 0.1794
53 Metal P roduc ts 0.2618 0.0920 0.0687 0.4224
54 Iron  & S te e l  Remoulding 0.2386 0.0166 0.2221 0.4772
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 0.0420 0.0920 -0.0355 0.0985
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0.0835 0.0920 0.1733 0.3488
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery 0.0693 0.0920 -0.0067 0.1546
58 B ic y c le s 0.0576 0.0920 0.0493 0.1989
K)to
0.0611 0.0920 0 .0794 0.2324
0.1520 0.0920 0.2136 0.4575
0.1962 0.0920 0.1043 0.3925
0.0538 0.0920 -0 .0955 0.0503
0.0827 0.0920 0 .2020 0.3766
0.1744 0.0920 0 .2614 0.5278
0.0945 0.0920 0 .3764 0.5629
0.1729 0.0166 0 .1564 0.3459
0.2620 0.0047 0 .1700 0.4366
0.2398 0.0047 0.1552 0.3997
0.3000 0.0047 0.1953 0.5000
0.2422 0.0047 0.1568 0.4036
0.2555 0.0047 0.1656 0.4258
0.3329 0.0047 0.2173 0.5549
0.2499 0.5001 -0 .3335 0.4165
0.5398 0.2299 0 .1300 0.8997
0.4602 1.4573 -1 .1505 0.7671
0.4895 1.4573 -1 .1310 0.8159
0.5670 0.1072 0.2708 0.9449
0.1894 0.0576 0 .0687 0.3157
0.3306 0.3950 -0 .1746 0.5510
0.2455 0.0576 0.1061 0.4092
0.4919 0.0576 0.2703 0.8198
0.3213 0.0576 0.1566 0.5354
0.4601 0.0576 0.2491 0.7669
0.4833 0.3134 0.0087 0.8055
0.4371 0.0274 0.2641 0.7285
0.3205 0.2715 -0 .0578 0.5342
0.5749 0.1072 0.2761 0.9581
59 T ran s p o r t  (Large S c a l e )
60 S h ip b u i l d in g
61 T ra n s p o r t  Equipment (Small  Sca le )
62 O f f i c e  Equipment
63 S p o r t s  Goods
64 S u rg ic a l  I n s t rum en ts
65 Other Large S ca le  M anufac tur ing
66 Other Small S ca l e  M anufac tur ing
67 Low-cost R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i ld in g
68 Luxurious R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i ld in g
69 Rural  B u i ld ings
70 F a c to ry  B u i ld in g s
71 P u b l i c  B u i ld in g s
72 Roads
73 I n f r a s t r u c t u r e
74 Ownership o f  D well ings
75 E l e c t r i c i t y   6 /  - i . i 6 U 6  u . / o / i  m
76 Gas   .  .  oi
77 Wholesale & R e t a i l  Trade
78 Road Transpo r t
79 Rai l  T ranspo r t
80 Air  T ran sp o r t
81 Water T ranspo r t
82 T e l e v i s i o n
83 Radio
84 Phone,  Te leg raph  & Pos t
85 Banking & Insu rance
86 Government
87 S e rv ic e s
Note: All coefficients are given as percentages of gross output at market prices. Land
coefficients for sectors (l)-(9) and (11)-(12) were calculated as 0.3 of value added.
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where SCF is the AR corresponding to labour’s marginal product (which we shall
assume to be agricultural produce). If we assume a tight labour market then we have
c=m (at market prices) and the WCF is simply the weighted average of the ARs for 
output forgone. If labour is taken from agriculture then this refers to agricultural 
commodities: the appropriate AR in this case was calculated at around 1.4 in Table Al. 
If labour is in surplus at wage c (say, because c > m) and if we treat extra income to 
labour as having no social value, i.e. p. = 0, then we also get WCF = 1.4 (if we
assume that the consumption bundle is also made up of agricultural produce). However, 
if c > m and if we treat extra income as at least equal in value to income accruing to 
the government, i.e. p. ^  1, then the WCF is lower. We may view the lower WCFs, 
e.g. 1.15 or 0.9, as representing examples of such situations.
The market cost of capital is made up of depreciation (the amount needed to
maintain capital) plus an interest cost. The shadow cost is calculated by valuing
depreciation (and capital) using a SCF for assets and by using an accounting rate of
interest (f). If we define the asset conversion factor (ACF) as the shadow divided by
the market cost of capital then (see Appendix C for details)
ACF = . SCF
where Î and i are the accounting and market rate of interest respectively and p is the 
rate of depreciation of assets. The results in Ahmad, Coady and Stem (1988) suggest 
an SCF for assets of around 0.8. Since we are uncertain of the relationship between Î 
and i and given the crude method used to calculate investment, we use a range for 
ACF: we experimented with ACFs of 1.2, 1.0 and 0.8.
§5.5 Results
We now present our calculation of shadow prices (accounting ratios - ARs) and 
social profitabilities for Pakistan for 1975/6. We first present a technical analysis of the 
results. Then we interpret the results from a policy viewpoint and indicate the type of 
detail and the issues that one needs to go into when analysing policy.
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§5.5.7 Technical Analysis
Estimates are calculated for two cases (Case A and Case B) and for various 
combinations of WCFs and ACFs. The ARs for non-traded commodities, calculated as 
the marginal social cost (MSC) of production, are presented in Table A5.2. Since we 
treat the calculated residual in value-added as having zero cost (thus treating it as a 
transfer payment with no social cost) we would expect that, ceteris paribus, non-traded 
activities which exhibit high positive residuals will have relatively low ARs and those 
with high negative residuals will have relatively high ARs (because the social input 
costs are high relative to the value of their output). Table 5.6 presents results for Case 
A for WCF = 1.15 and ACF = 1.0 and shows that the above holds true for most 
non-traded activities. However, the ARs for some sectors are greatly affected by those 
for other sectors which are major inputs into their production process. For example 
sector (1) ’wheat’ has a high AR of 1.40 and this gives (13) ’grain milling’ a high AR 
of 1.38 (grain milling also has a negative residual). Also, sectors (2) ’rice’ and (3) 
’cotton’ have high ARs of 2.51 and 2.42 respectively, and these give sectors (14) ’rice 
milling’ and (26) ’cotton ginning’ high ARs of 2.07 and 2.12 respectively. The high 
ARs of (73) ’infrastructure’, (75) ’electricity’, (76) ’gas’ and (79) ’rail transport’ are due 
to high negative residuals which in turn are caused by high capital services coefficients 
- thus charging appropriately for capital inputs implies a high social cost of production 
relative to the market value of output. Also notice, from Table A5.2, that activities 
with high labour coefficients are most sensitive to the WCF chosen - for example, 
sector (77) ’wholesale trade’. Sectors with high capital coefficients are most sensitive to 
the ACF chosen - for example, (73) ’infrastructure’, (74) ’ownership of dwellings’, (75) 
electricity’ and (76) ’gas’.
We now turn to the social profitability of various traded activities. Here we 
define this as the social value of output minus its marginal social cost (MSC) of 
production, divided by the social value of output. Given this definition, the social 
profitability of non-traded activities will be zero since their ARs are calculated as their 
marginal social cost. The analysis of social profitabilities involves an examination of 
the social profitability of expanding the domestic production of importables or
Table 5 .6
R e s u l t s  for  Case A : WCF=1.2 and ACF=1.Q
01 Wheat
02 Rice
03 Cotton
04 Sugarcane
05 Tobacco Growing
06 O i l seeds
07 P u l s e s
08 Other Crops
09 L iv e s to c k
10 F i s h in g
11 F o r e s t r y
12 Mining & Quarrying
13 G ra in  M i l l in g
14 Rice M i l l in g  & Husking
15 E d ib le  O il s
16 Sugar Ref in ing
17 Gur and Khandsari
18 Tea Blending
19 F i s h  & P r e p a r a t i o n s
20 C onfec t ionery  & Bakery
21 Other Food I n d u s t r i e s
22 Beverages
23 Tobacco P roduc ts
24 B id i s
Socia l Res idual AR I n d i r e c t Clas
Return Taxes i f i c a t
0.227 0.092 1.399 0 .000 M
0.569 0.074 2.510 0 .000 X
0.554 0.095 2.420 0 .000 X
0.000 0.112 1.042 0 .000 N
-0.392 0.128 0.756 0 .000 M
-0.414 0.100 0.734 0 .000 M
0.000 0.027 1.017 0 .000 N
-0.713 0.104 0.595 0 .000 M
0.008 0.094 0.990 0 .000 M
0.209 0.152 1.127 0 .000 X
0.000 0.138 1.028 0 .000 N
-0.073 0.088 0.958 0.011 M
0.000 -0 .050 1.377 0.000 N
0.000 -0.041 2.071 0.000 N
-0.150 -0.040 0.974 0.108 M
-0.069 0.026 0.664 0.253 M
0.000 0.027 0.993 0 .000 N
0.109 0.025 0.957 0.076 M
0.094 0.017 1.146 0.000 X
0.000 0.035 0.874 0.057 N
0.232 0.112 1.228 0.001 X
-2.165 0 .084 0.207 0.157 M
0.632 0.018 1.118 0.499 X
0.000 0.148 0.716 0 .000 N
N)to
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25 Cotton  Yarn
26 Cotton  Ginning
27 Cot ton  T e x t i l e s  (Large S ca le )
28 Cotton  T e x t i l e s  (Small  S ca le )
29 S i l k  & S y n t h e t i c  T e x t i l e s
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & H os ie ry
31 T h re a d b a l l s  and Other  T e x t i l e s
32 Carpe t s  & Rugs
33 Made-up Garments
34 Footwear (Non-rubber)
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e
36 Paper & P roduc ts
37 P r i n t i n g  and P u b l i s h i n g
38 L ea the r  & P roduc ts
39 Rubber Footwear
40 Rubber P roduc ts
41 P h a rm ac eu t i ca l s
42 F e r t i l i z e r
43 Perfumes & Cosmetics
44 P a i n t s  & Varn ishes
45 Soaps & D e te rg e n t s
46 Chemicals
47 P l a s t i c  P roduc ts
48 Pe t ro leum  Produc ts
49 Cement
50 Glass & Produc ts
51 Non-metal Mineral  P ro d u c t s
52 Bas ic  Metals
53 Metal P roduc ts
54 I ron  & S tee l  Remoulding
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery
-0,,517 0,,066 1.,015 0. 020 X
0.,000 -0.,018 2.,119 0. 000 N
-0.,327 -0.,037 1.,018 0. 046 X
0,,180 0.,097 1.,122 0.,000 X
-0.,540 -0.,027 0.,541 0. 059 M
-0.,626 0,,022 0.,594 0. 015 M
-0.,331 0,,058 0,,665 -0.,002 M
0.,288 0,,087 1,,033 0.,066 X
0. 203 0,,179 1.,023 0.,007 X
0.,011 0,.093 1 ,057 0.,000 X
0.,130 0,,111 0.,987 0.,012 M
-0, 065 0.,106 0,,726 0.,068 M
0.,000 0 .096 0,.766 0.,000 N
0.,403 0.,075 1 ,500 0.,038 X
0.,244 -0,.041 1 .195 0.,024 X
-0.,240 0 .024 0 .707 0,,042 M
0.,176 -0 .016 0 .973 0,,022 M
0. 389 0,,177 1 .544 0,,007 M
-2.,990 -0 .110 0 .196 0,,238 M
0.,078 -0 .055 0 .798 0.,201 M
0.,103 -0..004 0 .979 0,,090 M
0,.068 0..123 0 .852 0..093 M
0.,151 0,,121 0 .939 0,,057 M
-0,,020 0.,032 0 .925 -0.,027 M
0,,123 0,,027 1 .153 0,,157 X
-1.,619 -0,,182 0 .398 0,,148 M
0,,047 0,,043 0 .980 0.,003 M
-0,,070 0.,024 0 .794 0.,026 M
0.,030 0.,069 0 .909 0 .000 M
0,,000 0,,222 0 .734 0..000 N
0,,072 -0,,035 0 .984 0,.000 M
0,,128 0,,173 0 .861 0 .003 M
0,,010 -0,,007 0 .836 0,.099 M
NJto<sD
58 B ic y c le s
59 T ranspo r t  (Large S c a l e )
60 S h ip b u i ld in g
61 Transpo r t  Equipment (Small S c a l e )
62 O f f i c e  Equipment
63 S po r t s  Goods
64 S u rg ica l  I n s t ru m e n t s
65 Other Large S c a l e  M anufac tur ing
66 Other Small S c a l e  M anufac tu r ing
67 Low-cost R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i ld in g
68 Luxur ious  R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i ld in g
69 Rural  B u i ld in g s
70 F ac to ry  B u i l d in g s
71 P u b l i c  B u i Id in g s
72 Roads
73 I n f r a s t r u c t u r e
74 Ownership o f  D well ings
75 E l e c t r i c i t y
76 Gas
77 Wholesale & R e t a i l  Trade
78 Road T ranspo r t
79 Rai l  T ranspo r t
80 Air  T ranspo r t
81 Water T ran s p o r t
82 T e l e v i s i o n
83 Radio
84 Phone, T e leg raph  & Pos t
85 Banking & In s u ran ce
86 Government
87 S e rv ice s
0.,000 0.,049 0.,842 0.,002 N
-0.,205 0. 079 0.,693 0.,058 M
0.,000 0.,214 0.,962 -0.,198 N
0.,089 0. 104 0.,993 0.,000 M
0.,137 -0.,095 0.,983 0.,190 M
0,,117 0.,202 1.,037 0.,010 X
0.,378 0.,261 1.,131 0.,014 X
0.,484 0.,376 1,,110 0,,005 X
0.,000 0,,156 0.,690 0,,000 N
0.,000 0.,170 0.,877 0.,000 N
0,,000 0,,155 0,,866 0,,000 N
0.,000 0.,195 0,,846 0.,000 N
0.,000 0.,157 0,,860 0,,000 N
0,,000 0,,166 0,,838 0.,000 N
0.,000 0,,217 0,,830 0,,000 N
0.,000 -0 ,334 1 ,351 0.,000 N
0.,000 0,,130 0.,935 0,,000 N
0.,000 -1 ,150 2,.268 0,,000 N
0.,000 -1 .131 2.,201 0,,000 N
0,,000 0,.271 0,,811 0,,000 N
0.,000 0 ,069 0,,850 0.,018 N
0.,000 -0,,175 1.,162 0.,000 N
0.,000 0,,106 0,,846 0.,033 N
0.,000 0,,270 0,,795 0.,000 N
0.,000 0,,157 0,,884 0,,000 N
0,.000 0,,249 0.,851 0,,000 N
0,,000 0,,009 1 ,046 0,.000 N
0..000 0,,264 0.,816 0.,000 N
0 .000 -0 ,058 1 ,060 0,,000 N
0.,000 0.,276 0,,810 0,,000 N
NJUJo
Note: Indirect taxes are taken from PIDE (1985).
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exportables, at the margin. When calculating the MSCs we interpreted the input-output 
coefficients as marginal, i.e. reflecting the extra inputs required to produce an extra unit 
of output. Our results are therefore more valid for the evaluation of new investments 
as opposed to the evaluation of output increases in industries where capacity
underutilization is a problem.
Since we look at the social profitability of tradeables, the classification of sectors 
into traded and non-traded is crucial. We have two cases: Case A with 52 traded
sectors, and Case B with 38 traded sectors. In practice, given the level of aggregation, 
one might expect to find within any one sector commodities or sub-sectors which may 
be traded or non-traded. Note that commodities can be non-traded for physical/’natural’ 
reasons (e.g. due to high transport costs) or because of the existence of binding quotas. 
Therefore, our results indicate the general social profitability of aggregate sectors, but 
more detailed analysis of specific ’within-sector’ industries may reveal the co-existence 
of socially profitable and socially unprofitable activities. This may even be so within 
any particular activity where production technologies vary, e.g. capital-intensive and 
labour-intensive production techniques.
Tables A5.3 present the social profitability of traded sectors for Case A for various 
WCF and ACF combinations (i.e. WCFs of 1.4, 1.15 and 0.9 and ACFs of 1.2, 1.0 
and 0.8). We concentrate mainly on the signs and relative magnitudes of the results. 
As a general guideline, when analysing social profitabilities one can argue that, ceteris 
paribus, (a) a high (low) indirect tax element will lead to a high (low) social profit 
since indirect taxes are treated as transfer payments with zero social costs and are 
subtracted to reach marginal social costs, (b) a negative residual will have the opposite
effect since the imputed costs of labour and capital are higher than the value added in
the input-output table, and (c) a high (low) AR for an output leads to a high (low) 
social profit.
Focusing on Case A for WCF = 1.15 and ACF = 1.0 (see Table 5.6 above) we 
see that, broadly speaking, activities with ARs less tiian 0.8 exhibit negative social 
profitabilities. However, from the point of view of the above general guidelines some 
results require further explanation. For example, (16) ’sugar refining’ has a very large
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tax coefficient of 0.25 but exhibits a social loss reflecting both its low AR of 0.66 and 
the high AR (=1.04) of its major input, sugarcane. Also, (15) ’edible oils’ exhibits a 
social loss even though it has a relatively high AR of 0.97 and a tax coefficient of
0.11. This is due to the very high AR (=2.12) of its major input, (26) ’cotton
ginning’, combined with a negative residual. Sector (19) ’fish and preparations’ has a
lower social profit than would be expected from its high AR (=1.15) due to the high
AR (=1.13) of its major input, (10) ’fishing’. Sector (22) ’beverages’ has a very low 
AR of 0.21 (due to high import tariffs) and this gives a social loss despite its high tax 
coefficient and positive residual. Because of its low AR of 0.20 (due to high import 
tariffs) and high negative residual, (43) ’perfumes and cosmetics’ exhibits a social loss 
in spite of the fact that it also has a high tax coefficient. Also, (44) ’paints and 
varnishes’ has a greater return than would be expected from its AR of 0.8 and negative 
residual mainly because of its high tax coefficient.
From Table A5.3 one can see that some sectors have negative social profitabilities 
across all combinations of WCF and ACF. These are (5) ’tobacco growing’, (6) 
’oilseeds’, (7) ’other crops’, (15) ’edible oils’, (22) ’beverages’, (25) ’cotton yam’, (27) 
’cotton textiles (large scale)’, (29) ’silk and synthetic textiles’, (30) ’woollen textiles and 
hosiery’, (31) ’threadball and other textiles’, (40) ’mbber products’, (43) ’perfumes and 
cosmetics’, (50) ’glass and products’, and (59) ’transport (large scale)’. Other sectors 
which have negative social profitability at high combinations of WCF and ACF switch 
to having positive social profitability as we reduce these conversion factors. These are 
(9) ’livestock’, (12) ’mining and quarrying’, (16) ’sugar refining’, (34) ’footwear 
(non-mbber)’, (36) ’paper and products’, (46) ’chemicals’, (48) ’petroleum products’, (49) 
’cement’, (51) ’non-metallic mineral products’, (52) ’metal products’ and (57) ’electric 
machinery’. Thus, if lower conversion factors are appropriate for the activities in the 
latter list, investment in these appears socially attractive; but, even at the lowest 
conversion factors considered, investment in the former activities is not socially desirable.
Moving from Case A to Case B an additional fourteen sectors are classified as 
non-traded, reflecting the possible existence of binding quotas. Given that, by definition, 
there is zero net social profit for non-traded activities, the policy interest in the
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calculations for these activities lies in examining their MSCs. For example, we could 
ask whether there would be any benefit in the relaxation of import quotas in a sector 
(if this is the reason why it is non-traded) by comparing the shadow price with the 
import price. This question is similar to asking whether or not the activity is socially
profitable since the MSC of a socially profitable sector will be less than its world price
(suitably adjusted for trade and transport margins). Therefore, traded sectors which were 
socially profitable (unprofitable) in Case A have a lower (higher) AR in Case B where 
they are classified as non-traded. If the domestic production of a commodity is socially 
profitable then it is desirable to meet any extra demand (or even replace existing
imports) with increased domestic production rather than by relaxing quotas. For
commodities that are naturally non-traded we can ask if there are particularly beneficial 
uses to which extra output (e.g. extra electricity supply) can be put If the shadow 
value of the use exceeds the MSC of its production then output should be expanded so 
as to satisfy this demand. An appealing feature of the results (presented in Table A5.5 
to Table A5.7) is that the social profitabilities of traded activities are very insensitive to 
the reclassification of these extra 14 sectors as non-traded.
It is also interesting to compare social profitabilities with commercial profitabilities
as reflected by the residual. Because of the crude manner in which the residuals were
calculated we concentrate on sign differences. Table 5.7 presents a comparison for Case 
A for WCF = 1.15 and ACF = 1.0. There are large number of sectors which show a 
commercial profit but which are socially unprofitable (and vice-versa). This reflects the 
degree of distortion in the price mechanism, which encourages the domestic production 
of many commodities which are socially unprofitable. However, one must keep in ntind 
the level of aggregation of many of the sectors. For instance, there may exist various 
sub-sectors, or various technologies within one sector, which are socially profitable and
others which are not. This may be particularly the case for textile activities which
incorporate technologies which vary according to their degree of labour-intensiveness.
For the results presented we have valued the residual at zero thus treating it as a 
transfer with no resource cost. The analysis was repeated with the residual valued at 
0.8. This may be interpreted as assuming that profits have a social value of only 0.2,
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Table 5.7
Comparison of Social and Commercial Profitabilities
Sector Social
Profitability
Commercial
Profitability
(5
(6
(8
(12
(16
(22
(25
(30
(31
(36
(40
(48
(52
(59
(30
(41
(44
(45
(55
(57
(62
Tobacco Growing 
Oilseeds 
Other Crops 
Mining and Quarrying 
Sugar Refining 
Beverages 
Cotton Yam 
Woollen Textiles 
Other Textiles 
Paper and Products 
Rubber Products 
Petroleum Products 
Basic Metals 
Transport (large-scale) 
Rubber Footwear 
Pharmaceuticals 
Paints and Varnishes 
Soaps and Detergents 
Agricultural Machinery 
Electrical Machinery 
Office Equipment
-0.39
-0.41
-0.71
-0.07
-0.07
-2.16
-0.52
-0.63
-0.33
-0.06
-0.24
- 0.02
-0.07
- 0.20
0.24
0.18
0.08
0.10
0.07
0.01
0.14
0.13
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.03
0.08
0.07
0.02
0.06
0.10
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.08
-0.04
- 0.02
-0.05
- 0.01
-0.04
- 0.01
-0.10
Note: These results are for Case A with ACF=1.0 and WCF=1.15.
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so that a transfer of a unit of public funds to private profit has a social cost of 0.8. 
The social profitability of seven sectors exhibit sign changes for such a move: whereas 
sectors (9) ’livestock’, (34) ’footwear (non-rubber)’, (35) ’wood, cork and furniture’, (53) 
’metal products’, (56) ’other non-electrical machinery’, (61) ’transport equipment 
(small-scale)’, and (63) ’sports goods’ previously had positive social returns they now 
have negative returns.
§5.5.2 Policy Analysis
An analysis of the social returns should indicate which industries should be 
encouraged using the various policy instruments at the government’s disposal, e.g. tax 
and pricing policies. We focus first on agriculture. Relative output prices and yields 
are important determinants of the relative profitabilities of various crops (or various crop 
combinations in a double-cropping system). Since individual crops have varying
requirements in terms of water and climate their yields vary according to the
agro-climatic environment and this can be a major factor in determining whether or not 
a crop has a comparative advantage in certain locations. For example, in areas where 
water is scarce, cotton is often the dominant crop because of its efficiency in water use. 
Alternatively, in areas well endowed with irrigation, rice is often the dominant crop
because of its superior yields (relative to cotton) -  improved varieties of rice respond 
sensitively to additional water. This is often what lies behind the idea of ’rice areas’ 
and ’cotton areas’ in Pakistan. In areas where relative yields do not play a dominant 
role in determining the allocation of land between crops we should find that the 
resource allocation decision is very sensitive to relative output prices.
The four major crops in Pakistan are wheat, rice (IRRI and basmati), cotton and 
sugarcane. Wheat is the dominant rabi (winter) crop reflecting its high yields, especially 
in well-irrigated areas. In the double-cropping system, wheat/IRRI, wheat/basmati and 
wheat/cotton are the dominant rotations. In well irrigated areas wheat/IRRI-basmati
dominate wheat/cotton in terms of profitability, and vice versa in areas less well 
endowed with water. These three rotations all compete with sugarcane. However, since 
sugarcane is a very water-intensive crop, it probably is a substitute mainly for the
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wheat/rice rotations. In 1973, when world sugar prices were very high, sugarcane had a 
strong comparative advantage in certain areas. However, with world prices plummeting 
by 1976/7 this was no longer the case and the continued existence of sugarcane 
production reflected high support prices and the operation of sugarcane zones in the 
vicinity of sugar mills. It is also often assumed (see Gotsch and Brown, 1980, pp. 
70-87) that farmers using animal power would not be able to implement wheat/basmati 
or wheat/cotton rotations (presumably due to time constraints and the sensitivity of 
returns to the time of planting) so that the next best alternative to sugarcane is the 
wheat/IRRI rotation.
According to Gotsch and Brown (1980) the ranking of crop allocations, in 
descending order of profitability (using domestic resource costs) for 1970/1, was: 
wheat/IRRI, wheat/ basmati, wheat/cotton and sugarcane. The rankings of wheat/IRRI 
and wheat/basmati were reversed in the 1975/6 period when basmati prices improved 
relative to IRRI prices which fell sharply. These results are consistent with those found 
by Lawrence (1970). However, he also found rapeseed to have the lowest domestic 
resource cost (DRC) and that the DRC of fall-planted oilseed, which competes with 
wheat, is lower compared to summer-planted oilseeds which compete with rice. 
However, Gotsch and Brown (1980) suggest that expansion of oilseed production needs 
to be considered in conjunction with increased crushing facilities. (Similar considerations 
apply to the production of sugarcane whose social profitability is higher if we consider 
the low MSC of sugar refining in the short-run). Maize also appeared with a DRC 
lower than cotton and higher than IRRI which suggests that one should examine its use 
in certain agro-industries (e.g. production of starch, sugars and glutin). Traditional rice 
had the highest DRC. Results from a study by Khan (1975) for 1972/3 also support 
the above conclusions, with sugarcane and wheat/cotton reversing positions, reflecting the 
sharp increase in world sugar prices in this period.
Our social profitability results are very similar to those from the earlier studies for 
a similar period. Wheat, rice and cotton dominate all other crops in terms of social 
profitability. In the mid 1970s subsidies on imported wheat and export duties on rice 
and cotton operated to encourage farmers to allocate more land to non-traded crops
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(such as sugarcane) then would otherwise have been the case. However, recall that we
have calculated the opportunity cost of land assuming that a given unit of land is
allocated to the production of various crops, using the proportion of total cropped land 
allocated to a particular crop in 1975/6 as the relevant proportions. Therefore, if we 
think that certain ’minor’ crops do not compete with wheat, rice and cotton then these 
may be socially profitable. This may also be the case if high yielding varieties are 
introduced for such crops as maize, vegetables, pulses or oilseeds, or if better practices 
are encouraged by extension services. So we should interpret the negative profitability 
of, for example, (8) ’other crops’ in this light.
The social profitabilities of food processing industries such as (15) ’edible oils’, 
(16) ’sugar refining’, and (19) ’fish and preparations’ depend on the world prices of 
processed food, the resource costs of their major agricultural inputs and the technical 
efficiencies of the production technologies used. Our results suggest that the domestic 
productions of edible oils and sugar should not be encouraged, suggesting a greater 
reliance on imports. In the case of sugar, for example, this reflects its low world 
price, the existence of more profitable alternatives to sugarcane and the low recovery 
rate of sugar from sugarcane. The low profitability of processed fish reflects the high
opportunity cost of raw fish in terms of foreign exchange from exports. But one must
ask how much fish can be exported to neighbouring countries and also take account of 
the cost of exporting farther afield, e.g. using freezer ships to transport fish to the Gulf 
region. It also appears that the protection given to (22) ’beverages’, through import 
taxes, is not desirable. It is interesting to note that excises on beverages were 
increased substantially during the 1980s. Sector (23) ’tobacco products’ exhibits a high 
social return and is an efficient earner of foreign exchange. However, if one thought 
that further production would require the use of domestically produced raw tobacco 
(which exhibits a negative social profitability), or if one sees tobacco as a ’demerit’ 
good, then this would probably be much lower. The technical difficulties in maintaining 
the quality and transporting of raw tobacco suggest that it is probably a non-tradeable. 
Notice that although Table 5.1 suggests that the private profitably of sugar and edible 
oil production has improved since the mid 1960s, our results suggest that the industries
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have not yet reached a stage where they are socially profitable.
An interesting feature of the results is the negative social returns of (25) ’cotton
yam’ and (27) ’cotton textiles (large scale)’, together with a positive return for (28) 
’cotton textiles (small scale)’. This reflects the opportunity cost (in terms of foreign 
exchange from exports) of using raw cotton domestically (as opposed to its export) and 
the capital intensiveness of large scale producers. Small scale cotton textile producers
are more labour intensive and socially profitable. These results are all the more 
important given that cotton producers are the major industrial employers in the country 
and are subsidized through low domestic prices for cotton. One has to ask whether the 
social unprofitability of large-scale cotton textiles reflects any natural comparative 
disadvantage or just ’organizational’ inefficiencies. It may be that privileged treatment,
as reflected in artificially low cotton prices, have made them slack as regards monitoring 
efficiency. It also appears that import substitution in (29) ’silk and synthetic textiles’, 
(30) ’woollen textiles and hosiery’ and (31) ’threadballs and other textiles’ should not be 
encouraged. Notice that ’other textiles’ was one of the sectors with negative value
added at world prices in 1963/4 (see Table 5.1).
The relatively high social returns for exported manufactures, especially for 
traditional sectors, emphasises the need to encourage export-oriented manufacturing. 
Major exporting sectors, such as (32) ’carpets and rugs’, (33) ’made-up garments’, (38) 
’leather and products’, (39) ’rubber footwear’, (63) ’sports goods’ and (64) ’surgical 
instruments’, exhibit high social returns. It is interesting that the results also suggest
that the production of (49) ’cement’ for export should be encouraged. The low or
negative returns of many import-substituting sectors reflects the fact that the protection
of these activities may no longer be desirable. Any pleadings for continued protection
on ’leaming-by-doing’ or ’infant industry’ grounds should therefore be considered with
caution. The above results relating to textiles would also suggest that one should ask 
whether high tariffs are the most effective way of improving technical efficiency where
leaming-by-doing is important. However, there does appear to be an argument for the
continuation of import substitution for some imported commodities, namely, (41) 
’pharmaceuticals’, (42) ’fertilizers’, (45) ’soap and detergents’, (47) ’plastic products’,
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(56) ’other non-electrical machinery’ and (62) ’office equipment’. It is also possible 
that there exists some scope for continued import substitution within such sectors as (44) 
’paints and varnishes’, (46) ’chemicals’, (55) ’agricultural machinery’ and (61) ’transport 
equipment (small scale)’.
So far we have focused solely on medium and long-term industrialization policy. 
However, at any point in time, we are faced with the problem of selecting the 
appropriate policy given the level and nature of investment that presently exists. It is 
possible that appropriate short-term policies differ (possibly substantially) from the 
appropriate long-run policies, especially where there exists over-capacity (or
underutilization of existing capacity) and large fixed investments. In many industries 
there are large fixed costs which cannot be avoided once the investment is in place. 
Therefore, one should focus on marginal costs (and not average costs as in the above 
analysis) when selecting between policy options. It is also the case that within any one 
industry there can be a number of different technologies, varying in their levels of fixed 
costs. This feature of an industry must be incorporated into any analysis used to guide
policy. In order to highlight some of the issues involved we concentrate on the sugar
refining industry, but many of these issues are also pertinent to other industries.
At the time of partition there were only two-sugar refining plants in Pakistan. By
1960 there were twelve plants, by 1970 nineteen plants, thirty one by 1980 and 41 by
1986. The more recent investments have been in more capital-intensive plants and have 
been the focus of much criticism because of the high costs of domestic production. 
Since the early 1960s the government has regulated the industry, the extent of its 
involvement varying over time. Between 1972 and 1981 the government determined the 
support price for sugarcane, the ex-mill and retail prices of refined sugar, and also 
monopolized its purchase and sale. Retail prices were kept substantially above world 
prices and sugar was sold through ration shops. Each mill was allocated a zone in 
which farmers were obliged to sell sugarcane to the mill.
Sugarcane output is very unstable due to the vagaries of the weather, pests and 
disease. The objective of cane support prices is to protect farmers in ’good’ seasons 
and mills in ’bad’ seasons. In good seasons mills must pay the minimum support
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price, and they operate at full capacity. In bad seasons mills are often unwilling to 
purchase cane at prices greater than the support price because of fixed prices for sugar. 
Farmers then may find it more profitable to use cane to produce gur and khandsari, and 
this further exacerbates the problem of cane shortages. So capacity utilization varies 
substantially between good and bad years. This is more of a problem in Punjab and 
NWFP where the cottage sugar industry is more established. In Sind, the absence of a 
cottage sector, a more favourable (humid) climate and larger landholdings all combine to 
make sugar production more profitable.
Whereas many of the modem plants may be profitable, many of the smaller, older 
plants are not. The social profitability of sugar production depends on the social cost 
of production of cane. The social cost of producing cane will depend on the social 
value of alternative land use (for wheat, rice, cotton, etc.). Up to the mid 1960s cane 
competed with traditional varieties of wheat and rice so that the opportunity cost of 
producing cane was lower. The high world prices for sugar in the early 1960s ensured 
that the domestic production of sugar and cane were socially profitable. In the late 
1960s high yielding varieties of wheat and rice were introduced and the world price of 
sugar fell dramatically. Sugarcane yields remained static and its sucrose content low. 
Sugarcane and refined sugar were profitable only because of high support prices for
cane and the fixing of the domestic price of sugar well above world prices. The hike
in world sugar prices in the early 1970s helped to divert arguments for the closure of 
some plants and a greater reliance on imports. However, the plummeting of world 
sugar prices from 1976 renewed such pressure.
While we might conclude that, in the long run, the domestic production of sugar 
(and hence cane) is not socially profitable, in the short run we can argue that, because
of the low marginal cost of sugar production, the allocation of land to cane should be
maintained and the older sugar plants kept open. However, over time the less profitable 
plants should close and the land switched away from cane to wheat, rice and cotton (or 
other socially profitable crops). This obviously also has implications for short-run 
pricing policies and we discuss these further in Chapter 6. The question of optimal 
buffer stocks in the face of fluctuating world prices is likewise of much importance but
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we do not discuss that here.
Many other industries encompass a range of production technologies with varying
levels of social return. For example, while some fertilizer plants may be socially
profitable at world prices, older plants may not. We also saw that although large-scale 
cotton textile production was not socially profitable in the mid 1970s, small-scale plants 
had a positive social return suggesting that these labour-intensive techniques were
preferable to the more modem capital intensive ones. Whereas the question of the
social profitability of sugar production has immediate consequences for the level of cane 
production this is not so for fertilizer and cotton textiles because of the possibility of 
foreign trade. The interesting questions in the fertilizer sector are the optimal level of 
domestic production in the long run and the choice of production technique. With
cotton textiles we should ask: Given world prices for raw cotton and cotton textiles, 
should the former be exported or used to produce textile products domestically? The 
answer will depend on the production technique (i.e. labour or capital intensive)
employed, the efficiency with which raw cotton is transformed into textiles and relative 
labour and capital costs.
§5.6 Summary and Conclusions
From our discussion of industrialization and trade policies in Pakistan since 
Independence we saw that there has been a gradual movement away from quantative
restrictions on domestic production and foreign trade in favour of manipulating price 
incentives for investment in various industries. Up to the 1970s this liberalization of 
the economy was gradual and took the form of loosening, rather than eliminating, 
quantity controls. The 1970s saw a rapid and major move towards price controls as a 
way of adjusting the incentives facing producers and consumers. Our summary of 
previous studies into the extent of the consequent pricing distortions in the economy 
shows that the distortions were large and that the complexity of the price and tax 
system may have had unintended consequences, especially the effective taxation of
exporting industries. Such distortions may give wrong signals to private agents and 
encourage investments in industries which are socially unprofitable.
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In Chapter 1 we emphasised the need to use shadow prices when evaluating 
government economic policies and reforms. In this chapter we have set out a method 
for the calculation of a set of shadow prices for aggregate sectors. We discussed and 
interpreted the basic principles of the Litûe-Mirrlees approach for the calculation of 
shadow prices and argued that this method is easy to use and is also a very flexible 
and useful way of evaluating and formulating government policies. We then showed 
how this approach can be put into practice using data which are available for many 
developing countries. The specific model we set out for the calculation of shadow 
prices is easy to construct and can be applied in a very flexible manner.
We have calculated a set of shadow prices for Pakistan for the mid 1970s and 
have showed how these can be used in a discussion of industrialization and trade 
policies. The technical analysis of our results highlights the origin and nature of the 
distortions, e.g. trade or domestic taxes, and summarizes their combined effect on the 
overall level of distortion. We explored various assumptions about the workings of 
product and factor markets and their implications for shadow prices. We then went on 
to interpret the results from a policy viewpoint and showed how they could be used to 
guide government economic decisions concerning investment and pricing. We focused, in 
turn, on agriculture, agriculture- related industries, and manufacturing industries.
With agriculture the results suggest that the emphasis in Pakistan on wheat, rice 
and cotton is justified. These crops emerged as the most socially profitable crops. 
However, we also suggested that some of the minor crops may not compete directly
with these major crops, i.e. the land they take up is not suitable for the major crops,
in which case our policy conclusions would need to be adjusted accordingly. Our
analysis of agriculture- related industries showed that policy towards industries based on 
crops such as sugarcane and oilseeds needs to be re-evaluated. Unless scientific 
research leads to higher sugarcane or oilseed yields, or unless the technical efficiency of 
the relevant processing industries is improved, a greater reliance on imports may be
desirable. The results for cotton based industries also highlighted similar issues. The
social unprofitability of the cotton yam and the large-scale cotton textile industries 
emphaises the need to question whether or not there is a genuine infant industry
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argument for protection and, if so, whether tariff protection will actually achieve this, or 
are more direct policies required. Similar issues apply to some import-substituting 
industries. One must decide whether domestic production can ever be socially profitable 
and recognize the implications of inefficient production for government revenue and 
consumer welfare. Also, the social profitability of major exporting industries reinforces 
arguments for their continued encouragement, or at least not to discourage them through 
duties or input taxes.
Finally, we pointed out that much of our analysis was focused on the medium to 
long term. Using the sugar industry as an example, we argued that for industries in 
which there already exists large fixed investments short-run policies may look very 
different from longer-term objectives. For example, if a socially unprofitable industry 
has large fixed costs then we may want to maintain production levels (and those of 
non-traded inputs) but phase it out gradually, i.e. discourage new investments. In fact, 
if there is underutilization of capacity we may want to increase production. The 
implications of such issues for pricing policies are discussed in C huter 6.
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Chapter Six
Indirect Taxation and Pricing Policy in Pakistan
§6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 we highlighted that due to administrative and political constraints 
governments in developing countries often have to rely to a large extent on the 
manipulation of prices and the imposition of indirect taxes to raise a substantial 
proportion of the revenue required to finance government expenditures. We further 
argued that these constraints are particularly apparent when it comes to the taxation of 
the agricultural sector. While the theoretical models which analyse optimum commodity 
taxation or pricing are useful in identifying the desirable characteristics of a system of 
indirect taxation and price controls they are less useful when it comes to the analysis of 
agricultural pricing policy. The standard assumptions of optimal profits taxation and an 
ability to tax total consumption are less acceptable when applied to agriculture. It is 
generally agreed that the taxation of agricultural profits would be very difficult as would 
the taxation of the total consumption of agricultural households who are both consumers 
and producers. However, if agriculture is seen as part of the consumer sector then the 
results from the standard models are still valid, but now consumption elasticities are 
replaced with elasticities of net trade defined as the difference between production and 
consumption.
In spite of the ability of the standard models to incorporate the idiosyncracies of 
the agricultural sector one must recognize that the systems of indirect taxes and price 
controls observed in practice rarely conside with those suggested by these models. But 
risk-averse governments who require revenue to finance politically sensitive expenditures 
will be understandably wary of implementing major reforms. However, they may be 
more willing to undertake gradual reform and in §1.3 we presented a theory of price 
reform and showed how it can be used to identify welfare-improving changes in the 
existing system of price controls and indirect taxes. In this chapter we apply this 
approach to Pakistan using data from the mid 1970s. This is an interesting period to 
analyse since the government had access to many policy instruments reflecting its
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nationalization of numerous agricultural and industrial sectors. The results of our 
analysis, however, carry lessons for policies beyond this period. We use these lessons 
to comment on policies followed in the 1980s and to set out recommendations for the 
future.
The layout of the chapter is as follows. In §6.2 we recap on how the theory of 
price reform can be applied in practice and then set out a model which is intended to 
allow normative analysis of the instruments available to the government in the mid 
1970s. Although our modelling of the operation of government pricing policies may not 
be completely representative of the actual system in the mid 1970s and may appear 
somewhat ’optimistic’ from the point of view of the degree of control excercised by the 
government, we think that it does capture the essential features of the system. In §6.3 
the data used in the analysis are discussed. Our results are presented in §6.4, and §6.5 
uses these to discuss policies followed in the 1980s and to make recommendations for 
future policy. Some conclusions are given in §6.6.
§6.2 A Model for Pakistan
In §1.4 we set out an approach which can be used to analyse price reform. We 
defined the statistic Xj as the marginal social cost of raising extra revenue by changing 
the price (tax) on good i. We also showed that this could be written as the sum of 
direct effects on individual households (weighted by their marginal social utilities of 
income) divided by the indirect cost of changing demands as captured by the change in 
shadow revenue. Using (1.4.1), (1.4.3) and (1.4.4) this can be written in a form 
convenient for empirical analysis as:
or alternatively as Xj=D|/E^ where
- m
and Ej = [1 + (E j Tj ejj qjSj)/qiSj]
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The term Dj is the distributional characteristic of good i and reflects the pattern of net 
trade in i (defined as production minus consumption) across households with different 
marginal social utilities of income. ^  is the net trade in good i by household h: if a 
household is a net producer (consumer) of good i then ÿ  is positive (negative). For 
certain goods (e.g. wheat or labour in rural areas) individual households can be net 
purchasers or net sellers, or have zero trade when they consume what they produce. 
For other goods households may always be net purchasers (e.g. chemical fertilizers in 
rural areas or final commodities in urban areas), or always net sellers (e.g. cash crops 
in rural areas). The term captures the net market trade in good i by the
consumer sector as a whole (remember it now includes the agricultural sector). This 
can be positive or negative depending on whether the consumer sector as a whole is a 
net buyer or seller. For example, if the government is a net buyer of good i from the 
rural consumer sector, as is the case for wheat, then Sj is positive reflecting the surplus 
over consumption in rural areas. Therefore, an increase in q  represents a net transfer 
of resources to the rural consumer sector although among rural consumers there are 
some losers (net purchasers) and some gainers (net sellers). Alternatively, if the 
consumer sector as a whole is a net buyer of good i, as is the case with fertilizer in
rural areas and many consumer goods in rural and urban areas, then sj is negative and
an increase in qj represents a net transfer of resources out of the consumer sector.
The term Ej is the change in government (shadow) revenue with respect to % 
[multiplied by qj, i.e. q(9Ry/9qi), where q  is the price being changed], Tj is the 
shadow tax rate on good j and is the elasticity of g with respect to q .  The first
term captures the change in revenue when demands are fixed and the second term
calculates the effect on revenue when consumers respond to a price change by switching 
net demands between goods with varying tax rates.
We now examine the revenue equations (i.e. Ej) for each commodity, the nature of 
government involvement in each sector and the elasticity of government revenue with 
respect to various prices set by the government. The analysis is presented in terms of 
actual revenue but one only needs to replace producer prices and marginal costs with 
shadow prices and shadow costs to get to shadow revenue. Our applied work focuses
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on shadow revenue.
§5.2.7 Wheat and Atta
Government involvement in the wheat and atta (flour) markets is modelled as 
follows. The government sets the procurement price of wheat, P j , which also 
determines the market price. At this price producers decide how much to produce and 
to consume on farm, the difference being their marketed surplus. Rural non-producers 
also decide on their level of consumption. The government procures the residual after 
these decisions, i.e.
G, = S ,  - X, (6.2.1)
where Gj is government procurement of wheat, Sj is producers’ marketed surplus and 
Xj is demand by non-producers (mainly landless rural households). Note that G^  , not 
S j , captures the extent of government involvement in wheat trade and thus corresponds
to Sj in (6.1.1). We assume that the wheat milling industry is in the public sector.
Notice that it is now uninteresting to focus on the ‘issue price’ of wheat to millers
since changes in this price act only as a transfer between the government ‘wheat 
revenue account’ and its ‘atta revenue account’. The prices of interest are the
procurement price of wheat and the consumer prices of market and rationed atta set by 
the government.
The government sets both the price of atta in the ration shops, % , and the 
open-market price of atta, . At these prices it forecasts total atta demand, X^, 
where:
X, = X° + X, ( 6 . 2 . 2 )
0
Xj is demand in the open-market and X  ^ is demand for rationed wheat. We assume 
that ration quotas received by a household are fixed by the government and depend on 
the composition of the household. In reality some households do not take up the full 
quota to which they are entitled so we further assume that the factors which determine
248
take up are exogenous and not affected by the price changes considered.
Given total demand for atta this in turn implies a demand for wheat through the 
relationship;
Y, = V X, (6.2.3)
where is demand for wheat by the milling industry and y  is the fixed amount of
wheat required to produce one unit of atta, i.e. the physical input-output coefficient 
Yj/Xj.  The difference between this demand and the amount procured by the 
government is imported so that:
M, = Y, - G, = Y X, - G, (6.2.4)
where is wheat imports which are controlled by the government.
Using (6.2.1)-(6.2.4) government revenue from its operations in the wheat-atta 
market can be written as:
R = -Pj Gj + Qa + Qz - c - c - Pj Mj ( 6 . 2 . 5 )
where R is government revenue, c the total fixed costs of millers, C the variable cost
of production (per unit of X^) and p* the price paid by the government for imports
(the border price plus trade and transport margins). So:
Pi Pi  ^ Pi^i - pjGj ( 6 . 2 . 6 )
G
where e  ^  ^ is the elasticity of government procurement of wheat with respect to the
procurement price of wheat and pj Gj is the cost of wheat procured by the government.
It is this equation which enters into the calculation of , the effect on social welfare
of raising one extra unit of revenue by changing the procurement price of wheat. 
When revenue is valued at shadow prices we interpret p* as the shadow price of
wheat. Note that the relevant elasticity is that of government procurement and that,
from (6.2.4), (9M  ^/9pj )=(-9Gj /3pj ) so that changes in government procurement affect
import levels.
The effect on revenue of a change in the market price of atta is given by:
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q . ^  -  (q» - e^- P* y) «0^ x° + q , X° ( 6 . 2 . 7 )
where c  ^2 Ae elasticity of open-market atta demand with respect to the open-market 
price and is the value of open-market purchases. The term (c 4- p* j}/) is the
marginal cost of production. The effect on R of a change in the ration price is given
by:
-  ^  ^ (q , c - x/p*)  7 ^^  q  ^ x° + %  X, ( 6 . 2 . 8 )
3q, q:
where c  ^2 is the elasticity of demand for open-market atta with respect to the ration 
price of atta and ration levels are fixed so that a change in the ration price acts as an 
income transfer which in turn leads to a change in demand for open market atta. In a 
similar manner to above one can derive the effect on R of a change in any other price, 
Pj, so that:
Pi | r  = ( 'I '  -  ^ q , X° - I P . - ^  p. G, ( 6 . 2 . 9 )
0 G
where c  ^i and e are the elasticities, with respect to p j of open-market atta demand
and government procurement of wheat respectively.
The direct effect on welfare of all these price changes is given by the welfare- 
weighted sum of the relevant household surplus. From (6.2.6)-(6.2.9) we can see that 
the relevant elasticities for our tax reform analysis in the wheat-atta sector are the own- 
and cross-price elasticities of government procurement of wheat and market atta demand. 
A detailed analysis of household production-sales-purchases profiles (using Government of 
Pakistan, 1979) indicates that no farmer who purchased wheat from the market also 
purchased market atta and less than 1% purchased ration atta. Atta was mainly 
consumed in urban areas with wheat consumption predominant in rural areas. The data 
therefore suggests that whether or not a household purchases wheat or atta is determined 
mainly by location and is not very sensitive to relative wheat and atta prices. In 
deriving the above we assumed that changes in urban atta prices do not affect rural 
wheat production, consumption or govemmentt procurement. Information on overall 
production, marketed surplus and government procurement is presented in Table 6.1 for
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major crops.
§5.2.2 Rice
In the rice industry the government sets the procurement price of rice (unhusked
grain), p^. Given p^, rice farmers decide how much to produce. The farmer sells all
this grain to the public sector rice husking plant and buys back his consumption
requirements at a price of which is fixed by the government. We also assume that
qj is the price faced by other consumers so the government can confront all consumers 
with q^, even rice producers. The government has a price fixing rule given by:
Qs = Y P4 (6.2.10)
so that = Bq, = T We can think of y  being fixed to guarantee a certain
level of profits to millers.
T able 6 .1
Procurement and Marketed Su rp lu s  o f  Maior Crops 
P r o p o r t i o n  of  t o t a l  ou tpu t______
Procured  Consumed Sold  to  r=S/Y S/G
On Farm Open Mkt.
Wheat 0.25 0 .60  0 .15  2 .50  1.60
Rice 0 .30  0 .20  0 .50
Sugarcane 0 .30  0.70  - 3.33
Cot ton  1.00 - - 1.00
Note: S i s  marketed s u r p l u s , Y t o t a l  p ro d u c t i o n  and G government 
p ro c u re m e n t .
Source :  A g r i c u l t u r a l  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  P a k i s t a n  (1985) and Government 
o f  P a k i s t a n  (1979).
Let be the total production of rice, all of which is procured by the
government. This level of production is a function of p^. Given p^, the government 
sets q, to satisfy equation (6.2.10) and this determines the level of demand for (husked) 
rice, X j . The demand for unhusked rice by the domestic rice husking industry, , is 
then determined by the following relationship:
X , = a  X, (6.2.11)
where a  is the physical input-output coefficient, i.e. the amount of unhusked rice
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required to produce one unit of husked rice. The difference between domestic demand 
for and supply of unhusked rice is exported with:
E , = Y, - X, (6.2.12)
where is net exports of rice.
Using (6.2.10)-(6.2.12) the revenue equation for the rice sector can be written as:
R = - p* Y, + q^ Xg - c - c Xg + Pj E, ( 6 . 2 . 1 3 )
where c represents the fixed costs of the rice husking plants, c their per unit variable 
costs of production and p* is the rice export price. The effect of a change in the 
procurement price of rice on R is then:
P‘ Î :  = - P,Y. - P.Y. + '  q '  q ,x , + q,x,
..........................  ( 6 .2 . 1 4 )
where (c + a  p*) is the marginal cost of producing husked rice, p* is the world price 
of unhusked rice, and is the elasticity of rice production with respect to changes in 
the procurement price of rice.
The effect on R of a change in any other price pj can similarly be written as:
Pi ^  = - n . i  P,Y. + ■ -q - q,X, ( 6 . 2 . 1 5 )
where r\^\ and are, respectively, the elasticity of rice production and rice
consumption with respect to pj. So the relevant elasticities for the tax analysis are the 
supply elasticities (own and cross) for rice, and rice demand elasticities.
The direct effect on welfare of a change in p^  is XhP^(p4 y!? - q^x^), where we 
interpret the surplus as the difference between the value of rice production (zero for 
non-producers) minus the value of rice consumption. This crude modelling of the rice 
sector was necessary given the lack of detailed information concerning its operation. 
Notice that we have not distinguished between basmati and coarse varieties of rice due 
to lack of data.
§6.2.3 Sugarcane and Refined Sugar
In the sugar industry we assume that the government sets the procurement price of
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cane, . Given this price farmers decide on the level of their marketed surplus, , 
all of which is sold to the government. The government then sets both the market and 
ration prices for sugar as well as the sugar ration quota for various households. We 
assume that the ration quota received by households is fixed for the household according 
to household composition. As with wheat, in reality we find that some households do 
not take up their full ration entitlement, so we further assume that the take up decision 
is exogenous in the sense that it is not affected by the price changes considered. The 
market price of sugar is set at q, and the ration price at q , . At these prices 
consumers decide on their consumption of refined sugar so that:
X, = + X, ( 6 . 2 . 1 6 )
0
where X , is total demand for sugar, X, demand for open-market sugar and X, demand 
for
ration sugar. Domestic production of sugar is a function of the amount of cane 
procured by the government and is given by the relationship:
Y, = T G, (6.2.17)
where Y, is domestic production of sugar and T is the amount of sugar produced from 
one unit of cane or the ‘recovery percentage’ (the inverse of the physical input-output 
coefficient). The excess of demand over domestic production is met through imports of 
sugar:
A4, = X , - Y, = X, - T G, (6.2.18)
where M, represents imports of refined sugar.
The revenue from the sugar industry is given by:
R = " Pa Gg + q , X, + q , X, - c - c X, - p , M, ( 6 . 2 . 1 9 )
where c is the fixed cost of the sugar refining industry, C unit variable costs and p, 
the cost of importing sugar. The effect on R of changing the procurement price of 
cane is:
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P‘ ^  - Cy T p J  . p^  (3^ ( 6 . 2 . 2 0 )
where T is the inverse of T (or the physical input-output coefficient) or amount of 
sugarcane required to produce one unit of sugar), Ç is the ratio of the market price of 
sugar to the procurement price of cane, q, /p^, and e ^  is the elasticity of government 
procurement of cane with respect to the procurement price. Note that in our model we 
do not regard Ç as fixed. The term in brackets is positive if the marginal cost of 
producing sugar domestically is less than the cost of importing sugar, i.e. if domestic 
production is privately (socially if valued at shadow prices) profitable on the margin.
The effect on R of a change in the market price of sugar is:
q, 3%; = q» + q. ( 6 . 2 .21)
and the revenue effect of a change in the ration price is:
q, — = s ,  q, x“ + q, (6.2.22)
3q,
The effect on R of a change in any other price, pj, is:
PI q , X? + -  I ' - P . G. ( 6 . 2 . 2 3 )
with all variables as earlier. From (6.2.20)-(6.2.22) we see that the elasticities of 
government procurement and of open-market demand for sugar are the relevant 
elasticities when analysing price reforms.
Data from the Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan (Government of Pakistan, 1977 and 
1985) indicate that around 30% of total sugarcane output was purchased by the sugar 
refining industry. On the other hand. Government of Pakistan (1979) suggests that 
farmers sold on average 80% of sugarcane production. It is most likely that the 50% 
difference was sales to the gur industry. In this paper we treat this element of supply 
as on-farm consumption so that the elasticity of demand for sugarcane (taken as that for 
sugar) is assumed to reflect the decision as to how much sugarcane to withhold for the 
gur industry. Although this is not satisfactory, a more detailed analysis would need to
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undertake an in-depth study of the existence of a gur industry side by side with the 
sugar refining industry. This is not attempted here.
§d.2.4 Cotton
We assume that all raw cotton is sold to the government so that the procurement
elasticity is simply the supply elasticity for cotton. Since other prices are held constant
the domestic demand for cotton does not change and the change in the domestic supply 
of cotton is matched by a corresponding change in cotton exports.
§5.2.5 Fertilizer
In Pakistan the government fixes the consumer price of fertilizer. Some fertilizer 
producers are in the private sector while others are in the public sector. However, 
since the government guarantees producers a fixed return, and subsidizes or taxes 
(surcharge) any deviations from this return, we can proceed as if the fertilizer sector is 
totally within the public sector. We assume that domestic producers are producing at 
full capacity and that domestic demand for fertilizer exceeds domestic supply with the 
difference being imported. Any changes in demand brought about by price reforms will 
therefore lead to an adjustment in imports. The relevant elasticity is then the elasticity 
of demand for fertilizer.
§5.2.5 Other Final Commodities
We assume that all other goods are final consumer goods. The relevant elasticities
are then the conventional demand elasticities and the direct effect on welfare of changes
in their prices depends on the extent of consumption by each household.
§5.2.7 Labour
In order to incorporate the workings of the laboin market into our analysis we 
assume that the government can determine wages only in what we call the formal or 
organized sector. This sector will include large-scale manufacturing and some of the 
services sector. We assume that total labour supply in the economy is fixed at L and
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that net labour supply from the consumer sector to the formal sector, L , , is:
L3 = L - L, -
where is labour demand in the agricultural crop sector and labour demand in the
informal sector which includes non-crop agricultural activities (e.g. fishing and forestry), 
small-scale manufacturing and small-scale services (e.g. construction activities). We 
could rewrite the above equation to reflect a sequential flow of labour from the 
agricultural to the informal sector and then on to the formal sector but this would serve 
only to complicate matters unnecessarily.
For expositional purposes it is more useful to focus specifically on shadow revenue. 
The government shadow revenue equation for labour is then:
R = -(w-w*) L3
where L3 is net labour supply from the consumer sector (sectors 1 and 2), w is the 
wage paid by the formal sector and w* the social value to the economy of an extra 
unit of labour, i.e. the shadow wage rate. Therefore,
p ^  = - (1 - WCF) n . WL,
where the wage conversion factor (WCF) is defined as in Chapter 5 (the ratio of w* to 
w), 1^ 3 is the elasticity of net labour supply to the formal sector with respect to a price 
p, and WL3 is the formal sector wage bill.
To simplify things we assume that both L and do not respond to changes in p, 
in which case the response of labour demand in the crop sector determines 1)3 so that:
T|, =  -11. ^
where rii is the elasticity of demand for labour with respect to p in the agricultural 
crop sector. Take, for example, an increase in the price of wheat. This increases the 
demand for labour in the agricultural sector thus decreasing the net supply to the formal 
sector. If WCF<1 reflecting, say, the high welfare weight attached to wage income 
(which increases), then government revenue increases making a change in the price of 
wheat more attractive.
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§6.3 Data
To calculate the marginal social cost for each policy instrument we need 
information on the patterns of net trade across consumers, the direction and extent of 
net trade by the consumer sector as reflected in the degree of control exercised by the 
government, shadow tax rates, and the elasticities of net trade. We now discuss these 
in more detail.
§6.5.7 Surplus Trade (q i^ )
This value is taken as the value of output minus the value of consumption for
household h. For commodities such as wheat, rice and sugarcane there is both output 
and consumption for most households. For cotton, consumption is zero. For all other 
commodities the surplus is simply minus the value of consumption. These values are 
taken directly from Government of Pakistan (1979).
§6.5.2 Government Trade (Gi)
For most of the final commodities considered we have assumed that the 
government can tax total consumption so that pj^ in (6.2.1) is equivalent to total
consumption for those commodities. For other commodities allowance must be made for 
the degree of government intervention in total trade. In the case of wheat, sugarcane
and cotton the relevant values are those for government procurement. To calculate these 
values we multiply the total value of output for each commodity (as given in 
Government of Pakistan, 1979) by the percentage procured by the government (see Table 
6.1). Note also that these values are preceded by a negative sign reflecting the fact
that an increase in the procurement price leads to a fall in revenue from that
commodity. With rice some extra calculations need to be made. From (6.2.14) we see 
that the relevant entry for p^ s^  is taken as the value of total consumption of rice less 
the value of total output, i.e.
Q s  X 5  -  P 4  y ^
Using (6.2.10)-(6.2.12) this becomes:
p. y. [Y a-’ (1 - re) - 1] (6.3.2)
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where y is the ratio of the consumer price of rice to the procurement price, a  the 
amount of unhusked rice required to produce one unit of husked rice, and is the 
ratio of government procurement of rice for export to the total production of rice. The 
value of output is taken from Government of Pakistan (1979) as is y, the ratio of to 
p^ (calculated as 1.16). The value of is taken from the Agricultural Statistics of 
Pakistan (Government of Pakistan, 1977, p i22) and approximately equals 0.35. The first 
term inside the brackets of (6.3.2) is used to calculate the value of domestic 
consumption of rice implied by the value of output.
^6.3.3 Accounting Ratios (ARs) and Prices
The ARs, defined as the ratio of the shadow price of a good to its market price, 
are all taken from Chapter 5. It is necessary to merge these from their 87-sector 
classification based on input-output information to the 20-sector classification used in our 
tax analysis. Where more than one sector of the former was allocated to a single 
sector in the latter we calculated a weighted AR, using the private consumption values 
for the relevant sectors (given in the input-output tables) as weights. These merged 
ARs are presented in Table A6.1 and were discussed, at the 87-sector classification 
level, in Chapter 5.
For sugarcane the relevant entry for the shadow tax is the difference between the 
shadow price of refined sugar the marginal social cost of the domestic production of 
sugar, adjusted to allow for the ‘recovery’ of refined sugar from sugarcane - see 
(6.2.20). The recovery percentage is taken as 10% and the ratio of the market price of 
sugar to the procurement price of sugarcane as 54.1 and was calculated as follows.
The prices for sugarcane derived from Government of Pakistan (1979), using quantities 
sold and value of sales, are very unreliable. However, data from the Agricultural
Statistics of Pakistan (Government of Pakistan, 1985, pi 83) indicate a support price just 
above Rs. 5.6 per maund (approx. 37kg) in Punjab and Sind and just below this for 
NWFP. We therefore take Rs. 5.6 per maund as the procurement price of sugarcane. 
The market price of sugar is taken (from Government of Pakistan, 1979) as the average
sample market price of Rs. 303 per maund.
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The cotton output is valued at Rs. 100 per maund, the approximate average sample 
price (derived using value of sales and quantities sold). The Government of Pakistan 
(1979) does not provide data on use of fertilizer so we impose certain values on the 
sample. We assume that the per acre levels of fertilizer applied are 35 kg/acre on 
irrigated farms less than 25 acres and on non-irrigated farms over 25 acres, 20 kg/acre 
on non-irrigated farms less than 25 acres, and 45 kg/acre on irrigated farms over 25
kg/acre. This is obviously a crude method but has some support from values calculated 
from the Indus Basin Survey which was used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The
consumer price fixed by the government is taken as Rs. 3 per kg.
In our analysis we examine the sensitivity of our reform proposals to various sets
of shadow prices. Different sets of ARs were calculated using a range of ARs for 
labour (the wage conversion factor, WCF) and capital (the asset conversion factor, ACF). 
The values for the ACF were taken as 1.2, 1.0 and 0.8, and for the WCF were 1.4, 
1.15 and 0.9. The basis of these values was explained in Chapter 5. In presenting
our results we focus on the (WCF,ACF) combination of (1.4,1.2). However, we
compare the results derived using the other (WCF,ACF) combinations with this base
case.
%6.3.4 Welfare Weights (^ )
To evaluate tax reforms we need to select welfare weights. These weights are 
attached to households and reflect judgements as to how the relative social value of 
income varies over households. It is usual to make this rate a decreasing function of 
income (income taken as an indicator of the present level of well-being so that we
view a unit increase in income as more valuable if it accrues to lower-income families 
rather than higher-income households). The relative weights chosen therefore reflect our 
attitude towards the present distribution of income and our aversion to inequality. A 
useful way of representing our views of the prevailing distribution of income is:
ph = (ik / ih)g (6.3.3)
where is the welfare weight for household h (the marginal social value of income to 
h), I^ the per capita income level of household h and I^ that for the k’th (reference)
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household. The term e reflects the extent of aversion to inequality. The higher e the 
greater the dislike for an unequal distribution of income and, consequently, the greater 
the weight (in relative terms) attached to income accruing to lower-income households. 
For example, if household k has income half that of h then with e=0 a unit of income 
accruing to k is seen as just as valuable as a unit to h, with e=l it is seen as twice
as valuable, with e=2 four times as valuable and with e=5 as thirty two times as
valuable. This approach has also been used elsewhere (see, for example, Ahmad and 
Stem, 1984 and 1990).
In this paper we normalize the welfare weights by setting the weight for the
lowest income (per capita) household equal to unity, i.e. the household with the lowest 
per capita income is taken as the reference household. This normalization involves the 
assumption that a unit of government revenue is equal in value to a unit of income for 
the poorest household. Households are classified into income groups according to their 
per capita income level (see Table A6.2). Using average group expenditures we
calculate group welfare weights applying (6.3.3). The welfare weight of any household is 
the welfare weight of the income group to which it belongs. We check the sensitivity 
of our results to different values of e, choosing e=0, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0 and 5.0. Notice that
we focus on the ’household’ as the basic unit and therefore ignore important questions
concerning the distribution of income or consumption between household members of 
different ages and gender. Such a breakdown becomes very important when analysing 
issues like individual nutrition and when designing schemes to target certain household 
members.
When calculating welfare weights we used ’total expenditure’ as a proxy for ’total 
income’. This has obvious drawbacks since one might argue that ceteris paribus 
welfare weights should be a decreasing function of savings and thus total income. Even 
ignoring this problem we find that an analysis of Government of Pakistan (1979) makes
it quite clear that prices vary widely over regions for many commodities. Therefore,
we cannot be very confident that the relative levels of household expenditures reflect 
relative levels of welfare. It is more realistic to think of household welfare as a 
function of quantities consumed so that two households with the same levels of
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consumption of each commodity but facing different prices should be seen as having the 
same level of welfare even though their total expenditures may differ. To correct for 
this discrepancy we apply single prices to certain commodities rather than regional prices 
as above and calculate a new set of welfare weights using the implied total 
expenditures. This procedure can only be carried out on certain commodities, such as 
wheat and atta, which are relatively homogenous. Other more aggregate commodity 
groups prevent the application of such procedures since commodities within these groups 
are not homogenous and the composition of within group consumption may vary widely 
over households. However, since the results are virtually identical, we do not present 
these here. Welfare weights and expenditure levels are presented in Table A6.2.
§6.5.5 Distributional Characteristic (Dg)
In §6.2 we decomposed Aj, the marginal social cost of raising revenue by changing 
the price of good i, into the product of a distributional characteristic for the good, E^, 
and the inverse of its revenue elasticity. The distributional characteristic is calculated as 
Di=[EhP^qiS]^/-qiSi] and encapsulates the direct effects on household welfare of price 
changes - individual household effects are weighted by welfare weights which reflect 
concern about income distribution. If welfare weights are a decreasing function of
income then commodities which account for a relatively large proportion of the budgets
of higher income groups will have a relatively lower distributional characteristic implying 
a lower social cost of raising revenue by taxing these commodities, and ceteris paribus 
making them more attractive candidates for taxation. Also, as our aversion to 
inequality, e, increases there is a greater proportional decrease in the distributional 
characteristic of such commodities making them still more attractive as sources of
additional revenue. Such guidelines, however, are less straightforward when producer 
and shadow prices are not proportional. In this case that tax elasticity involves shadow 
prices which may be dependent on welfare weights.
Let us divide commodities into those traded and non-traded at the margin. The 
shadow price of a non-traded commodity is taken as the marginal social cost of
production. As e increases the welfare weight for lower income households increases in
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relative terms so that the shadow cost of employing such household labour decreases
(see §5.3.1). Therefore, the shadow price of commodities whose production is relatively 
intensive in its use of low-income labour falls relative to other shadow prices. The 
social profitability of industries which use this commodity increases thus suggesting 
investment in industries which use this input intensively. In our tax reform analysis this
is reflected in a higher (lower) shadow tax (subsidy) on this commodity so that reforms
which switch demand towards this commodity become more desirable as e increases.
Therefore, commodities which have a relatively high distributional characteristic and
whose production involves the use of a large amount of low-income labour will exhibit 
a relatively greater increase in X, the marginal social cost of raising revenue through
taxing this commodity. This suggests reforms which increase demand for these 
commodities and investment in industries which use these commodities intensively, i.e. it 
encourages lower taxes on goods consumed and produced by the worse off.
The shadow price of traded conunodities does not vary with e (ignoring the social
cost of domestic trade and transport margins which, in any case, usually have little 
effect - see Chapter 5) reflecting our definition of traded commodities as those for
which a change in net demand leads to a change in net foreign trade with no
adjustment in domestic production. However, as e increases the social profitability of 
domestic production of traded commodities increases, the extent of the increase
depending on the extent to which traded industries use low-income labour. This
suggests that the government should encourage investment in such industries leading to a 
fall in imports or an expansion of exports. So a change in e affects the optimal level 
of domestic production of traded commodities. From the point of view of the reform 
of final commodity taxation, however, an increases in e suggests a switch in taxation 
from non-traded to traded commodities since domestic production appears more socially 
profitable and changes in the taxation of tradeables, by definition, leads to changes in 
foreign trade with no effect on domestic production. However, the desirability of such 
a switch is reduced if traded commodities figure prominently in the budgets of 
low-income households. Crucial here, of course, is the assumption that more direct 
instruments for income distribution are not available.
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§5.5.5 Net Trade Elasticities
In §6.2 we described the relevant elasticities for our analysis of various price 
reforms. To calculate these elasticities we use the demand elasticities from Ahmad and 
Ludlow (1987), the agricultural output and fertilizer elasticities from Ali (1988), and the 
labour and fertilizer elasticities derived in Appendix E. When calculating the net trade 
elasticities we have taken into account the fact that some price changes do not affect 
all of the consumer sector. For example, changes in procurement prices affect only 
farmers while changes in ration prices affect only those entitled to rations. Therefore, 
the elasticities used in our analysis take account of the limited incidence of certain price 
changes. The net trade elasticities used in our analysis are presented in Table A6.3 and 
the supply elasticities in Table 6.2.
Table 6 .2
P r i c e  E l a s t i c i t i e s  of  Supplv fo r  Major A g r i c u l t u r a l  Crops
Wheat Rice Co t ton  Sugarcane
Wheat 0 .327  0.248 -0 .217  0
Rice 0.641 1.920 -0 .462  0
C ot ton  0 -0.616 1.339 0
Sugarcane 0 0 -0 .230  0 .810
Source:  Ali (1988) .
§6.4 Results
For the purpose of presenting our results it is useful to focus on the decomposition
of Xj, the marginal social cost of raising revenue by changing the price of good i, into
its distributional and efficiency effects. We have from (6.2.1):
Xj = Dj / Ej
where Dj is the distributional characteristic for i and E| the elasticity of revenue with 
respect to the price (tax) of i. This decomposition enables us to set out some general 
rules of thumb when selecting commodities as candidates for taxation. The higher the 
distributional characteristic of a commodity the higher the cost of using it as a source 
of revenue. The distributional characteristic of a commodity is higher the more it is 
consumed by poorer households. In the case of agricultural output, the distributional 
characteristic will be lower the more it is produced by richer households. Therefore, as
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e (our inequality aversion parameter) increases, commodities for which poorer households 
are net consumers and richer households net producers become major candidates for
taxation.
The more elastic is revenue to a commodity tax the lower the social cost of using
it as a source of revenue. The revenue elasticity reflects the elasticities of demand and
supply, and the prevailing tax rates. The lower the own-price elasticity of a commodity 
the higher the revenue elasticity thus making it an attractive source of revenue. Also, 
extra taxation of a commodity becomes more attractive the more an increase in its tax 
switches demand towards commodities with relatively high tax rates. We now analyse
the distributional (Ds) and efficiency (Es) effects of price changes. We first look at
each separately but then combine both to examine the overall impact on social welfare. 
We then check the sensitivity of our results to various parameter changes and focus on 
some of the lessons arising from our analysis.
%6A.l Equity
We focus first on the distributional characteristic, D. Table 6.3 presents the
distributional characteristics and their rankings for various values of e. From the results 
we see that the D for wheat becomes negative at very low values for e. This reflects 
the fact that poorer households are net consumers of wheat and richer households net 
producers. An increase in the tax on wheat corresponds to a decrease in its 
procurement price and also in the market price. This makes wheat (i.e. lower 
procurement prices) the most attractive source of revenue from a distributional point of 
view. Notice that a tax on wheat producers is simultaneously a subsidy to consumers. 
Also note that increasing a tax on commodities with negative Ds is a net welfare 
improvement even if we throw away the revenue. Other commodities with low 
distributional characteristics are rice (where D becomes negative for g=5), meat, other 
foods and other non-foods. So, for example, lower procurement prices for rice and
higher consumer taxes on meat are among the best ways of raising revenue from an
equity viewpoint. Commodities exhibiting high Ds are atta (market and rationed), sugar 
(rationed), maize and pulses. The high Ds f<or rationed commodities are, of course.
Commodi ty
( 1)
(2 )
( 3 )
(4)
(5)
( 6 )
(7)
( 8 ) 
(9) 
(10 
(11 
(12 
(13 
(14 
(15 
(16 
(17 
(18 
(19 
(20
Table 6 .3
Ds fo r Var ious  Values o f  c
:=0
D R
Wheat 
A t t a  (M)
A t t a  (R)
Rice
Sugarcane 
Cotton  
F e r t i l i z e r  
Sugar (M)
Sugar (R)
Pul ses 
Maize 
Meat 
Milk
V e g . ,F r u i t  & Sp ices
E d ib le  O i l s
Tea
Housing ,Fuel  & L igh t  
C lo th in g  
Other  Foods 
Other Non-foods
e=0 .,5 g=l .0 6=2 .0 6 = 5 .0
D R D R D R D R
-0 .126 1 -0 .410 1 -0 .397 1 -0 .174 1
0.580 18 0.359 18 0.166 18 0.056 16
0.598 20 0.389 20 0.201 20 0.082 19
0.500 4 0.258 2 0.070 2 -0.006 2
0.524 11 0.293 11 0.109 6 0.013 3
0.533 14 0.318 15 0 .150 16 0.064 17
0.520 10 0.291 10 0.111 8 0.023 7
0.529 13 0.305 13 0.126 13 0.029 10
0.582 19 0.369 19 0,186 19 0.078 18
0.553 16 0.332 16 0.148 15 0.046 15
0.558 17 0.339 17 0.164 17 0.082 20
0.500 5 0.273 5 0.102 5 0.021 6
0.517 7 0.288 6 0.111 7 0.024 8
0.518 9 0.291 9 0.116 10 0.030 11
0.517 8 0.290 8 0.113 9 0.026 9
0.534 15 0.310 14 0.130 14 0.034 14
0.513 6 0.289 7 0.118 11 0.034 13
0.524 12 0.296 12 0.118 12 0.030 12
0.496 3 0.265 4 0.093 3 0.015 4
0.492 2 0.263 3 0.095 4 0.021 5
N)
Note:  e i s  an i n e q u a l i t y  a v e r s i o n  pa ram ete r  (see  § 6 . 3 .4  for  d i s c u s s i o n ) ,  D c a p t u r e s  the d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  e f f e c t s  
o f  the re forms ,  R i s  the reform  ranking  w i th  R=1 i n d i c a t i n g  the most d i s t r i b u t i o n a l l y  a t t r a c t i v e  re form, 
and (M) and (R) r e f e r  to market and r a t i o n e d  commodit ies  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
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expected since rationing systems are designed to channel certain commodities to lower 
income households. Therefore, if the government wishes to raise more revenue it 
should avoid increasing ration prices or decreasing subsidies to market atta. Sugarcane 
and fertilizer become more attractive sources of revenue as e increases with cotton 
becoming a less attractive candidate. These results suggest that, from an equity 
standpoint, the government could improve welfare by lowering wheat, rice and sugarcane 
prices, and use the (first round) increase in revenue to finance lower ration prices, 
higher subsidies to market atta and higher cotton prices. However, these 
recommendations totally ignore the concomitant efficiency losses, to which we now turn.
%6.4.2 Efficiency
We now turn to the revenue elasticities. Note that when g=0 (i.e. D = 1) the As 
are simply the inverse of the revenue elasticities. Table 6.4 presents the As over various 
values of e. Focusing on values for e=0, the striking feature is that decreasing the 
procurement prices for wheat and rice, and increasing the sales price of fertilizer, 
actually decrease revenue. This is a consequence of the signs and magnitudes of the 
own- and cross-price net supply elasticities. In the case of wheat a decrease in the 
procurement price leads to a substantial fall in government procurement. This shortfall 
is met through higher levels of more costly imports. Lower wheat procurement prices 
also lead to lower rice production implying lower exports of rice at world prices higher 
than domestic procurement prices. These effects swamp the increase in revenue from a 
fall in demand for subsidized fertilizer.
Lower rice procurement prices lead to lower exports of rice and a rise in 
expensive wheat imports. The increase in sugarcane production is reflected in a rise in 
the domestic production of socially unprofitable refined sugar. These effects swamp the 
increased revenue from higher production and exports of cotton and falling fertilizer 
demand. Higher fertilizer prices increase wheat imports, and lead to a fall in rice and 
cotton export levels. These adverse effects on revenue swamp the revenue increases 
which arise from lower levels of socially unprofitable sugar output and falling fertilizer 
demand. The negative effects of lower cotton prices on cotton exports is dominated by
Commodi ty
Table 6 . 4
Lambdas for  Var ious  Values o f  g
6= 0
R
6= 0 . 5
R
1) Wheat -0 .278 3 0.035 3
2) A t t a  (M) 0.900 7 0.522 12
3) A t ta  (R) 0 .993 11 0.594 17
4) Rice -0 .225 2 -0.112 2
5) Sugarcane 0 .224 4 0.118 4
6) Cot ton 0.745 5 0.397 5
7) F e r t i l i z e r -0 .119 1 -0.062 1
8) Sugar (M) 1.216 19 0.643 18
9) Sugar (R) 1.016 15 0.591 16
10 P u lse s 0.982 10 0.543 14
11 Maize 1.185 18 0.661 19
12 Meat 0.995 13 0.498 10
13 Milk 1.005 14 0.519 11
14 V eg . ,F ru i  t & Spices 1.577 20 0.817 20
15 E d ib le  O i l s 1.045 17 0.540 13
16 Tea 1.027 16 0.548 15
17 Housing ,Fuel  & Light 0 .914 8 0.470 7
18 C lo th ing 0.828 6 0.434 6
19 Other Foods 0.995 12 0.493 9
20 Other Non-foods 0.974 9 0.479 8
6 = 1 . 0
0.114
0.323
0.386
-0.058
0.066
0.237
■0.035
0.370
0.375
0.326
0,401
0.272
0.290
0.460
0.303
0.318
0.264
0.245
0.263
0.256
R
4
14 
18
2
3
5 
1
16
17
15
19 
10 
11
20 
12 
13
9
6 
8 
7
:=2.0
0.110
0.149
0.200
■0.016
0.024
0 . 112
-0.013
0.153
0.189
0.146
0.194
0.102
0.111
0.183
0.119
0 .134
0.108
0.098
0.092
0.093
R
9
15 
20
2
3 
11
1
16 
18 
14 
19
7 
10 
17 
12 
13
8 
6
4
5
6= 5 . 0
0.048
0 .050
0.082
0.001
0.003
0.048
■0.003
0.036
0.079
0.045
0.097
0.021
0.024
0.047
0.027
0.035
0.031
0.025
0.015
0.020
R
16
17
19 
2
3
15
1
12
18
13
20 
6
7
14 
9
11
10
8
4
5
Note: See no te  to  Table 6 . 3 .  X, i s  the marginal  so c ia l  co s t  o f  each re fo rm.  The r e s u l t s  a re  based on a (WCF,ACF) 
combination  of  ( 1 . 4 , 1 . 2 )  and n e t  labour  supply e l a s t i c i t i e s  a re  assumed equa l  to ze ro .
K)
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the consequent fall in wheat and fertilizer imports, even though sugar production 
increases. Lower sugarcane prices lead to lower sugar production and fertilizer imports, 
both which increase revenue.
So in order to increase revenue, while minimizing efficiency losses, the government 
should increase the procurement prices of wheat and rice or decrease fertilizer prices. 
From an efficiency perspective increasing wheat or rice procurement prices, or lowering 
those for sugarcane, cotton or fertilizer, are the most attractive policy instruments for 
raising revenue. The attractiveness of lower fertilizer prices arises from the large
distortions in the prices of major agricultural crops. The fact that the reform of
agricultural pricing policies could lead to major efficiency gains is an important feature
of our results.
^6.4.2 Equity and Efficiency
The interaction of efficiency and distributional considerations is c^tured by the Xs 
for e>0. The fall in the correlation between the ranks of the Xs from 1 to 0.39 when 
e goes from 0 to 5 indicates that there is a strong conflict between equity and
efficiency. However, focusing on the correlation coefficient alone does not adequately 
capture the direction or size of changes in the distributional effect of price changes. 
For example, although increasing the procurement prices of rice increases revenue it also 
increases the social welfare of the consumer sector which is a net seller of rice to the 
government. But for e=5 the distributional characteristic for rice becomes negative 
reflecting the higher welfare weight attached to net consumers of rice, i.e. the increased 
income of rice farmers is valued using a relatively low welfare weight. The high 
ranking throughout for higher rice prices as a source of revenue reflects the dominance 
of efficiency considerations. Likewise, decreasing the price of fertilizer increases 
revenue and also farmers’ incomes. This ensures that decreasing the price of fertilizer 
remains the most attractive reform throughout, in spite of the increasing attractiveness of 
higher fertilizer prices from a distributional point of view. LoA^er procurement prices 
for sugarcane are attractive using both efficiency and equity criteria.
In contrast to rice and fertilizer, the ranking of wheat falls as e increases.
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Decreasing the procurement price of cotton also becomes less attractive at higher levels 
of inequality aversion. Other goods which become unattractive as sources of revenue as
e increases are market and rationed atta and rationed sugar. The rankings of market 
sugar, meat, milk, vegetables, edible oils, tea and other foods and non-foods increase 
with e thus making them more attractive as sources of revenue. Higher taxes on maize 
remain an unattractive source of revenue throughout since both distributional and 
efficiency considerations suggest lower taxes,
%6AA Sensitivity of Results
We now turn to the sensitivity of our results to various parameters in the analysis. 
First of all we analyse the effect of allowing for responses in the labour market. Then
we see how our results change when we use various sets of shadow prices for labour
and capital, and when we make different assumptions concerning the restoration of 
equilibrium after the reform through changes in foreign trade or domestic production. 
Finally, we generate a new set of results based on the demand elasticities from a less 
restricted demand model estimated by Deaton and Grimand (1991).
In the results presented above we assumed that the elasticity of net supply of 
labour from the consumer sector was zero with respect to all price reforms. We now 
drop this assumption. Since these elasticities only affect the efficiency aspects 
(including indirect distributional consequences) of the reforms we focus on the results for 
6=0. When the WCF is high, reflecting a high opportunity cost of labour in terms of 
output forgone, reforms which increase the demand for labour (thus decreasing the net 
supply of labour from the consumer sector) become less attractive. Therefore, higher
wheat and rice prices become less attractive, while higher fertilizer prices and lower
sugarcane and cotton prices become more attractive. When the WCF is low, reflecting, 
for example, the social benefits of higher incomes to wage earners, reforms which 
increase the demand for labour, and thus wages, become more attractive. We now 
comment on the sensitivity of our policy conclusions to changes in our assumptions 
concerning the price elasticities of net labour supplies.
A very useful feature of our results is their lack of sensitivity to our assumption
Table 6 .5
T.amhdas fo r  V arious Values o f  e
Commodi ty f=0 g=0.5 6 = 1 .0 6=2 0 6=5 0
X R X R X. R \  „ _ R X R
1) Wheat
2) A tta  (M)
-0 .4 8 2 3 0.061 3 0.198 5 0.191 18 0.084 19
0 .9 0 0 7 0.522 12 0.323 14 0 .149 14 0.050 16
3) A tta  (R) 0 .993 11 0.594 17 0.386 18 0 .200 20 0.082 18
4) R ice -0 .2 4 5 2 -0 .122 2 -0 .063 2 -0 .0 1 7 2 0.001 2
5) Sugarcane 0 .1 4 0 4 0.074 4 0.041 3 0.015 3 0.002 3
6) C o tton 0 .446 5 0.238 5 0.142 4 0.067 4 0.029 10
7) F e r t i l i z e r -0 .1 2 8 1 -0 .066 1 -0 .037 1 -0 .0 1 4 1 -0 .003 1
8) Sugar (M) 1.216 19 0.643 18 0.370 16 0.153 15 0.036 13
9) Sugar (R) 1.016 15 0.591 16 0.375 17 0.189 17 0.079 17
10) P u lse s 0 .982 10 0.543 14 0.326 15 0.146 13 0.045 14
11) Maize 1.185 18 0.661 19 0 . 4 0 1 19 0 . 1 9 4 19 0 . 0 9 7 20
12) Meat 0 .995 13 0.498 10 0.272 10 0.102 8 0.021 6
13) M ilk 1.005 14 0.519 11 0.290 11 0.111 10 0.024 7
14) V e g .,F ru i t  & S p ices 1.577 20 0.817 20 0.460 20 0.183 16 0.047 15
15) E d ib le  O ils 1 .045 17 0.540 13 0.303 12 0 .119 11 0.027 9
16) Tea 1 .027 16 0.548 15 0.318 13 0 .134 12 0.035 12
17) H ousing ,F uel & L igh t 0 .9 1 4 8 0.470 7 0.264 9 0.108 9 0.031 11
18) C lo th in g 0 .828 6 0.434 6 0.245 6 0.098 7 0.025 8
19) O ther Foods 0 .995 12 0.493 9 0.263 8 0.092 5 0.015 4
20) O ther N on-foods 0 .9 7 4 9 0.479 8 0.256 7 0.093 6 0 .020 5
N ote: See n o te  to  T ab les 6 .3  and 6 .4 .  H ere , labour ne t supply resp o n ses  a re  n o t assumed to  be z e ro .
to
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regarding the net labour supply from the consumer sector (see Table 6.5). Whether or 
not we assume net labour supply elasticities to be zero makes no difference to the 
ranking of our policy instruments, except in the case where 0.9 is taken as the value
for the WCF (see Tables A6.4 and A6.5). But even in this case these differences arise
from the sensitivity of one good, sugarcane, to the change. When the WCF=0.9 (and 
the ACFzl.O) the production of refined sugar becomes profitable and lower sugarcane 
prices reduce output and also the demand for labour. On both these counts this reform 
is not desirable and, in fact, when the ACF=0.8 the sign of the \  for sugarcane 
becomes negative so that lower sugarcane prices also reduce shadow revenue. For these 
values higher sugarcane prices increase the welfare of sugarcane producers, increase the 
production of socially profitable sugar and thus shadow revenue. It is useful, though, to 
point out here that when we use different commodity demand elasticities (see below) 
this negative revenue effect disappears and the assumption of net labour supply
elasticities makes virtually no difference to our results.
We now analyse the results generated using various (WCF,ACF) combinations (see 
Table A6.4). In Chapter 5 we discussed the assumption behind the various conversion 
factors and the values chosed cover a wide range of possibilities concerning the
operation of factor markets. For most goods the ARs do not change much, reflecting 
their traded classification. For these goods, changes in demand lead to changes in net 
foreign trade flows with no change in their domestic production. Therefore, the
valuation of domestic factors does not come into play. Sugarcane, however, does
experience a drastic change, reflecting the movement of sugar production into social 
profitability for (WCF, ACF) combinations of (0.9,1.0) and (0.9,0.8) This is a major 
factor in the low correlation coefficient across these factor valuations, since the ranking 
of sugarcane moves from 4 to 20 when the (WCF, ACF) combination moves from 
(1.4,1.2) to (0.9,0.8). Other commodities which experience movements between being
(shadow) taxed or subsidized are pulses, meat, housing and other foods and non-foods. 
Although these commodities show relatively large changes in ranking they remain within 
the middle rankings. So, in spite of the low correlations, the thrust of our results
remain the same. From an efficiency point of view, increases in rice and wheat prices.
271
and lower fertilizer and cotton prices are always attractive ways of raising revenue. 
Sugar, vegetables, maize and edible oils retain their relatively high social costs of 
raising revenue, while sugarcane and other non-foods join them for lower valuations of 
domestic factor inputs. At higher levels of aversion to inequality (e.g. e=5), 
distributional considerations dominate and, these being unaffected by domestic resource 
valuations, the correlation between the ranks of the Xs is very high at 0.97 or greater. 
Also, when we use a different set of demand elasticities (with a smaller number of 
commodity classifications) the robustness of our results is enhanced since important 
commodities are traded and others get allocated to more aggregate categories (see 
below).
When we make different assumptions about how equilibrium is restored in the 
wake of our reforms the results emerging are very similar to those above. A number
of conunodities, previously classified as imported on the margin, are reclassified as 
non-traded in an attempt to capture the presence of binding quotas. Any changes in 
demand are then assumed to be met by changes in domestic production. Since many 
of the reclassified sectors are allocated to more aggregated groups, the effect of these 
changes is diluted and, on the whole, the ranking of policy instruments is not very 
sensitive to this change (see Table A6.6). Notice that although the shadow tax on 
sugar is reduced, reflecting the high marginal social cost of production relative to the
fixed market price, its ranking remains very similar.
Finally, we repeat our tax analysis with a different set of demand elasticities. 
Above we used estimates from Ahmad and Ludlow (1987) who used a modified linear 
expenditure system. We now use estimates provided by Deaton and Grimand (1991) 
who, using a less restricted functional form, argues that:
’The Pakistani substitution patterns between rice, wheat, sugar and edible 
oils are not consistent witti additive preferences and so cannot be
accommodated within a model like the linear expenditure system.....
Nor could additive preferences accommodate the pattern of total expenditure
and own-price elasticities that characterise demand patterns in Pakistan.......
Additive preferences require that the ratio of own-price to expenditure
elasticities be (approximately) uniform over goods. Yet it is this ratio that 
is the principal determinant of how the balance between equity and efficiency 
ought to be struck’ (p34, italics added).
This issue becomes more important when focusing on the elasticity of marketed surplus
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since small differences in own- and cross-price elasticities can become magnified when 
moving to marketed surplus elasticities.
Fortunately, from the viewpoint of policy analysis, the results based on the
alternative set of demand elasticities are very similar to those presented above (see
Table 6.6). Like Deaton and Grimand (1991) we work with a smaller number of 
commodity categories: pulses, maize, vegetables and tea are now included in the ’other
foods’ category, while housing and clothing are included in ’other non-foods’. Focusing
on the results for e=0 we find that the negative ks for fertilizer, rice and wheat remain, 
so that increasing shadow revenue involves increasing the procurement prices of wheat 
or rice, but decreasing the price of fertilizer. However, the A, for edible oils now
becomes negative reflecting the negative effect of higher edible oil prices on wheat
procurement and on the demand for highly taxed sugar, combined with the positive
effect on sugarcane procurement. This is in spite of the positive effect on demand for
subsidized rice (to consumers) and the high own-price elasticity for edible oils.
These results suggest that, from an efficiency point of view, the best way of
raising revenue is by decreasing the price of fertilizer or increasing the procurement 
prices of rice or wheat. Lowering taxes on edible oils is the next best alternative,
followed by lower procurement prices for sugarcane and cotton. The least attractive 
ways of raising revenue are by increasing the prices of marketed or ration sugar, market 
atta other foods or non-foods.
Using distributional considerations the least attractive ways of raising revenue are 
lowering the prices of rationed or market atta, rationed or market sugar, or cotton. The 
most attractive instruments are decreasing the prices of wheat, rice, sugarcane, meat or 
other foods. Therefore, as before, there is a strong conflict between equity and 
efficiency when contemplating increasing revenue through increasing wheat or rice
procurement prices, or decreasing cotton prices. However, decreasing sugarcane prices is 
an desirable reform using both efficiency and equity criteria. Also, increasing the prices 
of market atta, or rationed and market sugar is not desirable from either viewpoint 
Note also that the efficiency considerations dominate pricing policy for rice and 
fertilizer, even at high levels of aversion to inequailty. Neither does the introduction of
Table 6 .6a
Commodi ty
(1) ^lieat
(2 ) A tta  (M)
(3 ) A tta  (R)
(4) R ice
(5) Sugarcane
(6) C otton
(7) F e r t i l i z e r
(8) Sugar (M)
(9) Sugar (R)
(10) Meat
(11) M ilk
(12) E d ib le  O ils
(13) O ther Foods
(14) O ther N on-foods
6=0 6=0.5 6 = 1 ,0 6=2 .0 6=5 .,0
X R X R X R X R X R
-0,.296 3 0 .037 4 0.,121 5 0. 117 10 0,,052 11
1,.049 12 0 .609 13 0. 376 12 0.,174 11 0..059 12
0,,998 8 0 .597 12 0..388 13 0.,201 14 0.,082 14
-0,.191 2 -0 .095 2 -0,.049 2 -0.,013 2 0,,001 3
0,.215 5 0 .113 5 0..063 4 0.,023 4 0,.003 4
0,,741 6 0 .395 6 0..235 6 0. 111 8 0.,048 10
-0,.120 1 -0 .062 1 -0..035 1 -0,,013 1 -0.,003 1
1 .406 14 0 .743 14 0..428 14 0,.177 12 0,,041 9
1, 010 10 0 .588 11 0,.373 11 0,.188 13 0,,079 13
1,.010 9 0 .505 8 0 .276 8 0,.103 6 0,.021 5
0,.876 7 0 .453 7 0..253 7 0,.097 5 0,.021 6
-0..546 4 -0 .282 3 -0..158 3 -0..062 3 -0,.014 2
1,.039 11 0 .524 9 0..285 9 0,.105 7 0,.022 7
1,.050 13 0 .533 10 0 .294 10 0 .113 9 0..027 8 to
w
Table 6 .6b
Commodity
(1 
(2 
(3 
(4 
(5 
(6 
(7 
(8  
(9 
( 10)
Wheat 
A tta  (M) 
A tta  (R) 
Rice
Sugarcane 
C otton  
F e r t i l i z e r  
Sugar (M) 
Sugar (R) 
Meat
Note
(11) M ilk
(12) E d ib le  O ils
(13) O ther Foods
(14) O ther N on-foods 
These r e s u l t s  a re  b ased  
com bination  o f  ( 1 .4 ,1 .2
6=0 6=0 ,5 6 = 1 .0 6=2.0 6 = 5 . 0
X R X R 1 R X R X R
-0 .5 3 9 3 0.068 4 0.221 6 0 .214 14 0.094 14
1.049 12 0.609 13 0.376 12 0.174 10 0 .059 11
0.998 8 0.597 12 0.388 13 0.201 13 0.082 13
-0 .2 0 5 2 -0 .102 2 -0 .0 5 3 2 -0 .0 1 4 2 0.001 3
0 .137 5 0.072 5 0 .040 4 0.015 4 0.002 4
0.445 6 0.237 6 0.141 5 0.067 5 0.029 9
-0 .128 1 -0 .067 1 -0 .0 3 7 1 -0 .0 1 4 1 -0 .003 1
1.406 14 0.743 14 0.428 14 0 A 7 7 11 0.041 10
1.010 10 0.588 11 0.373 11 0,188 12 0.079 12
1.010 9 0.505 8 0 .276 8 0.103 7 0.021 5
0.876 7 0.453 7 0.253 7 0 .097 6 0.021 6
-0 .5 4 6 4 -0 .282 3 -0 .1 5 8 3 -0 .0 6 2 3 -0 .014 2
1.039 11 0 .524 9 0 .285 9 0.105 8 0.022 7
1.050 13 0.533 10 0 .294 10 0.113 9 0.027 8
[ on demand e l a s t i c i t i e s  p r e s e n t e d in  Deaton(1991,  Tbale  VI, p24) and on a (WCF,ACF)
) .  In Table 6 .6 a we assume net  labour  supply  re s p o n s es to  be zero  bu t no t  in  Table 6 .
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net labour supply elasticities change the rankings.
§6.4.5 Comments
We now focus on some of the lessons from the analysis. Firstly, the results 
emphasize that any discussion of commodity taxation or pricing in a partial equilibrium 
framework can be severely misleading, especially when large price distortions already 
exist. This is particularly so for agricultural oufr)uts and inputs. Such concerns may 
also be magnified by our focus, in certain cases, on surplus rather than supply or 
demand elasticities alone. Thus tax reform analysis should be set in a general 
equilibrium framework. Secondly, our sensitivity analysis suggests that our policy
conclusions are robust. This robustness stems from the very high degree of price
distortion that existed for major agricultural commodities in the mid 1970s and also
from the traded nature of most important agricultural outputs and consumer goods.
Thirdly, the case of sugarcane highlights the impact of industry profitability on 
pricing policy. The appropriate pricing of sugarcane is determined mainly by the social 
profitability of domestically produced refined sugar, which in turn depends on the
marginal social cost of sugarcane production reflecting the opportunity cost of land and 
other agricultural outputs forgone. The higher (lower) the social profitability of refined 
sugar production the less (more) attractive lower sugarcane prices. We also found that 
lower sugarcane prices were desirable on equity grounds. A further issue raised by our 
analysis is the desirability of investment in the sugar refining industry and we return to 
this topic later.
Higher procurement prices should also be accompanied by higher fertilizer prices:
when we set the shadow tax rates of the major agricultural crops equal to zero,
increasing fertilizer prices became the most attractive way of raising extra revenue from 
an efficiency viewpoint. This is probably also applicable to other subsidized agricultural 
inputs such as water and electricity. Note that if such inputs are more accessible to
larger farmers then there is an additional distributional argument for the removal of
these subsidies. We have implicitly assumed that other tax instruments are, for 
whatever reason, unavailable to the government. If land taxes were to become feasible
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then these would probably be desirable from both equity and efficiency standpoints.
Some of our commodity categories are very broad, encompassing a wide variety of
individual commodities. It is probable that a more detailed analysis of these commodity 
groups will suggest the existence of certain commodities which are more attractive than 
other commodities in the group as sources of revenue. For example, poorer households 
may consume only certain types of ftiel (included in the ’housing’ category) making the 
taxation of these fuels less acceptable when applying distributional considerations. 
However, where an individual commodity has strong substitutes one will wish to apply 
similar tax rates on this commodity and its substitutes unless there are major 
distributional reasons for setting differential rates. Feasibility from an administrative 
point of view may be an important consideration here.
We have said very little about the desirability of input taxes on the manufacturing 
side. A general rule of thumb is that, where possible, we should focus on the taxation 
of final outputs. If this is not possible then taxation of inputs may be the best proxy
for output taxes, and such input taxes should be focused on materials for which there is
an inelastic demand. From this viewpoint taxes on cement, for instance, may be a 
useful way of taxing the services accruing from housing. This is probably desirable 
from a distributional stance given the large increase in construction of new houses by 
wealthy families, many of which may be returned migrants from the Middle East 
Where monopoly rents exist these should be taxed directly, if possible. Such taxes are 
more easily administered when monopoly profits accrue to large establishments (e.g. 
large factories) given the ease with which these can be identified. OuQ)ut or input 
taxes should be regarded as second best methods for taxing such rents.
§6.5 Agricultural Pricing Policy
The results presented above suggested that in the mid 1970s there were substantial 
efficiency gains to be had by reforming agricultural pricing policies. The desirability of 
lowering the price of fertilizer was based on the large price distortions for major 
agricultural crops. If these were to be removed then so too would the attractiveness of 
lower fertilizer prices as a source of revenue. Higher procurement prices for rice and
276
wheat, and lower prices for sugarcane, also provided large efficiency gains. However, 
except for sugarcane, these reforms appear to have adverse distributional consequences. 
In particular, the efficiency gains from higher wheat procurement prices are dominated 
by the beneficial distributional impact of lower prices. Also, the desirability of lower 
cotton prices from an efficiency perspective disappeared when we took account of the 
distributional consequences.
Our results also indicate that lower prices for atta and sugar (both rationed and 
market, especially rationed) are very attractive using distributional considerations. 
Combining this with the efficiency consequences set out above, we suggest that the 
adverse distributional consequences of higher wheat and rice procurement prices could be 
offset by lowering the prices of rationed commodities. In the absence of lump-sum 
transfer mechanisms, rationing schemes, given their similarity to such policy instruments, 
are a useful way of redistributing income. It is often argued, though, that the high 
administrative costs of running rationing schemes and their ineffectiveness at targeting 
income to the poor should eliminate them from the policy agenda. Such concerns seem 
to have impinged heavily on the decision by the goverment to abolish the rationing of 
sugar (in 1983) and the atta (in 1987):
’The abolision of the rationing system would allow the goverment to
save the subsidy of Rs 3000 million which hardly ever reached its intended 
beneficiaries’ (Pakistan Economic Survey, 1986, p71).
However, Rogers (1988a) argues that appropriate design of rationing schemes can go a
long way in allievating many such problems. In Rogers (1988b, p252) she concludes
that for Pakistan:
’The ration system, though far from perfect, nonetheless has a number 
of attributes which recommend its preservation. These include its 
widespread accesibility, its relatively low administrative burden on 
the government, its flexibility and the long-standing experience of those 
who operate it. Serious thought should be given to improving its benefits 
rather than eliminating them.’
Additionally, when the costs of ration schemes are set against the potential efficiency
gains from increased prices for major agricultural commodities they may become more
acceptable. The attractiveness of low wheat procurement prices from a distributional
viewpoint stemmed from the fact that poorer rural households (e.g. landless labourers
and those with small landholdings) were net consumers. Therefore, with higher wheat
I l l
prices one should examine the feasibility of extending rationing to rural areas. If this 
was considered too costly from an administrative viewpoint then other schemes would 
need to be put in place, e.g. rural work schemes (see, for example. World Development 
Report, 1990, Chapter 6, for discussion). It must also be remembered that higher crop 
prices may increase agricultural wages making such reforms more attractive. The 
absence of less distortionary policy instruments (e.g. land taxes) to raise revenue means 
that one probably has to resort to agricultural pricing policies in order to tax rural 
incomes. Note, however, that with higher rice prices, low procurement prices for wheat 
are less distortionary. This reflects the complementarity between these two crops 
implied by the positive price elasticities of supply.
Since the mid 1970s the Goverment of Pakistan has followed the policy of 
increasing the procurement prices of major agricultural commodities (see Figure 4.3). 
However, wheat and rice procurement prices have remained below world prices (see 
Table 6.7). This is especially so for basmati rice in which Pakistan is thought to have 
some monopoly power (so that marginal revenue from increased sales is below the 
actual world price). The variability in the domestic-world price ratio for cotton reflects 
volatile world prices so that the relatively constant domestic procurement prices since 
1980 were intended to reduce the uncertainty facing producers. This will be reflected 
in uncertain goverment revenue. Although the price of fertilizer fell rapidly from 1974 
to 1980, since then it has increased sharply but has remained constant after 1983. But 
it remains below world prices.
Our result indicate that lower sugarcane prices are desirable using both efficiency 
and distributional criteria. This result is a consequence of domestic sugar production 
being socially unprofitable, reflecting the high cost of producing sugarcane. In spite of 
the fact that sugarcane is essentially a crop for the tropics, Pakistan ranks fifth in the 
world in terms of acreage under sugarcane. Ideally, sugarcane requires a humid climate, 
well distributed rainfall and stable temperatures. Because of the extreme temperature 
ranges in Pakistan the growing period is very short (8-12 months compared to 12-14 
months in other countries). Combined with poor farm practices (reflecting inadequate 
extention services), disasters such as drought, inadequate control of disease and pests.
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Table 6 .7
R at io  o f  Domestic to World Market P r i c e s .  1979/80 to  1985/6
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Wheat 0.77 0.63 0.72 0 .8 0 0.63 0.73 0.75
Rice
Basmati 0.61 0.84 0.88 0 .87 0.61 0 .57 0 .56
I r r i - 6 0.60 0.51 0.65 0 .87 0.81 0 .87 0 .90
Cot ton  ( L i n t ) 0.81 0.69 0.95 0.83 1.28 0 .80 0.90
Sugar 0.99 1.39 2.00 1.35 1.42 1.64 1.56
Source :  P a k i s t a n  Economic Survey (1985 and 1987).
and unreliable water supplies, this acts to give low sugarcane yields. At less than 39 
tons per hectare, Pakistan has one of the lowest yields in the world compared to 88 
tons/ha and 57 tons per hectare in the USA and India respectively (see Hussain, 1989). 
These factors also lead to low sugar content, a problem which is reinforced by the 
policy of payment according to the weight and lack of co-ordination between mills and 
farmers at harvesting. Although the recovery rate of sugar from sugarcane is very low 
(on average, 8.5%) by international standards, the amount of sugar extracted in mills as 
a percentage of sugar available is comparable.
The opportunity cost of sugarcane is the output of wheat, rice and cotton forgone. 
In the early 1960s sugarcane benefited most from improved irrigation availability and 
yields increased substantially (see Figure 4.2). This lowered the opportunity cost of a 
given amount of sugarcane so that the production of sugar would have appeared more 
profitable. However, since then the yields of other crops have increased with the 
introduction of new high-yielding seeds while sugarcane yields have remained stagnant. 
This acts to reduce the social profitability of domestic sugar production. In spite of 
this, goverment policy has been directed towards increasing sugar production and thus 
increasing acreage under sugarcane. From 1979 to 1987 ten new mills were installed 
and sugar production more than doubled (see Figure 6.1). The basis of the 
self-sufficiency policy is the desire by the goverment to protect consumers from the 
uncertainty of very volatile world prices (see Figure 6.2). Many countries have very 
protectionist policies for their sugar industries with regulated consumer prices. 
Therefore, given the low demand elasticity for sugar, the variable world sugarcane
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production (due to pests and adverse climatic conditions) is reflected in volatile world 
prices.
Prior to 1981 the goverment set high sugarcane and sugar prices so as to
encourage production. All sugar output was procured by the goverment and sold
through ration shops at prices which, although below the price paid to producers, were 
above world prices. Differences between production and demand were met by
government imports. With increasing demand, subsidy bills began to rise so in 1981 
the market was partially decontrolled with firms allowed to sell 10% of their production 
on the open market. In 1983 sugar rationing was decontrolled and all price and 
distribution controls were lifted. Imports by private firms were allowed but subject to 
import duties. The goverment now uses imports, sold through the Utility Stores 
Corporation, to influence domestic prices.
We argued above for an decrease in sugarcane prices because of the high
opportunity cost of land allocated to sugarcane and the social unprofitability of domestic 
sugar production. Protection for the consumer (and producers) against unstable world 
prices could be provided by running down government sugar stocks in times of world 
sugar shortages and high import prices. However, there are arguments for the 
maintaining some domestic capacitity:
(1) There is a large existing investment is sugar capacity and the marginal cost of 
production may be quite low. In the short run at least, it may be optimal to maintain 
production capacity and high sugarcane prices.
(2) Since the high cost of domestic sugar production stems from low sugarcane yields 
and low sugar content, if this can be rectified domestic production will become more 
profitable. The present large discrapency between best and worst yields (and quality) 
suggest that improved extension services and farms practices may be able to achieve 
large increases in yields and quality and increase the profitability of domestic production.
(3) Sugarcane yields and sugar extraction rates are higher in Sind reflecting more 
favourable climatic conditions and better coordination between the more moden mills and 
the relatively large landholdings. Sugar and sugarcane production could be concentrated 
here.
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(4) If funds were directed torwards research into developing high-yielding sugarcane 
seeds then, along with better farm practices, this would decrease the opportunity cost of 
sugarcane.
(5) Low world prices reflect subsidies provided by foreign governments. The 
continuation of these should not be taken for granted.
(6) Domestic demand is increasing rapidly with income. In the absence of an 
expansion of domestic production this implies greater reliance on imports with volatile 
world prices. However, the ability to use buffer stocks to reduce the import of 
temporarily high world prices dilutes this argument.
All these factors must be taken into account when analysing the pricing policy for 
sugar. From Table 6.7 we see that domestic sugar prices have continually been 
maintained at levels higher than world prices (around twice as high in 1980). Since 
poorer households have a higher budget share for sugar they benefit most from lowering 
sugar prices towards world prices.
The issues arising from the analysis of pricing policy for sugar are also relevant 
for other sectors. For example, consumers of edible oils are taxed by a complex 
system of producer subsidies and controlled prices. By 1984/5 subsidies to edible oils 
stood at Rs2251 million, representing around 42% of total current subsidies (nearly 0.5% 
of GDP) and 27% higher than wheat subsidies for the same year (Pakistan Economic 
Survey, 1986/7, p44-5). Our results suggest that lower consumer taxes would have 
substantial efficiency gains and beneficial distributional effects.
Since 1980 the procurement price of sugarcane has remained static (see Figure 4.3) 
while fertilizer, wheat and rice prices have risen sharply. Also, the yields of cotton, a 
major competitor with sugarcane for land, have increased dramatically since 1983, 
implying an even higher opportunity cost for sugarcane. Therefore, the arguments 
discussed above for maintaining sugar and sugarcane production must take account of 
the increasing efficiency gains from lower sugarcane prices and the alternative possibility 
of using sugar stocks to protect consumers from high world sugar prices. The decision 
to abandon sugar rationing needs to be analysed iu a similar manner to atta above.
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§6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have set out a model which we used to analyse government 
pricing policies in Pakistan. Our results indicate that in the mid 1970s there was
substantial scope for price reforms, particularly as regards major agricultural crops, which 
provided large efficiency gains. We also argued that, although the mechanism for
allievating the adverse distributional consequences associated with some of the reforms
was already in place (i.e. rationing and subsidized market atta), one would have to pay 
particular attention to the extension of this mechanism to rural areas. If this were not 
possible then one should examine the possibility of implementing other schemes. In the 
absence of such schemes, low procurement prices for wheat, a policy actually followed 
in the mid 1970s, may be desirable.
Our discussion of policy since the mid 1980s concluded that, while the policy of
increasing procurement prices and prices of major agricultural inputs removed the high 
level of distortion that existed in the 1970s, the elimination of rationing was not
consistent with our suggestions here. Given that the prices of major agricultural 
commodities remained below world prices in the mid 1980s, our assessment of the 
efficiency gains to be reaped by increasing procurement prices is still valid. However, 
it is essential that the ability to counteract the adverse distributional effects of this
policy, through rationing or other schemes, be addressed.
Given the absence of less distortionary policy instruments, the revenue requirement 
will require the use of agricultural pricing policy to tax rural incomes. In this case, 
our results suggest that with higher rice prices (say, for irri rice) low procurement 
prices for wheat are less distortionary and have a beneficial impact on income 
distribution. Also, if the extension of income support schemes to rural areas is
considered too administratively burdensome, such a policy becomes more attractive.
Our discussion of the results has highlighted the importance of considering pricing 
policies in a general equilibrium framework. Focusing on one commodity in isolation 
can lead to misleading conclusions about appropriate pricing policies since the effects on 
production and consumption of other commodities can have substantial efficiency and 
revenue implications. This was particularly apparent for important agricultural outputs
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and inputs (such as wheat, rice and fertilizer) where the revenue effects arising from net 
supply changes in each other’s markets had a considerable influence on the direction of 
price changes required to raise revenue. The analysis of the pricing of sugar and 
sugarcane also helped to show clearly that the efficiency and distributional consequences 
in one market can have important implications for pricing policy in another. We also 
emphasised the need to consider the availability of more direct distributional mechanisms 
when recommending price reforms.
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion
It is a common characteristic of governments in many developing countries that
they rely to a large extent on setting prices and indirect taxes as a means of raising
the bulk of their revenue requirement. This reflects the limitations on other more direct
policy instruments (e.g. land or income taxes) due to administrative or political 
difficulties. Pakistan is no different in this respect with over 80% of total tax revenue 
accounted for by indirect taxes. This reliance on indirect taxes and price controls is 
likely to persist since, in the short to medium term at least, the government is likely to 
rely further on this source to finance rising current expenditures. One therefore has to 
ask what is the most efficient and equitable way of raising revenue using these
instruments. This has been the central focus of the thesis.
We have shown in Chapter 1 how the standard theoretical models of optimum 
indirect taxation can be adapted to incorporate the special features of the agricultural 
sector and the constraints on revenue-raising instruments. Price controls are widespread 
in the agricultural sector where the government is often limited to the taxation of net 
market trade. This is particularly relevant for foodgrains such as wheat where a large 
proportion of production is consumed on farm. We have also suggested that risk averse 
governments with politically sensitive expenditures to finance may be more receptive to 
gradual or piecemeal reforms as opposed to a major redesign of the tax system. It is, 
in part, for this reason that we have focused our analysis on the evaluation of marginal 
reforms in prices and indirect taxes.
Although we recognize that one must combine basic economic principles with an 
understanding of the political, legal and administrative environment of a country when 
evaluating and recommending price reforms, we have concentrated for the most part on 
economic criteria. Therefore, we have analysed price reforms by examining their 
implications for equity and efficiency. However, we also try to allow for political, 
legal and administrative consequences when examining possible policies.
The effectiveness with which governments cam raise revenue by manipulating prices
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facing producers and consumers, and the implications of these policy instruments for
equity and efficiency, depends on the nature of the relationships between economic
agents, the organization and operation of markets, and the decision-making framework of
households. We focus primarily on agricultural pricing policy. Our analysis of the
organization of agriculture in Pakistan in Chapter 2, using data for the mid 1970s, led
us to a number of conclusions. These include that knowledge of household decision 
making in the presence of uncertainty, the absence of certain markets (e.g. for spreading 
risk), and the presence of market imperfections, especially for agricultural inputs, is 
required if one is to understand agricultural decisions and the observed variation in
agricultural practices. Our exploratory analysis of the data suggests that the combination
of the synchronic timing of many farm operations with farming activities concentrated
into certain periods (e.g. planting and harvesting), the need for reliable access to crucial 
factor inputs and the imperfect operation of the markets for draught animals, credit and 
labour, leads farmers to transact in the land market (mainly through renting and
sharecropping in or out) so as to match land operated with these imperfectly mobile
factors. Observed cropping decisions and the greater use of labour on smaller farms 
may be the result of more expensive hired labour, the latter reflecting the need to
monitor tasks carefully given the high level of husbandry skills required by modem
agricultural technology. It also appears that sharecropping plays a role in overcoming 
some of the informational problems associated with credit provision and in ensuring a 
reliable labour supply. Landlords and tenants may interlink transactions in markets 
through the sharetenancy arrangement with, for example, the former providing credit and 
land in return for guaranteed labour at crucial times.
The data also show that small farms have a greater proportion of their landholdings
under cultivation as well as higher cropping and resource intensities. This is consistent
with the findings of studies of other developing countries and suggests that the
much-debated and commonly observed inverse relationship between productivity and farm 
size also holds for Pakistan. However, our analysis of the physical yields for individual 
crops suggests that rice and cotton yields are megatively related to farm size while 
wheat and sugarcane yields are positively related fco farm size. This may be explained.
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in part, by the greater labour intensity of the former group and more costly hired 
labour. We also find that farms which allocate a higher proportion of cultivated land 
to risky crops appear to ’compensate’ for this by having lower input levels and 
consequently, ceteris paribus, lower yields. This may explain the productivity result for 
wheat.
Our analysis of what farmers perceive to be the main factors constraining 
productivity levels suggests that availability of credit and irrigation were the main 
constraints with the former appearing to be more constraining among smaller farms. 
The results from our production function analysis reinforce this since we find that 
variations in fertilizer use and irrigation levels were statistically significant in explaining 
variations in physical yields for individual crops. Constraints on credit mean that 
farmers have to rely on ’own-fiinds’ to finance the purchase of inputs such as fertilizer. 
Preliminary results from more recent surveys for Pakistan suggest that, despite a large 
increase in institutional credit and tubewell finance, these constraints still persisted in the 
mid 1980s. They also show that smaller farms are more likely to be unaware of the 
possibility of cheaper sources of credit or of recommended farming practices. The 
effectiveness of policies regarding the increase in credit availability and extension 
services should therefore be examined. Our analysis of the organization of agriculture 
in Pakistan reinforces the fact that an understanding of behaviour under uncertainty and 
the imperfect nature of markets for inputs and factors of production is required if 
economic analysis of the organization of agriculture in Pakistan is to contribute to the 
formulation of welfare-improving policy recommendations.
It is common in developing countries for governments to tax agriculture by 
procuring outputs at prices below world prices. For example, in Pakistan in the mid 
1970s the procurement of wheat was on a voluntary basis with wheat procured at low 
prices and a ban on trade between provinces. This can be viewed as a tax on net 
producers and a subsidy to net consumers with both being effected according to the 
extent of their net trade or marketed surplus (MS). The implications of such price 
controls for equity and efficiency depend, respectively, on the pattern of MS across 
households (possibly with differing welfare weights) and on how aggregate MS responds
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to price changes. In Chapter 3 we focus on wheat, the major foodgrain in Pakistan. 
We show how we can gain insights into the variation in levels of MS across 
households using cross-section data and how agricultural household models are useful 
when deciding how an empirical analysis should be formulated, what variables should be 
included and how the model should be specified. With simple examples we show the 
likely direction and magnitude of household responses to parameters of interest. For 
example, using parameters for Pakistan for the mid 1970s and ’low’ estimates for 
production elasticities we calculate aggregate price elasticities of MS of 0.86 and 0.26 
for wheat and rice respectively. We also argue that these elasticities are unlikely to be 
negative and are likely to exceed their output elasticities.
Because of the way in which data are collected and given the highly skewed 
distribution of land size, an analysis of MS using cross-section surveys will encounter 
estimation problems including measurement error, sample selection, heteroskedasticity and 
influential observations. These become less problematic if we estimate a reduced form 
equation which includes only exogenous variables such as farm size, household 
composition and locational variables, and use the well-known Heckman technique for 
correcting sample selection bias. We find that the probability of having market sales 
increases with farm size. It also seems that the land and price elasticities of MS 
decrease with farm size with the latter being substantially greater than one. Extra land 
increases both wheat output and wheat consumption (because of higher income), with the 
output effect dominating. The origin of the positive price effect on MS was traced to 
the production response suggesting that the positive income effect from higher prices (for 
those with market sales) cancelled out the negative pure substitution effect in 
consumption. Extra family members also increase wheat consumption and decrease MS. 
The lack of any significant relationship between the number of family members (in 
particular the number of adult males) and production may possibly be explained by the 
reallocation of land away from wheat which counteracts the higher wheat yields per acre 
due to extra labour input. We prefer this reasoning rather than the argument that one 
does not expect to find any relationship between production levels and the number of 
family members (or adult males) if labour markets are functioning well. We also find
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evidence of a consumption preference for wheat in both Punjab and NWFP compared to 
Sind.
The observation that MS increases with farm size with large farms being net 
producers and small farms net consumers suggests that low procurement prices are 
attractive from an equity viewpoint This conclusion is further reinforced when one 
recognizes that landless labourers, who are often among the poorest in developing 
countries, are also net consumers (although they may benefit if real wages increase). 
However, the high price elasticity of MS suggests that low procurement prices may be 
associated with large efficiency losses. We comment further on this trade-off between 
equity and efficiency below. The high price elasticity also tells us that small changes 
in prices may have substantial effects on government procurement, the level of rural 
food surpluses to be transferred to urban areas, and foreign exchange earnings. All 
these effects should be taken into account when formulating pricing policy.
Theoretical models indicate that when we include the agricultural sector in the
consumer sector for the purpose of analysing pricing policy it is no longer the case that 
economic efficiency is necessarily desirable for this sector. Thus, whether agricultural 
(purchased) inputs should be taxed or subsidized will depend on the pattern and 
responsiveness of use across farms. In Chapter 4 we focus on the use of chentical 
fertilizer which is the main purchased input and whose increased use is closely linked
with the spread of the green revolution in Pakistan. In empirical analyses it is 
important to treat separately households which do not apply fertilizer because they are
constrained, say, in the credit market and those who do not apply fertilizer because at
current relative prices it is not profitable for them to do so. We use a ’double-hurdle’
model, which enables us to take account of zeros which can arise in more than one
way, to explain the pattern of fertilizer use across farms. A simple model of behaviour 
under uncertainty is used as the basis of our empirical investigation and our
interpretation of the results.
The simple theoretical models presented suggest that input levels are lower in the 
presence of uncertainty. Also, both the distribution of wealth between stochastic and
non-stochastic components and the behaviour of farmers in response to additional
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exposure to risk determine the pattern of input intensity across farm size. Of course, a 
greater availability of knowledge, credit or complementary inputs (e.g. irrigation) also 
increases factor productivity and, therefore, intensity. The presence of irrigation (e.g. 
tubewells) also reduces the uncertainty of water availability. Our results indicate that 
the factors which we expect to affect fertilizer productivity (e.g. use of phosphate, 
application of nitrogen as a top dressing and access to reliable irrigation) are positively 
correlated with farm size and have the effect of increasing fertilizer intensity on larger 
farms. However, the presence of uncertainty operates to reverse this effect. Although 
larger farms have a higher level of non-stochastic wealth which, in the presence of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, has the effect of increasing fertilizer intensity with 
farm size, the presence of increasing relative risk aversion means that the net 
relationship between farm size and fertilizer intensity is negative. Thus, while in the 
absence of uncertainty one may expect to observe fertilizer intensity increasing with farm 
size, reflecting their higher productivity of fertilizer, the presence of uncertainty appears 
to reverse this relationship.
The finding that problems in securing credit, especially among smaller farms, 
constrains the use of fertilizer highlights how the operation of one market can affect 
that of another. As indicated above, the fact that credit constraints among smaller 
farms have persisted into the 1980s in spite of increased government involvement 
suggests that the effectiveness of policies followed should be examined. Also, although 
our analysis was not specifically policy oriented, we might conclude that if one assumes 
that markets for spreading risk are unlikely to emerge m the short to medium run, then 
the government should be aware that its selection and use of policy instruments (e.g. for 
revenue raising from the agricultural sector) may be able to act as a partial substitute.
From our discussion in Chapter 5 of industrialization and trade policies in Pakistan 
since Independence we saw that there has been a gradual movement away from 
quantitative restrictions on domestic production and foreign trade in favour of 
manipulating price incentives for investment in various industries. Up to the 1970s this 
liberalization of the economy was gradual and took the form of loosening, rather than 
eliminating, quantity controls. The 1970s saw a rapid and major move towards price
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controls as a way of adjusting the incentives facing producers and consumers. Our 
summary of previous studies into the extent of the consequent pricing distortions in the 
economy shows that the distortions were large and that the complexity of the price and 
tax system may have had unintended or hidden consequences, especially the effective 
taxation of exporting industries. Such distortions may give wrong signals to private 
agents in the sense of encouraging investments in industries which are socially 
unprofitable.
It is generally agreed that in developing countries, because of the imperfect
operation or absence of many markets (in particular factor and risk markets) and the 
nature of government involvement in the economy, market prices of commodities may 
not reflect their social value to the economy. When evaluating government policies and 
investment decisions it is necessary to take account of this divergence between social 
and market prices. Fortunately, Irom the point of view of pricing policy, much of the 
standard tax analysis goes through as before but with producer prices being replaced by 
shadow prices and by viewing the difference between shadow and consumer prices as a 
shadow tax. Using data of a kind which are often available for many developing
countries we calculate a set of economy-wide shadow prices (for the mid 1970s) and 
show how these can be used to evaluate possible reforms of trade and industrialization 
policies. The model presented is based on the well-known Little-Mirrlees procedure for 
calculating shadow prices and is easy to manipulate for the purposes of sensitivity 
analysis.
The technical analysis of our results highlights the origin and nature of the 
distortions, e.g. trade or domestic taxes, and summarizes their combined effect on the
overall level of distortion. We explore various assumptions about the workings of 
product and factor markets and their implications for shadow prices. We then interpret 
the results from a policy viewpoint and show how they could be used to guide 
government economic decisions concerning investment and pricing. We focus, in turn, on 
agriculture, agriculture-related industries, and manufacturing industries.
With agriculture the results suggest that the emphasis in Pakistan on wheat, rice
and cotton production is justified in the sense that these crops emerge as the most
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socially profitable crops. However, we also suggest that some of the minor crops may 
not compete directly with these major crops, i.e. the land they take up is not suitable 
for the major crops, in which case our policy conclusions would need to be adjusted
accordingly. Our analysis of agriculture-related industries show that policy towards
industries based on crops such as sugarcane and oilseeds should be re-evaluated. Unless 
better agricultural practices or new high-yielding variety seeds lead to higher sugarcane 
or oilseed yields, or unless the technical efficiency of the relevant processing industries 
is improved, a greater reliance on imports may be desirable. The results for cotton- 
based industries also highlighted similar issues. The social unprofitability of the cotton 
yam and the large-scale cotton textile industries emphaises the need to question whether 
or not there is a genuine infant industry argument for protection and, if so, whether 
tariff protection will actually achieve this, or whether more direct policies are required. 
Similar issues apply to some import-substituting industries. One must decide whether
domestic production can ever be socially profitable and recognize the implications of 
inefficient production for government revenue and consumer welfare. Also, the social 
profitability of major exporting industries reinforces arguments for their continued
encouragement, or at least not to discourage them through duties or input taxes.
Much of our analysis focuses on the medium to long term. However, using the 
sugar industry as an example, we argue that for industries in which there already exists 
large fixed investments policies appropriate in the short-run may look very different from 
those suggested by longer-term objectives. For example, if a socially unprofitable 
industry has large fixed costs then we may want to maintain production levels (and 
those of non-traded inputs) but phase it out gradually, i.e. discourage new investments. 
In fact, if there is underutilization of capacity we may want to increase production.
In Chapter 1 we discuss the standard models for tax analysis and showed how 
these can be adapted to incorporate the special features of the agricultural sector and the 
limitations on the policy instruments available to the government, and described how the 
theory of tax reform can be used to identify welfare-improving marginal reforms in the 
tax and price system. We further suggest that risk averse governments with politically 
sensitive expenditures to finance may be more willing to undertake piecemeal reforms.
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In Chapter 6 we present a model specific to Pakistan which is intended to allow 
normative analysis of the instruments available to the government in the mid 1970s. 
Using data for this period we calculate and compare the marginal social costs of raising 
additional revenue across the various price and tax instruments available to the 
government. We use these to identify possible welfare-improving reforms in the existing 
system for the mid 1970s. However, our results also carry lessons for policies beyond 
this period and we use these to comment on policies followed in the 1980s and to set 
out recommendations for future policy.
Our results indicate that in the mid 1970s there was substantial scope for price 
reforms, particularly as regards major agricultural crops, which provided large efficiency 
gains. Efficiency considerations alone suggested that higher producer prices for wheat, 
rice and cotton were desirable. We also argue that, although the mechanism for 
alleviating the adverse distributional consequences associated with some of the reforms 
was already in place (i.e. rationing and subsidized market atta), one would have to pay 
particular attention to the extension of this mechanism to rural areas. If this were not 
possible then one should examine the possibility of implementing other schemes. In the 
absence of such schemes (e.g. if they were considered too administratively costly), low 
procurement prices for wheat, a policy actually followed in the mid 1970s, may be 
desirable. It appears that the effects on the net demand for agricultural labour and 
wages does not change these results.
Our discussion of policy since the mid 1980s suggests that, while the policy of 
increasing procurement prices and prices of major agricultural inputs removed the high 
level of distortion that existed in the 1970s, the elimination of rationing was not 
consistent with our suggestions here. Given that the prices of major agricultural 
commodities remained below world prices in the mid 1980s, our assessment of the 
efficiency gains to be reaped by increasing procurement prices is still valid. However, 
it is essential that the ability to counteract the adverse distributional effects of this 
policy, through rationing or other schemes, be addressed.
Given the absence of less distortionary policy instruments, the revenue requirement 
will require the use of agricultural pricing policy to tax rural incomes. In this case.
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our results suggest that with higher rice prices (say, for irri rice) low procurement
prices for wheat are less distortionary; the high efficiency gains from higher wheat 
prices when both wheat and rice prices are ’low’ reflects the fact that higher wheat
prices make the wheat-rice crop rotation more profitable and thus increase the production
of these crops both of which are highly taxed. Additionally, lower wheat prices have a 
beneficial impact on income distribution. Also, if the extension of income support 
schemes to rural areas is considered too administratively burdensome, such a policy 
becomes more attractive.
Our discussion of the results has highlighted the importance of considering pricing 
policies in a general equilibrium framework Focusing on one commodity in isolation
can lead to misleading conclusions about appropriate pricing policies since the effects on 
production and consumption of other commodities can have substantial efficiency and 
revenue implications. This was particularly apparent for important agricultural outputs 
and inputs (such as wheat, rice and fertilizer) where the revenue effects arising from net 
supply changes in other commodity and factor markets had a considerable influence on 
the direction of price changes required to raise revenue. The analysis of the pricing of 
sugar and sugarcane also helps to show clearly that the efficiency and distributional 
consequences in one market can have important implications for pricing policy in 
another. Although one may wish to rely more on sugar imports in the future and 
reduce reliance on domestic sugar production (and hence reduce sugarcane production), 
the low short-run social marginal cost of sugar production (with a large existing 
domestic sugar capacity) suggests that sugarcane production should be maintained, at 
least in the short-run. Therefore, if the prices of other major agricultural commodities 
were increased then one may also want to increase sugarcane prices so as to encourage 
farmers to continue to grow sugarcane. Similarly, in such circumstances, low sugarcane 
prices would increase the attractiveness of low prices for other major agricultural 
commodities. Finally, we also emphasised the need to consider the availability of more 
direct distributional mechanisms when recommending price reforms.
294
References
Ahmad, E., and S. Ludlow (1987) : ’Aggregate and Regional Demand Response 
Patterns in Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review, XXXVI (4), 
pp645-655.
Ahmad, E., and N.H. Stem (1984): ’Theory of Reform and Indian Indirect Taxes’,
Journal of Public Economics, 25, pp259-295
Ahmad, E., and N.H. Stem (1986): ’Tax Reform in Pakistan: Overview and Effective
Taxes for 1975-76’, p iis ta n  Development Review, XXV(l), pp43-72
Ahmad, E., and N.H. Stem (1990): Tax Reform and Shadow Prices for Pakistan’, 
Oxford Economic Papers, 42, ppl35-159.
Ahmad, E., and N.H. Stem (1991): The Theorv and Practice of Tax Reform in 
Developing Countries. Cambridge University Press.
Ahmad. E., D. Coady and N.H. Stem (1988): ’A Complete Set of Shadow Prices for 
Pakistan: Illustrations for 1975-76’, Pakistan Development Review, XXVn(l), 
pp7-43
Ahmad, E., H-M Leung and N.H. Stem (1987) : ’The Demand for Wheat Under 
Non-Linear Pricing in Pakistan’, Joumal of Econometrics, 36,
Special Issue on the Problems and Issues of LDC’s.
Ahmad, N., S. Butt, A.A. Hai, K.M. Nadvi and S.N. Zahid (1986a) : ’A
Study of Specific Constraints Facing Small Farmers In Pakistan - 
Sind’, AERC, University of Karachi, Pakistan.
Ahmad, N., S. Butt, A.A. Hai, K.M. Nadvi and S.N. Zahid (1986b) : A
Study of Specific Constraints Facing Small Farmers In Pakistan - 
Baluchistan’, AERC, University of Karachi, Pakistan.
Ahmed, V., and R. Amjad (1984): The Management of Pakistan’s Economy. 1947-82. 
Oxford University Press: Karachi.
Afzal, M. (1976) : ’Demand for Nitrogenous Fertilizers and Fertilizer
Price Policy in Pakistan - A Comment’, Pakistan Development 
Review, Autumn, pp330-333.
Alderman, H. A. (1987) : ’Estimates of consumer price response in Pakistan 
using market prices as data’, Draft Copy, Intemational Food 
Policy Research Institute, Washington.
Aleem, I. (1990): ’Imperfect Information, Screening, and the Costs of Informal Lending: 
A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan’, World Bank Economic 
Review, 4(3), pp329-349.
Ali, M. (1988): ’Supply Response of Major Crops in Pakistan: A Simultaneous Equation 
Approach’, Special Report Series, No. 11, Pakistan Economic Analysis 
Network Project, Islamabad.
Amemyia, T. (1981) : ’Qualitative Response Models : A Survey’, Joumal 
of Economic Literature, XIX (Dec.), pp 1483-1536.
Amjad, R. (1972) : ’A Critique of the Green Revolution in Pakistan’,
Pakistan Social and Economic Review, June.
295
Askari, H., and J. J. Cummings (1976) : Agricultural Supply Response :
A Survey of the Econometric Evidence. New York : Praegar.
Aslam, M. M. (1978) : ’Some Comparative Aspects of Production and Profit 
Functions : Empirical Applications to a Punjab District’,
Pakistan Development Review, Summer, ppl91-211.
Atkinson, A.B., J. Gomulka and N.H. Stem (1984): ’Household Expenditure on Tobacco 
1970-1980: Evidence from the Family Expenditure Survey’, Discussion Paper 
No.57, TIDI Programme, STICERD, London School of Economics.
Bagi, F. S. (1981) : ’Economics of Share-Cropping in Haryana (India)
Agriculture’, Pakistan Development Review, Spring, pp95-119.
Bagi, F. S. (1981) : ’"Economics of Share-Cropping in Haryana (India)
Agriculture" - Rejoinder’, Pakistan Development Review, Winter, 
pp453-464.
Bell, C. (1972): ’The Acquisition of Agricultural Technology: Its Determinants and 
Effects’, Joumal of Development Studies, 9, ppl23-159.
Bell, C. (1988) : ’Credit Markets and Interlinked Transactions’, Ch. 16 in 
H. Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan (eds.).
Beringer, C. and I. Ahmad (1964) : The Use of Agricultural Surplus
Commodities for Economic Development in Pakistan’, Monographs in 
the Economics of Development, No. 12, The Institute of 
Development Economics, Karachi (Pakistan).
Bertrand, T. J., and L. Squire (1980) : ’The Relevance of the Dual Economy 
Model : A Case Study of Thailand’, Oxford Economic Papers,
Vol. 32 (Nov), pp480-511.
Besley, T., and R. Kanbur (1988) : ’Food Subsidies and Poverty
Alleviation’, Economic Joumal, vol. 98 (Dec.), pp701-719.
Bhalla, S. S., and P. Roy (1988) : ’Mis-specification in Farin Productivity
Analysis: The Role of Land Quality’, Oxford Economic Papers, 40, 
pp55-73.
Binswanger, H P., Y. Mundlak, Maw-cheng Yang and A. Bowers (1985): ’Estimation of 
Aggregate Agricultural Supply Response from Time-Series of Cross-Country 
data’. Working Paper 1985-83, Commodities Studies and Project Division, 
World Bank, Washington D.C.
Binswanger, H P. and M R. Rosenzweig (1986) : ’Behavioural and Material 
Determinants of Production Relations in Agriculture’, The Joumal 
of Development Studies, pp503-539.
Bird, R.M. (1974) : Taxing Agricultural Land in Developing Countries.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Bliss, C. and N. H. Stern (1982) : ’Palanpur : An Indian Village’, Oxford University 
Press.
Boiteux, M. (1956): ’Sur la gestion des monopoles publics asterints l ’équilibre
budgétaire’, Econometrica, 24(1), pp22-40. translation in Boiteux, 1971).
Boiteux, M. (1971): On the Management of Public Monopolies Subject to Budget
Constraints’, Joumal of Economic Theory, 3(3), pp219-240. (Translation of
296
Boiteux, 1971).
Bose, S. R. (1972) : ’East-West Contrast in Pakistan’s Agricultural
Development’, Ch. 2 of Growth and Inequality in Pakistan by K.
Griffin and A. R. Khan(1972), Macmillan.
Carter, M R. (1984): ’Identification of the Inverse Relationship Between Farm Size and 
Productivity: An Empirical Analysis of Peasant Agricultural Production’, 
Oxford Economic Papers, 36, ppl31-145. »
Chaudhary, M. A. (1978) : ’Determination of Cost of Tubewell Water and 
Estimation of Economic Rent in Canal Irrigation’, Pakistan 
Development Review, Summer, pp139-168.
Chaudhry, M. G. and M. A. laved (1976) : ’Demand For Nitrogenous 
Fertilizers and Fertilizer M ce Policy in Pakistan’, Pakistan 
Development Review, Spring, ppl-7.
Chemonics (1985) : ’Pakistan Fertilizer Policy : Review and Analysis’,
USAID, Islamabad (Pakistan).
Chenery, H., and T. N. Srinivasan (1988), eds.. Handbook of Development 
Economics. Vols. 1 and 2, North Holland.
Cheong, K., and R. D’Silva (1984): ’Prices, Terms of Trade and The Role of the
Government in Pakistan’s Agriculture’,World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 
643.
Cheung, S. N. S. (1969) : The Theorv of Share Tenancy. Chicago : University 
of Chicago Press.
Comelisse, P. A. and S. N. Naqvi (1987) : ’The Wheat-Marketing Activity 
in Pakistan’, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
Comia, G.A. (1985): ’Farm Size, Land Yields and The Agricultural Production Function: 
An Analysis for Fifteen Developing Countries’, World Development, 13(14), 
pp513-534.
Dandekar, V. M. (1964) : ’Prices, Production and Marketed Supply of Food­
grains’, Indian Joumal of Agricultural Economics, July-Dee.,
Vol. 19, ppl88-195.
Dasgupta, P.S., S. Marglin and A.K. Sen (1972): Guidelines for Project Evaluation. New 
York: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (Vienna).
Deaton, A. (1989): ’Rice Prices and Income Distribution in Thailand: A Non-parametric 
Analysis’, Economic Joumal, 99(395), Supplement, ppl-37.
Deaton, A., and F. Grimard (1991): ’Demand Analysis for Tax Reform in Pakistan’, 
Research Program in Development Studies, Princeton University.
Deaton, A., and J. Muellbauer (1980) : ’An Almoat Ideal Demand System’,
American Economic Review, 70, pp.312-326.
Deaton, A., and N.H. Stem (1986): ’Optimally Uniform Commodity Taxes, Taste 
Differences, and Lump-Sum Grants’, Economic Letters, 20, pp263-266.
Diamond, P., and J. Mirrlees (1971): ’Optimal Taxation and Public Production: Part 1, 
Production Efficiency; Part 2, Tax Rules’, American Economic Review, 61(1) 
and 61(2), pp8-27 and pp261-278.
297
Dixit, A. K. (1969) : ’Marketed Surplus and Dual Development’, Journal 
of Economic Theory, 2, May, pp203-219.
Drèze, J., and N.H. Stern (1987): ’The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis’, in A.
Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.). Handbook of Public Economics. Vol. II, 
North-Holland.
Falcon, W. P. (1964) : ’Farm Response to Price in a Subsistence Economy:
West Pakistan’, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings.
Falcon, W. P. (1970): ’Green Revolution: Second Generation Problems’,
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Dec.
Falcon, W. P. and G. V. Papanek (1971) : ’Development Policy 2 - The 
Pakistan Experience’, Harvard University Press (Mass.).
Feder, G. (1980): ’Farm Size, Risk Aversion and the Adoption of New Technologies 
under Uncertainty’, Oxford Economic Papers, 32, pp263-283.
Feder, G., RE. Just and D. Zilberman (1985): ’Adoption of Agricultural Innovations in 
Developing Countries: a Survey’, Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, pp255-298.
Gamser, M S. (1988): ’Innovation, Technical Assistance and Development: The
Importance of Technology Users’, World Development, 16(6), pp711-721.
Ghatak, S, (1975) : ’Marketed Surplus in Indian Agriculture: theory and
evidence’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 37, 
ppl46-153.
Gotsch, C. H. (1973) : ’Some Observations on Small Farm Credit Problems’,
Small Farm Credit (Summer Papers), AID Spring Review of Small 
Farmer Credit, Vol. XX.
Glaeser, B. (ed.) (1987) : The Green Revolution Revisited: A Critique and 
Alternatives. London: Allen and Unwin.
Gotsch, C. and G. Brown (1980) : ’Prices, Taxes and Subsidies in Pakistan
Agriculture, 1960-1976’, WBSWP, No. 387, World Bank (Washington 
D. C.).
Government of India (1956): Second Five Year Plan. 1956-61. Planning Commission.
Government of Pakistan (1982): National Accounts of Pakistan (Product and 
Expenditure). Federal Bureau of Statistics, Karachi.
Government of Pakistan (1983a): Ten Years of Pakistan Statistics. 1972-82. Federal 
Bureau of Statistics, Karachi.
Government of Pakistan (1983b): Sixth Five Year Plan. 1983-88. Planning Commission, 
Islamabad.
Government of Pakistan . Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan (1977 and 1985), Ministry 
of Agriculture, Islamabad.
Government of Pakistan. Pakistan Economic Surv^ev (annual).. Economic Advisor’s Wing, 
Finance division, Islamabad.
Government of Pakistan. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook (annual). Federal Bureau of 
Statistics, Karachi.
298
Government of Pakistan. Federal Bureau of Statistics. Foreign Trade Statistics (annual). 
Karachi.
Government of Pakistan. Federal Bureau of Statistics. Monthlv Statistical Bulletin 
(monthly). Karachi.
Government of Pakistan. Federal Bureau of Statistics. National Accounts Statistics 
(annual). Karachi.
Government of Pakistan, Indus Basin Survev. Agricultural Economics Survey of the 
Master Planning and Review Division of WAPDA.
Government of Pakistan. Planning Commission (1979), Micro-Nutrient Survev 1976/77. 
Islamabad.
Greene, W. (1981) : ’Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error: Comment’, 
Econometrica (Notes and Comments), 49(3), pp795-798.
Griffin, K. (1974) : The Political Economv of Agrarian Change : An Essav 
on the Green Revolution. Macmillan.
Griffin, K. and A. R. Khan (1972, eds) : Growth and Inequalitv in 
Pakistan. Macmillan.
Guisinger, S. (1981): ’Trade Policies and Employment: The Case of Pakistan’, in A. 
Krueger (ed.). Trade and Emplovment in Developing Countries. ****
Guisinger, S., and G. Scully (1991): ’Liberalizing Foreign Trade: The Experience of 
Pakistan’, in Papageorgiou, D., M, Michaely and A. Choksi (eds.). 
Liberalizing Foreign Trade (Vol. 5). Blackwell.
Hamdani, K. A. and Nadeem-Ul-Haque (1978) : ’The Demand for Fertilizer : A 
Critical Review’, Pakistan Development Review, Winter, pp 
451-467.
Hazell, R. (1988) (ed.): Crop Insurance and Agricultural Development. John Hopkins: 
Baltimore.
Heckman, J. J. (1979) : ’Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error’, 
Econometrica, 47(1), ppl53-161.
Hoff, K. (1991): ’Land Taxes, Output Taxes and Sharecropping: Was Henry George 
Right?’, World Bank Economic Review, 5(1), pp93-lll.
Hussain, A. (1989): ’Science and Technology in the Chinese Coimtryside’, Ch. 10 in 
D.F. Simon and M. Goldman (eds.). Science and Technologv in Post-Mao 
China (Cambridge, Mass.)
Johnston, B.F., and J.W. Mellor (1961): ’The Role of Agriculture in Economic 
Development’, American Economic Review, 51, pp566-593.
Kaneda, H. (1969) : ’Economic Implications of the "Green Revolution" and 
the Strategy of Agricultural Development in West Pakistan’,
Pakistan Development Review, Summer, ppl 11-143.
Kaneda, H. and M. Ghaffar (1970) : ’Output Effects of Tubewells on the 
Agriculture of the Punjab : Some Empirical Results’, Pakistan 
Development Review (Notes and Comments), X(l), pp68-87.
Khan, M. H. (1975) : The Economics of the Green Revolution. Praeger.
299
Khan, M. H. (1979) : ’Farm Size and Land Productivity Relationships in 
Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review, Spring, pp69-77.
Khan, M. H. (1981) : ’The Political Economy of Agricultural Research In 
Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review, Summer, pp.191-213.
Khan, M. A., M. J. Khan and M. Sarwar (1986) : ’Socio Economic Impact of 
Tractorization in Pakistan’, Punjab Econontic Research Institute,
Lahore (Pakistan).
Khan, M. H. and D. R. Maki (1980) : ’Relative Efficiency by Farm Size and 
the Green Revolution in Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review,
Spring, pp51-64.
Krasker, W. S., E. Kuh and R. E. Welsch (1983) : ’Estimation for Dirty 
Data and Flawed Models’, in Z. Griliches and M. D. Intriligator 
(eds.). Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 1, Ch. 11, pp651-698.
North Holland.
Kusro, M. A. (1967) : ’Pricing of Food in India’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 81, May, pp271-285.
Leonard, P. L. (1969) : ’A Note on the Demand for Fertilizer in West
Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review (Notes and Comments),
Winter, pp419-425.
Lewis, S. R. (1969) : ’Economic Policy and Industrial Growth in Pakistan’,
Allen and Unwin (London).
Lewis, S.R. (1970): Industrialization and Trade Policies. Oxford University Press: 
London.
Lewis, S R., and S. Guisinger (1968): ’Measuring Protection in a Developing Country: 
The Case of Pakistan’, Journal of Political Economy, 76(6),pp****
Lipton, M. (1977) : Whv the Poor Stav Poor : Urban Bias in World 
Development. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press.
Littie, I.M.D., T. Scitovsky and M. Scott (1970): Industrv and Trade in Some 
Developing Countries. Oxford University Press: New York.
Little, I.M.D., and J. Mirrlees (1974): Project Appraisal and Planning for Developing 
Countries. London: Heinemann.
Maddala, G. S. (1983) : Limited-dependent and Oualative Variables in 
Econometrics. Cambridge University Press.
Mahmood, M., and Nadeem-Ul-Haque (1981) : ’Farm Size and Productivity 
Revisited’, Pakistan Development Review, Summer, ppl51-189.
Mathur, P., and H. Eze^d (1961) : ’Marketed Surplus of Food and Price 
Variables’, Vol. XIV.
Mellor, J. W. (1976): The New Econontics of Growth. Cornell University 
Press.
Mellor, J. W. and R. Ahmed (1988), eds.. Agricultural Price Policv for 
Developing Countries. John Hopkins University Press.
300
Narain, D. (1961) : Distribution of Marketed Surplus of Agricultural 
R-oduce bv Size-level of Holding in India. 1950-51. Asia 
Publishing House, Bombay.
Newbery, D., (1987a): ’Agricultural Taxation: The Main Issues’, in D. Newbry and N.H. 
Stem (1987).
Newbery, D. (1987b): Identifying Desirable Directions of Agricultural Price Reform in
Korea’, in D. Newbwey and N.H. Stem (1987)
Newbery, D., and N.H. Stem (1987),(eds.), The Theory of Taxation for Developing 
Countries. Oxford University ftess.
NFDC (1986) : ’Pakistan Fertilizer Statistics’, Islamabad (Pakistan).
Nowshirvani, V. F. (1967) : ’Note on Marketed Surplus’, Indian Joumal 
of Agricultural Economics, Jan.- Mar.
Nowshirvani, V. F. (1967) : ’Allocation efficiency in traditional Indian
agriculture: a comment’, Joumal of Farm Economics, vol. 49 (1),
pp218-221.
Nulty, L. (1972) : The Green Revolution in West Pakistan. Praegar.
Pakistan Institute of Development Studies (1985): ’Final PIDE Input-Output Table of
Pakistan’s Economy: 1975-76’. Islamabad. (Research Reports Series No. 139).
Papanek, G.V. (1968): Pakistan’s Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Pinckney, T.C. (1989): ’The Multiple Effects of Procurement Price on Production and 
Procurement of Wheat in Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review, 28(2), 
pp95-120.
Pearse, A. (1980) : Seeds of Plentv. Seeds of Want: Social and Economic 
Implications of the Green Revolution. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pudney, S. (1989): Modelling Individual Choice: The Econometrics of Comers. Kinks 
and Holes. Blackwell.
Quraishi, B. A. and M. J. Khan (1970) : ’Economics of Fertilizer
Application to Wheat Crop : The Results of a Survey in Lyallpur 
District’, Pakistan Development Review (Notes and Comments),
Spring, pp88-99.
Ramsey, F. (1927): ’A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation’, Economic Joumal, 37 
(1), pp47-61.
Reuss, J. and Sam Johnson (1978) : ’A Note on The Fertilizer Ratio 
Concept’, Pakistan Development Review, Spring, ppl23-130.
Rogers, B. (1988): ’Pakistan’s Rationing System: Distribution of Costs and Benefits’, in 
Per Pinstmp-Andersen (ed.). Food Subsidies in Developing Countries. John 
Hopkins University Press.
Ruttan, V. (1977) : ’The Green Revolutuion: some generalizations’,
Intemational Development Review, vol. 19, pp. 19-23.
Sal am, A. (1975) : ’Socio-Economic and Institutional Factors Influencing 
Fertilizer Use in Punjab (Pakistan)’, Pakistan Development
301
Review, Winter, pp397-415.
Sal am, A. (1976) : ’Resource Productivity in the Punjab’s Agriculture’,
Pakistan Development Review, Summer, ppl 15-133.
Sal am, A. (1977a) : ’Economic Analysis of Fertilizer Demand in the Punjab’,
Pakistan Development Review, Summer, pp l81-191.
Sal am, A. (1977b) : ’Technological Change, Tenant Displacement and
Adjustment in Pakistan : Some Preliminary Observations’, Pakistan 
Development Review, Winter, 435-448.
Sal am, A. (1978) : ’Factor Inputs Use and Farm Productivity on Different 
Farm Categories in the Punjab’, Pakistan Development Review,
Autumn, pp316-331.
Sal am, A. (1981a) : ’Farm Tractorization, Fertilizer Use and Productivity 
of Mexican Wheat in Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review,
Autumn, pp323-345.
Sal am, A. (1981b) : ’Economics of Share-Cropping in Haryana (India)
Agriculture - A Comment’, Pakistan Development Review, Winter, 
pp447-452.
Samuelson (1951, 1988): ’Theory of Optimal Taxation’, Memorandum to the U.S.
Treasury. Published in Journal of Public Economics, 30(2), July 1986, 
ppl37-144.
Sharif, M., M.J. Khan and M. Sarwar (1986): ’Constraints Facing Small Farmers in 
Punjab’, Publication No. 224, Punjab Economic Research Institute, Lahore.
Schultz, T. W. (1978), ed.. Distortions of Agricultural Incentives. Bloom­
ington: Indiana University Press.
Sen, A.K. (1975): Emplovment. Technologv and Development. Oxford University Press: 
London.
Singh, I., L. Squire and J. Strauss (1986), (eds.). Agricultural Household 
Models: Extentions. applications and policv. Washington, D. C.,
World Bank.
Soligo, R. and R. Stern (1985): ’Tariff Protection, Import Substitution and Investment 
Efficiency’, Pakistan Development Review, XXIV(2), pp26-35.
Stem, N.H. (1984): ’Optimal Taxation and Tax Policy’, Intemational Monetary Fund 
Staff Papers, 31(2), pp339-378.
Stem, N.H. (1987): ’Aspects of the General Theory of Reform’, in D. Newbery and 
N.H. Stem (1987).
Stem, N.H. (1990): ’Uniformity versus Selectivity in Indirect Taxes’, Economics and 
Politics, 2(1), pp83-108.
Sternberg, M. J. (1970) : ’ The Economic Impact of the Latifundista’,
Land Reform, Land Settlements and Co-operatives, No. 2, pp21-34.
Timmer, C. P., W. P. Falcon and S. R. Pearson (1983) : Food Policy 
Analvsis. Baltimore, Md.:John Hopkins University Press.
302
Turvey, R,, and E. Cook (1976) : ’Government Procurement and Price Support 
of Agricultural Commodities: A Case Study of Pakistan’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, Vol. 28, March, ppl02-117.
White, H. (1980) : ’A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix
Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity’, Econometrica, 
Vol. 48 (4), pp817-838.
World Development Report (1990). Oxford University Press: New York.
Wizarat, S. (1981) : ’Technological Change in Pakistan’s Agriculture :
1953-1979’, Pakistan Development Review, Winter, pp427-445.
303 
Appendix A
Modified Cobb-Douglas Production Function
The production function we estimate is a modified version of the standard 
Cobb-Douglas (C-D) production function. It is usual to estimate the parameters of the 
standard C-D function in its log-linear form. Dummy variables are introduced as
multiplicative shifts in the production function. For example, take a log-linear equation
with dependent variable y, a continuous explanatory variable x and a zero-one dummy
variable d, i.e.
In y = a + b jd  + b^ln x + € (A2.1)
The multiplicative form is:
y = A e^: ^ é  (A2.2)
where A = e^ and e is the stochastic term. When the dummy variable d equals one
bj d bj bj d
then e takes the value e and when it equals zero e takes the value one. So 
the dummy variable acts as a multiplicative shift in the production function.
A problem exists when estimating the standard function as it is described in
(A2.1). Any variable which takes on a value zero for any observation must be
included as a dummy variable rather than an ’x’ variable since we cannot take the log 
of zero. Where the level of such a variable is important in determining the level of 
the dependent variable this is unsatisfactory. To overcome this difficulty we use a
modified version of the C-D production function.
The modified function used here in estimating production functions for each crop
is:
b j d  b g Z  b j Z 2  b^
y = A e e e x (A2.3)
where z is a continuous variable containing some zero values and other variables are as
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above. In its log-linear form this is written as:
In y = a + bj d + z + bj z2 + b  ^In x (A2.4)
The marginal product (MP) of input x is as with the standard function, i.e.
dy y
—  = b, -  (A2.5)
dx X
and it seems appropriate that when taking average values these should be calculated at 
the geometric mean since the estimated function for y will go through this value. Also, 
the estimate of b  ^ is an estimate of the elasticity of y with respect to input x.
The MP of input z is:
ay
—  = y(2bg z + b J  (A2.6)
dz
and we can take average values at the arithmetic means of y and z. Notice that,
depending on the values on the right-hand side of (A2.6), the MP of z can take on
negative values. However, if we have strong a priori expectations that the MP should
be positive we are not concerned with this property of (A2.6) as long as the MP is
positive for the range of z considered. The elasticity of y with respect to z is given 
by:
z(2b, z + b j) (A2.7)
or, alternatively, by the MP of z multiplied by z/y. The dummy variables can be
interpreted as multiplicative shifts, as before, where the percentage shift in y due
b.
to d taking on the value 1 is given by (e - 1).
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Table Al
F e r t i l i z e r  Use and Farm S ize
Farm Wheat Rice C ot ton S ’cane
Acreage N U N U N U N U
a) N i t ro g en :
Less than  5 287 0.78 113 0 .62 133 0 .6 4 147 0 .67
5 -1 2 .5 574 0.82 232 0.70 313 0.81 261 0 .76
1 2 .5 -2 5 .0 205 0.85 114 0.81 92 0 .84 97 0 .84
Over 25 34 0.71 29 0.78 20 0.83 42 0 .84
All 1100 0.81 488 0.71 558 0.81 547 0.75
(b) Phosphorous :
Less than  5 105 0.29 25 0.14 40 0 .19 49 0 .22
5 -1 2 .5 293 0.42 67 0.20 150 0.39 110 0 .32
1 2 .5 -2 5 .0 108 0.45 47 0.33 50 0 .46 45 0.39
Over 25 20 0.42 14 0 .38 11 0 .46 23 0 .46
All 526 0.39 153 0 .22 251 0 .34 227 0.31
Note:  N i s  the number o f  households app ly ing  p o s i t i v e  amounts o f  
n i t r o g e n  and U i s  N d iv ided  the t o t a l  number o f  households  
Source :  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976)
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APPENDIX B
Influential Observations
One of the striking features of agriculture in Pakistan is the very unequal 
distribution of land with 76% of farm households owning less than 40% of total 
cultivated land (see Table A3.2). This is also a common characteristic of many other 
developing countries. Therefore, in any farm household survey one often observes a 
very small number of large farms. Because many other agricultural characteristics (e.g. 
output) are highly correlated with farm size the distribution of these variables are also 
often highly skewed. Econometric models used to try to explain certain features of 
agriculture in developing countries or to estimate certain behavioural responses regularly 
use such data as explanatory variables. The skewed distribution of such variables can 
have undesirable consequences for estimates in these analyses.
Influential observations are those which lie outside the pattern set by the majority 
of the data. These are usually located far from the centre (i.e. majority) of the data 
and are referred to as ’leverage points’. Such points can have an unreasonable 
influence on regression estimates when we use OLS. Using regression diagnostics we 
can attempt to identify these observations.
An excellent survey of the regression diagnostics used to detect influential 
observations is provided by Krasker et al (1983). We focus here on two indicators:
hj = X](X’X)-lxj 
and ef = e;/[s(i)/(l-hi)]
where X is the matrix of explanatory variables, Xj the vector of i ’th observations of the 
explanatory variables, yj and ÿj are the actual and predicted value of the dependent 
variable for the i ’th observation respectively, q=y^-^ is the i’th residual and s(i)^ is the 
error variance estimate after deleting the i’th observation. The hj’s are therefore the
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diagonal elements of the OLS ’hat’ matrix and ef the studentized residual. Since OLS 
works by minimizing squared residuals these residuals need to be augmented by leverage 
information when identifying influential observations. The 1^’s capture the influence of 
observation i on regression estimates. We can use 1^  to look for imbalance in the
x-data.
To analyse the influence that any single observation has on regression estimates we 
can compare the OLS estimates generated using all observations with those obtained 
when the relevant observation is deleted from the sample. Two comparisons are
particularly useful:
(i) DFFITS = [y - y(i)]/[s(i)/h(i)] where the i in brackets denotes the parameter
without the i’th observation. DFFITS is a scaled measure of the change in 
the predicted value for the i ’th observation and tells us by how many 
standard deviations the predicted value of y would shift if the relevant 
observation were deleted.
(ii) DFBETASj = [bj-bj(i)]/[s(i)AX’X)ij] where (X’X)Ü indicates the (j,j)’th
element of (X’X)"1. This captures the change in a coefficient estimate in
terms of the standard error of the coefficient.
Both of these indicators use the t^’s and e*’s in their derivation (see Krasker et
al, 1983). It is possible that an observation has a substantial influence on regression
estimates even though residuals are small when the relevant 1^  is large. The common
approach of focusing solely on residuals can therefore fail to detect observations which 
do not fit in with the pattern set by the bulk of the data especially when these 
observations are extreme (leverage) points. If many influential observations exist in a 
tight cluster then the single row deletion method described here may fail to reveal their 
existence.
An analysis of the influential diagnostics indicates substantial imbalance in the farm 
size (i.e. LAND) variable. Tables B1 to B3 present the relevant diagnostics where we 
use both farm size (LAND) and its square (LAND2) as explanatory variables along with
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other variables. From Table B1 we can see the substantial influence exerted on the 
regression estimates by the top five values of LAND - all have high h’s. Krasker 
suggests that any observation which has h greater than two or three times the number 
of parameters divided by the number of observations can be viewed as having an 
unreasonable influence on regression estimates. In our case we have nineteen parameters 
and 526 observations - a ratio of 0.036. The h’s in Table B1 are substantially greater 
than 0.108 (i.e. 0.036 x 3), observation 526 being a major problem with h = 0.61. 
This is in spite of the fact that it also has a very high scaled residual (i.e. 3.27). Its 
deletion from the sample would shift the predicted value of MS by over four standard 
deviations. Its inclusion also has an substantial impact on the estimated coefficients of 
LAND and LAND2.
The origins of the above problem lie in the fact that we have observations which 
lie a long way from the majority of the data and these can have a substantial impact 
It is possible that these data are either part of a completely separate population and our 
model is not valid for these households. For example, it may be that some large farms 
should not be included in our model which is meant to explain the behaviour of farm 
households, but should be viewed as similar to commercial estates. Since estates will 
sell all of their output on the market, i.e. they do not consume any on-farm, our 
modelling of consumption as a function of income is not valid for such observations. 
We would therefore not wish these observations to have such an influence on our 
estimates. Of course, in this case we should just exclude such farms from the sample 
and indeed this was our reason for excluding farms where on-farm consumption of 
wheat was zero. However, our fear is that there may be other such ’household’ 
idiosyncracies which are not captured by our data and which necessitate the exclusion of 
the observations from the sample. Because of the extremely heterogenous nature of 
agriculture in developing countries we should always be aware of the possible existence 
of such idiosyncries and indeed this is why we often observe low s in cross-section 
studies. Our model is meant to explain the behaviour of the majority of farms and we 
are not always able to identify characteristics which may exclude certain households 
from the population under study. It is for this reason that we are wary of any
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observation which has a very strong influence on our estimates.
Krasker et al suggest three methods for dealing with influential observations:
(i) use bounded influence (i.e. robust or resistant) estimators,
(ii) transform the data in such a way that the x-data become 
more balanced,
or (iii) delete observations with unreasonable influence.
Tables B2 and B3 show how the h’s and scaled residuals change as we eliminate 
observations. We see that as we delete observations with high influence the influence 
of the other observations increase. This problem has its origins in the distribution of
LAND. We saw earlier (see Table A3.2) that the distribution of farm units according
to farm size is very much skewed to the right. Therefore, when we delete one
influential observation another will take its place. Eliminating all leverage points would 
imply a loss of a substantial number of observations. It is in circumstances such as
this that bounded influence (BEF) estimators are most useful.
In the absence of BIF estimators and since the deletion method would lead to the 
loss of many observations we chose option (ii), i.e. we transform the data in such a 
way that the relevant variables become more balanced. One such transformation is to
express the variable in log form. So we select the exponential model, which is linear
in logs, for our analysis. This function is made more attractive since we also expect 
problems with heteroskedastic error terms. The log transformation reduces the dispersion 
in the tails of the distribution of a given variable (thus making it more symmetric) and 
so reduces the impact on estimates of observations which lie a long distance from the 
centre of the data. When we use the log of LAND as an explanatory variable the h 
statistic for observations 526 to 522 are reduced to 0.10, 0.08, 0.07, 0.05 and 0.04 
respectively.
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Table B1
E f f e c t  o f  I n f l u e n t i a l  Obse rvations  on R eg res s io n  R e s u l t s
PESETAS
Obs. hi e* DFFITS LAND LAND2
522 0.09 -2.09 -0 .66 -0 .0 4 -0 .17
523 0.11 -0 .80 -0 .28 0.05 -0 .11
524 0.12 1.28 0.46 0 .04 0.13
250 0.15 0.46 0.19 -0 .02 0 .09
526 0.61 3.27 4.06 -1 .64 3.16
Table B2
E f f e c t  o f  D e le t i o n s  o f  I n f l u e n t i a l  O b se rv a t io n s  on h ’ s
Obs . No. of O bse rva t ions
526 525 524 523 522
522 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.25
523 0.11 0.16 0.20 0 .24 -
524 0.12 0.21 0.27 - -
525 0.15 0.27 - - —
526 0.61
Table B3
E f f e c t  of D e le t io n  of I n f l u e n t i a l  O b se rv a t io n s *on e
Obs. No. o f  O b se rv a t io n s
541 525 524 523 522
522 -2 .09 -1.47 -1 .10 -0 .05 -0.:
523 -0 .80 0.01 0.38 1.13 -
524 1.28 2.54 3.18 - -
525 0.46 1.86 -
526 3.27 -
Notes:  The h j ’ s c a p tu r e  the in f lu en ce  of  o b s e r v a t i o n  i on the  r e g r e s s i o n  
r e s u l t s .  Our t h r e s h o l d  l e v e l ,  above which an o b s e r v a t i o n  i s  deemed 
to have e x c e s s iv e  leverage  on the r e s u l t s ,  i s  0 .123 .  e i s  the 
s t u d e n t i z e d  r e s i d u a l .  DFFITS c a p tu re s  the  e f f e c t  o f  an o b s e r v a t i o n  
on the f i t t e d  v a l u e s ,  while PESETAS c a p t u r e s  i t s  e f f e c t  on 
c o e f f i c i e n t  e s t i m a t e s .
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Appendix C
Notes to Tables
Table  4 .5  : (a )  uses  FACC in  the  p r o b i t  s t a g e  w hile  (b)
uses  bo th  CRDUM and NOPTIM. The ’ ro b u s t  t ’ 
s t a t i s t i c  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  u s in g  White (1980).
’** ’ i n d i c a t e s  v a r i a b l e s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the 
5% leve l  and v a r i a b l e s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the 
10% leve l  (both  u s ing  the  robus t  t - s t a t i s t i c .  
V a r ia b l e s  LAND and WHPR a re  in  l o g s ,  TOTASS is  
in  Rs’OOO and the dependent  v a r i a b l e  i f  the 
t o t a l  n i t rogenous  f e r t i l i z e r  a p p l i e d  to wheat 
( i n  kgs ) .
Tab le  4 . 6 :  Same as Table 4 .5  excep t  LANDW, the  p e r c e n ta g e  o f
t o t a l  cropped acreage  under improved wheat ,  i s  
inc luded  as an e x p l a n a to r y  v a r i a b l e  in  the t o b i t  
s t a g e ,  w ith  FACC as th e  on ly  e x p l a n a to r y  v a r i a b l e  
in  the probi  t s t a g e .
Table  A4.1: LAND, LANDW and WHPR a re  in  l o g s .  TOTASS is  in
R s ’OOO and NIT i s  kgs o f  n i t r o g e n  a p p l i e d  to 
t o t a l  wheat ac reage .
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>^)pendix D
Value Added and the Shadow Price of Land
To calculate the shadow prices of non-traded commodities (and the social
profitability of traded sectors) we need to calculate the shadow cost of factor inputs.
Since each factor input can have a different shadow price we need to separate value 
added (VA) into payments to each factor input, i.e. labour, land, capital and a residual 
(or pure profits). The input-output table available from PIDE (1985) gives a single 
value for VA and does not separate payments across factor inputs. In order to separate 
VA into factor payments we make some crude assumptions. We assumed in Ahmad, 
Coady and Stem (1988) that labour and land payments were a certain percentage of VA 
(e.g. 0.5 and 0.3 respectively for agriculture). We present here a simple model which 
helps to develop our intuition in this respect and is also used to select plausible shadow 
conversion factors (SCFs) for factor payments.
To develop our model of the agricultural sector we think in terms of a
sharecropping system. We assume that a tenant retains 50% of output but must also 
pays for 50% of the cost of certain purchased inputs (i.e. seeds and fertilizer). The 
tenant incurs all other costs (e.g. draught power) except for the transport costs of 
getting grain to the market and the cost of capital both of which we assume are paid 
for by the landlord. The landlord receives the residual after all payments, which we 
interpret as the rental on land (which effectively assumes that land is paid what is
necessary to prevent it from switching to alternative uses). So:
pY = rj^L + WjjN + pfF + pgS + p^T + PqO + iK (D5.1)
where Y, L, N, F, S, T, K and O are total output and land, labour, fertilizer, seed, 
transport, capital and ’other’ inputs respectively. The coefficients preceeding each of 
these (with lowercase subscripts) are the appropriate input prices or factor payments. 
The PIDE (1985) input-output matrix provides data on the share of certain input costs
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(i.e. fertilizer, seed, transport and ’other’ and VA) as a proportion of the value of total 
output. The relevant data are presented in Table D1 and can be used to calculate the 
shares of land and labour in VA.
From (D5.1) the payment to the landlord (rj^L), interpreted as the land rental, is:
r^L = pY - 0.5pY - 0.5pfF - O.SpgS - p^T - iK (D5.2)
since w^N, the direct payment to labour, equals 0.5pY. Substituting the values from 
Table D1 this implies:
^  = 0 .1 9
Since VA is 56% of pY this in turn implies that:
= 0 34
The net income of the sharecropper (i.e.the return to labour) is:
In = 0.5pY - O.SpfF - O.Sp^S - p^O (D5.3)
The values in Table D1 imply that:
Ir
SO that
^  -  0.25
K  = 0.45
The values calculated here for (rj^LA'^A) and (I^/VA) suggest that those used in Ahmad, 
Coady and Stem (1988), i.e. 0.3 and 0.5, as the ratio of factor payments for land and 
labour, respectively, to total factor payments, are reasonable assumptions. We use these 
ratios (i.e. 0.3 and 0.5) in deriving our results presented in §5.5.
We now turn to the SCFs for land and capital. The SCF for land (LCF) is given
by the land rental at shadow prices divided by the land rental at market prices:
pY - 0.5pY - 0 .5p jF  - 0.5pgS - p^T - ÎK
"  pV - 0.5p"Y - O.Sp^F - 0.5PgS - p^T - IK
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where p is a shadow price. Dividing both numerator and denominator by pY and 
interpreting prices as accounting ratios we get:
0 .5p  - O .5 p . 0 .  - 0.5p  0 - p 0 - Î0,
LCF = — 0 .3  - o s L  - O . d  - 0.  - V .4)
where 0j is the share of j ’s costs in the total value of output (for j=f, s, t, and k). 
Substituting values from Table D1 we get (assuming i=1.5):
_ 0 . 5 ( 1 . 3 9 )  - 0 . 5 ( 1 . 5 2 ) 0 . 0 4  - 0 . 5 ( 1 . 3 9 ) 0 . 0 4  - 0 . 8 ( 0 . 1 5 )  - 0 1 . 5 (0 . 0 3 )  
0 .5  - 0 . 5 ( 0 . 0 4 )  - 0 .0 5 (0 .0 4 )  - 0.15  - 0 .03
- 0 ^  = 1-685
Alternatively we can use a simpler model where
pY = rj^L + WjjN 
with only land and labour as inputs. The LCF is then
LCF = (D5.5)
1 - «n
where we again interpret p and w as the ARs for output and labour respectively, and 
0n is the share of labour costs. If we take 0^ = 0.3, p = 1.39 and w = 1.5 then we 
get LCF = 1.49. In the results presented in §5.5 we take a value between 1.68 and
1.49, i.e. we use LCF = 1.6.
The shadow cost of capital is made up of depreciation (the amount needed to 
maintain capital), valued at shadow prices, plus an interest cost, (i.e. fixed and working 
capital stock valued at shadow prices and multiplied by an accounting rate of interest). 
We therefore need to estimate the cost of capital at market prices and multiply by a 
SCF for capital goods (i.e. by an asset conversion factor - ACF). From the data 
available to us (Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1982 and 1983) we have been able to put
together an estimate of the market cost of capital under some admittedly crude
assumptions. If we assume that all assets depreciate by a fraction p per year and that 
a fraction a  of current investment I is used for replacement then:
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K = (a/p) I
where K is the capital stock. The cost of capital (C) is made up of interest plus 
depreciation so that:
C = [i (o/p) + a] I (D5.6)
In our analysis we have assumed that [i(o/p)+a]=l since we do not have good 
information on a  and p. One example consistent with this is i = p (say 10%) and 
0=0.5. If we define the asset conversion factor (ACF) as the ratio of the shadow to 
the market cost of capital then:
ACF =
+ a
a
'  P
+ a
.SCF (D5.7)
where SCF is the shadow cost of assets (e.g. their world price) divided by their 
domestic price, and i is the accounting rate of interest (all interest rates are in real 
terms). Dividing above and below by p/a we get
ACF = <D SCF.
where
0 =_ Î + pI + p
I f Ï = i then 0  = 1, so the ACF is then the SCF for capital goods. Since capital is 
mostly imported in Pakistan with high tariffs we expect the SCF for assets to be below 
unity. The values in Ahmad, Coady and Stem (1988) suggest a rough average over 
assets at about 0.8.
In Pakistan the government has placed great emphasis on the growth of the 
manufacturing industry. The manufacturing sector, in particular the large-scale 
manufacturing sector, has benefitted from a number of incentives which reduce the cost 
of capital, e.g. subsidized interest rates, accelerated depreciation allowances, tax holidays 
and licences for the import of capital goods (whose scarcity values were several times 
their face value). Guisinger (1981) argues that the market cost of capital, C, is
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substantially lower than the opportunity cost, C, defined as the cost that would have 
prevailed if a neutral set of government policies had been in effect and if  all markets 
had functioned smoothly, especially for large-scale manufacturing. Allowing for all these 
incentives he calculates a ratio C/C=1.27 for 1972-75. But this is an overestimate of
the ratio for the whole economy since the small-scale sector did not benefit from many
of the incentives, and Guisinger (1981, p333) suggests that this sector paid close to the 
opportunity cost of capital.
Under certain conditions (see §5.4.4) the accounting rate of interest, Î, can be taken 
as the interest rate on foreign loans. In 1975 the LIBOR was 10.19%. However, this
may not have been the marginal rate facing Pakistan since it could probably not borrow 
freely at this rate. In his analysis of the cost of capital for the early 1960s Guisinger 
(1981;p330) assumed (=15% and a subsidized rate to large-scale manufacturing of 
1=5.74%. Applying these to the equation for ACF above, with j3=10%, we get a value 
of 0=1.59 and an ACF=1.27. This value is, fortunately, the same as that calculated by 
Guisinger (1981;p332). Since all producers did not benefit from these incentives (with
many probably facing a cost nearer the opportunity cost of capital) we choose a range
of values for ACF of 1.2, 1.0 and 0.8 in calculating the results presented in §5.5.
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Table D1
Acreage! Shares Shadow P r ic e s *
Wheat 6110 (0 .37)  - 1.39
Rice 1710 (0 .10)  - 2.51
Cot ton  1852 (0 .11)  - 2 .42
Sugarcane  700 (0 .04 )  - 0 .97
Other 6524 (0 .38 )  - 0 .85
Seed - 0 .04  1.39
F e r t i l i z e r  - 0 .04  1.52
T ra n s p o r t  - 0.15 0 .80
Other  - 0.21 0 .80
C a p i t a l  - 0.03  0.80*
Value Added - 0 .56
Notes:
(1) Acreage is taken from the Pakistan Statistical Yearbook (1985), pl20-5, for the
year 1975-76. Figures in brackets are individual crop acreage as a proportion of 
total acreage allocated to these for these crops (i.e. 16.6 million hectares). These 
ratios are used as weights to calculate a single shadow price (or accounting ratio) 
for seeds.
(2) The accounting ratios for wheat, rice, cotton, cane and fertilizer are taken from the 
text. The AR for seeds is a weighted average of those for all crops. The AR’s 
for cane, transport and ’other’ are approximations of those calculated in Ahmad, 
Coady and Stem (1988).
(3) The SCF for capital is taken at 0.8, reflecting high tariffs on imports. The share 
of capital includes a rent of 0.01, taken from Ahmad, Coady and Stem (1988).
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Appendix E
Some Elasticities fot Tax Reform Analvsis
For our analysis we use the own- and cross-price supply elasticities for agricultural 
crops with respect to crop and fertilizer prices taken from Ali (1988) who estimated
own- and cross-price elasticities for the major crops in Pakistan with respect to each 
others prices and to the price of fertilizer. In order to calculate plausible price 
elasticities for fertilizer and labour demands we assume a Cobb-Douglas profit function. 
Although restrictive, this is a very convenient form which requires only average input 
shares to calculate the remaining relevant elasticities. This approach has also been used 
by Newbery (1987b) for a similar analysis of agricultural price reform.
The aggregate profit function is assumed to be:
n  =  I j  =  I i  A j  K j  q j^^ i  p
where Kj is land allocated to crop i (determined by total demand), and cq, rij and Vj
are the shares of each commodity, fertilizer and labour in the net profit of good i
respectively. By differentiation we get:
= &  = Ki q?' p '“ ‘
= ^  = w'''i = X i^
L = = -Xi V j A i K i q | * q ' p ' " ' w  ' O + V j )  =
From these equations we can show that T|j is the own-price elasticity of supply for crop 
i and that -oq is the elasticity of supply of i with respect to p, the price of fertilizer. 
We can further derive the own-price elasticity of demand for fertilizer as (l+ct) where 
â  is the weighted share across crops of fertilizer expenditure in net profit, with fertilizer 
shares as weights. The elasticity of fertilizer demand with respect to the price of crop 
i is:
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(l+'Hi) Y
where and Y are the consumption of fertilizer by crop i and the total aggregated
across crops respectively.
Likewise we can calculate labour demand responses and show that the elasticities 
of labour demand with respect to crop prices and fertilizer prices are (l+rjj)0i and
-XiOCjGj respectively where 0j is the labour allocated to crop i as a proportion of total
labour demand.
While the use of the Cobb-Douglas profit function is restrictive it does provide us 
with a simple way of calculating some elasticities necessary for our tax analysis. The 
own- and cross-price elasticities of supply for the major crops in Pakistan are taken 
from Ali (1988, p21). The elasticities of crop supply with respect to the fertilizer price 
were also taken from this source. The proportion of total fertilizer demand applied to 
individual crops were taken from the Pakistan Statistical Yearbook (1985, pl32): the
shares allocated to wheat, rice, cotton and sugarcane were calculated as 0.48, 0.12, 0.16 
and 0.11 respectively. Using these data we calculate the fertilizer demand elasticities 
with respect to individual crop prices as 0.64, 0.35, 0.37 and 0.2 for wheat, rice, cotton 
and sugarcane respectively.
The share of fertilizer expenditures in net profit for each crop are taken from 
Qureshi (1987): these are 0.29, 0.25, 0.35 and 0.13 for wheat, rice, cotton and
sugarcane respectively. Using these shares we calculate an own-price fertilizer elasticity 
of -1.239. However, one should note that if the Cobb-Douglas profit function was 
appropriate (in the sense of describing decision making by a household) then the share 
of fertilizer expenditures in net profit should be given by oq, which is also the supply
elasticity of crop i with respect to the fertilizer price, using these elasticities as the
relevant shares (taken from Ali, 1988) we calculate an own-price fertilizer demand
elasticity of -1.567. The elasticity reported in Chapter 4 was -0.83. This highlights a 
restriction of the Cobb-Douglas profit function that the term for the own-price fertilizer 
demand elasticity, i.e. -(1+ft), exceeds unity in absolute terms since fertilizer shares in 
net profit are positive. In our applied analysis we experiment with the range of
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fertilizer elasticities calculated here.
To derive the elasticity of demand for net labour supply to the formal sector with
respect to crop and fertilizer prices we need the proportion of total labour supply 
allocated across crops and between the agricultural, informal and formal sectors. In 
Chapter 5 we calculated labour coefficients for each sector. Using these we find that 
the proportion of total agricultural wage income originating in wheat, rice, cotton and
sugarcane is 0.27, 0.07, 0.13 and 0.13 respectively. Using the national accounts data on 
sectoral value added (Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1985, p368-79), allocating sectors 
between the agricultural, informal and formal sectors, and assuming that wage income 
accounts for 0.3, 0.5 and 0.6 of value added for the formal (large-scale manufacturing 
and some services), agricultural and informal (small-scale industry), and service sectors
respectively, we find that wage income in the agricultural sector is 0.72 times that in
the formal sector. We can then calculate the elasticity of net labor supply from the
consumer sector with respect to crop prices as -0.258, -0.147, -0.219 and -0.169
respectively for wheat, rice, cotton and sugarcane. Using the fertilizer shares provided 
by Qureshi (1987) we derive a net labour supply elasticity with respect to the price of 
fertilizer of 0.114, but using the own- and cross-price supply elasticities from Ali (1988)
as fertilizer shares we get a figure of 0.277.
Finally, the national accounts data can be used to estimate a value for total labour
income in the formal sector at R sl8,916 million, equivalent to nearly 30% of the total
wage bill calculated for the whole economy. We need to reduce this number to our
sample level. To do this we calculate the total expenditure for the sample and divide 
it by total consumer expenditure for the economy. The resulting figure, i.e. 0.0001, is 
used to scale down the formal sector wage bill to get to the sample equivalent.
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Table A 3.la
Marketed Surp lus for  Wheat (Improved!
Farm S ize  
( a c r e s )
No. of  
Farms
% wi th  
Surplus=0
Less  than 5 . 0  
5 . 0  - 12.5 
12.5 - 25 .0  
Over 25 .0
369
713
259
114
0.87
0 .64
0.43
0.22
0.37
0.38
0.41
0 .56
0.02
0.18
0.20
0 .60
All 1455 0.63 0.41 1.00
P rov ince  
Punj ab 
Sind 
NWFP
1036
372
47
0 .60
0.67
0.91
Farm Tenure 
Pure owners 
Pure t e n a n t s  
O w n e r - l a n d l ’ s 
Owner- tenan ts
849
376
54
176
0.59
0.75
0.50
0.58
Source :  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976).
Note: (1) s i s  the average surp lus  share  for  househo lds  t h a t  have s a l e s
(2)  S i s  the share  in t o t a l  sample s u r p l u s .
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Table A3.lb
Marketed Surplus for  Rice fImproved^
Farm S ize  
( a c r e s )
No. of  
Farms
% wi th 
Surplus>0
Less than 5 .0  
5 . 0  - 12.5 
12.5 - 25 .0  
Over 25 .0
181
332
147
51
0.67
0.47
0.35
0.18
0.53
0.55
0.59
0 .7 0
0 .04
0 .26
0 .30
0 .40
All 711 0.48 0.57 1.00
Prov ince  
Punj ab 
Sind 
NWFP
460
247
4
0.48
0.47
1.00
Farm Tenure 
Pure owners 
Pure t e n a n t s  
O w n e r - l a n d l ’ s 
Owner- tenan ts
382
215
30
84
0.47
0.53
0.67
0.59
Source :  Indus Bas in  Survey (1976).
Note: (1)  s i s  the average su rp lus  share fo r  househo lds  t h a t  have s a l e s
(2)  S i s  the share  in t o t a l  sample s u r p l u s .
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Table A3.2
(a ) Number and Area o f  Farms hv S iz e .  1972
Farm S ize Nq , o f  Farms Farm Area C u l t i v a t e d  Are
( a c r e s ) % Cuml% % Cuml% % Cuml %
Less than  2 .5 14 14 1 1 2 2
2 .5  - 5 .0 14 28 4 5 4 6
5 . 0  - 12.5 15 43 7 12 8 14
12.5 - 25 .0 24 67 18 30 20 34
25 .0  - 50 .0 28 96 19 76 19 82
Over 50 .0 4 100 24 100 18 100
(b) Number and Area of  Farms bv S i z e . 1980
Farm S ize  
( h e c t a r e s ) ^
No. o f  Farms 
% Cuml%
Farm Area 
% Cuml%
C u l t i v a t e d  Area 
% Cuml %
Less than  0 .5 10 10 1 1 1 1
0 .5  - 1.0 10 20 2 3 2 3
1 .0  - 2 .0 17 37 5 8 6 9
2 . 0  - 3 .0 17 54 9 17 10 19
3 .0  - 5 .0 22 76 19 36 20 39
5 . 0  - 10.0 16 92 24 60 26 65
10.0  - 20 .0 6 98 18 78 17 82
2 0 .0  - 60 .0 2 100 14 92 12 94
Over 60.0 - 100 8 100 6 100
Sources : Paki Stan S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook (1981 and 1986).
Notes : (1) 1 h e c t a r e  = 2.471 a c r e s .
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T able A3.3
Data Summary S t a t i s t i c s  
V a r i a b l e  Mean SD Min Max
F u l l  Sample (1437 o b s e r v a t i o n s )
LAND 11.20 12.71 0 .7 0 156.00
LANDL 2.06 0.81 -0 .3 6 5.05
WHPR 0.96 0.06 0 .5 4 2 .14
WHPRL -0.05 0.05 -0 .6 2 0.76
NUMTOT 11.07 6.81 1.00 63.00
NUMTOTL 2.24 0.58 0 .0 0 4 .14
MEN 3.12 1.99 1.00 20.00
MENL 0.96 0 .60 0 .0 0 3 .00
WOMEN 2.66 1.78 0 .0 0 16.00
BOYS 1.23 1.48 0 .0 0 14.00
GIRLS 1.04 1.48 0 .0 0 16.00
CHILD 3.02 3.02 0 .0 0 31.00
NUMOTH 7.95 5.49 0 .0 0 0.53
DIST 0.47 0.53 0 .0 0 5 .00
TRAC 0.05 0.21 0 .0 0 1.00
BULL 0.37 0.48 0 .0 0 1.00
DONK 0.33 0.47 0 .0 0 1.00
OTHTR 0.14 0 .34 0 .0 0 1.00
PTEN 0.26 0 .44 0 .0 0 1.00
OTEN 0.12 0.33 0 .0 0 1.00
OLRD 0.04 0.19 0 .0 0 1.00
CREDIT 0.25 0.43 0 .00 1.00
JOB 0.07 0.25 0 .00 1.00
SLSAL 0.19 0.39 0 .00 1.00
GSAL 0.05 0.22 0 .00 1.00
SYSAL 0.22 0.41 0 .00 1.00
PUNJ 0.71 0.45 0 .00 1.00
NWFP 0.03 0.18 0 .00 1.00
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Trunca ted  Sample (529 o b s e rv a t i o n s !
LAND 16.80 17.37 0 .7 0 156.00
LANDL 2.49 0.77 -0 .3 6 5.05
WHPR 0.95 0.09 0 .5 4 2.14
WHPRL -0.05 0.08 -0 .6 2 0.76
NUMTOT 11.62 7.21 1.00 53.00
NUMTOTL 2.28 0.61 0 .0 0 3.97
MEN 3.37 2.09 1.00 15.00
MENL 1.04 0.61 0 .0 0 2.71
WOMEN 2.79 1.85 0 .0 0 14.00
BOYS 1.27 1.52 0 .0 0 14.00
GIRLS 1.09 1.44 0 .0 0 10.00
CHILD 3.10 3.06 0 .0 0 22.00
NUMOTH 8.24 5.79 0 .0 0 41 .00
NUMOTHL 1.90 0.69 0 .0 0 3.71
DIST 0.51 0.51 0 .0 0 5 .00
TRAC 0.08 0.28 0 .0 0 1.00
BULL 0.36 0.48 0 .0 0 1.00
DONK 0.37 0.48 0 .00 1.00
OTHTR 0.12 0.33 0 .00 1.00
PTEN 0.17 0.38 0 .0 0 1.00
OTEN 0.14 0.34 0 .0 0 1.00
OLRD 0.05 0.22 0 .0 0 1.00
CREDIT 0.30 0.46 0 .00 1.00
JOB 0.04 0.19 0 .00 1.00
SLSAL 0.17 0.38 0 .00 1.00
GSAL 0.02 0.14 0 .00 1.00
SVSAL 0.23 0.42 0 .00 1.00
PUNJ 0.76 0.42 0 .0 0 1.00
NWFP 0.01 0.09 0 .0 0 1.00
MS 3494.60 6827.10 37.32 79130.00
MSL 7.34 1.21 3 .62 11.28
PC 2523.70 2598.60 112.00 26130.00
FCL 7.52 0.78 4 .72 10.17
Y 8079.40 10416.00 373 .20 91220.00
YL 8.59 0.85 5 .92 11.42
Note: The v a lues  of  NUMOTHL are  in  r e l a t i o n  to the  sm a l l e r  sample 
o f  524 o b s e r v a t i o n s .  See Table 3 .3  fo r  v a r i a b l e  d e f i n i t i o n s .
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Table A3.
R e s u l t s  from P ro b i t
4
R e g re s s io n
C o e f f i c i e n t t - s t a t Robust  t
I n t e r c e p t -1 .93 -8 .0 0 -7 .8 0
LANDL 0.82 13.00 14.00
NUMTOT -0.02 -3 .9 0 -3 .9 0
DIST -0 .02 -0 .27 -0 .3 0
TRAC 0.45 1.90 1.90
BULL 0.36 2 .60 2 .50
DONK 0.36 2 .50 2 .50
OTHTR 0.08 0 .47 0 .46
PTEN -0.56 -5 .7 0 -5 .7 0
OTEN -0.16 -1 .4 0 -1 .5 0
OLRD -0.21 -1 .1 0 -0 .96
CREDIT 0.19 2 .20 2 .20
JOB -0.08 -0 .46 -0 .44
SLSAL 0.01 0 .04 0 .04
GSAL -0.23 -0 .78 -0 .73
SVSAL 0.04 0 .42 0.42
PUNJ -0 .06 -0 .33 -0 .33
NWFP -0.08 -1 .9 0 -1 .7 0
Log-L ike l ihood  = -771.89 
L og-L ike l ihood  w i th  c o n s ta n t  only = -945.48  
L i k e l i h o o d  r a t i o  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  = 347.16 
Number o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s  = 1437
Note: The robus t  t - s t a t i s t i c  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  u s in g  White (1980)
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Table A4.1
Data S t a t i s t i c s  
(a )  Households Applying F e r t i l i z e r  :
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max.
FACC 1.00 0 .03 1.00 1.00
LANDW 1.53 0 .70 -1 .61 3.55
LAND 1.98 0.71 -0 .36 4 .29
TOTASS 17.26 20.89 0 316.50
NUMTOT 10.81 6.43 1.00 63.00
DISTV 0.72 0 .77 0 7 .00
DISTC 8.24 6.08 0 40 .00
E2 1.02 0 .28 0 2.43
WHPR -1.15 0 .14 -2 .2 9 2 .17
CMYLR 0.04 0 .20 0 1
PHOS 0.48 0 .50 0 1
NTOPD 0.47 0 .50 0 1
TW 0.37 0 .48 0 1
JOB 0.07 0.25 0 1
SLSAL 0.26 0 .44 0 1
GSAL 0.20 0 .4 0 0 1
NSAL 0.32 0 .47 0 1
OWNL 0.03 0 .18 0 1
OWNT 0.12 0 .32 0 1
PTEN 0.27 0 .44 0 1
IPRIV 0.24 0 .42 0 1
IINAD 0.02 0.15 0 1
IMIX 0.03 0 .16 0 1
NOPTIMl 0.49 0 .50 0 1
PUNJ 0.71 0.45 0 1
NWFP 0.04 0 .19 0 1
NIT 141.46 108.58 8.49 598.49
No. o f  O b se rv a t io n s  = 1099
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(b) All Households :
V a r ia b l e Mean S.D. Min. Max.
FACC 0.90 0 .3 0 0 1
LANDW 1.51 0 .72 -1 .61 3.91
LAND 1.96 0 .72 -0 .36 4 .29
TOTASS 16.98 20 .30 0 316.50
NUMTOT 10.75 6.43 1.00 63.00
DISTV 0.72 0 .76 0 7 .00
DISTC 8.42 6 .14 0 40 .00
E2 1.05 0 .32 0 2.43
WHPR -1.15 0 .1 4 -2 .89 2.17
CMYLR 0.04 0 .2 0 0 1
PHOS 0.39 0 .49 0 1
NTOPD 0.39 0 .49 0 1
TW 0.35 0.48 0 1
JOB 0.07 0 .26 0 1
SLSAL 0.25 0.43 0 1
GSAL 0.20 0 .4 0 0 1
NSAL 0.33 0 .47 0 1
OWNL 0.03 0 .17 0 1
OWNT 0.12 0 .32 0 1
PTEN 0.27 0 .4 4 0 1
IPRIV 0.22 0.41 0 1
IINAD 0.05 0 .22 0 1
IMIX 0.04 0 .19 0 1
NOPTIMl 0.52 0 .50 0 1
PUNJ 0.70 0 .46 0 1
NWFP 0.03 0 .18 0 1
NIT 115.01 112.37 8.49 598.49
O bse rva t ions = 1351
Note: See Appendix for  notes
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Table A5.1
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  S e c t o r s
Sec to r Case A Case B
01 Wheat M M
02 Rice X X
03 Cot ton X X
04 Sugarcane N N
05 Tobacco Growing M M
06 O i1 seeds M M
07 Pul ses N N
08 Other Crops M M
09 L ives tock M M
10 Fi shing X X
11 F o r e s t r y N N
12 Mining & Quarrying M M
13 Grain  M i l l ing N N
14 Rice M i l l in g  & Husking N N
15 Ed ib le  O i ls M M
16 Sugar Ref in ing M N
17 Gur and Khandsari N N
18 Tea Blending M N
19 F i s h  & P re p a r a t i o n s X X
20 C onfec t ione ry  & Bakery N N
21 Other Food I n d u s t r i e s X X
22 Beverages M M
23 Tobacco Products X X
24 Bid i s N N
25 Cotton  Yarn X X
26 Cotton  Ginning N N
27 Cotton T e x t i l e s  (Large S c a l e ) X X
28 Cotton T e x t i l e s  (Small S c a l e ) X X
29 S i l k  & S y n th e t i c  T e x t i l e s M N
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & Hosiery M N
31 T h rea d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s M M
32 Carpets  & Rugs X X
33 Made-up Garments X X
34 Footwear (Non-rubber) X X
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e M N
36 Paper & Products M N
37 P r i n t i n g  and P u b l i s h in g N N
38 Lea ther  & Products X X
39 Rubber Footwear X X
40 Rubber Products M N
41 P harm aceu t ica ls M N
42 F e r t i l i z e r M M
43 Perfumes & Cosmetics M N
44 P a i n t s  & Varnishes M M
45 Soaps & D ete rgen ts M M
46 Chemicals M N
47 P l a s t i c  P roducts M M
48 Petro leum Products M N
49 Cement X X
50 Glass & Products M M
51 Non-metal Mineral P roduc ts M M
52 Bas ic  Metal s M M
53 Metal P roduc ts M M
54 Iro n  & S te e l  Remoulding N N
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery M M
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery M M
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery M M
58 B ic y c le s N N
59 T ra n s p o r t  (Large Sca le ) M N
60 S h ip b u i l d in g N N
61 T ra n s p o r t  Equipment (Small S c a l e ) M N
62 O f f i c e  Equipment M N
63 S p o r t s  Goods X X
64 S u rg ic a l  Ins truments X X
65 Other Large Scale  Manufac tur ing X X
66 Other Small Sca le  Manufac tur ing N N
67 Low-cost R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i ld ing N N
68 Luxur ious  R e s id e n t i a l  B u i ld in g N N
69 Rural  B u i ld ings N N
70 F a c t o ry  B u i ld ings N N
71 P u b l i c  B u i ld ings N N
72 Roads N N
73 I n f r a s t r u c t u r e N N
74 Ownership o f  Dwell ings N N
75 E l e c t r i c i  ty N N
76 Gas N N
77 Wholesa le & R e ta i l  Trade N N
78 Road T ranspo r t N N
79 Rai l  T ranspo r t N N
80 Air  T ranspo r t N N
81 Water T ranspo r t N N
82 T e l e v i s i o n N N
83 Radio N N
84 Phone,  Telegraph  & Post N N
85 Banking & Insurance N N
86 Government N N
87 S e rv ic e s N N
Note:  M, X and N d eno te ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  s e c t o r s  which a re  im p o r ta b l e ,  
e x p o r t a b l e  and non - t raded  on the margin .
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Table A5.2
N on- t raded  Accounting  R a t io s  : Case A
ACF = 1.2
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
04 Sugarcane 1.170 1.054 0.937
07 Pul ses 1.090 1.031 0.971
11 F o r e s t r y 1.164 1.037 0.910
13 G ra in  M i l l i n g 1.430 1.402 1.375
14 Rice M i l l i n g  & Husking 2.132 2.100 2.068
17 Gur and Khandsari 1.129 1.009 0.888
20 C o n fe c t io n e ry  & Bakery 0.961 0.905 0.850
24 Bidi  s 0 .822 0.727 0.632
26 Cot ton  Ginning 2.157 2.141 2.125
37 P r i n t i n g  and P u b l i s h i n g 0. 866 0.795 0.724
54 I ro n  & S te e l  Remoulding 0.872 0.752 0.633
58 B ic y c le s 0 .907 0.868 0.830
60 S h ip b u i Id in g 1.058 0.992 0.926
66 Other Small S ca le  Manufac turing 0.767 0.698 0.630
67 Low-cost  R e s i d e n t i a l  Bu i ld ing 0 .959 0 .880 0.801
68 Luxurious  R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i ld ing 0 .954 0.872 0.790
69 Rural B u i ld in g s 0 .949 0.851 0.753
70 F a c t o ry  B u iId ings 0.941 0.864 0.786
71 P u b l i c  B u i ld in g s 0.931 0.844 0.756
72 Roads 0 .920 0.832 0.744
73 I n f r a s t r u c t u r e 1.540 1.457 1.374
74 Ownership o f  Dwell ings 1.124 0.982 0 .840
75 E l e c t r i c i  ty 2.701 2.576 2.450
76 Gas 2.621 2.495 2.368
77 Wholesale & R e t a i l  Trade 0.983 0.835 0.687
78 Road T ra n s p o r t 0 .944 0.869 0.793
79 R ai l  T ra n s p o r t 1.336 1.243 1.150
80 Air T ran s p o r t 0 .969 0.869 0.768
81 Water T ran s p o r t 0 .950 0.812 0 .674
82 T e l e v i s i o n 0.999 0.903 0.808
83 Radio 1.017 0.881 0 .745
84 Phone,  Te leg raph  & Post 1.254 1.116 0.978
85 Banking & Insurance 0.973 0.838 0.703
86 Government 1.264 1.131 0 .998
87 S e r v i c e s 0 .982 0 .834 0.686
ACF = 1 . 0 :
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40  1.15 0 .90
04 Sugarcane 1.158 1.042 0 .925
07 P u i s e s  1.077 1.017 0.958
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11 F o r e s t r y 1.155 1.028 0.901
13 G ra in  M i l l i n g 1.404 1.377 1.349
14 Rice M i l l i n g  & Husking 2.103 2.071 2.039
17 Gur and Khandsari 1.114 0.993 0.872
20 C o n fe c t io n e ry  & Bakery 0.929 0.874 0.818
24 B id i s 0.811 0.716 0.621
26 Co t ton  Ginning 2.135 2.119 2.104
37 P r i n t i n g  and P u b l i s h in g 0.837 0.766 0.695
54 I ro n  & S te e l  Remoulding 0.853 0.734 0.614
58 B ic y c le s 0.881 0.842 0.803
60 S h i p b u i l d in g 1.027 0.962 0.896
66 Other  Small Sca le  Manufactur ing 0.759 0.690 0.622
67 Low-cost R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i ld ing 0.955 0.877 0.798
68 Luxur ious  R e s i d e n t i a l  Bui ld ing 0.948 0.866 0.784
69 Rura l  B u i ld in g s 0.945 0.846 0.748
70 F a c t o ry  B u i ld in g s 0.937 0.860 0.782
71 P u b l i c  B u i ld in g s 0.925 0.838 0.751
72 Roads 0.918 0.830 0.742
73 I n f r a s t r u c t u r e 1.434 1.351 1.268
74 Ownership o f  Dwell ings 1.078 0.935 0.793
75 E l e c t r i c i t y 2.394 2.268 2.142
76 Gas 2.328 2.201 2.074
77 Wholesa le & R e t a i l  Trade 0.959 0.811 0.663
78 Road T ra n s p o r t 0.925 0.850 0.774
79 R ai l  T ra n s p o r t 1.255 1.162 1.069
80 Air  T ra n s p o r t 0.946 0.846 0.745
81 Water T ran s p o r t 0.932 0.795 0.657
82 T e l e v i s i o n 0.979 0.884 0.789
83 Radio 0.987 0.851 0.715
84 Phone,  Te leg raph  & Post 1.184 1.046 0.908
85 Banking & Insurance 0.951 0.816 0.681
86 Government 1.193 1.060 0.927
87 S e r v i c e s 0.958 0.810 0.663
ACF = 0.
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
04 Sugarcane 1.147 1.030 0.914
07 Pul ses 1.064 1.004 0.944
11 F o r e s t r y 1.146 1.019 0.892
13 G ra in  M i l l i n g 1.378 1.351 1.323
14 Rice M i l l i n g  & Husking 2.075 2.042 2.010
17 Gur and Khandsari 1.098 0.977 0.857
20 C o n fe c t io n e ry  & Bakery 0.898 0.842 0.787
24 Bidi  s 0.800 0.705 0.609
26 Co t ton  Ginning 2.113 2.098 2.082
37 P r i n t i n g  and P u b l i s h in g 0.808 0.737 0.666
54 I ro n  & S te e l  Remoulding 0.835 0.715 0.595
58 B ic y c le s 0.855 0.816 0.777
60 S h i p b u i l d in g 0.997 0.931 0.865
66 Other  Small Sca le  Manufacturing 0.750 0.682 0.613
67 Low-cost R e s i d e n t i a l  Bu i ld ing 0.952 0.873 0.795
68 Luxur ious  R e s i d e n t i a l  Build ing 0.943 0.861 0.779
69 Rural  B u i ld in g s 0.940 0.841 0.743
70 F a c t o ry  B u i ld in g s 0.934 0.856 0.778
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71 P u b l i c  B u i ld in g s 0 .919 0.832 0.745
72 Roads 0 .916 0.828 0.740
73 I n f r a s t r u c t u r e 1.327 1.244 1.161
74 Ownership o f  Dwell ings 1.031 0.889 0.747
75 E l e c t r i c i t y 2 .086 1.961 1.835
76 Gas 2 .034 1.907 1.781
77 Wholesale & R e t a i l  Trade 0 .935 0.787 0.639
78 Road T ra n s p o r t 0 .907 0.831 0.755
79 Rai l  T ran s p o r t 1.174 1.081 0.988
80 Air  T ra n s p o r t 0 .924 0.823 0.723
81 Water T ran s p o r t 0 .915 0.777 0.640
82 T e l e v i s i o n 0.960 0.865 0.770
83 Radio 0 .957 0.821 0.685
84 Phone,  T e leg raph  & Pos t 1.114 0.976 0.838
85 Banking & Insurance 0 .929 0 .794 0.659
86 Government 1.122 0.989 0.856
87 S e r v i c e s 0 .934 0.787 0.639
Note: ACF and WCF a r e ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  the a s s e t  and wage c o n v e r s io n  
f a c t o r s .  See Table A5.1 fo r  s e c to r  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s .
ACF = 1.2 :
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Table A5.3
Socia l  P r o f i t a b i l i t y  : Case A
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
01 Wheat 0 .166 0 .222 0.279
02 Rice 0.527 0.563 0.599
03 Cot ton 0.506 0 .549 0.591
05 Tobacco Growing -0 .512 -0 .397 -0 .277
06 O i1 seeds -0 .520 -0.421 -0 .319
08 Other Crops -0 .836 -0 .720 -0.598
09 L i v e s to c k -0 .078 0.002 0.084
10 Fi shing 0.047 0 .156 0.265
12 Mining & Quarry ing -0.191 -0 .088 0.018
15 E d i b l e  O i l s -0 .195 -0 .177 -0 .159
16 Sugar R e f in in g -0 .193 -0 .106 -0 .014
18 Tea Blending 0.063 0.088 0.113
19 F i s h  & P r e p a r a t i o n s 0.042 0 .072 0.103
21 Other  Food I n d u s t r i e s 0 .144 0.206 0.269
22 Beverages -2 .156 -2 .216 -2 .294
23 Tobacco P roduc ts 0 .586 0.611 0.636
25 C o t ton  Yarn -0 .602 -0 .557 -0 .512
27 C o t ton  T e x t i l e s  (Large Sca le) -0 .423 -0 .365 -0 .306
28 C ot ton  T e x t i l e s  (Small Sca le) 0 .129 0 .172 0.215
29 S i l k  & S y n t h e t i c  T e x t i l e s -0 .630 -0 .587 -0 .540
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & Hosiery -0 .693 -0 .662 -0.628
31 T h r e a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s -0 .408 -0.371 -0.331
32 C arp e t s  & Rugs 0.211 0.265 0.319
33 Made-up Garments 0 .144 0.182 0 .220
34 Footwear (Non-rubber) -0 .066 -0 .010 0.047
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e 0.013 0.105 0.196
36 Paper  & P ro d u c ts -0 .166 -0 .112 -0 .054
38 L e a th e r  & P roduc ts 0.373 0.388 0.403
39 Rubber Footwear 0.153 0.218 0.283
40 Rubber P roduc ts -0 .324 -0 .277 -0 .226
41 P h a rm a c e u t i c a l s 0.121 0.151 0 .182
42 F e r t i 1i z e r 0.315 0.347 0.380
43 Perfumes & Cosmetics -3 .135 -3 .063 -2.981
44 P a i n t s  & V arn ishes 0.031 0.051 0.071
45 Soaps & D e te rg e n t s 0 .052 0.079 0.107
46 Chemicals -0.031 0.021 0.075
47 P l a s t i c  P roduc ts 0 .055 0.125 0.198
48 P e t ro leum  P ro d u c ts -0 .064 -0 .044 -0 .024
49 Cement -0 .016 0.047 0.110
50 Glass  & P ro d u c ts -1 .875 -1 .744 -1.603
51 Non-metal Mineral  Products -0 .019 0.025 0.070
52 B as ic  Meta ls -0 .150 -0 .107 -0 .062
53 Metal P roduc ts -0.085 0 .004 0.097
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 0 .024 0 .050 0.076
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0 .050 0.097 0.146
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery -0 .052 -0 .016 0.020
59 T ra n s p o r t  (Large Sca le ) -0 .265 -0 .234 -0.201
61 T ra n s p o r t  Equipment (Small S ca le ) 0 .014 0.069 0 .124
62 O f f i c e  Equipment 0 .076 0.109 0 .144
63 S p o r t s  Goods 0 .053 0 .094 0 .136
64 S u r g ic a l  Ins t rum ents 0 .288 0.355 0 .422
65 Other  Large S ca le  Manufacturing 0.417 0.462 0 .507
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ACF = 1 .0 :
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .9 0
01 Wheat 0.171 0.227 0.285
02 Rice 0.533 0 .569 0.605
03 Cotton 0.511 0 .554 0.596
05 Tobacco Growing -0 .507 -0 .392 -0.271
06 O i1 seeds -0 .512 -0 .414 -0.311
08 Other  Crops -0 .830 -0.713 -0 .590
09 L i v e s to c k -0 .072 0.008 0.089
10 Fi shing 0 .100 0.209 0.318
12 Mining & Quarrying -0 .176 -0.073 0 .034
15 E d i b l e  O i l s -0 .169 -0 .150 -0.131
16 Sugar R e f in in g -0 .158 -0 .069 0.023
18 Tea Blending 0.084 0.109 0.134
19 F i s h  & P r e p a r a t i o n s 0 .064 0.094 0.125
21 Other  Food I n d u s t r i e s 0 .169 0.232 0.294
22 Beverages -2 .110 -2.165 -2 .237
23 Tobacco P roduc ts 0 .607 0.632 0.657
25 Co t ton  Yarn -0 .562 -0 .517 -0 .472
27 Co t ton  T e x t i l e s  (Large Sca le) -0 .386 -0 .327 -0 .269
28 C ot ton  T e x t i l e s  (Small Sca le) 0 .137 0.180 0.223
29 S i l k  & S y n th e t i c  T e x t i l e s -0 .585 -0 .540 -0.491
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & Hosiery -0 .659 -0 .626 -0 .590
31 T h r e a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s -0 .370 -0.331 -0 .289
32 C arpe t s  & Rugs 0 .234 0.288 0.342
33 Made-up Garments 0 .165 0.203 0.242
34 Footwear (Non-rubber) -0 .046 0.011 0.068
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e 0 .039 0.130 0.222
36 Paper  & Produc ts -0.121 -0 .065 -0 .004
38 L e a th e r  & P roduc ts 0.388 0.403 0.418
39 Rubber Footwear 0 .179 0.244 0.308
40 Rubber P roduc ts -0 .289 -0 .240 -0 .187
41 P h a rm a c e u t i c a l s 0 .146 0 .176 0.208
42 F e r t i 1i z e r 0 .356 0.389 0.423
43 Perfumes & Cosmetics -3 .067 -2 .990 -2.901
44 P a i n t s  & V arn ishes 0 .058 0.078 0.099
45 Soaps & D e te rge n ts 0 .076 0.103 0 .132
46 Chemicals 0 .015 0.068 0.123
47 P l a s t i c  P roduc ts 0 .080 0.151 0 .224
48 P e t ro leum  Produc ts -0 .040 -0 .020 0 .000
49 Cement 0 .060 0.123 0.187
50 Glass  & Produc ts -1 .756 -1 .619 -1 .473
51 Non-metal Mineral P roducts 0 .003 0.047 0.093
52 B as ic  Meta ls -0 .113 -0 .070 -0 .023
53 Metal P roduc ts -0 .059 0.030 0 .125
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 0 .046 0.072 0 .099
56 Other  N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0 .080 0.128 0.177
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery -0 .026 0.010 0 .047
59 T ra n s p o r t  (Large Scale) -0 .237 -0 .205 -0 .172
61 T ra n s p o r t  Equipment (Small Sca le) 0 .033 0.089 0.145
62 O f f i c e  Equipment 0 .103 0.137 0.172
63 S p o r t s  Goods 0.076 0.117 0.158
64 S u r g i c a l  Ins t rum en ts 0.311 0.378 0.445
65 Other  Large Sca le  Manufacturing 0.439 0.484 0.529
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ACF = 0 . 8 :
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
01 Wheat 0 .176 0.233 0.290
02 Rice 0 .539 0.575 0.611
03 Cot ton 0 .516 0.558 0.601
05 Tobacco Growing -0 .502 -0 .386 -0.265
06 O i1 seeds -0 .505 -0 .406 -0 .302
08 Other Crops -0 .823 -0 .706 -0.582
09 L i v e s to c k -0 .067 0.014 0.095
10 Fi shing 0 .152 0.261 0.370
12 Mining & Quarry ing -0 .162 -0 .057 0.050
15 E d ib le  O i l s -0 .142 -0 .123 -0 .104
16 Sugar R e f in in g -0 .123 -0 .033 0.061
18 Tea Blending 0 .106 0.131 0.156
19 F i s h  & P r e p a r a t i o n s 0 .086 0.117 0.147
21 Other  Food I n d u s t r i e s 0 .195 0.257 0.319
22 Beverages -2 .062 -2 .111 -2 .177
23 Tobacco P roduc ts 0 .627 0.652 0.677
25 C ot ton  Yarn -0.521 -0 .476 -0.431
27 Cot ton  T e x t i l e s  (Large Sca le ) -0 .348 -0 .290 -0.231
28 Co t ton  T e x t i l e s  (Small S ca le ) 0 .145 0.188 0.231
29 S i l k  & S y n th e t i c  T e x t i l e s -0 .540 -0 .492 -0.441
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & Hos ie ry -0 .625 -0 .590 -0 .552
31 T h r e a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s -0.331 -0.291 -0.247
32 C arpe t s  & Rugs 0 .257 0.311 0.365
33 Made-up Garments 0 .186 0 .224 0.263
34 Footwear (Non-rubber) -0 .025 0.032 0.088
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e 0 .064 0.156 0.247
36 Paper  & P roduc ts -0 .075 -0 .016 0.046
38 L e a th e r  & Produc ts 0 .403 0.418 0.433
39 Rubber Footwear 0 .204 0.269 0.334
40 Rubber P ro d u c ts -0 .253 -0 .202 -0.148
41 P h a rm a c e u t i c a l s 0.171 0 .202 0.234
42 F e r t i 1i z e r 0 .398 0.431 0.466
43 Perfumes & Cosmetics -2 .997 -2 .914 -2 .819
44 P a i n t s  & Varn ishes 0 .084 0.105 0.127
45 Soaps & D e te rg e n ts 0 .100 0.128 0.157
46 Chemicals 0 .062 0.116 0.172
47 P l a s t i c  P roduc ts 0 .106 0.178 0.251
48 P e t ro leum  Produc ts -0 .017 0 .004 0.025
49 Cement 0 .137 0 .200 0.263
50 G lass  & Produc ts -1 .635 -1 .493 -1.341
51 Non-metal Mineral  P roducts 0 .025 0 .070 0.116
52 Bas ic  Metals -0 .077 -0 .032 0.016
53 Metal P roduc ts -0 .034 0 .057 0.152
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 0 .069 0.095 0.122
56 Other  N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0 .110 0.159 0.208
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery 0.001 0.038 0.075
59 T ra n s p o r t  (Large Scale) -0 .208 -0 .175 -0 .142
61 T ra n s p o r t  Equipment (Small Sca le ) 0 .053 0.109 0.165
62 O f f i c e  Equipment 0 .130 0.165 0.200
63 S p o r t s  Goods 0 .099 0 .140 0.181
64 S u r g i c a l  Ins t ruments 0 .335 0 .402 0.469
65 Other  Large Scale  Manufacturing 0.461 0 .506 0.551
Note:  See no te  to Table A5.2.
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Table A5.4
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
ACF = 
01
1.2 :
Wheat 1.416 1.402 1.388
05 Tobacco Growing 0.775 0 .759 0.743
06 011 seeds 0 .752 0.737 0.721
08 Other Crops 0 .614 0 .598 0.582
09 L i v e s to c k 0.998 0.991 0.985
12 Mining & Quarry ing 0.975 0.961 0.948
15 E d ib le  O i l s 0.992 0 .977 0.962
16 Sugar R e f in in g 0.682 0 .667 0.651
18 Tea Blend ing 0.965 0.959 0.952
22 Beverages 0 .242 0.212 0.183
29 S i l k  & S y n t h e t i c  T e x t i l e s 0 .566 0.545 0.523
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & Hosiery 0 .625 0.599 0.573
31 T h r e a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s 0.691 0.669 0.646
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e 0 .987 0.987 0.987
36 Paper  & P ro d u c ts 0 .758 0.731 0.704
40 Rubber P roduc ts 0 .739 0.712 0.685
41 P h a rm a c e u t i c a l s 0.993 0.976 0.959
42 F e r t i l i z e r 1.577 1.553 1.529
43 Perfumes & Cosmetics 0 .212 0.199 0.186
44 P a i n t s  & Varni shes 0 .819 0.802 0.784
45 Soaps & D e te rg e n ts 0 .999 0.982 0.965
46 Chemicals 0 .872 0.855 0.838
47 P l a s t i c  P roduc ts 0 .955 0.941 0.928
48 Pe t ro leum  P roduc ts 0 .947 0.928 0.910
50 Glass  & P roduc ts 0 .414 0 .400 0.387
51 Non-metal Mineral  P roducts 0.993 0.982 0.972
52 B as ic  Metal s 0 .824 0.799 0 .774
53 Metal P ro d u c ts 0 .935 0 .914 0.892
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 0 .997 0.987 0.977
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0.873 0 .864 0.855
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery 0 .847 0.839 0.830
59 T ra n s p o r t  (Large Scale) 0 .707 0.698 0.688
61 T ra n s p o r t  Equipment (Small S ca le ) 0 .999 0 .994 0.989
62 O f f i c e  Equipment 0 .999 0.986 0.972
ACF = 
01
1,0 :
Wheat 1.413 1.399 1.386
05 Tobacco Growing 0 .772 0.756 0.740
06 O i1 seeds 0 .749 0 .734 0.719
08 Other Crops 0 .612 0.595 0.579
09 L i v e s to c k 0 .997 0.990 0.983
12 Mining & Quarrying 0 .972 0.958 0.945
15 E d ib le  O i l s 0 .990 0.974 0.959
16 Sugar R e f in in g 0 .680 0.664 0.648
18 Tea Blend ing 0 .964 0.957 0.951
22 Beverages 0 .236 0.207 0.177
29 S i l k  & S y n t h e t i c  T e x t i l e s 0 .562 0.541 0.519
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & Hosiery 0 .620 0 .594 0.568
31 T h re a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s 0 .687 0.665 0.643
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e 0 .987 0.987 0.987
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36 Paper & P roduc ts 0.753 0.726 0.699
40 Rubber P roduc ts 0 .734 0.707 0.680
41 Pharm aceu t i ca l  s 0 .990 0.973 0.956
42 F e r t i 1i z e r 1.569 1.544 1.520
43 Perfumes & Cosmetics 0 .209 0.196 0.183
44 P a i n t s  & Varn ishes 0.815 0.798 0.781
45 Soaps & D e te rg e n t s 0 .996 0.979 0.962
46 Chemical s 0 .869 0.852 0.835
47 P l a s t i c  P roduc ts 0.953 0.939 0.925
48 P e t ro leum  Produc ts 0 .944 0.925 0.906
50 Glass  & Produc ts 0.411 0.398 0.384
51 Non-metal Mineral  P roduc ts 0.991 0.980 0.969
52 Bas ic  Metal s 0 .819 0 .794 0.769
53 Metal P roduc ts 0.931 0.909 0.888
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 0.994 0 .984 0.974
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0 .870 0.861 0.852
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery 0 .844 0.836 0.827
59 T ra n s p o r t  (Large S ca le ) 0.703 0.693 0.683
61 T ra n s p o r t  Equipment (Small S ca le ) 0.998 0.993 0.989
62 O f f i c e  Equipment 0 .997 0.983 0.969
; = 
01
0 ,9 :
Wheat 1.411 1.397 1.383
05 Tobacco Growing 0.769 0.753 0.737
06 O i1 seeds 0 .746 0.731 0.716
08 Other Crops 0 .609 0.593 0.576
09 L i v e s to c k 0.996 0.989 0.982
12 Mining & Quarrying 0.969 0.955 0.942
15 E d ib le  O i l s 0 .987 0.972 0.957
16 Sugar R e f in ing 0.677 0.661 0.645
18 Tea Blend ing 0.963 0.956 0.950
22 Beverages 0 .230 0.201 0.171
29 S i l k  & S y n t h e t i c  T e x t i l e s 0 .559 0.537 0.516
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & Hosiery 0 .616 0 .590 0.564
31 T h re a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s 0.683 0.661 0.639
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e 0 .987 0.987 0.986
36 Paper & Produc ts 0 .749 0.722 0.695
40 Rubber P roduc ts 0 .729 0.702 0.676
41 P ha rm a c e u t i c a l s 0 .987 0.970 0.953
42 F e r t i l i z e r 1.560 1.536 1.512
43 Perfumes & Cosmetics 0 .207 0 .194 0.181
44 P a i n t s  & V arn ishes 0 .812 0.795 0.778
45 Soaps & D e te rg e n ts 0.993 0.976 0.959
46 Chemicals 0 .866 0.849 0.832
47 P l a s t i c  P roduc ts 0 .950 0.936 0.922
48 P et ro leum  Produc ts 0 .940 0.922 0.903
50 Glass  & P roduc ts 0.408 0.395 0.381
51 Non-metal Mineral  P roduc ts 0.988 0.977 0.966
52 Bas ic  Metals 0 .814 0.789 0.764
53 Metal P roduc ts 0 .927 0.905 0.883
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 0 .992 0.982 0.972
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0 .868 0.859 0.850
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery 0.841 0.832 0.824
59 T ra n s p o r t  (Large S ca le ) 0 .698 0.688 0.679
61 T ra n s p o r t  Equipment (Small S ca le ) 0 .997 0.993 0.988
62 O f f ic e  Equipment 0 .994 0 .980 0.967
Note: See no te  to Table  A5.2.
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Table A5.5
N on- t raded  Accounting R a t io s  : Case B
ACF = 1.2 :
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
04 Sugarcane 1.173 1.055 0.938
07 Pul ses 1.094 1.034 0.973
11 F o r e s t r y 1.165 1.038 0.911
13 G ra in  M i l l i n g 1.435 1.406 1.378
14 Rice M i l l i n g  & Husking 2 .142 2.108 2.073
16 Sugar R e f in in g 0.816 0.738 0.660
17 Gur and Khandsari 1.132 1.011 0.890
18 Tea Blend ing 0.842 0.764 0.687
20 C o n fe c t io n e ry  & Bakery 0 .994 0.923 0.853
24 Bidi  s 0 .828 0.731 0.634
26 C ot ton  Ginning 2.159 2.143 2.127
29 S i l k  & S y n t h e t i c  T e x t i l e s 1.059 0.977 0.894
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & Hosiery 1.103 1.034 0.964
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e 0 .980 0.881 0.783
36 Paper & P ro d u c ts 0 .932 0.840 0.749
37 P r i n t i n g  and P u b l i s h i n g 0 .930 0.835 0.739
40 Rubber P roduc ts 0.991 0.918 0.845
41 P h a rm a c e u t i c a l s 0 .895 0.821 0.747
43 Perfumes & Cosmet ics 0 .898 0.811 0.723
46 Chemicals 0 .913 0.839 0.766
48 Pe t ro leum  P roduc ts 1.012 0.973 0.934
54 I ro n  & S te e l  Remoulding 0.880 0.759 0.637
58 B ic y c le s 0 .936 0.891 0.845
59 T ra n s p o r t  (Large S ca le ) 0.921 0.883 0.844
60 S h ip b u i l d in g 1.064 0.997 0.929
61 T ra n s p o r t  Equipment (Small Sca le ) 0 .985 0.888 0.791
62 O f f i c e  Equipment 0 .946 0.877 0.809
66 Other Small Sca le  Manufacturing 0.782 0.708 0.634
67 Low-cost R e s i d e n t i a l  Bui ld ing 0.960 0.881 0.802
68 Luxurious  R e s i d e n t i a l  Bu i ld ing 0.955 0.873 0.790
69 Rural  B u i ld in g s 0.951 0.852 0.753
70 F a c t o ry  B u i ld in g s 0.943 0.865 0.787
71 P u b l i c  B u i ld in g s 0.933 0.845 0.758
72 Roads 0.922 0 .834 0.745
73 I n f r a s t r u c t u r e 1.542 1.458 1.374
74 Ownership o f  Dwell ings 1.124 0 .982 0 .840
75 E l e c t r i c i  ty 2.713 2.583 2 .454
76 Gas 2.623 2 .496 2.369
77 Wholesa le & R e t a i l  Trade 0 .984 0 .836 0.687
78 Road T ran s p o r t 1.000 0 .912 0 .824
79 Rai l  T ran s p o r t 1.348 1.252 1.155
80 Air  T ran sp o r t 0 .984 0 .879 0 .774
81 Water T ran s p o r t 0.951 0.813 0.675
82 T e l e v i s i o n 0.999 0 .898 0.797
83 Radio 1.027 0.889 0.751
84 Phone,  T e leg raph  & Post 1.257 1.118 0.979
85 Banking & Insu rance 0.981 0 .843 0.706
86 Government 1.267 1.133 0 .999
87 S e r v i c e s 0.983 0 .835 0.687
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ACF = 1.0 :
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
04 Sugarcane 1.160 1.043 0.926
07 Pul ses 1.080 1.019 0.958
11 F o r e s t r y 1.155 1.028 0.901
13 G ra in  Mi 1 l i n g 1.408 1.379 1.351
14 Rice M i l l i n g  & Husking 2.111 2.076 2 .042
16 Sugar R e f in in g 0.788 0.711 0.633
17 Gur and Khandsari 1.116 0.994 0.873
18 Tea Blend ing 0 .779 0.702 0.624
20 C o n fe c t io n e ry  & Bakery 0 .953 0.883 0.812
24 B id i s 0 .815 0.718 0.621
26 C ot ton  Ginning 2.137 2.121 2.104
29 S i l k  & S y n t h e t i c  T e x t i l e s 1.008 0.926 0.843
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & Hosiery 1.069 1.000 0.931
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e 0.951 0.852 0.754
36 Paper  & P ro d u c ts 0 .877 0.785 0.693
37 P r i n t i n g  and P u b l i s h i n g 0.882 0.786 0.690
40 Rubber P ro d u c t s 0 .955 0.882 0.810
41 P h a rm a c e u t i c a l s 0.841 0.768 0.694
43 Perfumes & Cosmetics 0 .856 0.769 0.682
46 Chemicals 0 .859 0.785 0.712
48 P e t ro leum  P roduc ts 0 .985 0.946 0.907
54 I ro n  & S te e l  Remoulding 0 .860 0.738 0.616
58 B ic y c le s 0 .905 0.859 0.814
59 T ra n s p o r t  (Large S ca le ) 0 .892 0.853 0.815
60 S h ip b u i l d in g 1.032 0.965 0.897
61 T ra n s p o r t  Equipment (Small Sca le) 0 .953 0.856 0.760
62 O f f i c e  Equipment 0 .896 0.828 0.759
66 Other Small S ca le  Manufacturing 0.769 0.695 0.621
67 Low-cost  R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i ld ing 0.957 0.878 0.798
68 Luxur ious  R e s i d e n t i a l  Bu i ld ing 0.949 0.867 0.785
69 Rural B u i ld in g s 0 .946 0.847 0.748
70 F a c t o ry  B u i Id ings 0 .939 0.861 0.783
71 P u b l i c  B u i ld in g s 0 .927 0.839 0.751
72 Roads 0 .920 0.831 0.743
73 I n f r a s t r u c t u r e 1.435 1.351 1.267
74 Ownership o f  Dwell ings 1.078 0.935 0.793
75 E l e c t r i c i  ty 2.401 2.272 2.142
76 Gas 2.328 2.201 2.074
77 Wholesa le & R e t a i l  Trade 0 .960 0.812 0.663
78 Road T ran s p o r t 0 .969 0.880 0.792
79 Rai l  T ran s p o r t 1.263 1.166 1.069
80 Air T ran s p o r t 0 .956 0.851 0.746
81 Water T ran s p o r t 0 .933 0.795 0.657
82 T e l e v i s i o n 0.975 0.874 0.773
83 Radio 0 .995 0.857 0.719
84 Phone,  Te leg raph  & Pos t 1.186 1.047 0.908
85 Banking & Insu rance 0 .956 0.819 0.682
86 Government 1.195 1.062 0.928
87 S e r v i c e s 0 .959 0.811 0.663
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ACF = 0 .8 :
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
04 Sugarcane 1.148 1.031 0.913
07 Pul ses 1.066 1.005 0 .944
11 F o r e s t r y 1.146 1.019 0 .892
13 G ra in  M i l l i n g 1.381 1.352 1.324
14 Rice M i l l i n g  & Husking 2.080 2.045 2.011
16 Sugar R e f in in g 0.761 0.683 0.605
17 Gur and Khandsari 1.099 0.978 0.856
18 Tea Blend ing 0.717 0.639 0.561
20 C o n fe c t io n e ry  & Bakery 0.913 0.842 0.772
24 B id i s 0 .802 0.705 0 .609
26 C o t ton  Ginning 2.115 2.098 2 .082
29 S i l k  & S y n t h e t i c  T e x t i l e s 0 .957 0.875 0.792
30 Woollen T e x t i l e s  & Hosiery 1.035 0.966 0.897
35 Wood, Cork & F u r n i t u r e 0.921 0.823 0.725
36 Paper  & P roduc ts 0.821 0.729 0.638
37 P r i n t i n g  and P u b l i s h i n g 0.833 0.737 0.642
40 Rubber P roduc ts 0 .919 0.847 0.774
41 P h a rm a c e u t i c a l s 0.788 0.715 0.641
43 Perfumes & Cosmetics 0 .815 0.728 0.640
46 Chemicals 0.805 0.732 0.658
48 P e t ro leum  P roduc ts 0.958 0.919 0.880
54 I ro n  & S te e l  Remoulding 0.839 0.717 0.596
58 B ic y c le s 0.873 0.828 0.782
59 T ra n s p o r t  (Large S ca le ) 0 .862 0.824 0.785
60 S h ip b u i l d in g 1.000 0.933 0.865
61 T ra n s p o r t  Equipment (Small Sca le ) 0.921 0.824 0.728
62 O f f i c e  Equipment 0 .847 0.778 0.710
66 Other Small S ca le  Manufacturing 0.756 0.682 0.608
67 Low-cost R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i ld ing 0.953 0.874 0.795
68 Luxur ious  R e s i d e n t i a l  B u i ld ing 0.943 0.861 0.779
69 Rural  B u i ld in g s 0.941 0.842 0.743
70 F a c t o ry  B u i ld in g s 0 .935 0.856 0.778
71 P u b l i c  B u i ld in g s 0.921 0.833 0.745
72 Roads 0 .917 0.828 0.740
73 I n f r a s t r u c t u r e 1.328 1.244 1.160
74 Ownership o f  Dwell ings 1.031 0.889 0.747
75 E l e c t r i c i t y 2 .089 1.960 1.831
76 Gas 2 .034 1.907 1.780
77 Wholesa le & R e t a i l  Trade 0 .936 0.787 0.639
78 Road T ran s p o r t 0 .937 0.849 0.761
79 Rai l  T ran s p o r t 1.178 1.081 0.984
80 Air  T ran s p o r t 0 .928 0.823 0.718
81 Water T ran s p o r t 0 .915 0.777 0.640
82 T e l e v i s i o n 0 .950 0.849 0.748
83 Radio 0 .963 0.825 0.687
84 Phone,  T e leg raph  & Pos t 1.115 0.976 0.837
85 Banking & Insurance 0 .932 0.795 0.658
86 Government 1.124 0 .990 0.856
87 S e r v ic e s 0 .935 0.787 0.639
Note : See note  to Table  A5.2
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Table A5.6
Soc ia l  P r o f i t a b i l i t y  : Case B
ACF = 1.2:
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
01 Wheat 0 .164 0.221 0.278
02 Rice 0 .523 0 .560 0.598
03 Cotton 0 .505 0.548 0.590
05 Tobacco Growing -0 .512 -0 .397 -0 .277
06 O i1 seeds -0.521 -0 .422 -0 .320
08 Other Crops -0 .836 -0 .720 -0.598
09 L i v e s to c k -0 .078 0 .002 0.084
10 F i s h i n g 0 .044 0 .154 0.264
12 Mining & Quarry ing -0 .194 -0 .090 0.017
15 E d ib le  O i l s -0 .197 -0 .178 -0 .158
19 F i s h  & P r e p a r a t i o n s 0 .039 0.071 0.102
21 Other Food I n d u s t r i e s 0 .136 0.201 0.266
22 Beverages -2 .210 -2 .239 -2.278
23 Tobacco P roduc ts 0.581 0 .608 0.635
25 Cotton  Yarn -0 .6 2 0 -0 .572 -0 .524
27 Cotton  T e x t i l e s  (Large S ca le ) -0 .447 -0 .382 -0 .316
28 Cot ton  T e x t i l e s  (Small S ca le ) 0 .120 0 .165 0.209
31 T h r e a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s -0 .430 -0 .388 -0.343
32 C arp e t s  & Rugs 0 .089 0 .156 0.224
33 Made-up Garments 0 .137 0 .178 0.219
34 Footwear (Non-rubber) -0 .085 -0 .018 0.048
38 L ea th e r  & Produc ts 0.371 0 .388 0.405
39 Rubber Footwear 0.097 0 .182 0.266
42 F e r t i 1i z e r 0.312 0 .345 0.379
44 P a i n t s  & V arn ishes 0 .008 0.058 0.110
45 Soaps & D e te rg e n ts 0.046 0 .078 0.111
47 P l a s t i c  P roduc ts 0.042 0.118 0.196
49 Cement -0 .024 0.041 0.107
50 Glass  & P roduc ts -1 .890 -1 .739 -1 .576
51 Non-metal Minera l  P roduc ts -0 .027 0 .020 0.068
52 Bas ic  Metals -0 .153 -0 .110 -0 .064
53 Metal P roduc ts -0 .090 0.001 0.095
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 0 .019 0 .046 0.073
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0 .044 0 .094 0.145
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery -0 .057 -0 .018 0.023
63 S p o r t s  Goods 0.048 0.091 0.135
64 S u rg ic a l  Ins t rum en ts 0 .284 0 .352 0.420
65 Other Large Sca le  Manufacturing 0.405 0.461 0.517
ICF = 1 .0 :
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
01 Wheat 0 .170 0.227 0.284
02 Rice 0 .530 0.567 0.604
03 Cotton 0.510 0.553 0.596
05 Tobacco Growing -0 .507 -0 .391 -0 .270
06 O i1 seeds -0 .513 -0 .414 -0.311
08 Other Crops -0 .830 -0 .713 -0 .590
09 L iv e s to c k -0 .072 0.008 0.090
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10 Fi sh ing 0.097 0.207 0.317
12 Mining & Quarry ing -0.178 -0 .074 0.034
15 E d ib le  O i1s -0 .169 -0 .150 -0 .129
19 F i s h  & P r e p a r a t i o n s 0.062 0.093 0.124
21 Other Food I n d u s t r i e s 0.163 0.228 0.293
22 Beverages -2 .152 -2 .174 -2 .202
23 Tobacco P ro d u c ts 0.603 0.630 0.657
25 Cot ton  Yarn -0 .577 -0 .529 -0 .480
27 Co t ton  T e x t i l e s  (Large Scale) -0 .404 -0 .339 -0 .273
28 C ot ton  T e x t i l e s  (Small Sca le) 0 .130 0.174 0.219
31 T h r e a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s -0 .387 -0 .344 -0 .297
32 C a rp e t s  & Rugs 0.121 0.189 0.257
33 Made-up Garments 0 .160 0.201 0.242
34 Footwear (Non-rubber) -0 .057 0 .010 0.076
38 L e a th e r  & P ro d u c ts 0.387 0 .404 0.421
39 Rubber Footwear 0.138 0.223 0.308
42 F e r t i l i z e r 0 .354 0.388 0.423
44 P a i n t s  & V arn ishes 0.600 0.113 0.167
45 Soaps & D e te rg e n t s 0 .074 0.107 0.141
47 P l a s t i c  P ro d u c ts 0.072 0.149 0.228
49 Cement 0 .054 0 .120 0.185
50 Glass  & P roduc ts -1 .756 -1 .598 -1 .429
51 Non-metal Mineral  P roduc ts -0 .002 0.045 0.094
52 Bas ic  Metals -0 .116 -0 .072 -0 .024
53 Metal P ro d u c ts -0 .063 0.029 0.125
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 0.042 0 .070 0.097
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0.076 0.127 0.178
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery -0 .028 0.012 0.053
63 S p o r t s  Goods 0.072 0.116 0.160
64 S u rg ic a l  In s t rum en ts 0.309 0.377 0.445
65 Other Large S ca le  Manufacturing 0.436 0.492 0.548
ICF = 0 . 8 :
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
01 Wheat 0.176 0.233 0.291
02 Ri ce 0.537 0 .574 0.611
03 Cotton 0.516 0.558 0.601
05 Tobacco Growing -0 .502 -0 .386 -0 .264
06 O i1 seeds -0 .505 -0 .406 -0 .302
08 Other Crops -0.823 -0 .706 -0 .582
09 L i v e s to c k -0 .066 0 .014 0.096
10 Fi sh ing 0.150 0 .260 0.370
12 Mining & Quar ry ing -0 .163 -0 .057 0.051
15 E d ib le  O i l s -0 .142 -0.121 -0.101
19 F i s h  & P r e p a r a t i o n s 0.085 0.116 0.147
21 Other Food I n d u s t r i e s 0 .190 0.255 0.321
22 Beverages -2.091 -2 .104 -2 .122
23 Tobacco P ro d u c ts 0.625 0.652 0.679
25 Cot ton  Yarn -0.533 -0 .485 -0 .437
27 Cot ton  T e x t i l e s  (Large Scale) -0.361 -0 .295 -0 .230
28 Cot ton  T e x t i l e s  (Small Sca le) 0.139 0 .184 0.228
31 T h r e a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s -0 .344 -0 .299 -0 .250
32 C arp e t s  & Rugs 0 .154 0.222 0.290
33 Made-up Garments 0 .184 0.225 0.266
34 Footwear (Non-rubber) -0 .029 0.038 0.104
38 L e a th e r  & P roduc ts 0 .404 0.421 0.438
39 Rubber Footwear 0 .180 0 .264 0.349
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42 F e r t i l i z e r 0.397 0.432 0.468
44 P a i n t s  & Varni  shes 0.116 0.169 0.224
45 Soaps & D e te rg e n t s 0.103 0.136 0.171
47 P l a s t i c  P ro d u c t s 0.102 0.180 0.260
49 Cement 0.133 0.198 0.264
50 Glass  & P ro d u c ts -1.619 -1 .455 -1 .279
51 Non-metal Minera l  P ro d u c ts 0.023 0.071 0.120
52 B as ic  Metals -0 .079 -0 .033 0.017
53 Metal P ro d u c ts -0 .036 0.057 0.154
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 0.066 0 .094 0.122
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0.109 0 .160 0.212
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery 0.002 0.043 0.084
63 S p o r t s  Goods 0.097 0.141 0.185
64 S u rg ic a l  In s t ru m e n t s 0.333 0.401 0.469
65 Other Large S ca l e  Manufac turing 0.468 0 .524 0.580
Note: See no te  to Table  A5.2.
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Table A5.7
Imported Accounting R a t io s  : Case B
ACF = 1.2 :
S ec to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
01 Wheat 1.418 1.404 1.390
05 Tobacco Growing 0.776 0 .760 0.743
06 011 seeds 0.752 0.737 0.722
08 Other Crops 0.616 0.599 0.583
09 L iv e s to c k 1.000 0.992 0.985
12 Mining & Quarry ing 0.976 0 .962 0.948
15 E d ib le  O i l s 0.993 0.978 0.962
22 Beverages 0.245 0 .214 0.184
31 T h re a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s 0 .692 0 .670 0.647
42 F e r t i l i z e r 1.583 1.558 1.532
44 P a i n t s  & Varn ishes 0 .820 0.802 0.785
45 Soaps & D e te rg e n ts 1.000 0.983 0.966
47 P l a s t i c  P roduc ts 0.957 0.943 0.929
50 Glass  & P roduc ts 0.415 0.401 0.387
51 Non-metal Mineral  Products 1.000 0.988 0.975
52 Bas ic  Metals 0 .830 0.804 0.777
53 Metal P roduc ts 0.938 0.916 0.894
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 1.002 0.991 0.979
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0.878 0.868 0.857
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery 0.851 0.842 0.832
= 1 .0:
S ec to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
01 Wheat 1.415 1.401 1.386
05 Tobacco Growing 0.773 0.757 0.740
06 O i1 seeds 0.750 0.734 0.719
08 Other Crops 0.613 0.596 0.580
09 L iv e s to c k 0.998 0.991 0.984
12 Mining & Quarrying 0.972 0.959 0.945
15 E d ib le  O i l s 0 .990 0.975 0.960
22 Beverages 0.238 0.208 0.178
31 T h r e a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s 0.688 0.666 0.643
42 F e r t i 1i z e r 1.574 1.548 1.522
44 P a i n t s  & Varni shes 0.816 0.799 0.781
45 Soaps & D e te rgen ts 0.997 0.979 0.962
47 P l a s t i c  P roduc ts 0 .954 0 .940 0.926
50 Glass  & Produc ts 0.412 0.398 0.384
51 Non-metal Mineral Produc ts 0 .996 0.984 0.971
52 Bas ic  Metals 0.824 0.797 0.770
53 Metal P roduc ts 0.933 0.911 0.889
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 0.998 0.987 0.976
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0 .874 0 .864 0.854
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery 0.847 0.838 0.828
346
ACF = 0 . 8 :
S e c to r  WCF = 1.40 1.15 0 .90
01 Wheat 1.412 1.397 1.383
05 Tobacco Growing 0 .770 0.754 0.737
06 011 seeds 0 .747 0.732 0.716
08 Other Crops 0 .610 0.593 0.577
09 L iv e s to c k 0.996 0.989 0.982
12 Mining & Quarrying 0.969 0.955 0.942
15 E d ib le  O i ls 0 .988 0.972 0.957
22 Beverages 0 .232 0.202 0.171
31 T h re a d b a l l s  and Other T e x t i l e s 0 .684 0.661 0.639
42 F e r t i l i z e r 1.564 1.538 1.512
44 P a i n t s  & V arn ishes 0.813 0.795 0.778
45 Soaps & D e te rg e n t s 0.993 0.976 0.959
47 P l a s t i c  P roduc ts 0.951 0.937 0.923
50 Glass  & Produc ts 0 .409 0.395 0.381
51 Non-metal Mineral  P roduc ts 0 .992 0.979 0.967
52 Bas ic  Metals 0 .818 0.791 0.764
53 Metal P roduc ts 0 .928 0.906 0.884
55 A g r i c u l t u r a l  Machinery 0 .994 0.983 0.972
56 Other N o n - e l e c t r i c a l  Machinery 0.871 0.861 0.851
57 E l e c t r i c  Machinery 0 .843 0.833 0.824
Note: See no te  to Table  A5.2.
Table A6.1
Account ing R a t io s  for  Var ious  rwCF.ACF) Combinations
Commodi ty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1) Wheat 1.416 1.402 1.388 1.413 1.399 1.386 1.411 1.397 1.383
2) At t a  (M) 1.430 1.402 1.375 1.404 1.377 1.349 1.378 1.351 1.323
3) Rice (P) 2.510 2.510 2.510 2 .510 2.510 2 .510 2.510 2.510 2.510
4) Rice (M) 2.132 2.100 2.068 2.103 2.071 2.039 2.075 2.042 2.010
5) Sugarcane 1.170 1.054 0.937 1.158 1.042 0.925 1.147 1.030 0.914
6) Cotton 2.420 2.420 2.420 2 .420 2.420 2.420 2.420 2.420 2.420
7) F e r t i l i z e r 1.577 1.553 1.529 1.569 1.544 1.520 1.560 1.536 1.512
8) Sugar (M) 0.682 0.667 0.651 0 .680 0.664 0.648 0.677 0.661 0.645
9) Pul ses 1.090 1.031 0.971 1.077 1.017 0.958 1.064 1.004 0.944
10 Maize 0 .614 0.598 0.582 0.612 0.595 0 .579 0.609 0.593 0.576
11 Meat 1.004 0.997 0.991 1.002 0.996 0 .989 1.001 0.995 0.988
12 Milk 0.998 0.991 0.985 0.997 0.990 0.983 0.996 0.989 0.982
13 V e g . , F r u i t  & S p ices 0 .614 0.598 0.582 0.612 0.595 0.579 0.609 0.593 0.576
14 E d ib le  O i l s 0.985 0.970 0.955 0.982 0.967 0.952 0 .980 0.965 0.950
15 Tea 0.965 0.959 0.952 0.964 0.957 0.951 0.963 0.956 0.950
16 Housing,Fuel& Ligh t 1.109 1.024 0.939 1.071 0.986 0.901 1.034 0,949 0.864
17 C lo th in g 1.273 1.266 1.258 1.268 1.260 1.252 1.262 1.254 1.247
18 Other  Foods 1.007 0.977 0.947 1.002 0.972 0.942 0 .997 0.967 0.937
19 Other Non-Foods 1.020 0.925 0.829 0.990 0.895 0.799 0 .960 0.865 0.769
20 Labour 1.400 1.150 0.900 1.400 1.150 0.900 1.400 1.150 0 .900
21 C a p i t a l 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.800 0.800 0 .800
e: Column numbers 1-9 c o r re spond  to (WCF,ACF) combinat ions  g iven  by rows 20-21.
u>
No
Source:  Chapter  5,
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Table A6.2
Income D i s t r i b u t i o n  and Welfare  Weights
Tal Actual  P r i c e s :
Income Group No. o f % of Cuml. Average
(Annual per  c a p i t a ) Households Tota l % Expendi t u r e B
(1) Less than 700 54 5 .5 5 .5 572.33 1.00
(2) 700 to 900 76 7 .7 13.2 816.50 0 .70
(3) 900 to 1100 88 8 .9 22.1 1004.48 0 .57
(4) 1100 to 1400 156 15.8 37 .9 1243.99 0 .46
(5) 1400 to 2000 250 25.3 63 .2 1688.18 0 .34
(6) 2000 to 2600 146 14.8 78 .0 2273.76 0.25
(7) 2600 to 3200 87 8.8 86.8 2865.61 0 .20
(8) 3200 to 4000 60 6.1 92 .9 3603.73 0 .16
(9) 4000 to 5200 40 4.1 97 .0 4529.49 0.13
(10) Over 5200 30 3 .0 100.0 8201.34 0 .07
t b l  C o r re c t e d  P r i c e s :
Income Group No. o f % o f Cuml Average
(Annual per  c a p i t a ) Households Total % Expendi t u r e B
(1) Less than 700 51 5 .2 5 .2 572.33 1.00
(2) 700 to 900 65 6 .6 11.8 807.21 0.71
(3) 900 to 1100 94 9 .5 21 .3 1000.98 0 .57
(4) 1100 to 1400 152 15.4 36 .7 1242.72 0 .46
(5) 1400 to 2000 256 25 .9 62 .6 1685.83 0 .34
(6) 2000 to 2600 148 15.0 77 .6 2273.07 0 .25
(7) 2600 to 3200 86 8 .7 86.3 2861.68 0 .2 0
(8) 3200 to 4000 66 6 .7 93 .0 3605.26 0 .16
(9) 4000 to 5200 39 4 . 0 97 .0 4558.09 0 .12
(10) Over 5200 30 3 .0 100.0 8277.55 0 .07
Source :  Government o f  P a k i s t a n  (1979) .
Table A6.3a
Net Trade E l a s t i c i t i e s
Wheat Atlta(M) Atta (R ) Ri ce S ’cane Cotton Fei t ’ r Sugar(M) Sugar(R) Pul se
Wheat 2,,350 0,,000 0.,000 0. 224 -0,,015 -0,,421 -1.,364 0,,013 0.,007 0.,010
Atta(M) 0,,000 -0,,277 -0. 012 -0. 005 0.,000 0,,000 0,,000 -0.,008 -0.,009 -0.,004
Rice(P) 0,,641 0,,000 0. 000 1. 920 0,,000 -0,,462 -1.,702 0.,000 0.,000 0.,000
Rice(M) -0,,005 -0,,019 -0. 012 -0. 768 0,,011 0,,029 -0,,028 -0,,009 -0.,003 -0,,011
S ’cane -0,,090 0,,000 0.,000 -0. 129 4.,383 -0,,652 -1.,742 0,,000 0.,000 0,,026
Cotton 0,,000 0.,000 0..000 -0. 616 0,,000 1,,339 -0,,722 0,,000 0,,000 0,,000
F e r t ’ r 0.,640 0,,000 0.,000 0. 350 0.,200 0,,370 -1.,239 0,,000 0,,000 0,,000
S u g a r (M) -0,,053 -0,,012 -0. 006 0. 017 0.,014 0,,015 -0,,043 -0.,549 -0,,009 -0,,008
P u ls e s -0.,010 -0.,008 -0. 004 0. 009 0,,007 0,,015 -0,,023 -0,,006 -0.,007 -0,,398
Maize -0,,010 -0,,008 -0. 004 0, 009 0,,007 0,,015 -0,,023 -0,,006 -0,,007 -0,,006
Meat -0.,029 -0,,040 -0. 019 -0. 007 0,,021 0,,042 -0,,065 -0,,031 -0,,033 -0,,019
Milk -0,,021 -0,,025 -0, 012 0. 016 0.,015 0,,030 -0,,047 -0,,015 -0,,017 -0,,012
V e t g e t . -0.,026 -0.,029 -0. 014 0. 020 0,,018 0,,037 -0,,057 -0,,022 -0.,025 -0 ,015
EdOil -0,,017 -0,,026 -0.,013 0, 013 0 ,012 0,,026 -0.,038 -0,,016 -0 ,018 -0.,011
Tea -0,,010 -0,,022 -0, Oil 0. 005 0,,007 0,,014 -0,,022 -0.,013 -0,,014 -0 .008
Housing -0,,024 -0,,027 -0.,017 0. 018 0,,016 0 ,034 -0,,053 -0.,024 -0 ,026 -0 .014
C lo th in g -0,,019 -0,,025 -0,,012 0. 014 0.,013 0,,027 -0.,042 -0 ,017 -0 .019 -0 .007
0 th .F ood -0,,015 -0,,027 -0.,013 0. 009 0.,010 0,,022 -0.,033 -0.,014 -0.,015 -0 .011
0 th ,  NF -0.,032 -0,,038 -0.,021 0. 025 0.,023 0,,046 -0,,072 -0.,030 -0 .033 -0 .019
Labour -0,,258 0,,000 0.,000 -0. 147 -0,,169 -0,,219 0.,114 0 ,000 0 .000 0 .000
U)
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Table  A6.3a con t inued :
Maize Meat Milk Veget EdOil Tea Housing C lo th in g OthFd OthNF
Wheat 0 .010 -0.008 0.012 -0.008 0.018 0.008 -0.001 0.024 0.020 -0 .044
Atta(M) -0 .004 0.003 -0 .010 -0 .005 -0 .006 -0.002 -0 .004 -0 .009 -0 .002 0.006
R ice(P) 0 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rice(M) -0.011 0.009 -0.018 -0.001 -0 .017 -0.007 -0 .004 -0.023 -0 .012 0.029
S ’ cane 0 .026 -0.023 0.026 -0.021 0.042 0.023 -0 .002 0.054 0.047 -0 .100
C ot ton 0 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 .000
F e r t ’ r 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 .000
Sugar(M) -0.008 0.006 -0 .014 -0.001 -0.012 -0.005 -0.003 -0 .017 -0 .009 0.021
Pul ses -0 .006 0.004 -0.008 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 -0 .002 -0.011 -0 .006 0.015
Maize -0.398 0.004 -0.008 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 -0.002 -0.011 -0 .006 0.015
Meat -0 .019 -1.123 -0 .040 -0 .012 -0 .029 -0.011 -0.012 -0.043 -0 .015 0.041
Milk -0 .012 0 .010 -0.857 -0.001 -0.019 -0.008 -0.005 -0 .027 -0 .014 0.034
V e g e t . -0 .015 0.012 -0 .030 -0.955 -0.023 -0.009 -0.008 -0 .033 -0 .013 0.034
EdOil -0.011 0 .010 -0 .022 -0 .004 -0.788 -0.007 -0 .009 -0 .025 -0.011 0.028
Tea -0.008 0.006 -0.018 -0.005 -0.013 -0.569 -0.005 -0 .019 -0 .007 0.018
Housing -0 .014 0.011 -0.031 -0.011 -0.021 -0.007 -0 .882 -0.031 -0 .009 0.027
C lo th in g -0 .007 0 .010 -0.023 -0 .004 -0 .019 -0.007 -0 .006 -0 .797 -0 .018 0.029
0 t h .  Fd. -0.011 0.009 -0.019 -0 .002 -0.017 -0.007 -0.005 -0.023 -0 .745 0.028
0 t h .  NF -0 .019 0.015 -0.039 -0 .010 -0 .030 -0.011 -0 .012 -0.043 -0 .017 -1.161
Labour 0 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LOLno
Note:  These e l a s t i c i t i e s  were c a l c u l a t e d  u s in g  demand e l a s t i c i t i e s  from Ahmad and Ludlow (1987) .
Wheat
Atta(M)
Ric e(P)
Rice(M)
S ’cane
Cotton
F e r t ’ r
Sugar(M)
Meat
Milk
EdOils
OthFd
OthNF
Labour
Wheat
2.740
0.000
0.641
0 .366
•0.559
0.000
0.640
0 .099
•0.082
0.039
0.122
0.017
•0.034
•0.258
Atta(M)
0.000
-0 .690
0.000
0 .427
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.031
-0 .097
-0 .035
0 .044
0 .044
-0 .026
0.000
A tta (R )  Rice 
0 .000  0.001 
0.015 0 .220
0.000  1.920
•0.012 -1 .650  
0 .000  -0 .830  
0 .000 -0 .616 
0 .000 0 .350  
0.008 0.252
0.012  0.142
0.013 -0 .029  
0 .006  0.149
0.008 -0 .016 
0.008 0 .010  
0 .000  -0 .147
Table A6.3b
Net Trade E l a s t i c i t i e s  
S ’cane Cot ton  F e r t ’ r Sugr(M) Sugr(R) Meat Milk E d o i l s  OthFd OthNF 
-0 .153 -0 .426 -1 .359 -0 .086  0.008  0 .180  -0 .240  -0 .180  -0 .030  0 .240
0.000 0 .000 0 .000 -0 .020  -0 .012  -0 .100  -0 .030  0 .050  0 .130  0 .040
0.000  -0 .462 -1 .702  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000
0.054  0 .019  -0 .019  0 .084  -0 .008 0 .290  -0 .270  0 .300  -0 .200  -0 .030
4.152 -0 .627 -1 .767  0 .000  0 .000  -0 .419  -0 .233 1.020 -0 .233 2 .959
0.000 1.339 -0 .722 0 .000  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000
0.200 0 .370  -1 .239 0 .000 0 .000  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000
0.012 0.013 -0 .037 -0 .420  -0.015 0 .015 0 .035 -0 .275  -0 .155  -0 .280
0.033 0.031 -0 .047  0.020 -0 .020  -0 .465 0 .050  0 .050  0 .085  -0 .700
0.016 0.029  -0.045 -0 .005  -0 .020  0 .040  -1 .000  0 .010  -0 .005 0.035
-0 .032  0 .012 -0 .018  -0 .180  -0 .009 0 .070  0.105 -1 .555 0 .000  0 .785
0.012  0.017 -0 .026 -0 .045 -0 .012 0 .040  0 .040  -0 .015 -0 .370  -0 .245
-0 .003 0 .017 -0 .026 -0 .035  -0 .012  -0 .060  -0 .015  -0 .025 -0 .110  -0 .825
-0 .169 -0 .219 0 .114 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000  0 .000  0 .000  0 .000
OJ
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Note: These e l a s t i c i t i e s  were c a l c u l a t e d  u s in g  demand e l s a t i c i t i e s  from Deaton (1991) .
fa)  Lambdas: 
Commodi ty WCF=
Table A6.4
Lambdas and Ranks for  Var ious  tWCF.ACF^ Combinations
1.4
ACF=1.2
1.15 . 0 Æ
ACF=1.0
1.15 0 . 9
ACF=0.8
1.15 0 . 9
(1) Wheat -0 278 -0 285 -0 291 -0 280 -0 286 -0 293 -0 281 -0 288 -0 295
(2) A t t a  (M) 0 900 0 937 0 977 0 915 0 953 0 994 0 930 0 969 1 012
(3) A t t a  (R) 0 993 1 020 1 049 1 002 1 029 1 058 1 010 1 038 1 067
(4) Rice -0 225 -0 225 -0 225 -0 225 -0 226 -0 226 -0 226 -0 226 -0 227
(5) Sugarcane 0 224 0 348 0 772 0 261 0 443 1 473 0 310 0 609 16 148
(6) Cotton 0 745 0 753 0 761 0 744 0 752 0 760 0 744 0 752 0 760
(7) F e r t i 1i z e r -0 119 -0 115 -0 112 -0 118 -0 114 -0 110 -0 116 -0 113 -0 109
(8) Sugar (M) 1 216 1 263 1 313 1 228 1 276 1 327 1 241 1 289 1 342
(9) Sugar (R) 1 016 1 041 1 068 1 023 1 049 1 076 1 031 1 057 1 085
(10 Pul ses 0 982 1 029 1 081 0 993 1 042 1 095 1 005 1 055 1 109
(11 Maize 1 185 1 203 1 222 1 189 1 208 1 227 1 193 1 212 1 231
(12 Meat 0 995 0 998 1 001 0 995 0 998 1 002 0 995 0 998 1 002
(13 Milk 1 005 1 023 1 042 1 010 1 028 1 047 1 015 1 033 1 052
(14 V e g . , F r u i t  & Sp ices 1 577 1 621 1 668 1 586 1 630 1 677 1 594 1 639 1 686
(15 E d ib le  O i l s 1 045 1 197 1 401 1 084 1 248 1 471 1 126 1 304 1 549
(16 Tea 1 027 1 048 1 069 1 032 1 053 1 074 1 038 1 059 1 080
(17 Housing ,Fuel  & Ligh t 0 914 0 987 1 072 0 944 1 022 1 113 0 976 1 059 1 .157
(18 C lo th in g 0 828 0 838 0 849 0 833 0 843 0 854 0 838 0 848 0 .859
(19 Other Foods 0 995 1 018 1 043 0 998 1 022 1 047 1 002 1 026 1 .052
(20 Other Non-foods 0 974 1 088 1 232 1 007 1 130 1 287 1 .043 1 176 1 .346
( j jUlM
rb) Ranks : 
Commodi ty WCF=
ACF=1.2
1.4  1.15 0 .9 1.4
ACF=1.0 
1.15 0 .9
(1) Wheat 3 3 3 3 3 3
(2) A t t a  (M) 7 7 7 7 7 6
(3) A t t a  (R) 11 11 11 12 12 10
(4) Rice 2 2 2 2 2 2
(5) Sugarcane 4 4 5 4 4 19
(6) C o t ton 5 5 4 5 5 4
(7) F e r t i l i z e r 1 1 1 1 1 1
(8) Sugar (M) 19 19 18 19 19 17
(9) Sugar (R) 15 14 12 15 14 12
(10) P u l s e s 10 13 15 9 13 13
(11) Maize 18 18 16 18 17 15
(12) Meat 13 9 8 10 8 7
(13) Milk 14 12 9 14 11 8
(14) V e g . , F r u i t  & Spices 20 20 20 20 20 20
(15) E d ib le  O i l s 17 17 19 17 18 18
(16) Tea 16 15 13 16 15 11
(17) Housing ,Fuel  & Ligh t 8 8 14 8 9 14
(18) C lo th in g 6 6 6 6 6 5
(19) Other  Foods 12 10 10 11 10 9
(20) Other Non-foods 9 16 17 13 16 16
: Net labour  supp ly  r e sponses are assumed to be ze ro . See no te to Tab les  6
ACF=0.8
1.4 1.15 0 .9
3 3 3
7 7 7
12 11 10
2 2 2
4 4 20
5 5 4
1 1 1
19 18 16
14 13 12
11 12 13
18 17 15
9 8 6
13 10 9
20 20 19
17 19 18
15 14 11
8 15 14
6 6 5
10 9 8
16 16 17
U)
Lnu>
fa)  Lambdas: 
Commodi ty
Table A6.5
Lambdas and Ranks fo r  Var ious  tWCF.ACF) Combinations
ACF=1.2 ACF=1.0 ACF=0■8
WCF= 1.4 1.15 0 Æ 1.4 _ U 5 . 0 .9 1.4 1.15 0 .9
1) Wheat -0 482 -0 340 -0 262 -0 487 -0 342 -0 264 -0 492 -0 345 -0 265
2) A t t a  (M) 0 900 0 937 0 977 0 915 0 953 0 994 0 930 0 969 1 012
3) A t t a  (R) 0 993 1 020 1 049 1 002 1 029 1 058 1 010 1 038 1 067
4) Rice -0 245 -0 232 -0 221 -0 246 -0 233 -0 221 -0 247 -0 234 -0 222
5) Sugarcane 0 140 0 258 1 590 0 154 0 307 81 128 0 170 0 379 -1 654
6) C ot ton 0 446 0 600 0 918 0 446 0 600 0 917 0 446 0 600 0 916
7) F e r t i 1i z e r -0 128 -0 118 -0 110 -0 126 -0 117 -0 109 -0 124 -0 115 -0 107
8) Sugar (M) 1 216 1 263 1 313 1 228 1 276 1 327 1 241 1 289 1 342
9) Sugar (R) 1 016 1 041 1 068 1 023 1 049 1 076 1 031 1 057 1 085
10 Pul ses 0 982 1 029 1 081 0 993 1 042 1 095 1 005 1 055 1 109
11 Maize 1 185 1 203 1 222 1 189 1 208 1 227 1 193 1 212 1 231
12 Meat 0 995 0 998 1 001 0 995 0 998 1 002 0 995 0 998 1 002
13 Milk 1 005 1 023 1 042 1 010 1 028 1 047 1 015 1 033 1 052
14 V e g . , F r u i t  & Sp ices 1 577 1 621 1 668 1 586 1 630 1 677 1 594 1 639 1 .686
15 E d i b le  O i l s 1 045 1 197 1 401 1 084 1 248 1 471 1 126 1 304 1 .549
16 Tea 1 027 1 048 1 069 1 032 1 053 1 074 1 038 1 059 1 .080
17 H ousing ,Fuel  & Ligh t 0 914 0 987 1 072 0 944 1 022 1 113 0 976 1 059 1 .157
18 C lo th in g 0 828 0 838 0 849 0 833 0 843 0 854 0 838 0 848 0 .859
19 Other  Foods 0 995 1 018 1 043 0 998 1 022 1 .047 1 .002 1 026 1 .052
20 Other Non-foods 0 974 1 088 1 .232 1 007 1 130 1 .287 1 .043 1 .176 1 .346
u>ui
cs :
ACF=1.2 ACF=1.0
'
ACF=0.8
Commodity WCF= 1.4 1.15 0 .9 1 .4 1.15 0 .9 1.4 1.15 0 .9
(1) Wheat 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
(2) A t t a  (M) 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 7 8
(3) A t t a  (R) 11 11 10 12 12 10 12 11 11
(4) Rice 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
(5) Sugarcane 4 4 19 4 4 20 4 4 4
(6) Cot ton 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6
(7) F e r t i l i z e r 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(8) Sugar (M) 19 19 17 19 19 17 19 18 17
(9) Sugar (R) 15 14 11 15 14 12 14 13 13
(10) P u l s e s 10 13 14 9 13 13 11 12 14
(11) Maize 18 18 15 18 17 15 18 17 16
(12) Meat 13 9 7 10 8 7 9 8 7
(13) Milk 14 12 8 14 11 8 13 10 10
(14) V e g . , F r u i t  & Sp ices 20 20 20 20 20 19 20 20 20
(15) E d ib le  O i l s 17 17 18 17 18 18 17 19 19
(16) Tea 16 15 12 16 15 11 15 14 12
(17) H ousing ,Fuel  & Ligh t 8 8 13 8 9 14 8 15 15
(18) C lo th in g 6 6 4 6 6 4 6 6 5
(19) Other Foods 12 10 9 11 10 9 10 9 9
(20) Other Non-foods 9 16 16 13 16 16 16 16 18
(JJLn
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Note:  Net labour  supply  re sponses  a re  not  assumed to be z e ro .  See n o te s  to Tab les  6 . 4  and 6 .5 .
Table A6.6
Commodi ty e=0
Lambdas for  Var ious  Values o f  c 
6=0.5 €=1 ,0 6=2 0 6=5 0
X R X R X R X R X R
1) Wheat -0.278 3 0.035 3 0.114 3 0.110 10 0.048 16
2) A t t a  (M) 0.897 7 0.521 13 0.322 13 0.149 16 0.050 17
3) A t t a  (R) 0.991 11 0.593 18 0.385 18 0.199 20 0.081 19
4) Rice -0.225 2 -0.113 2 -0.058 2 -0 .016 2 0.001 2
5) Sugarcane 0.763 5 0.400 5 0.224 5 0.083 3 0.010 3
6) C o t ton 0.676 4 0.361 4 0.215 4 0.102 7 0.044 13
7) F e r t i l i z e r -0.138 1 -0.072 1 -0 .040 1 -0 .015 1 -0 .003 1
8) Sugar (M) 1.114 18 0.589 16 0.339 15 0.141 13 0.033 11
9) Sugar (R) 1.012 15 0.589 17 0.373 17 0.188 18 0.079 18
10) P u l s e s 0 .974 10 0.539 14 0.323 14 0.144 15 0.045 14
11) Maize 1.182 19 0.659 19 0.400 19 0.194 19 0 .097 20
12) Meat 0.995 12 0.498 9 0.272 10 0.102 8 0.021 6
13) Milk 1.001 14 0.517 11 0.289 11 0.111 11 0.024 8
14) V e g . , F r u i t  & Spices 1.575 20 0.815 20 0.459 20 0.183 17 0.047 15
15) E d ib le  O i l s 1.001 13 0.517 12 0.290 12 0.113 12 0.026 9
16) Tea 1.097 17 0.586 15 0.340 16 0.143 14 0.037 12
17) H ousing ,Fuel  & Ligh t 0.905 8 0.465 7 0.261 8 0.106 9 0.031 10
18) C lo th in g 0.784 6 0.411 6 0.232 6 0.092 5 0 .024 7
19) Other Foods 1.025 16 0.509 10 0.271 9 0.095 6 0.016 4
20) Other Non-foods 0.953 9 0.469 8 0.251 7 0.091 4 0 .020 5
Note : These r e s u l t s  use  an a l t e r n a t i v e  s e t  o f  shadow p r i c e s  which assume a d i f f e r e n t  method fo r  r e s t o r i n g  
e q u i l i b r i u m  a f t e r  a p r i c e  re form,  i . e .  fo r  some commodit ies  marg ina l  changes in  ne t  demand a re  met th rough  
i n c r e a s e d  p r o d u c t i o n  i n s t e a d  o f  changing ne t  e x p o r t s .  These shadow p r i c e s  co r re s p o n d  to  Case B in  Chapter  5.
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